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http://www.archive.org/details/foundingofspanisOOchaprich 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK   •    BOSTON  •    CHICAGO  •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


Antonio  Maria  Bucarely  y  Ursua,  Viceroy  of  New  Spain, 
1771-1779. 

From  M.  Rivera  Cambas,  Los  gobemantes  de  Mexico,  Vol.  I,  opposite  page  422. 


THE   FOUNDING 

OF 

SPANISH   CALIFORNIA 


THE   NORTHWESTWARD  EXPANSION 
OF   NEW   SPAIN,  1687-1783 


BT 


CHARLES   EDWARD   CHAPMAN,  Ph.D. 

ASSISTANT   PROFESSOR   OF    HISTORY    IN    THE 
UNIVERSITY    OF    CALIFORNIA 


Netn  gorft 

THE   MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

1916 

All  rights  reserved 


OOPTEIOHT,    1916, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  printed.     Published  June,  1916. 


NorfaootJ  5Preg8 

J.  8.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &.  Smith  Oo. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


6V 


PREFACE 

The  present  study  owes  its  form  to  two  principal  ideas, 
which  seem  at  first  sight  only  distantly  related,  but  which 
in  fact  merge  into  one.  In  the  first  place,  I  have  endeavored 
to  trace  those  influences  that  were  at  work  prior  to  the 
nineteenth  century  whose  tendency  was  to  preserve  Alta 
(or  American)  California,  perhaps  also  Oregon  and  Wash- 
ington, for  ultimate  acquisition  by  the  United  States. 
In  the  second  place,  I  have  aimed  to  give  in  detail  an  account 
of  a  Spanish  experiment  in  colonization,  although  the 
narrative  is  limited  to  a  comparatively  brief  span  of  years, 
and  is  still  further  narrowed  in  scope  by  treatment  from  the 
standpoint  of  governmental  interest,  rather  than  from  that 
of  events  or  experiences  in  the  lands  referred  to.  The 
problem  of  colonizing  the  Californias  (considered  as  ex- 
tending from  Cape  San  Lucas  indefinitely  northward)  was 
one  of  such  extreme  difficulty  that  it  was  manifestly  impos- 
sible of  successful  accomplishment  without  an  extraordinary 
effort  on  the  part  of  those  attempting  it.  After  permanent 
establishments  had  been  formed  by  the  Spaniards  in  Alta 
California,  a  still  more  extraordinary  effort  would  have 
been  required  to  develop  them  into  a  populous  province. 
Nothing  but  a  sequence  of  fortunate  events  —  such  as 
discoveries  or  inventions  that  would  have  helped  to  over- 
come the  difficulties  of  communication,  and  the  finding  of 
gold,  which  would  have  made  the  region  attractive  to  set- 
tlers —  could  have  enabled  Spain  to  achieve  the  establish- 
ment of  strong  colonies  in  Alta  CaKfornia  without  great 
expenditure  of  treasure  and  of  effort.  Noteworthy  inven- 
tions facilitating  communication,  and  consequent  growth 
of  population,  were  not  to  come,  however,  until  well  into 
the  nineteenth  century,  while  the  discovery  of  gold  was 


MSi^'^'as 


Vi  PREFACE 

almost  certainly  destined  to  come  only  as  a  result  of  an 
increased  population,  before  it  could  become  in  turn  a  cause 
for  yet  further  growth.  Gold  lay  back  from  the  coast,  up 
the  river  valleys,  whereas  the  early  settlements  were  founded, 
as  it  was  natural  they  should  have  been,  in  a  narrow  strip 
along  the  coast.  Until  population  should  become  great 
enough  to  induce  men  to  seek  new  lands  in  the  interior,  the 
gold  was  likely  to  remain  undiscovered.  These  considera- 
tions make  it  clear  that  the  two  ideas  above  referred  to  are 
in  reality,  as  stated,  only  different  aspects  of  one  idea :  the 
difficulties  of  colonization  from  the  Pacific  were  so  great 
that  in  the  absence  of  exceptional  exertions  by  Spain,  or 
in  default  of  fortuitous  events  extraordinarily  favorable 
to  her,  the  era  of  populous  settlement  was  inevitably  post- 
poned until  the  way  to  CaHfornia  was  opened  to  colonists 
from  across  the  continent. 

This  will  appear  more  clearly  if  we  consider  for  a  mo- 
ment the  difficulties  that  lay  in  the  way  of  colonization  from 
.the  Pacific.  The  Calif ornia^jyeraJifiB-rly  the  farthest  from 
western  Europe  of  any  of  the  lands  of  the  earth.  Merely 
to  reach^the  Pacific'fequired'X'voyarge  o  length. 

Once  there,  the  storms  of  that  ill-named  ocean  iiad  to  be 
encountered ;  and  especially  ^as  This"  the  case  for  the  voy- 
age northward  from  Cape  San  Lucas.  Furthermore,  there 
was  the  danger  of  uncharted  seas  and  little  known  shores ; 
nautical  information  was  not  at  all  what  it  is  to-day ;  ships' 
crews  and  officers  were  often  of  an  inferior  character; 
pirates  not  infrequently  lay  in  wait ;  and  ships  themselves 
were  small  and  frail.  Other  difficulties,  which  arose  from 
the  nature  of  the  land  and  inhabitants  of  the  Californias, 
combined  with  the  preceding  to  deprive  these  of  communi- 
cation with  the  outer  world  by  sea.  The  Indians  of  that 
region  were  on  such  a  low  plane  of  culture  that  they  had 
almost  nothing  which  could  serve  the  needs  of  white  men. 
The  food  products  which  California  now  yields  in  such 
abundance  did  not  exist  in  any  part  of  the  Californias  when 
the  early  voyagers  came  there.  Not  only  were  there  no 
agricultural  products  capable  of   sustaining  a  white  popu- 


PREFACE  vii 

lation,  but  there  were  no  domestic  animals,  and  none  of 
the  utensils  required  by  civilized  men,  wherefore  every- 
thing that  was  needed  had  to  be  brought  from  without. 
Supplies  inevitably  dwindled,  and  this  precluded  a  long 
stay  by  the  early  explorers.  What  was  perhaps  worse,  was 
that  the  sailors  contracted  scurvy,  owing  to  a  lack  of  fresh 
supplies,  and  died  in  such  numbers  that  it  was  rare  indeed 
when  a  vessel  could  return  to  Europe  from  a  voyage  to 
the  Pacific  with  as  many  as  half  its  original  crew.  Even 
the  short  voyage  along  the  peninsula  of  Baja  California 
was  in  many  cases  equally  fatal.  Finally,  although  men 
could  in  some  cases  overcome  extraordinary  difficulties  and 
reach  the  Cahfornias,  they  did  not  at  first  bring  women 
with  them,  and  therefore  any  establishments  they  formed 
lacked  for  a  time  a  very  necessary  element  of  permanence. 

From  this  review  it  is  evident  that  a  base  of  supplies, 
near  at  hand,  was  required,  if  settlement  of  the  Califomias 
under  normal  conditions,  without  the  influence  of  unusual 
forces,  was  to  be  reaHzed.  This  meant  that  colonists  who 
approached  by  land,  maintaining  communication  with  well- 
settled  communities  behind  them,  would  have  the^  best 
chagce^of^axK^Qiiring  the  Califomias.  This  narrowed"  the 
contest  to  the  Spanish,  English,  French,  and  Russians. 
The  French  were  ousted  by  the  English  in  1763,  and  the 
English  advance  towards  the  Pacific  broke  into  two  col- 
umns with  the  establishment  of  the  independence  of  the 
United  States.  Curiously  enough  these  four  peoples  suc- 
ceeded in  acquiring  portions  of  the  Californias,  although 
the  Spanish  part  was  cut  down  to  Baja  CaHfornia,  after 
Mexico  had  succeeded  to  Spain^s  claim,  and  the  Russians 
voluntarily  withdrew,  after  the  sale  of  Alaska  to  the  United 
States. 

It  was  thus  that  matters  ultimately  worked  out ;  but 
there  was  at  least  one  diversion  from  the  normal  progress 
of  events.  That  was  due  to  an  extraordinary  effort  on  the 
part  of  Spain,  as  a  result  of  which  Alta  California  was  oc- 
cupied by  the  Spaniards  in  1769,  and  so  developed,  in  the 
face  of  such  difficulties  as  have  been  named,  that  by  the 


vm  PREFACE 

founding  of  San  Francisco  in  1776  the  Spanish  settlements 
were  rescued  from  impending  failure  and  placed  on  a  per- 
manent basis.  The  leading  names  associated,  respectively, 
with  these  great  achievements  are  those  of  the  visitador 
Gdlvez  and  the  viceroy  Bucarely.  Their  work  proved  to 
be  a  piece  of  extreme  good  fortune  for  the  United  States. 
At  a  time  when  the  Russians  and  English,  particularly  the 
latter,  were  pressing  onward  with  a  prospect  of  setthng 
Alta  California,  it  enabled  the  land  to  be  held  temporarily 
by  Spain  and  Mexico,  until  the  American  movement  ac- 
quired the  impetus  that  carried  it  to  the  Pacific  coast  in 
the  early  forties  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Spain's  capacity  for  great  effort  in  Alta  California  seemed 
likely  to  continue.  Bucarely  had  plans  under  way,  the 
successful  accomplishment  of  which  would  have  advanced 
the  colonies  far  beyond  the  stage  of  mere  permanence  into 
that  of  populous  development.  And  here,  indeed,  was 
danger  to  the  future  prospects  of  the  United  States;  for 
a  populous  development  of  Alta  CaUfornia  must  almost 
certainly  have  involved  discovery  of  gold,  and  a  consequent 
haste  of  settlement  before  the  United  States  could  have  been 
ready  to  make  good  her  interests  in  the  region.  It  is  well 
to  bear  in  mind,  too,  that  the  Spaniards  have  been  among 
the  most  expert  seekers  of  precious  metals  in  the  history 
of  modern  times ;  the  rush  of  miners  to  Arizonac  and  Ciene- 
guilla,  referred  to  in  this  volume,  shows  what  might  have 
happened  if  they  had  been  the  discoverers  of  Alta  Cali- 
fornia's gold.  It  must  be  remembered,  also,  that  the 
United  States  did  not  extend  beyond  the  Mississippi  until 
1803,  did  not  acquire  frontage  on  the  Pacific  until  1819, 
and  did  not  make  great  progress  in  colonizing  the  Oregon 
country  until  after  1840. 

Bucarely  was  not  permitted  to  carry  out  his  plans,  how- 
ever. Through  Gdlvez's  agency  the  Calif ornias  were  taken 
from  his  command  and  placed  under  a  new  government 
of  the  frontier  provinces  of  New  Spain.  Teodoro  de  Croix, 
whom  Gdlvez  chose  to  rule  the  new  government,  proved 
incompetent  to  carry  out  the  projects  for  the  development 


PREFACE  IX 

of  Alta  California,  which  depended  for  their  success  on 
the  maintenance  of  an  overland  route  from  Sonora,  already 
opened  by  Bucarely.  Croix  founded  some  weak  establish- 
ments on  the  California  side  of  the  Colorado  River  at  its 
junction  with  the  Gila,  opposite  Yuma,  Arizona,  but  in 
other  respects  neglected  the  problems  affecting  the  route. 
The  result  was  that  the  Yuma  Indians  rose  against  the 
Spanish  establishments  in  1781  and  destroyed  them.  The  . 
Yuma  massacre  closed  the  overland  route  to  Alta  California,  ^ 
and  with  it  passed  Alta  California's  chance  for  early  popu- 
lous settlement.  It  meant  that  gold  was  reserved  for  dis- 
covery until  1848.  That  discovery  at  that  particular  time 
was  yet  another  bit  of  good  fortune  for  the  United  States, 
for  it  insured  the  development  of  the  region  when  the 
United  States  had  just  become  possessed  of  it. 

Four  dates,  then,  in  the  history  of  California  are  of  more    \  \ 
than  passing  significance  in  the  history  of  the  United  States,     j 
to  wit,  1769,  1776,  1781,  and  1848;    particularly  the  last     1  \ 
three.     They  had  a  bearing  on  the  acquisition  and,  in  the 
case  of  the  last,  on  the  retention  of  California  by  the  United 
States.     The   effect   on   Oregon   and   Washington   of   the 
events  marked  by  the  first  three  dates  may  be  gathered 
from   that  of  the  discovery  of  gold  in   1848;    after  the 
first  rush  for  the  gold  fields  was  over,  Oregon  and  Washing- 
ton shared  in  the  development  that  was  transforming  Cali- 
fornia.   And  the  significance  of  the  events  connected  with 
the  dates  just  mentioned  may  be  even  greater  in  the  future 
than  now,  if  frontage  on  the  Pacific  becomes  a  vital  factor 
in  the  history  of  the  United  States,  as  the  interests  of  other 
peoples  around  that  ocean  continue  to  develop. 

For  the  reasons  given,  it  would  seem  worth  while  to  re- 
late the  story  of  Spain's  attempts  during  two  centuries  and 
a  half  to  occupy  the  Californias.  As  a  corollary  the  his- 
tory of  Spain  in  its  broadest  aspects  is  of  great  import.  If 
logical  proportions  alone  were  considered,  a  large  share 
would  be  allotted  in  this  study  to  that  history.  The  space 
cannot  be  given,  but  its  lack  may  in  a  measure  be  met  by 
emphasis  at  this  point.     It  was  an  important  factor  in 


X  PREFACE 

American  history  that  Spain  followed  an  imperialistic  pol- 
icy in  Europe,  seeking  possessions  in  Italy  and  in  the 
Low  Countries,  or  their  retention,  once  they  had  been 
gained.  This  involved  her  in  almost  continuous  war, 
requiring  troops  and  heavy  expenditures.  Spain  herself 
being  unable  to  provide  enough  funds,  she  resorted  for  them, 
after  the  discovery  of  America,  in  large  measure  to  her 
colonies.  Receipts  never  equalled  the  need,  however,  with 
the  result  that  as  little  revenue  as  possible  was  expended 
by  her  in  the  colonies,  whose  affairs  were  regarded  as  less 
important  than  her  policy  in  Europe.  Had  she  been  con- 
tent or  able  to  restrict  herself  to  the  Iberian  peninsula  and 
her  colonies,  there  might  have  been  funds  available  for  the 
benefit  of  the  latter.  If  more  funds  had  been  applied  to 
the  founding  of  settlements  in  Alta  California,  an  object 
which  Spain  so  ardently  desired  that  even  as  things  were, 
she  was  willing  to  go  to  some  expense  to  accomplish  it,  an 
early  development  of  that  province,  with  all  the  conse- 
quences above  indicated,  might  well  have  been  reahzed. 
It  is  perhaps,  a  far  cry  from  the  ItaHan  conquests  of  Pedro 
III  of  Aragon  (1276-85)  to  the  acquisition  of  California 
and  other  territories  by  the  United  States,  but  there  is 
ground  for  asserting  that  the  connection  exists. 

To  treat  in  detail  of  the  entire  history  of  Spain's  under- 
takings in  the  Californias  would  require  many  volumes, 
wherefore  it  has  seemed  best  to  put  the  greatest  stress  on 
the  vital  period  in  the  history  of  Spanish  settlement  in 
Alta  California  from  1773  to  1776,  when  Bucarely  was 
transforming  the  weak  establishments  of  earlier  years, 
and  placing  them  on  an  enduring  basis.  It  has  further 
seemed  necessary,  since  the  tale  is  for  the  most  part  new, 
to  introduce  a  vast  amount  of  documentary  detail,  in  or- 
der to  drive  home  the  conclusions  that  have  been  formed. 
The  portion  of  this  study  most  intensively  treated  is  pre- 
ceded by  a  discussion  in  seven  chapters  of  projects  bearing 
on  the  advance  of  the  Spanish  conquest  overland  toward  the 
Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  from  1521  to  1773,  with  some 
reference   also   to  the   occupation   of  the  two  Californias 


PREFACE  XI 

before  the  mainland  conquest  had  reached  those  rivers.' 
This  portion  of  the  present  volume  was  presented  as  a  doc- 
toral thesis  in  May,  1915,  at  the  University  of  California, 
in  substantially  the  same  form  as  it  appears  here,  under 
the  title  Preliminaries  of  the  Spanish  advance  from  Sonora  to 
California,  1687-1773.  Then  follows  the  principal  part 
of  the  work,  to  which  are  added  two  concluding  chapters, 
showing  that  Spain  did  not,  after  1776,  continue  her  ex- 
traordinary efforts  to  develop  Alta  California. 

In  a  subject  like  that  treated  in  this  work,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  avoid  touching  upon  a  variety  of  subjects  that 
cannot  be  carried  to  a  conclusion.  Among  topics  of  such 
a  nature  that  appear  in  the  present  study  are  the  following  : 
Spanish  colonial  administration  in  its  various  phases ;  the 
story  of  the  Spanish  advance  from  Mexico  City  to  Sonora, 
and  along  another  line  to  Nueva  Viz  cay  a ;  events  taking 
place  east  of  Sonora  in  Nueva  Vizcaya,  for  they  in  fact  had 
a  bearing  upon  Sonora  affairs,  and  northwestward  advance ; 
the  part  played  by  the  regular  and  secular  clergy  in  the 
conquest ;  the  part  played  by  military  and  civil  authorities ; 
the  importance  of  the  civilian  population,  especially  miners, 
involving  discussion  of  the  use  and  treatment  of  Indians 
by  the  whites ;  the  inter-relations  of  the  elements  just 
named,  and,  in  particular,  conflicts  between  them ;  Spain's 
chronic  fear  of  foreign  encroachment  on  her  dominions  of 
the  Pacific ;  the  occupation  of  Baja  California  and  progress 
there ;  the  early  voyages  to  Alta  California ;  the  Manila 
galleon  and  Pacific  commerce;  the  wars  with  the  Seris, 
Apaches  and  other  Indians  in  Sonora ;  the  internal  develop- 
ment of  Sonora ;  the  Department  of  San  Bias ;  the  ex- 
peditions of  1769  to  Alta  California ;  the  reforms  of  Gdlvez 
in  Baja  California  and  Sonora ;  the  northwest  voyages  in 
the  last  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century ;  the  internal 
development  of  Alta  California ;  the  attempts  to  open  a 
route  between  New  Mexico  and  Alta  California ;  a  detailed 
study  of  the  Anza  and  other  expeditions,  in  themselves, 
aside  from  external  factors  to  which  they  were  related ; 
the  comandancia  general  of  the  frontier  provinces ;    life  in 


xii  PREFACE 

Alta  California  in  the  later  Spanish  period  and  under  Mexico. 
Most  of  these  topics,  as  far  as  they  come  within  the  period 
1760  to  1786,  may  be  studied  with  a  fair  degree  of  adequacy 
by  use  of  materials  included  in  my  Catalogue  (see  biblio- 
graphical notes). 

An  explanation  may  be  made  of  some  of  the  methods  that 
I  have  adopted  in  the  mechanical  construction  of  the  volume. 
The  opening  paragraphs  of  each  chapter  after  the  first  con- 
sist of  an  interpretation  and  summary  of  that  chapter. 
Thereafter  comes  a  recital  of  details  gleaned  from  the 
documents  with  but  Httle  accompanying  comment. 

In  names  of  persons  modern  spelling  has  been  used  for 
the  Christian  name,  and  the  form  employed  by  the  in- 
dividual himself,  when  known,  for  the  apellido,  or  family 
name  of  the  father.  Accents  have  been  used,  whether 
employed  by  the  person  in  question  or  not.  Thus,  "  Jos6^' 
for  "Josef"  or  "Joseph,"  "Bautista"  for  "Baptista"; 
"Bucarely"  for  "Bucareli,"  "Roxas"  for  "Rojas";  "Car- 
ets" for  "Garces,"  and  "Galvez"  for  "Galvez."  So  many 
Indian  tribes  are  mentioned  for  which  I  can  find  no  present- 
day  equivalent,  that  I  have  followed  Spanish  spelling  of  the 
eighteenth  century  in  all  cases,  even  when  the  tribe  is  easily 
identified  now  under  another  name.  Thus,  "Cocomari- 
copas"  for  "Maricopas,"  "Quiquimas,"  for  "Quigyumas," 
and  others. 

In  the  nomenclature  of  places  difficulties  arise  owing  to 
changes  in  names  and  boundaries  of  provinces,  and  to  the 
practice  of  transferring  the  name  of  a  particular  place  to 
another  sitey  although  the  last-named  practice  is  not  likely 
to  cause  confusion  in  the  present  work.  In  the  case  of 
provinces,  the  writer  has  usually  employed  the  modern 
names  designating  states  of  the  United  States  or  Mexico, 
as  for  example  "Sinaloa"  and  "Sonora,"  instead  of  one 
name  for  both,  or  either  or  both  with  Ostimuri,  which  was 
at  times  regarded  as  a  separate  district.  The  same  rule  is 
observed  in  such  cases  as  the  following:  "Pacific  Ocean" 
for  "South  Sea";  "Colorado  River"  for  "Rio  del  Tiz6n" 
and  other  names;   "El  Paso"  for  "Paso  del  Norte."     This 


PREFACE  xiii 

rule  has  a  number  of  exceptions.  "Arizona ^^  does  not 
appear,  the  region  south  of  the  Gila  (the  only  one  in  Arizona 
which  enters  the  account)  being  regarded  as  part  of  Sonora, 
usually  under  the  name  of  its  northernmost  portion,  "Pi- 
meria  Alta/'  "Moqui^'  is  retained  because  always  referred 
to  as  separate  from  New  Mexico.  The  terms  "  Calif ornias'' 
and  "California"  appear  so  frequently  in  the  documents  in 
connection  with  Pacific  coast  regions  from  Cape  San  Lucas 
northward,  that  a  distinction  has  been  made.  "Baja 
California"  has  been  used  to  denote  the  peninsula;  "Alta 
California"  for  the  modern  American  state;  and  "Cali- 
fornias"  for  both,  also  including  in  some  cases  the  far 
northwest.  "Nueva  Vizcaya"  has  been  employed  rather 
than  "Chihuahua"  and  "Durango,"  partially  because 
those  two  states  do  not  accurately  describe  the  limits  for- 
merly assigned  to  Nueva  Vizcaya.  Similarly,  "Nueva 
GaHcia^'  is  used  for  Guzman^s  conquests.  "New  Spain" 
is  preferred  to  "Mexico,"  not  so  much  because  it  was  Nueva 
Espana  to  Spaniards,  as  to  avoid  confusion  with  Mexico 
City.  It  is  a  temptation  to  say  "Provincias  Internas,"  as 
do  the  documents,  for  the  northern  tier  of  provinces  from 
Sonora  to  Texas.  That  phrase  has  been  avoided,  however, 
and  "frontier  provinces"  used  instead.  The  word  "Gulf" 
often  appears  instead  of  "Gulf  of  California,"  there  being 
no  other  gulf  with  which  confusion  is  possible.  The  "  Col- 
orado River"  refers  to  the  river  of  that  name  emptying  into 
the  Gulf  of  California,  unless  special  notice  is  given  that 
the  Colorado  of  the  east  is  meant.  Accents  have  been 
employed  where  they  would  be  used  in  modern  Spanish, 
except  where  the  place  name  is  of  very  frequent  usage  in 
English,  in  which  case  the  accent  is  dropped.  Thus,  "Que- 
r^taro"  with  the  accent,  and  "Mexico"  without;  "San 
Jose"  and  "Santa  Barbara"  when  referring  to  those  places 
in  Alta  California,  but  "San  Jose"  and  "Santa  Barbara" 
when  concerned  with  regions  farther  south.  The  accent 
is  retained  in  "Panamd,"  although  that  case  is  near  the 
line,  and  also  in  "Santa  Fe,"  New  Mexico,  —  possibly  with 
some  failure  of  consistency. 


XIV  PREFACE 

The  selection  of  maps  for  insertion  in  the  text  has  been 
based  only  partially  on  their  value  for  illustrating  the 
narrative.  If  already  published  and  easily  accessible,  they 
have  been  omitted.  An  attempt  has  also  been  made  to 
include  such  maps  as  would  indicate  all,  or  nearly  all,  of  the 
place  names  referred  to  in  the  text.  Aside  from  these 
reasons  the  determining  factor  for  inclusion  or  exclusion 
of  maps  has  been  their  importance  as  affecting  this  account. 
In  order  that  technical  matter  may  not  interrupt  the  nar- 
rative I  have  often  used  such  phrases  as  "this  letter,^^ 
where  "a  copy  of  this  letter"  would  be  the  technically  ac- 
curate phrase. 

Spanish  terms  have  rarely  been  retained,  but  there  are 
three  notable  exceptions.  An  expediente  means  all  of  the 
documents  in  an  oflBicial  file  of  papers  on  a  given  case.  A 
testimonio  is  an  expediente  of  a  special  type.  It  is  a  copy 
of  an  expediente,  physically  bound  together  by  sewing,  and 
usually  with  a  title  describing  the  contents.  As  used  in 
this  work  it  refers  nearly  always  to  certified  copies  of  ori- 
ginal files,  or  expedientes,  in  Mexico,  sent  to  Spain  with  a 
letter  of  the  viceroy  and  perhaps  other  documents.  It 
thus  forms  only  part  of  the  expediente  as  found  in  Spain. 
The  term  ministro  general  or  ministro  general  de  Indias  is 
used  to  denote  an  office  which  was  undergoing  changes, 
in  name  as  well  as  in  functions,  in  the  period  covered  by 
this  work.  Julian  de  Arriaga  and  Jose  de  Galvez,  who  held 
that  post  in  the  period  most  intensively  covered,  were  cer- 
tainly officials  of  more  consequence  than  was  the  Council 
of  the  Indies  of  their  day.  They  dominated  the  Council, 
and  were  apart  from  it.  Hence,  it  would  not  be  proper  to 
say  "Council  of  the  Indies,"  when  ministro  general  is  meant. 
Usually,  it  is  possible  to  avoid  use  of  the  latter  term  by 
employing  the  official's  name,  but  it  seems  worth  while  to 
call  attention  to  an  office  which,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  not 
yet  been  adequately  treated  in  an  historical  work. 

To  Professor  H.  Morse  Stephens  I  am  greatly  indebted 
for  instruction,  advice,  and  encouragement  during  the  past 
eight  years.     This  volume  is  the  first  to  be  completed  of 


PREFACE  XV 

several  in  preparation  as  a  direct  result  of  his  prescient 
leadership  in  promoting  the  study  of  the  history  of  the 
Pacific  coast.  I  wish  in  the  second  place  to  make  acknowl- 
edgments to  the  patriotic  Cahfornian  order,  the  Native  Sons 
of  the  Golden  West.  Acting  under  the  inspiring  leader- 
ship of  its  Grand  Presidents  this  order  is  contributing  lib- 
erally to  the  encouragement  of  historical  study  by  sup- 
porting annually  two  TravelHng  Fellowhips  in  Pacific 
Coast  History.  The  very  preponderant  bulk  in  this  vol- 
ume of  materials  from  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias  of 
Seville,  Spain,  selected,  during  two  years  while  I  was  priv- 
ileged to  hold  one  of  these  fellowships,  measures  my  debt 
to  this  fraternity.  My  stay  in  Seville  was  made  both 
more  agreeable  and  more  profitable  than  it  might  other- 
wise have  been  by  the  exceptionally  kind  treatment  and 
efficient  service  that  I  received  at  the  hands  of  the  officials 
of  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias.  Especially  do  I  thank 
the  scholarly  and  courteous  chief  of  that  archive,  Senor 
Don  Pedro  Torres  Lanzas,  and  I  acknowledge  with  gratitude 
the  many  favors  accorded  by  Senores  Verger  and  Jimenez 
Placer,  both  now  deceased,  and  by  Senores  Llorens,  Navas, 
and  Lafita,  all  of  them  of  the  archive  staff  during  the  period 
of  my  residence  in  Seville.  Since  my  return,  Mr.  Clarence 
M.  Hunt,  editor  of  the  N.  S.  G.  W.  organ,  the  Grizzly  Bear 
Magazine,  has  aided  me  in  innumerable  ways  in  connection 
with  the  publication  of  this  volume. 

I  wish  in  particular  to  acknowledge  the  aid  and  encour- 
agement of  Dr.  Herbert  E.  Bolton,  chairman  of  my  doc- 
toral committee,  from  whose  vast  knowledge  of  the  entire 
field  of  North  American  colonization  I  have  profited  greatly. 
The  first  chapter  and  a  half  have  had  the  advantage  of  his 
rigid  criticism,  and  I  have  often  consulted  him  with  regard 
to  the  later  portions  of  the  volume.  To  him  also  I  owe 
my  access  to  the  large  body  of  materials  discovered  and 
procured  by  him  in  Mexican  archives.  To  Mr.  Herbert  I. 
Priestley,  Assistant  Curator  of  the  Academy  of  Pacific  Coast 
History,  I  am  deeply  indebted  for  repeated  favors  and  able 
criticism,  rendered  doubly  valuable  by  his  intensive  knowl- 


Xvi  PREFACE 

edge  of  Spanish  colonial  administration  and  of  the  field 
covered  by  my  work.  Many  others  have  given  me  help, 
in  some  cases  by  valuable  advice,  in  others  by  supplying 
me  with  materials  that  I  desired,  and  in  still  others  by  criti- 
cism of  different  chapters.  A  few  of  those  who  have  thus 
aided  me  are  Dr.  David  P.  Barrows,  Dr.  Francis  S.  Phil- 
brick,  Dr.  Eugene  I.  McCormac,  Dr.  Frank  A.  Golder, 
Dr.  William  L.  Schurz,  Mr.  Champlin  Burrage,  Mr.  Gordon 
C.  Davidson,  Mr.  Karl  C.  Leebrick,  Mr.  Charles  W.  Hack- 
ett,  Mr.  CoHn  B.  Goodykoontz,  Mr.  Frederick  J.  Teggart, 
and  Mr.  George  L.  Albright,  the  last  named  a  student  in 
my  seminar. 

Berkeley,  January  5,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

Antonio   Mari'a   Bucarely  y  UrsuX,  Viceroy  of   New  Spain, 

1771-1779 Frontispiece 

PAGB 

Preface v 

Introduction  by  H.  Morse  Stephens xix 

I.    The  Spanish  Advance   from   Mexico   City  to   Fimbria 

Alta,  1521-1687 1 

11.     Early  Projects  for  Advance  by  Way  of  the  Colorado 

AND  Gila  Rivers,  1687-1752 14 

III.  Obstacles  in  the  Way  of  an  Advance,  1752-1765  .        .  45 

IV.  Achievements  of  Jose  de  Galvez,  1765-1771    .        .        .  68  >s 
V.    The  Need  for  an  Overland  Route  to  Alta  California,  — 

1769-1773 92 

vl.    State  of  Affairs  in  the  Frontier  Provinces,  1771-1773  130 

\^IL    Garces  and  Anza,  1769-1773 145 

VIII.     Approaches  of  the  Russians  and  the  English  to  Span- 
ish Possessions  of  the  Pacific  Northwest        .        .  173 

IX.    Diplomacy  of   the   Reign   of   Charles   III   (1759-1788)  

FROM  War  to  War  with  England,  1763-1779    .         .  187 

Up]  Activities   of   Spain  against   Foreign   Aggressions  in  _^ 

THE  Pacific  Northwest,  1773-1775        ....  216 
\fii    Spanish  Attention  to  Local  Problems  of  the  Califor- 

nias,  1773-1775  . 249  > 

XII.    The  First  Anza   Expedition,  and  Preparations  for  a 

""*^          Second,  1774 273 

<5^III^   Conditions  in  Sonora  and  Baja  California,  1773-1776  .  301 

^XIV.    Problems  and  Progress  of  Alta  California,  1774-1775  314~^ 
XV.    The    Second  Anza   Expedition    and    Related    Events, 

""^               1775-1776 337 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I       XVI.    Bucarely's  Difficulties  in  Maintaining  the  Depart- 

i  ment  of  San  Blas,  1775-1777 368 

XVII.    The  Incompetent  Rule  of  Croix,  1776-1783  .        .        .386 
\  XVIII.     The  Aftermath,  1783-1822 417 

Bibliographical  Notes 437 

Appendix  I.  Table  Showing  Total  Receipts  and  Disburse- 
ments OF  the  Real  Caja  of  Guadalajara  in  Each  Year 
from  1743  TO  1781 455 

Appendix  II.  Specimen  Tables  of  the  Real  Caja  of  Guada- 
lajara Showing  Receipts  and  Disbursements,  Item  by 
Item,  for  Each  op  Two  Years facing  456 

Appendix  III.     Diaries  of  the  Anza  Expeditions        .        .        .     457 

Appendix  IV.  The  Echeveste-Anza  Calculation  of  the  Prob- 
able Cost  of  the  Second   Anza  Expedition  .         .        .        .     461 

Appendix  V.  Resolution  of  the  Junta  of  December  16,  1774, 
Concerning  Authorization  of  a  Second  Expedition  by 
Anza  to  Alta  California 467 

Appendix  VI.  Galvez's  Order  of  March  6,  1779,  Directing 
Croix  to  Give  the  Californias  Preference  in  His  Atten- 
tion   469 

Appendix  VII.    Table  Showing  the  Population  by  Districts 

of  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  in  1781 470 

Index 471 


MAPS 

FACING 
PAGB 

The   Sanchez  Map  of   PiMERfA  Alta  and  the  Colorado-Gila 

Country,  1751 36 

Russian  Map  of  1773  of  Siberia  and  the  North  Pacific         .  224 

The  Crame  Map  of  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  1774    .        .  231 

Map  of  1777  of  Garces'  Travels,  1775-1777 364 

Font's  Map  of  1778  of  the  Regions  Visited  by  Garces     .        .  366 

Spanish  Settlements  of  Alta  California 434 


INTEODUCTION 

The  peculiar  fascination  of  the  history  of  Alta  Cahfornia, 
that  is  of  the  northern  part  of  the  two  CaHfornias,  which  is 
now  the  State  of  Cahfornia,  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
in  it,  and  in  it  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  the  other  States 
carved  out  of  Spanish  North  America,  can  be  traced  a  story 
of  Spanish  romance,  Spanish  exploration,  and  Spanish  ad- 
ministration in  a  country  where  was  later  to  be  established 
a  vigorous  American  State.  While  most  of  the  older  Ameri- 
can States  boast  of  the  romantic  beginnings  of  settlement 
from  England,  while  Louisiana  grew  out  of  the  ambitious 
designs  of  great  Frenchmen,  a  certain  group  of  southwestern 
States,  such  as  Texas,  and  Arizona,  and  New  Mexico,  as 
well  as  California,  trace  their  origins  to  the  Spaniards  of 
New  Spain.  American  civilization  in  the  United  States 
is  so  thoroughly  an  outgrowth  of  English  individualism  and 
English  law  that  students  and  readers  of  the  history  of  the 
United  States  are  apt  to  forget  the  contributions  made  by 
the  Dutch  in  the  New  Netherlands,  now  New  York,  by  the 
French  in  Louisiana,  and  by  the  Spaniards  in  the  larger  area 
of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  and  the  Mexican  Concession. 
Douglas  Campbell  made  an  attempt  to  estimate  the  in- 
fluence of  Dutch  institutions  in  North  America,  though  it 
has  generally  been  held  that  he  considerably  overshot  the 
mark,  and  no  doubt  attempts  have  been  made  and  will  be 
made  to  estimate,  and  perhaps  to  exaggerate,  the  influence 
upon  both  local  and  general  American  civilization  of  the 
French  in  Louisiana,  and  of  the  Spaniards  in  Florida  and  the 
Louisiana  Purchase.  Whenever  the  time  comes  to  work 
out  in  detail  the  extent  of  these  influences,  a  serious  contri- 
bution will  be  made  to  the  history  of  institutions.     It  will 

xix 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

probably  be  found  that  the  actual  influence  of  non-English 
institutions  has  not  been  very  great,  but  that,  on  the  other 
hand;  the  traditions  of  early  exploration  and  settlement  have 
helped  to  create  a  peculiar  fund  of  local  sentiment. 

If  it  be  true,  as  seems  to  be  generally  held  at  the  present 
time,  that  the  spirit  of  nationality  is  not  so  much  the  out- 
come of  identity  of  race,  or  language,  as  the  product  of 
historic  traditions  sung  by  poets  and  taught  by  historians, 
it  can  be  asserted  with  equal  probability  that  the  enthusiasm 
of  State  loyalty  in  the  United  States  is  the  result  of  the  early 
history  of  each  individual  State.  While  New  England  is 
generally  regarded  from  the  outside  as  a  historic  unit,  some 
modern  scholars  have  tried  to  trace  a  distinct  difference  in 
the  civilization  of  New  Hampshire  and  Massachusetts,  or  of 
Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut,  from  the  particular  condi- 
tions of  their  first  settlement.  To  the  outsider.  New  Eng- 
land is  just  New  England,  but  to  those  who  reside  within 
the  New  England  States,  a  sort  of  State  loyalty,  differing 
only  in  degree  from  the  national  spirit  in  the  states  of  Europe, 
is  clearly  to  be  seen.  The  same  thing  is  true  with  regard  to 
the  Southern  States.  A  very  short  residence  in  Virginia 
or  South  Carolina  will  make  manifest  that  in  those  two  States 
is  a  marked  State  loyalty  and  State  consciousness  which 
sets  them  apart  from  the  other  Southern  States,  each  of 
which,  nevertheless,  has  its  own  sentiment  of  a  distinct 
State  civilization.  Even  in  the  Middle  West,  which  has 
been  more  recently  settled,  and  which  cannot  boast  of  any 
romantic  colonial  memories,  there  is  yet  a  local  historic  pride 
which  differentiates  the  citizens  of  Ohio  from  the  citizens 
of  Indiana,  and  the  citizens  of  Wisconsin  from  the  citizens 
of  Minnesota.  State  pride,  based  upon  State  consciousness, 
has  been  the  outcome  in  these  modern  States,  not  simply 
of  different  sources  of  population,  not  simply  of  different 
political  traditions,  but  of  the  complex  spiritual  influences 
which  make  up  in  a  nation  or  in  a  state,  as  in  a  family,  the 
abiding  and  characteristic  sentiment  of  a  united  community. 
Hitherto,  the  great  tendency  in  the  United  States  has  been, 
consciously  and  unconsciously,  towards  the  desire  to  create 


INTRODUCTION  XXI 

a  national  spirit.  The  vehement  behef  in  the  unity  and 
indivisibihty  of  an  American  nationahty,  which  was  forged 
amidst  much  bloodshed  in  the  great  Civil  War,  or  War 
between  the  States,  has  induced  leading  American  historians 
to  dwell  upon  the  history  of  the  United  States  as  a  united 
whole,  and  has  led  its  most  famous  statesmen  and  orators 
to  insist  upon  the  unity  of  the  nation.  No  one  would  be  so 
foolish  as  to  deny  this  prevailing  trend  of  public  sentiment 
in  the  United  States,  but,  at  the  same  time,  there  exists,  so 
clearly  that  no  one  may  ignore  it,  the  local  sentiment  of 
State  pride,  based  upon  Sifate  traditions,  which  runs  side 
by  side  with  the  larger  national  spirit. 

The  view  set  forth  in  the  preceding  paragraph  is  so  obvious 
that  it  needs  no  further  demonstration.  Every  one  who 
Kves  in  the  United  States  recognizes  that  there  is  a  New 
England  temperament  and  a  Rhode  Island  temperament,  as 
there  is  a  New  England  pronunciation  of  words ;  every  one 
realizes  that  there  is  a  Southern  spirit  as  well  as  a  Southern 
accent ;  every  one  knows  that  in  the  Middle  West  there 
is  a  sharp  contrast  between  Kansas  and  Illinois ;  the  charac- 
teristics of  Louisiana  and  the  charm  of  New  Orleans  differ 
from  the  characteristics  of  New  England  and  the  charm  of 
Boston ;  and  the  latest  school  of  American  historical  writers, 
especially  in  the  Middle  West,  has  shown  that  it  is  necessary 
to  go  beyond  Professor  Turner's  epoch-making  Significance 
of  the  Frontier  upon  American  History,^  and  points  out  that 
every  one  of  the  States  that  has  developed  in  the  West  has 
its  own  character  and  its  own  temperament.^  Who,  that 
has  lived  in  Utah,  can  have  failed  to  observe  the  influence 
of  the  Mormon  tradition  ?  And,  to  come  at  last  to  the  pre- 
cise subject  of  this  introduction,  who  that  has  ever  visited 
California  has  failed  to  feel  that  the  Californian  differs 
from  the  people  of  other  States  ? 

It  is  usual,  and  not  wholly  untrue,  to  declare  that  the  pe- 
culiar temperament  of  the  people  of  California  in  their 

1  American  Historical  Association,  C.  L.  Becker  in  Essays  in  American 
Report,  1893.  history,    dedicated    by    F.    J.    Turner, 

*  See,  for    instance,    "Kansas"    by      New  York,  1910,  pp.  86-112. 


Xxii  INTRODUCTION 

attitude  towards  life  is  due  to  their  descent  in  large  part 
in  central  California  from  the  sturdy  and  adventurous 
pioneers  who  were  led  to  that  beautiful  land  by  the  rush  for 
gold.  Bret  Harte  has  fixed  in  literature  certain  types  of  the 
first  gold  miners  in  California,  and,  though  his  idealistic 
treatment  of  these  earliest  settlers  has  been  much  criticised, 
there  still  remains  the  fact  that  in  San  Francisco  and  Sacra- 
mento and  in  the  old  mining  counties  the  pioneers  were  men 
and  women  of  a  stri'kingly  free,  daring,  and  individual 
character.  But,  after  all,  the  entire  population  of  modern 
California  is  not  descended  trom  the  gold  miners.  The 
great  territory  of  Southern  Cahforria  is  just  as  conscious  of 
California  ideals  and  as  proud  of  them  as  the  descendants  of 
the  pioneers  themselves.  Whence  comes,  then,  the  charac- 
teristic California  loyalty  to  a  mode  of  living  and  a  mode  of 
thought  that  differs  from  that  prevalent  in  other  States? 
Disciples  of  Buckle  would  doubtless  assert  that  environment 
due  to  climate  has  shaped  the  nature  and  the  sentiments  of 
the  people  of  California.  Disciples  of  the  economic  inter- 
pretation of  history  might  declare  that  the  difference  is 
entirely  due  to  economic  conditions,  in  the  old  cattle  ranches, 
the  old  grain  ranches,  and  the  orange  groves  of  to-day.  And 
yet  these  explanations  are  as  inconclusive  as  the  similar 
explanations  of  the  characteristics  of  nationality  in  European 
countries.  It  is  something  more  than  climatic  conditions, 
or  economic  development,  or  descendance  from  the  gold 
seekers,  that  makes  the  people  of  modern  California  a  dis- 
tinctive community  with  a  distinctive  civilization,  with  a 
creative  aptitude  for  literature  and  art,  and  with  a  sort  of 
personality  that  is  everywhere  recognized.  Consciously, 
in  these  latter  days,  an  effort  has  been  made  in  California, 
as  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  in  the  other  States  of  the  United 
States,  to  bring  together  a  body  of  historical  tradition  to 
explain  and  create  a  California  State  pride  and  a  Califor- 
nia State  individuality.  This  spirit  quickly  invades  the 
minds  of  new  settlers  in  the  State,  whencesoever  they  come. 
If  a  brief  residence  in  California  is  enough,  as  it  is,  to  make  a 
loyal  Calif ornian,  even  though  the  vast  majority   of  the 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

people  of  California  have  no  direct  affiliation  with  either 
the  early  Spanish  settlers  or  the  enterprising  gold-seeking 
American  pioneers,  it  is  clear  that  something  is  being  done 
to  create  a  California  nationality.  The  California  organiza- 
tion of  the  Native  Sons  of  the  Golden  West  was  deliberately 
founded  to  maintain  an  interest  in  the  history  of  California, 
and  that  part  of  the  population  which  is  immigrant  and  not 
native  has  shown  itself  ready  to  aid  the  Native  Sons  in  their 
generous  attempts  to  give  life  and  truth  to  California 
history. 

There  are  two  romances  which  lie  at  the  back  of  the  con- 
sciousness of  California  pride  in  the  State  of  California; 
one  is  the  romance  of  Spanish  exploration  and  settlement, 
the  other  is  the  romance  of  the  gold  diggers.  The  first 
romance  has  been  twined  around  the  name  of  Father 
Junipero  Serra  and  the  history  of  the  Franciscan  missions 
in  Alta  Cahfornia.  Mission  architecture,  mission  furniture, 
the  study  of  mission  sites,  and  the  restoration  of  mission 
buildings  all  bear  witness  to  the  sincere  desire  of  the  modern 
residents  in  California  to  seek  a  common  interest  in  at  least 
one  side  of  the  Spanish  settlement  of  Alta  California.  For 
some  years,  one  of  the  most  popular  demonstrations  of  the 
interest  felt  in  the  Franciscan  missions  has  been  the  success 
of  the  San  Gabriel  Mission  Play,  which  has  been  witnessed 
by  thousands,  and  has  stirred  the  sensibilities  of  the  casual 
tourist  as  well  as  of  the  resident  or  the  native  son.  Cele- 
brations in  honor  of  Don  Caspar  de  Portold,  the  Spanish 
captain  of  dragoons,  who  led  the  first  expedition  by  land 
northward  from  San  Diego,  have  been  held  in  San  Francisco. 
The  study  of  California  history,  introduced  into  the  Cali- 
fornia schools,  among  the  new  settlers  of  the  south,  as  well 
as  among  the  descendants  of  the  pioneers  in  the  north  and 
central  parts  of  the  State,  has,  hitherto,  always  begun  with 
the  story  of  the  Franciscan  missionaries.  And  yet  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  missions  is  but  an  episode  in  the  Spanish 
settlement  of  California,  and  a  new  school  of  California 
historians  is  arising,  and  is  attempting  to  cover  the  story  of 
the  Spanish  settlement  in  a  more  thorough  fashion  and  to 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

show  the  forces  that  lay  behind  the  movement  of  New  Spain 
into  Alta  Cahfornia. 

The  pubHcation  of  Doctor  Chapman's  book  is  an  evidence 
of  the  new  spirit  with  regard  to  the  foundation  of  Spanish 
Cahfornia,  developed  among  younger  historians.  All  earnest 
students  of  Cahfornia  history  acknowledge  the  enormous 
debt  of  gratitude  they  owe  to  Mr.  Hubert  Howe  Bancroft, 
for  the  treasury  of  information  with  regard  to  California 
brought  together  in  his  colossal  work.  Mr.  Bancroft  under- 
took the  task  of  writing  California  history  upon  a  stupendous 
scale.  He  realized  his  opportunity.  Seeing  that  California 
was  first  brought  to  civilization  through  New  Spain,  he 
collected  sources  of  information,  not  only  upon  the  history 
of  Alta  California,  but  also  upon  Central  America  and 
Mexico.  The  large  way  in  which  he  conceived  his  work 
led  to  the  gathering  of  the  unequalled  collection  of  primary 
sources  which  now  forms  the  glory  of  the  Library  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  California.  All  was  grist  that  came  to  his  mill, 
and  he  absorbed  such  great  collections  of  material  as  the 
Squier  Collection  on  Central  America,  and  the  library  of 
the  Emperor  Maxmilian.  Professor  Langlois  of  Paris,  the 
recognized  master  of  historical  bibliography,  in  an  article 
published  so  long  ago  as  1891  in  the  Revue  Universitaire^ 
under  the  title  of  H.  H.  Bancroft  et  C**,^  drew  the  at- 
tention of  European  scholars  to  the  remarkable  work  ac- 
complished by  Mr.  H.  H.  Bancroift.  Mr.  Bancroft  was  not 
a  native  son  of  California,  but  came  from  Ohio,  and  yet  it  is  to 
him  that  Cahfornia  historians  owe  their  greatest  debt  of 
gratitude.  Professor  Langlois  wonders  at  the  grandeur  of 
the  ideas  of  this  bookseller  and  publisher,  without  academic 
training,  who  conceived  the  possibiHty  of  collecting  all  the 
accessible  sources  on  the  history  of  California  civilization, 
and  who  then  formed  an  organization  not  unhke  that  of  the 
old  Magdeburg  Centuriators  in  the  sixteenth  century  in 
Europe  to  collate  and  interpret  them.  "Mr.  Bancroft  and 
Company,"  to  translate  the  title  of  Langlois'  article,  brought 

*  This  article  is  reprinted  in  Questions  d'histoire  et  cf  enseignement,  par  C.  V. 
Langlois,  Paris,  1902,  pp.  243-274. 


INTRODUCTION  XXV 

forth  thirty-nine  large  volumes  of  Pacific  coast  history, 
based  upon  his  own  collection  of  original  sources.  This  is 
not  the  place  to  criticise,  even  if  the  desire  existed,  the  stupen- 
dous work  of  Mr.  H.  H.  Bancroft,  and,  as  the  years  go  by, 
the  value  of  his  vast  collection  is  being  more  and  more  appre- 
ciated. Every  generation  writes  its  own  history  of  the  past, 
and  modern  historians  may  not  agree  with  all  Mr.  Bancroft's 
views,  especially  with  regard  to  the  attitude  taken  by  him 
upon  certain  phases  of  Spanish  and  Mexican  California,  but 
the  collection  of  sources  that  he  made  will  be  forever  the 
mine  in  which  future  Cahfornia  historians  must  dig  for  in- 
formation. To  the  same  epoch  of  historical  composition, 
belongs  the  History  of  California  by  Theodore  H.  Hittell, 
published  in  1885,  an  admirable  book  composed  upon  a 
smaller  scale  than  that  of  Bancroft's  more  elaborate  work, 
and  confined  more  strictly  to  the  history  of  Alta  California. 
These  remarkable  books  were  representative  of  the  period  in 
which  they  were  written,  and  both  of  them  laid  a  considerable 
amount  of  emphasis  upon  the  Spanish  settlement  of  Cali- 
fornia. But  historians,  Hke  histories,  get  out  of  date,  and 
new  men  arise  to  take  up  the  task  of  interpreting  the  past 
where  their  predecessors  left  off.  Among  the  more  recent 
histories,  especial  weight  should  be  laid  upon  the  books  of 
Mr.  Irving  B.  Bichman,  whose  California  under  Spain  and 
Mexico  appeared  in  1911,  and  of  Mr.  Zoeth  S.  Eldredge, 
whose  Beginnings  of  San  Francisco  appeared  in  1912.  Both 
of  these  books,  and  especially  that  of  Mr.  Eldredge,  are  real 
contributions  to  a  knowledge  of  the  early  history  of  Cah- 
fornia. But  more  remained  to  be  done ;  for  however  wide- 
reaching  had  been  Mr.  Bancroft's  net,  he  had  failed  to  gather 
in  all  the  sources  upon  the  romantic  history  of  the  Spanish 
settlement  of  California.  It  was  known  that  vast  quantities 
of  material  were  preserved  in  the  great  collection  of  pubhc 
records  known  as  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias  at  Seville  in 
Spain.  Here  has  been  collected  all  the  ojficial  correspond- 
ence from  Spanish  America  with  Spain.  Mr.  Bancroft 
had  obtained  copies  of  some  of  the  most  necessary  docu- 
ments, but  it  was  quite  certain  that  hidden  away  and  un- 


XXvi  INTRODUCTION , 

indexed  among  the  masses  of  state  papers  there  must  be 
many  more  that  would  explain  in  detail  the  settlement  of 
Spanish  California. 

The  difficulty  that  presented  itself  was  how  to  prepare 
students  of  California  history  to  work  among  these  great 
stores  of  official  documents,  and  how  to  maintain  them  during 
a  residence  at  Seville.  The  University  of  California  made 
ready  to  undertake  the  task  by  calling  to  its  Faculty  an 
acknowledged  master  of  modern  history.  Professor  Herbert 
E.  Bolton,  who  had  done  admirable  work  in  the  University  of 
Texas,  who  had  made  himself  familiar  with  the  treasure 
houses  of  Spanish  documents  in  Mexico,  and  who  had 
finished  his  well-known  Guide  to  Materials  for  the  History 
of  the  United  States  in  the  Principal  Archives  of  Mexico,^  was 
the  very  man  to  train  California  historical  scholars.  His 
wealth  of  knowledge  of  Spanish  American  history,  together 
with  his  practical  experience  in  dealing  with  Spanish  official 
documents,  made  it  possible  to  deal  adequately  with  the 
materials  preserved  in  the  Bancroft  Collection,  and  to  prepare 
for  further  investigation  at  the  fountain  head  in  Spain.  At 
this  moment,  came  providentially  most  generous  aid  from 
the  local  California  society,  devoted  to  the  study  of  Cali- 
fornia history,  and  organized  as  the  Order  of  the  Native 
Sons  of  the  Golden  West.  At  the  critical  moment,  when  a 
school  of  young  Cahf ornia  historians  was  foreshadowed  in  the 
work  of  Professor  Bolton,  the  Native  Sons  of  the  Golden 
West  came  forward  with  a  subsidy  of  $3000  a  year  for  the 
maintenance  of  Travelling  Fellows,  who  were  to  reside 
in  Spain  and  devote  themselves  to  a  search  for  documents 
on  the  history  of  Spanish  California.  The  first  fruits  of 
their  generosity  are  to  be  seen  in  Doctor  Chapman's  volume, 
to  which  this  is  a  general  introduction.  Other  volumes  are 
now  in  hand,  and  during  the  next  few  years  a  series  of  mono- 
graphs on  the  early  history  of  Spanish  California  may  be 
expected  which  will  supplement  the  historical  work  accom- 
plished by  such  pioneers  as  Bancroft  and  Hittell,  and  by 
such  modern  historians  as  Richman  and  Eldredge. 

1  Published  by  the  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington,  D.  C,  in  1913. 


INTRODUCTION  XXvii 

It  is  now  time  to  turn  to  the  actual  contribution  made  by 
Doctor  Chapman  to  the  history  of  Spanish  CaHfornia.  It 
has  already  been  said  that  the  attention  of  the  people  of 
California  with  regard  to  their  Spanish  predecessors  had  been 
at  first  almost  entirely  devoted  to  the  Franciscan  missions. 
Not  until  the  publication  of  Mr.  Eldredge's  book  had  suffi- 
cient weight  been  laid  upon  the  fact  that  the  Portola  ex- 
pedition and  the  foundation  of  the  missions  would  have  had 
but  little  effect  if  this  movement  had  not  been  followed  up 
by  the  Anza  expedition,  which  resulted  ij^  the  foundation  of 
the  Presidio  of  San  Francisco  in  1776.  ^But  behind  the  expe- 
ditions of  both  Portola  and  Anza,  lay  a  long  story  of  the 
development  of  the  movement  of  New  Spain  towards  CaH- 
fornia Alt  a.  With  the  story  of  this  preliminary  movement 
and  its  growth  into  the  Anza  expedition,  Doctor  Chapman's 
book  deals.  It  is  a  sincere  and  valuable  contribution  to 
history,  and  it  sets  forth  not  only  the  facts  of  the  north- 
westerly landward  movement  towards  California  from 
Mexico,  but  also  the  motives  which  underlay  that  movement, 
and  the  reasons  which  had  delayed  it  until  the  latter  part  of 
the  eighteenth  centuryf 

The  history  of  California  becomes  part  of  the  general 
history  of  civihzation  with  the  establishment  of  the  Presidio 
of  San  Francisco  in  1776.  Up  until  the  eighteenth  century, 
the  Pacific  Ocean  had  been  a  Spanish  lake,  traversed  by  the 
Manila  galleons  carrying  their  annual  freight  between  Manila 
and  Acapulco.  But  in  the  eighteenth  century  other  Euro- 
pean nations  began  to  enter  the  Pacific  Ocean.  The  Rus- 
sians, having  moved  across  Siberia,  crossed  into  Alaska  and 
began  to  work  their  way  down  the  northern  Pacific  coast  of 
America.  French  traders,  even  before  1715,  had  made  their 
way  up  the  Pacific  coast  of  South  America.  An  English 
squadron,  under  Commodore  Anson,  broke  into  the  Pacific 
Ocean  in  1740  and  captured  one  of  the  Manila  galleons.  The 
mystery  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  attracted  European  public 
opinion ;  possibilities  for  commercial  expansion  into  the 
South  Sea  were  widely  discussed ;  exploration  of  the  ocean 
was  undertaken,  most  conspicuously  in  the  famous  voyages 


XXviii  INTRODUCTION 

of  Captain  Cook ;  and  Spain  felt  that  she  must  protect  the 
entire  Pacific  coast,  if  she  was  to  maintain  the  monopoly  of 
the  Pacific  Ocean  itself.  But  could  the  coast  of  Alta  Cali- 
fornia be  occupied  from  the  ocean  ?  Could  the  Pacific  coast 
of  Alta  California  be  held  through  the  command  of  the 
sea?  This  problem  had  long  been  in  the  minds  of  Spanish 
officials  in  New  Spain. 

/Nothing  is  more  interesting  in  Doctor  Chapman^s  book 
than  the  evidence  he  has  gathered  to  show  that  the  problem 
of  the  occupation  of  Alta  California  grew  naturally  out  of 
the  northward  expansion  of  New  Spain./  Just  as  the  expan- 
sion of  Rome  was  the  natural  and  inevitable  sequel  of  the 
history  of  the  Roman  RepubHc ;  just  as  the  conquest  of  each 
new  Roman  province,  whether  civilized  or  uncivilized,  led 
inevitably  to  further  advance^ just  as  the  United  States 
moved  irresistibly  westward  across  America,  and  Russia 
eastward  across  Siberia;  just  as  the  history  of  the  British 
Empire  in  India  bears  witness  to  the,  steady  movement  in 
search  of  a  scientific  military  frontier  ;/so  the  Spanish  officials 
in  Mexico  City  witnessed,  sometimes  almost  with  despair, 
the  inevitable  expansion  of  New  Spain.  A  certain  school  of 
historians,  like  a  certain  school  of  statesmen,  have  lamented 
the  expansion  of  the  great  empires  of  the  past  and  of  the 
present.  Now  and  then,  desperate  efforts  have  been  made 
to  check  an  expanding  movement  and  to  declare  that  the 
final  frontier  has  been  reached.  But  the  best  intended 
efforts  to  check  expansion  from  poHcy  have  been  vain  in  the 
past,  as  in  the  present.  Growth  is  a  law  of  life.  Stagnation 
means  death.  Although  Spain,  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
was  too  exhausted  at  the  heart  to  be  capable  of  covering 
efficiently  a  further  area  in  America,  yet  the  demand  for 
movement  was  felt  in  the  extremities  of  Spanish  America, 
and  the  Christian  missionaries  pressed  onward  and  onward 
in  their  pious  fervor.  The  viceroys  of  New  Spain  tried  to 
hold  back  both  missionaries  and  pioneers  and  to  set  limits 
to  the  irresistible  advance.  Augustus  and  Tiberius  en- 
deavoured to  check  the  growth  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  to 
fix  strategical  boundaries,  but  in  vain.     English  statesmen. 


INTRODUCTION  XXIX 

in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  tried  to  stop  the 
development  of  the  British  Empire,  and  furiously  resented 
the  onward  movement  of  the  Austrahans  into  New  Guinea, 
of  the  Anglo-Indian  statesmen  into  Afghanistan,  and  of  the 
great  empire  builders,  like  Goldie,  and  MacKinnon,  and 
Cecil  Rhodes,  in  Africa.  Spain,  in  America,  could  not 
stand  still  so  long  as  the  road  was  open,  any  more  than 
Russia,  in  Siberia.     It  was  forced  into  expansion. 

^  The  most  valuable  part  of .  Doctor  Chapman's  book  is 
his  development  from  the  original  sources,  still  buried  at 
Seville,  of  the  northward  expansion  of  New  Spain.  He  has 
done  full  justice  to  the  hardships  that  faced  the  advancing 
missionaries  and  settlers,  but  he  has  also  seen  the  difficulties 
that  beset  the  Spanish  officials,  and  has  concentrated 
attention  upon  the  importance  of  the  views  held  by,  and  the 
work  done  by,  the  Viceroy  Bucarely  and  the  Visitor-General 
Galvez./'The  importance  of  the  work  of  Galvez  has  never 
been  adequately  recognized,  but  a  most  valuable  and  in- 
teresting monograph,  based  upon  the  original  sources, 
has  been  written  upon  him  by  Mr.  H.  I.  Priestley,  which  is 
about  to  be  published  by  the  University  of  California.  Gdl- 
vez  saw  the  danger  presented  by  the  incursion  of  other 
European  states  than  Spain  into  the  Pacific  Ocean.  He 
realized  that  the  political  and  commercial  situation  in 
Europe  was  going  to  affect  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  would 
sooner  or  later  press  problems  upon  the  Pacific  coast.  With 
feverish  activity,  he  labored  for  an  immediate  advance, 
and  since  an  overland  advance  was  for  the  moment  im- 
possible, for  the  reasons  Doctor  Chapman  has  set  forth, 
the  first  movement  to  the  northward  to  Alta  California  was 
undertaken  along  the  coast  line  in  the  famous  expedition 
under  Don  Caspar  de  Portola.  But  the  missions  and  pre- 
sidios in  Alta  California  could  not  be  maintained  by  coast 
cmnmunication.     An  overland  route  had  to  be  developed. 

'^^The  middle  chapters  of  Doctor  Chapman's  book  deal 
with  the  problems  that  faced  the  officials  of  New  Spain  after 
the  Portola  expedition.  The  European  situation  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean  was  becoming  more  defined;     the  Russians 


XXX  INTRODUCTION       , 

and  the  English  were  particularly  active.  Eang  Charles  III 
of  Spain  developed  a  strong  anti-English  attitude,  which, 
combined  with  the  Family  Compact  made  with  the  French 
king,  induced  him  to  take  part  in  the  American  War  of  In- 
dependence upon  the  side  of  the  American  Colonies.  The 
Viceroy  Bucarely,  with  calmer  judgment,  but  with  less 
feverish  activity  than  was  displayed  by  Gdlvez,  made  ready 
for  the  Spanish  occupation,  through  an  overland  route,  of 
Alt  a  California. 

Doctor  Chapman's  hero  in  the  third  part  of  his  book  is 
Don  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza.  Mr.  Zoeth  Eldredge,  in  the 
volumes  more  than  once  referred  to,  has  brought  out  very 
clearly  the  momentous  character  in  the  history  of  Spanish 
Cahfornia  of  the  great  Anza  expedition,  which  culminated  in 
the  establishment  of  the  Presidio  of  San  Francisco.  From 
this  point  of  view,  Mr.  Eldredge's  book  is  excellent  and  con- 
clusive. But  Doctor  Chapman's  book  brings  out  a  point 
that  does  not  clearly  appear  in  Mr.  Eldredge's  volumes, 
namely,  the  fact  tliat  Anza's  expedition  was  the  culminating 
feature  of  a  long  attempt  at  the  northwest  expansion  of 
New  Spain.  The  work  of  Anza  did  not  suddenly  leap  into 
prominence ;  it  was  the  outcome  of  a  long  series  of  movements 
and  of  the  natural  development  of  frontier  policy.  Anza 
himself  inherited  his  interest  in  the  movement  of  expansion. 
Like  certain  officers  on  the  northwest  frontier  of  India,  his 
entire  life  had  been  spent  as  an  officer  and  an  official  upon 
the  frontier.  Like  Colonel  Warburton,^  his  life  had  been  a 
frontier  life.  His  father  had  been  killed  in  a  fight  with  the 
Apache  Indians  upon  the  frontier.  He  knew  the  Pimas  and 
the  Yumas  and  the  frontier  tribes,  whose  territories  he  was 
to  traverse,  as  Warburton  knew  the  Afghan  frontier  tribes. 
It  was  with  a  full  consciousness  of  the  danger  of  his  mission, 
and  with  a  full  experience  as  to  the  organization  that  was 
needed,  that  he  set  forth  at  last  in  1775  upon  his  epoch- 
making  expedition  from  Sonora  to  San  Francisco.  The  de- 
tails of  the  great  march  can  be  read  alike  in  Mr.  Eldredge's 

1  Eighteen  years  in  the  Khyber,  by  Colonel  Sir  Robert  Warburton,  London, 
1900. 


INTRODUCTION  XXxi 

Beginnings  of  San  Francisco  and  in  Doctor  Chapman's 
volume.  The  two  accounts  supplement  each  other,  though, 
as  has  been  said,  the  point  of  view  and  of  departure  of  the 
two  authors  differs  greatly. 

This  introduction,  written  at  the  request  of  Doctor  Chap- 
man, is  not  intended  to  contain  a  summary  of  the  result  of 
his  researches  in  the  documents  bearing  upon  the  history 
of  the  Anza  expedition,  which  he  has  discovered  at  Seville. 
/The  truthfulness  of  his  work,  hia  patient  examination,  analy- 
sis, and  transcription  of  new  documents,  are  made  clear  upon 
the  pages  of  his  book,  in  the  carefulness  of  his  citations  and 
in  the  valuable  appendices.  His  volume  belongs  to  the  class 
of  historical  works  based  upon  the  consultation  of  primary 
authorities,  which  is  now  forming  so  creditable  a  feature  of 
modern  historical  work  in  the  United  States^  The  careful 
reader  need  have  no  hesitation  in  accepting  his  conclusions, 
for  he  has  shown  what  Gibbon,  in  his  famous  preface,  de- 
clared to  be  the  only  merits  which  an  historical  writer  may 
ascribe  to  himself,  namely,  "diligence  and  accuracy.'' 
That  such  a  volume  should  be  the  first  fruits  of  the  generosity 
of  the  Order  of  the  Native  Sons  of  the  Golden  West  gives 
hope  of  an  even  more  valuable  harvest  to  follow. 

Instead  of  giving  a  summary  of  Doctor  Chapman's  con- 
tribution to  the  knowledge  of  the  preliminary  steps  towards 
the  Spanish  occupation  of  Alta  California,  it  has  seemed  more 
fitting  in  this  introduction  to  try  to  explain  wherein  its 
largest  value  lies.  First  and  foremost,  an  attempt  has  been 
made  in  a  few  sentences  to  indicate  wherein  the  occupation 
of  Alta  California  is  connected  with  the  general  situation  in 
Europe  with  regard  to  the  Pacific  Ocean  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  writer  of  a  monograph  is  apt  to  be  so  in- 
terested in  his  particular  field  that  it  is  most  necessary  that 
the  effort  should  be  made  to  show  the  connection  of  all  studies 
of  local  history  with  the  trend  of  general  history.  Some  day, 
some  historian  of  large  vision,  and  with  a  grasp  like  that  of 
Gibbon  of  a  wide  field  of  history,  will  bring  out  the  general 
story  of  the  expansion  alike  of  states,  of  nations,  and  of 
civilizations.     Local  histories  and  specialized  histories  of  all 


xxxii  INTRODUCTION 

kinds  are  apt  to  be  too  specialized  and  not  to  pay  sufficient 
attention  to  general  considerations.  But  further,  it  seemed 
worth  while  in  the  opening  paragraphs  of  this  introduction 
to  say  something  upon  the  importance  of  such  detailed  work 
as  Doctor  Chapman's  as  illustrating  the  growth  of  State 
loyalty  and  State  consciousness.  The  people  of  California 
are  very  proud  of  the  traditions  of  their  State,  even  if  the 
vast  majority  of  them  are  either  themselves  recent  immi- 
grants, or,  at  the  most,  only  in  the  second  or  third  generation 
from  pioneer  settlers.  Yet  all  alike  have  absorbed  and  now 
express  the  traditions  of  the  old  Alta  California  under  Spain 
and  Mexico,  and  they  feel  that  their  State  is  no  common 
land,  but  boasts  of  a  romance  and  a  charm  that  other  States 
cannot  rival.  While  some  may  boast  of  cHmate,  and  some 
of  citrous  fruit,  far  back  in  their  consciousness,  in  their  pro- 
nunciation of  old  Spanish  names  of  places,  in  their  love  for 
the  old  mission  buildings,  and  their  pride  in  the  picturesque 
careers  of  Franciscan  missionaries  and  of  Spanish  hidalgos, 
of  gold  seekers  from  all  parts  of  the  world,  and  of  a  cour- 
ageous folk,  who  undauntedly  built  up  the  ruined  city  of 
San  Francisco,  the  chief  bond  of  that  California  loyalty 
which  they  instil  into  their  children,  and  which  they  them- 
selves cherish  with  the  enthusiasm  that  an  Englishman  or  a 
Scotchman,  a  Frenchman  or  a  German,  feels  for  his  historic 
nationahty,  is  based  upon  the  historic  traditions  of  the  land 
in  which  they  live.  Doctor  Chapman's  book  is,  upon  the 
one  hand,  a  witness  to  the  love  that  Californians  feel  for 
their  historic  traditions,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  worthy 
contribution  towards  a  broader  view  of  the  Spanish  states- 
men and  pioneers,  and  towards  a  better  and  more  detailed 
understanding  of  that  Spanish  background  against  which  is 
now  reared  one  of  the  proudest  and  most  self-conscious  States 
of  the  United  States  of  America. 

H.  Morse  Stephens. 
Berkeley,  California, 
March  6,  1916. 


THE    FOUNDING    OF    SPANISH 
CALIFORNIA 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  SPANISH  ADVANCE  FROM  MEXICO  CITY  TO  PIMERIA  ALTA, 

1521-1687 

The  discovery  of  America  in  1492  marked  the  beginning 
of  a  struggle,  in  which  Spain  was  to  play  a  leading  part,  for 
possession  of  the  new  worid.  Spain  acquired  a  base  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  thence  went  forth  to  the  conquest  of  the 
mainland.  One  line  of  effort  led  her  to  the  Isthmus  of 
Panamd,  where  the  Spaniards  established  themselves  by 
1510.  As  their  foothold  there  became  more  secure  they 
began  to  extend  their  rule  northward.  Before  they  had 
gone  very  far,  they  met  another  stream  of  conquest  coming 
south,  for  in  1519  Cortes  had  landed  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
of  Mexico  and  had  begun  the  war  which  in  two  years  re- 
sulted in  the  overthrow  of  the  Aztec  power.  The  capture 
of  Mexico  City  in  1521  gave  Spain  a  new  base  of  operations 
for  conquest.  By  1522,  Cortes  had  reached  the  Pacific 
coast,  establishing  a  settlement  at  the  Port  of  Zacatula, 
and  a  few  years  later  the  lands  south  of  Mexico  to  Panama 
were  taken.  There  remained  a  vast  ever-widening  area  to 
the  north,  not  yet  subjected  to  the  Spanish  crown. 

The  sixteenth  century  was  the  era  of  the  Spanish  con- 
quistadores.  U^These  men  led  expeditions  which  made  a 
permanent  conquest  of  large  areas,  and  developed  a  pre- 
liminary knowledge  of  nearly  the  whole  field  subsequently 


2  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA        [Ch.  I 

occupieov^They  were  followed,  perhaps  in  the  wake  of 
other  expeditions,  by  soldiers,  missionaries,  and  civilians, 
all  of  Spanish  blood.  The  civilians  were  for  the  most  part 
miners,  a  smaller  number  engaging  in  stock-raising  and 
other  pursuits  characteristic  of  frontier  life.^  This  was  a 
second  phase  of  the  conquest.  Eventually,  in  a  portion  of 
the  field^Sthere  came  a  third  phase,  when  settled  orderly 
government  appeared,  the  military  moving  on,  secular  clergy 
replacing  regular,  and  civilians  entering  in  greater  numbers 
and  engaging  in  a  greater  variety  of  occupations.  This  was 
the  final  stage,  when  the  particular  region  ceased  to  partake 
of  the  attributes  of  a  frontier  province.  In  all  three  stages 
the  white  people,  although  a  very  small  minority,  were  the 
ruling  class.  As  a  rule  the  Indians  were  not  driven  away  or 
killed,  as  in  the  English  colonies,  but,  although  strictly  ruled 
and  virtually  enslaved,  were  allowed  to  remain. 

Northward  expansion  from  Mexico  City  may  be  said  to 
have  followed  three  principal  lines :  northwestward  to 
Sonora  and  the  Calif ornias ;  up  the  central  plateau  through 
Nueva  Vizcaya  to  New  Mexico ;    similarly,  but  branching 

1  Not  much  has  been  written  con-  by  ships  going  to  the  Americas  (ibid., 

ceming  the,  importance  of  the  civilian  ley   VI),    and   government  officials   in 

element  in  Spanish  conquests.     Some  the    colonies    were    to    do    the    same, 

small  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  delivering  forbidden  books  to  the  proper 

military,    but    the    greatest    space    by  religious    authorities    (ibid.,  ley    VII). 

far  has  been  assigned  to  the  religious,  Great  care  was  also  enjoined  to  avoid 

certainly   after   the   era   of   early   con-  circulation  of  books  by  heretic  pirates 

quests.     This  is  because  but  little  use  (ibid.,    ley   XIV).     As    Bancroft  says, 

has  thus  far   been  made   of   any   but  "religious  teachers  guided  public  taste, 

printed  sources,  and  because  these  are  and  strove  to  obtain  a  circulation   for 

in  most  cases  writings  of  the  religious  their    own    productions,"    and     "Since 

themselves,  who  were  bent  upon  tell-  every  work  had  to  pass  through    the 

ing  of  the  achievements  of  their  order ;  hands    of    censors,    notably    the    rigid 

see  the  list  of  works  cited  in  connection  inquisition,  it  became  almost  necessary 

with  this  volume.     The  laws  themselves  to  give  a  pious  tinge  to  the  pages  in 

operated  to  discourage  any  but  religious  order  to  secure  permission  to  publish, 

publications,  from  fear  lest  the  subject  and    above    all    to    suppress   whatever 

population  read  anything  which  might  savored    of    acquaintance    with    works 

tend  to  diminish  their  belief  in  Catholic  not  favored  by  the  church."     Bancroft, 

Christianity,     and    thus    weaken    the  Literature  of  colonial  Mexico,  in  Essays 

bonds  by  which  Spain  ruled  them.     No  and  miscellany,  486. 

books  pertaining  to  the  Americas  could  The  story  of  the  civilian  is  in  large 

be  printed  unless  previously  approved  measure  gone  beyond  recall,  but  a  rich 

by  the  Council  of  the  Indies  (Recop.,  harvest    nevertheless    awaits    the    in- 

lib.  I,  tit.  XXIV,  ley  I).     No  books  of  vestigator  who  will  use  the  unpublished 

romance   of  profane  or  fabulous   sub-  materials  which  exist  in  such  stupendous 

ject-matter  were  allowed  to  be  sent  to  quantity   in    the   Archivo    General    de 

the  colonies  (ibid.,  ley  IV).     Religious  Indias. 
in  Spain  were  to  inspect  books  carried 


1521]      THE  SPANISH  ADVANCE   FROM  MEXICO  CITY  3 

off  to  run  through  Coahuila  into  Texas.  A  fourth  Hne, 
basing  in  early  days  on  Tampico,  and,  later,  on  Mexico 
City  and  Queretaro,  ran  to  Nuevo  Leon  and  Nuevo  San- 
tander  (Tamaulipas),  and  slightly  into  Texas.  This  was 
hardly  so  important  as  the  others.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this 
work  to  direct  attention  to  the  first-named  movement,  and 
to  only  its  latest  phases  with  any  degree  of  completeness. 
Yet,  all  four  were  closely  related,  —  so  much  so,  that  we 
shall  often  be  forced  to  take  into  account  what  was  happen- 
ing to  the  east  of  Sonora.  All  went  ahead  at  relatively  the 
same  rate  of  progress,  except  the  much  shorter  fourth  move- 
ment. Military  and  exploring  expeditions  made  side  trips 
that  crossed  different  lines  of  advance.  All  were  related 
by  the  problem  of  Indian  warfare,  especially  against  the 
Apaches,  who  were  wont  to  appear  in  all  sections,  often 
going  from  one  to  another  according  as  resistance  to  their 
raids  was  strong  or  weak.  All  were  threatened  by  foreign 
aggressions  from  the  northeast,  for  the  Colorado  River  of 
the  west  was  believed  to  be  a  route  making  the  western 
provinces  almost  as  accessible  to  the  French  or  English  as 
those  in  the  east.  Some  or  all  of  the  regions  along  the  four 
lines  of  advance  were  at  different  times  under  the  same 
political  rule,  or  served  as  a  field  for  the  same  body  of 
religious,  or  were  part  of  the  same  diocese.  Finally,  all  of 
these  regions  had  much  the  same  internal  problems,  political, 
economic,  and  social,  and  all  were  under  the  viceroy,  or,  in 
the  latest  period,  under  the  comandante  general.  Despite 
these  unifying  factors,  not  much  space  can  be  given  to  the 
northward  movement  as  a  whole.  Before  proceeding  to  a 
consideration  of  northwestward  advance,  however,  it  is 
worth  while  to  give  an  idea  of  the  sweep  of  the  other  lines  of 
conquest. 

Naturally,  the  line  of  advance  through  Nueva  Viz  cay  a  to 
New  Mexico  was  most  closely  related,  because  nearest,  to  the 
movement  through  Sonora.  The  same  Indian  wars  often 
affected  both.  The  Jesuits  were  in  western  Nueva  Vizcaya 
as  well  as  in  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  until  1767.  Sinaloa  and 
Sonora  were  included  in  the  government  of  Nueva  Vizcaya 


4  THE   FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA        [Ch.  I 

until  1734,  and  formed  part  of  the  same  diocese  under  the 
bishop  of  Durango  until  1779,  when  a  bishopric  was  created 
for  Sinaloa,  Sonora,  and  the  CaUfornias.  The  first  great 
name  in  the  history  of  Nueva  Vizcaya  is  that  of  Francisco 
de  Ibarra,  who  set  up  a  government  there  in  the  middle  of 
the  sixteeiith  century.  By  the  end  of  that  century  the  line 
of  settlement  had  reached  southern  Chihuahua.  Next 
there  was  a  gap,  beyond  which  lay  New  Mexico,  settled 
by  the  Oiiate  expedition  of  1598.  By  the  close  of  the 
seventeenth  century  the  line  of  settlement  had  approached 
or  reached  the  Rio  Grande ;  for  example,  the  presidios  of 
Pasage,  Gallo,  Conchos,  Janos,  and  Casas  Grandes  were 
already  in  existence.  In  the  eighteenth  century  there  were 
many  changes  in  presidial  sites,  the  general  movement  being 
to  suppress  the  more  southerly  presidios,  and  establish  new 
ones  toward  the  Rio  Grande.  Similarly  the  missions  ad- 
vanced, and  the  region  behind  them  was  gradually  yielded 
over  to  the  secular  clergy.  In  1767,  according  to  statistics 
compiled  by  Bishop  Tamaron,  Nueva  Vizcaya  had  a  Chris- 
tian population  of  120,000  divided  evenly  between  Chihua- 
hua and  Durango,  its  northern  and  southern  divisions ;  but 
while  Durango  had  46,000  civilized  people,  there  were  but 
23j000  in  Chihuahua.^  Meanwhile,  New  Mexico  had  en- 
joyed great  prosperity  until  1680,  when  all  was  destroyed 
by  an  Indian  revolt,  and  the  land  was  not  reconquered  until 
over  a  decade  later.^  Thenceforth,  the  land  was  held,  but 
little  further  advance  was  made.  By  the  end  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  there  may  have  been  20,000  civilized  people 
in  the  province,  and  10,000  Christian  Indians.^ 

Along  the  Coahuila  line  Parras  and  Saltillo  in  southern 
Coahuila  were  occupied  by  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
although  these  two  settlements  were  under  the  government 

2  The  term  "civilized  people"  is  Mexico  in  1680,  and  the  beginnings  of 
used   for  what   Spaniards   called   gente       El  Paso. 

de    raz6n,    including    those    of    white  *  For  a  good  summary  of  the  Span- 

or  mixed   blood  or  even   negroes.     In  ish    advance    through    Nueva    Vizcaya 

fine,   all   but   Indians  were  included.  to  New  Mexico  until  near  the  end  of 

3  Hackett,  The  revolt  of  the  Pueblo  the  seventeenth  century,  see  the 
Indians  of  New  Mexico  in  1680;  and  introductory  part  to  Hughes,  The 
Retreat    of    the    Spaniards    from    New  beginning  of  Spanish  settlement  in  the 

El  Paso  district. 


1521]      THE  SPANISH  ADVANCE  FROM  MEXICO  CITY  5 

of  Nueva  Vizcaya  until  1785.  Coahuila  never  enjoyed 
striking  prosperity.  By  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century 
Monclova  was  the  most  northerly  presidio,  while  the  mis- 
sions had  passed  on  to  the  Rio  Grande.  Early  in  the 
eighteenth  century  the  presidios  reached  that  river.  The 
total  Christian  population  of  Coahuila  in  1780  was  about 
8000,  of  whom  2000  were  Indians.  The  addition  of  Sal- 
"tillo  and  Parras  in  1785  doubled  the  population.  The  most 
interesting  portion  of  this  line  is  the  Texas  extremity.  In 
the  sixteenth  century  there  were  voyages  along  the  coast, 
and  overland  incursions  from  New  Mexico  and  even  from 
Florida,  but  no  settlements.  Between  1685  and  1688  La 
^alle  made  a  disastrous  attempt  to  found  a  French  colony 
inMatagorda  Bay.  This  incident,  joined  to  tal^^oTTabu- 
lous  wealth  in  the  land  of  the  Tejas  in  eastern  Texas,  in- 
duced the  Spaniards  to  send  an  expedition  in  1689  under 
Governor  Leon  of  Coahuila,  which  led,  in  the  next  few  years, 
to  the  establishing  of  missions  east  of  the  Trinity.^  These 
failed,  but  on  the  renewal  of  French  activities,  this  time 
from  New  Orleans,  several  missions  and  a  presidio  were 
founded  in  eastern  Texas  in  1716.  In  1718,  establishments 
were  made  at  San  Antonio,  not  far  from  Coahuila.  In 
1721,  a  presidio  was  placed  near  the  coast  at  Esplritu  Santo, 
and  the  eastern  settlements  (which  had  been  destroyed  by 
the  French)  were  reestablished  and  strengthened.  Be- 
tween 1745  and  1763  several  new  posts  were  founded, 
notably  in  northern  Texas,  but  the  northernmost  of  these, 
on  the  San  Gabriel  and  the  San  Sabd  rivers,  were  soon 
abandoned.  By  the  cession  of  Louisiana  to  Spain  in  1762 
the  French  peril,  the  dominating  note  in  Texas  history  up 
to  that  time,  was  removed,  and  the  eastern  settlements  were 
given  up.  In  a  few  years,  however,  many  of  the  Spanish 
settlers  returned  to  eastern  Texas.*  In  1782  there  were 
only  2600  civilized  people  in  Texas,  and  460  Christian 
Indians. 

The  beginnings  of  Nuevo  Leon  date  from  its  colonization 

*  Bolton,  The  Spanish  occupation  of  « Bolton,   Texas  in  the  middle  eigh- 

Texas,  1619-1690.  teenlh  century. 


6  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA        [Ch.  I 

by  Carabajal,  late  in  the  sixteenth  century.  Nothing  else 
occurred  that  need  be  noted  here  until  1748  when  Escandon, 
coming  from  Queretaro,  achieved  an  almost  bloodless  con- 
quest of  Nuevo  Santander.  His  work  was  remarkable  by 
reason  of  the  number  of  settlements  formed  by  him,  render- 
ing the  conquest  as  thorough  as  it  had  been  quick  and 
peaceful.  Unruly  Indians  were  soon  conquered  or  went 
elsewhere,  and  this  part  of  the  frontier  enjoyed  unusual 
prosperity. 

The  first  great  conqueror  after  Cort6s  along  the  line  lead- 
ing northwestward  to  Pimeria  Alta  was  Nuno  de  Guzmdn. 
In  1529,  he  set  out  from  Mexico  City  with  an  army  of  five 
hundred  Spaniards  and  perhaps  ten  thousand  native  allies, 
and  by  1531  he  had  passed  through  Jalisco  to  Sinaloa,  reduc- 
ing the  country  along  his  line  of  march.  At  one  stroke, 
over  half  the  territory  between  Mexico  City  and  Alta  Cah- 
fornia  had  been  traversed  and  made  known  to  the  Spaniards, 
and  much  of  it  remained  definitely  conquered.  Contem- 
porary with  this  conquest  were  the  first  northwestward 
voyages,  made  under  the  authority  of  Cortes,  one  of  whose 
ships  reached  Baja  California,  probably  at  La  Paz,  in 
1533.  Q9r+.^g  liiTTisif^lf  foiinded_a  settlements-there  in  1535, 
but  it  dijijiaLefldure;  beingwithdrawn  in  1536. 

The  romantic  adventures  of  Alvar  NlineT-^-Cabeza  de 
Vaca  became  known  at  this  time,  and  aroused  enthusiasm 
anew  for  northward  explorations.  Nunez  had  been  a 
member  of  the  ill-fated  Narvaez  expedition  to  Florida  in 
1528.  After  several  years  of  wandering  and  vicissitudes  he 
had  crossed  the  continent,  going  by  way  of  Texas,  Chihua- 
hua, and  Sonora,  to  the  Spanish  settlement  of  Culiacan, 
Sinaloa,  which  he  reached  in  1536.  He  told  of  substantial 
cities  to  the  north,  of  which  he  had  heard,  but  which  he  had 
not  seen.  His  story  was  confirmed  by  the  Franciscan, 
Marcos  de  Niza,  who  crossed  Sonora  and  Arizona  to  New 
Mexico  in  1539.  There,  from  a  distance,  he  saw  one  of  the 
seven  cities  of  Cibola  (Zuni),  really  a  wretched  native  town, 
but  which  to  his  inflamed  imagination  seemed  larger  than 
Mexico    City.     Meanwhile,  Cortes    had    equipped    a    sea 


1521]      THE  SPANISH  ADVANCE   FROM  MEXICO  CITY  7 

expedition  under  JFrancisco  de  UUoa^to  seek  the  fabled 
wealth  of  the  north!  UUoa  set  sallfrom  Acapulco  iA  1539, 
following  the  coast  of  the  mainland  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Colorado  River.  Descending  the  gulf  along  the  coast  of 
Baja  California,  he  came  to  Cape  San  Lucas,  and  went  up 
the  western  shore  to  a  few  leagues  beyond  Cerros  Island. 
He  had  rvrnyf^  T^gjg  Qahfomia  to  be  a  peninsula;  pre- 
viously it  was  believed  to  be  an  island.  Two  centuries  had 
to  elapse,  however,  before  its.  peninsularity  became  defi- 
nitely recognized.  In  the  next  year,  1540,  Coronado  led 
an  army  by  way  of  Sonora  to  New  Mexico,  and  from  there 
went  on  to  Kansas  in  a  vain  search  for  the  reputedly  rich 
province  of  Quivira.  The  principal  expedition  returned  to 
Mexico  in  1542.  Meanwhile,  two  supporting  parties  had 
made  the  first  direct  approaches  to  Alta  CaHfornia  by  way 
of  the  Colorado  River.  A  ^et  under  Hernando  de  Alarcon 
left  Acapulco  in  May,  1540,  to  cooperate  with^UoroTi^^^^^ 
expedition.  Alarc6n  reached  the^moutli  of  th^  Colorado, 
and  ascended  the  river  in  smalPboats,  but  seems  to  have 
stopped  short  of  the  Gila.  Seeing  nothing  of  Coronado 's 
expedition,  he  returned  to  his  ships,  and  sailed  back.  Late 
in  the  same  year,^Mej£horDiaz,  with  a  part  of  Coronado's 
forces  which  had^i^en  left  behind  in  vSonora,  set  out  to 
cooperate  more  difectly  than  Coronado  with  Alarc6n.  He 
reached  the  QmoradO;  and  crossed  it,  probably  at  some 
point  south  of  the  Gila.  Finding  that  Alarcon  had  departed, 
the  expedition  returned. 

Interest  in  northwestward  exploration  now  shifts  to  sea 
voyages  up  the  coast  of  the  CaHfornias.  The  most  notable 
were  the  following:  that  of  Cabrillo  ^  and  Ferrelo,  1542- 
43,  to  the  vicinity  of  the  present  Oregon-CaHfomia  line; 
Drake^s  voyage  of  1579,  including  a  stay  of  several  weeks  at 
Drake's  Bay,  a  voyage  of  which  the  Spaniards  had  informa- 
tion ;  the  annual  voyages,  after  1565,  of  the  Manila  galleons, 

^  Cabrillo  is  referred   to  in  L6pez,  to  call  him  Rodriguez,  as  L6pez  did, 

281,    as    the    pilot    Juan     Rodriguez,  that  being  the  family  name,   and   Ca- 

without  mention  of  the  name  Cabrillo.  brillo  in  all  probability  the  name  of  his 

The  full  name  being  Juan  Rodriguez  mother. 
Cabrillo,   it   would    seem   more   fitting 


8  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA        [Ch.  I 

which  passed  near  the  California  coast,  en  route  to  Acapulco, 
in  particular  the  voyage  of  Francisco  £jSi]i,  who  in  1584 
sighted  Cape  Mendocino ;  that  of  Cermeno  from  Manila 
in  1595,  resulting  in  shipwreck  at  Drake's  Bay,  named  San 
Francisco  by  Cermeiio ;  finally,  the  most  famous  of  this 
series,  that  of  General  Sebastian  Vizcain^_ijDLjL602;^3,  from 
which  dates  the  story  of  Monterey^s  excellence  as  a  port. 
This  was  the  last  notable  voyage  to  Alta  California  until 
1769.  As  a  result  of  these  voyages  the  general  trend  of  the 
California  coast  became  known,  all  ports  of  importance 
having  been  discovered,  except  the  most  important  of  all, 
that  of  San  Francisco  Bay,  and  all  of  them,  Monterey  in 
particular,  being  deemed  worthy  of  eventual  occupation, 
lest  some  other  power  seize  them.  The  name  "  Calif ornias'^ 
was  extended  northward  from  the  peninsula,  no  northern 
boundary  being  set,  unless  it  were  the  vainly  sought  Strait 
of  Anian  (as  it  came  to  be  called),  an  imaginary  body  of 
water  through  the  continent  uniting  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Pacific.  Alta  California  was  known  to  have  a  considerable 
native  population ;  but  a  more  intensive  knowledge  of  the 
land,  its  real  wealth  and  productive  possibilities  had  not  in 
fact  been  obtained,  although  they  had  been  guessed  at  by 
writers  about  the  Californias,  who  added  many  tales  of 
fabulous  wealth.  These  factors,  although  not  of  equal 
weight,  and  of  greatly  varying  interest  at  different  times, 
were  a  standing  incentive  to  further  northwestward  explora- 
tion, and  to  the  settlement  of  Alta  California,  when  the 
authorities  at  Mexico  should  find  occasion  to  undertake  such 
an  enterprise.^    It  is  noteworthy  that  the  natives  of  San  Diego, 

8  A  detailed  description  of  the  that  of  the  Manila  galleon  and  off- 
California  coast  appears  in  Gonzalez  shoots,  even  to  Spain  around  South 
(or  as  writers  have  usually  called  him,  America  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  vari- 
Cabrera  Bueno),  Navegacidn  especvla-  ous  parts  of  Asia  on  the  other.  The 
Hva  y  prdctica.  Though  not  published  route  from  Cape  Mendocino  south  to 
until  1734  it  may  be  taken  to  repre-  Acapulco  is  described  in  eleven  pages 
sent  Spanish  experience  over  a  period  (302-13).  From  this  it  appears  that 
of  nearly  two  centuries  preceding  that  the  Spaniards  had  a  detailed  and  fairly 
date.  It  is  a  technical  work  on  navi-  accurate  knowledge  of  the  coast, 
gation,  but  one  of  its  five  parts  is  Gonzalez's  language  would  imply  that 
devoted  to  descriptions  of  sailing  routes,  the  region  between  Cape  Mendocino 
and  of  lands  along  these  routes,  though  and  Monterey  must  often  have  been 
always  from  the  standpoint  of  the  sighted  by  the  galleon.  According  to 
navigator.     The     routes     treated     are  him    also,    the    galleon    must    usually 


1521]     THE  SPANISH  ADVANCE  FROM  MEXICO  CITY  9 

Catalina  Island,  and  Ventura  told  Cabrillo  that  there  were 
other  white  men  in  the  interior.  The  Indians  of  the  Bay 
of  San  Quentin  and  of  San  Diego  told  like  stories  to  Viz- 
caino. They  probably  were  referring  in  the  first  instance 
to  the  Coronado  expedition,  possibly  to  its  offshoots,  the 
Alarcon  and  Diaz  expeditions,  and  in  the  second,  to  Onate's 
expedition,  then  in  New  Mexico.  These  statements  might 
well  have  induced  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  practicable 
route  to  the  Californias  from  Sonora. 

The  Onate  expedition^  4ust  referred  to,  set  out  from  San 
Bartolome,  Chihuahua,  in  1598,  to  conquer  N^W  MpyiVo^ 
and  achieved  its  object.  In  one  of  its  ramifications  this 
expedition  extended  Spanish  knowledge  of  the  lower  Col- 
orado River  country.  In  1604-5,  Onate  marched  west- 
ward along  Bill  Williams  Fork  to  the_i?)o1oradn,  descended 
the  latter  to  its  mouth,  and  then  retraced  his  steps  to  New 
Mexico.  According  to  Bancroft,  this  journey  had  been 
unknown  to  nineteenth  century  writers  before  himself.® 
There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  this  and  other  notable 
expeditions  referred  to  in  this  chapter  were  well  known  to 
Spaniards  of  the  eighteenth  century.-^^  Hence,  mention  of 
them  here  is  appropriate ;  they  were  a  factor  affecting  the 
question  of  a  route  from  Sonora  to  the  Californias.  Onate 
reported  that  a  strait  existed  between  the  Californias  and 
the  mainland. ^^ 

have   seen   the   coast   from    Monterey  route  to  the  Californias  by  way  of  the 

south.     After  describing  the  bay  and  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers.     Nmnerous 

even  the  land  at  Monterey,  Gonzalez  other  references  might  be  given, 
says:    "This  port  is  in  37°  north  lati-  "Renewal  of  the   belief   that   Cali- 

tude  and  is  a  good  port  for  relief  of  fornia  was  an  island  may  not  have  been 

the  ships  from  China  (the  galleon)  on  due  to   Oiiate  so   much  as  to   certain 

account  of  its  being  the  first  land  that  memorials  of  Nicolds  de  Cardona.     It 

they  see   (reconocen)   when  they  come  has  been  traced  by  Bancroft  to  Ascen- 

to  New  Spain."  si6n,  a  friar  on  the  Vizcaino  expedition 

9  Bancroft,    Ariz,    and    New    Mex.,  of   1602-3.     The   earliest   writing   now 

157.  extant  of  Ascension  on  the  point  is  his 

^0  Both    the    Coronado    and    Onate  memorial  of  October  12,  1620,  in  which 

expeditions     were     referred     to     quite  he   implies    that    the    Californias    had 

casually,  as    if  they  were  well-known  recently    been    discovered    to    be    an 

facts,  in  a  letter  to  the  viceroy  in  1737  island.     Referring  to  the  Gulf  of  Cali- 

by   Anza's   father,    a   presidio    captain  fornia,    Ascensi6n    says :     hasta    agora 

in    Sonora.     C-178.     This    letter    was  se  ha  entendido  que  aquella  era  ensenada 

considered  by  the  authorities  in  Mexico  6  seno  grande  que  alii  hiciese  la  mar,  y 

and  Spain  at  that  time,  and  again  in  no  mar  corriente  y  seguida  coma  lo  es. 

1772,  with  relation  to  proposals  of  the  In    Coleccidn    de    documentos    inSditos 

Anzas,  father  and  son,  for  opening  a  relativos  al  descvhrimiento,  conquista  y 


10  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA        [Ch.  I 

From  Ofiate's  time  until  late  in  the  century  Spanish 
explorations  northwestward  seem  to  have  been  confined 
to  Baja  California  and  the  Gulf,  and  very  little  was  accom- 
pHshed.  As  far  as  memorials  and  governmental  plans  went, 
the  Californias  held  a  prominent  place  in  the  seventeenth 
century.  Friars  petitioned  for  a  mission  field  there ;  navi- 
gators and  traders  offered  to  get  information  about  the 
Californias,  cartographical  and  otherwise,  and  to  found 
settlements,  all  at  their  own  expense,  in  return  for  which 
they  asked  a  license  to  fish  for  pearls,  usually  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  others;  and  the  government  was  continuously 
desirous  of  occupying  the  territory  as  a  defensive  measure. 
Many  voyages  were  made  to  the  eastern  shore  of  the  penin- 
sula, the  greater  number  of  which,  it  seems  probable,  have 
not  thus  far  been  made  known.  The  real  object  of  the 
voyagers  was-aot-lg  found  settlements,  but JjcLaefik-psarls ; 
the  terms  of  the  contract  were  butalufe  to  get  the  more 
remunerative  advantage  of  the  license.  When  at  length 
it    seemed   clear   that   nothing   of   consequence   would   be 

organizacidn  de  las  antiguaa  posesiones  Lucar  la  Mayor,  Sumiller  de  Corps  de  su 

espaflolas  de  America  y  Oceania,  VIII,  Mag^    Gran    Canciller   de    las    Indias. 

637-74  at  546.     The  recent  discovery  The  document  is  dated  June  24,  1^2, 

to  which  Ascension  referred  was  prob-  Madrid,  and  is  signed  with  lli(i  name 

ably  that  of  Juan  de   Iturbe   in    1615,  and    rubric    of    Nicolds    de    Cardona. 

and  not  Onate's   of    a    decade  before.  Part  of  the  document,  the^'Ketdctdn," 

Iturbe  was  in  charge  of  a  vessel  en-  appears    in    Coleccidn    de    documentos 

gaged  in  the  pearl-fisheries,  in  pursu-  in4ditos  relativos  at,  despuhrimiento,  con- 

ance  of  a  contract  obtained  from  the  quista   y   organizacidn   de   las   cmtiguas 

king  by  Tomds  de  Cardona  and  others  posesiones     espanolas     de     America     y 

in  1611   (not  1610,  as  Bancroft  says).  Oceania,  IX,  30-42.     The  most  signif- 

C-20.     Iturbe  went  to  the  head  of  the  icant  part,  however,  namely  fortj^-two 

Giilf»  and  believed  he  saw  a  strait  to  ^aags     with     individual     descriptions, 

northward.     This     voyage     led     to     a  has    not    yet    been    published.     These 

number   of   memorials   by    Nicolds   de  maps,     which     are     most     graphically 

Cardona,  of  which  I  have  seen  nine,  represented,     must     have     carried     a 

between  the  years  1617  and  1643.     The  great  deal  of  weight  as  affecting  geo- 

earlier  ones  were  probably  known  to  graphical  beliefs.     Some  of  the  docu- 

Ascensi6n,  or  at  least  the  results  of  the  ments  noted  in  my  Catalogue  show  that 

Iturbe  voyage.     But  perhaps  the  most  attention    was    paid    to    the    Cardona 

important   of   the   Cardona   memorials  memorials,  e.g.  a  real  cedula  of  March 

as  affecting  resumption  of  belief  in  the  15,   1635,   adding  one  of  the  Cardona 

insularity  of  the  Californias  is  a  manu-  memorials    to    the    expediente    arising 

script     in     the     Biblioteca     NacionaU  out  of  the  cedula  of   August    2,    1628 

Madrid,    entitled    Descripciones,    Geo-  (cf.  infra,  note  12),  so  that  the  viceroy 

graphicas,  E  hydrographicas  de  muchas  might  inform  himself  about  the   Cali- 

tierras'  y  Mares  del  norte  y  sur,  en  las  fornias,   and   call  for   memorials    from 

Indias,    en   especial   del   descubrimiento  others  who  might  wish  to  discuss  that 

del  Reyno  de  la  California  .  .  .  por    d  subject.     C-37.     Photographs    of    the 

Capp«n  y  Cabo  Nicolds  de  Cardona  .  .  .  entire    Cardona    manuscript    of    June 

dirigidas  al  Ex^  S'^.   D.  Caspar  de  Guz-  24,  1632,  are  in  the  Academy  of  Pacific 

m^n,   Conde  de  Olivares,   Duque  de  S.  Coast  History. 


1521]      THE  SPANISH  ADVANCE  FROM  MEXICO  CITY         11 

accomplished  by  private  initiative,  the  government  je- 
solved  to  assume  the  expense.  The  ^Otondo  expedition 
resulted,  a  colony  being  founded  in  1683,  which  failed, 
however,  after  an  existence  of  two  years.  This  was  the 
most  successful  attempt  until  1697,  when,  at  length,  a 
permanent  settlement  was  made.-^^ 

The  age  of  the  conquistadores  along  the  northwestward 
line  had  passed,  but  the  work  in  its  second  and  third  phases 
had  been  steadily  proceeding.    -Guzman  founded  a  settle- 


"  Very  little  historical  work  has 
been  done  with  regard  to  explorations 
and  discoveries  in  the  Calif ornias  in 
the  seventeenth  century.  Bancroft 
skimmed  through  a  few  documents, 
and  nobody  has  added  much  to  what 
he  said.  The  following  documents  of 
my  Catalogue  might  serve  as  a  con- 
venient starting  point  for  further 
investigations  in  this  field :  C-15,  17, 
20,  21,  24,  26,  27,  30-63,  65,  66.  Ten 
of  these  are  great  testimonios,  and  the 
rest,  for  the  most  part,  memorials  of 
individuals,  and  royal  decrees.  As  an 
example  of  the  materials  that  go  to 
make  up  a  testimonio,  the  documents  of 
C-27  may  be  cited,  omitting  oaths 
taken  by  notaries : 

1.  1628.  [Aug.]  2.  The  king,  by 
Andres  de  Rocas,  to  the  president  and 
oidores  of  the  Audiencia  of  Mexico. 
This  recites  Vizcaino's  voyage  of 
1602-3  to  Alta  CaUfornia,  and  alludes 
to  the  slight  knowledge  that  Spain 
still  had  of  that  land.  The  Audiencia 
is  ordered  to  obtain  reports  about  it 
from  Fray  Antonio  de  la  Ascension 
and  others,  and  to  advise  the  king  in 
^reat  detail  as  to  the  best  manner  of 
making  further  discoveries,  in  case 
it  is  deemed  wise  to  make  them. 

The    other    documents    are    the    re- 
quested memorials,  as  follows : 

2.  1629.  May  20.  Ascensi6n  to 
the  Audiencia. 

3.  1629.     June  8. 
May  5. 


Ascension. 
Juan  Lopez  de 


May  25. 


Juan  Lopez  de 
May  27.  Gonzalo  de  Fran- 


4.  1629. 
Vicufia. 

5.  1629. 
Vicuna. 

6.  1629. 
<5ia. 

7.  1629.  June  15.  Martin  de  Lezama. 

8.  1629.     June   23.     Lope    de  Ar- 
guelles  Quinonel. 

9.  1629.     July  3.     Juan  de  Iturbe. 
10.   1629.  July  30.  Henrique  Marti- 
nez. 


^    11.  [1629.]  —  Sebastian  Gutierrez. 
>    12.  [1629(?).]   —  Alonso   Ortiz    de 
Sandoval. 

V  13.   1630.  Dec.  22.  Conde  del  Valle. 
.     14.    1632.     Mar.  22.     Ascension. 

V  15.   1632.     Sept.  30.     Esteban  Car- 
bonel  de  Valenzuela. 

V  16.   1632.     Nov.    19.     Diego    de  la 
Naba. 

This  is  one  of  the  smaller  testimonios, 
aggregating  157  pages,  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  size  of  the  page 
used  (31  by  21|  centimetres)  and  the 
practice  of  writing  testimonios  without 
leaving  much  margin  or  wide  spacing 
enabled  the  scribe  to  get  as  much  on  a 
page  as  we  might  expect  to-day  on  the 
average-sized  page  of  print.  Among 
noteworthy  features  of  the  testimony 
is  the  fact  that  Nicolds  de  Cardona  is 
not  referred  to  as  commanding  ex- 
peditions which  he  himself  claimed  to 
have  led ;  Juan  de  Itiirbe  is  named  as 
commanding  them,  and  Cardona  is 
not  even  mentioned. 

As  examples  of  the  larger  testimonios 
C-39-41  may  be  cited.  The  three 
aggregate  1888  pages,  all  concerning 
proceedings  against  Francisco  de  Ver- 
gara  and  Francisco  Esteban  Carbonel. 
Vergara  had  been  authorized  by  the 
viceroy,  the  Marqu6s  de  Cadereita, 
to  engage  in  pearl  fishing,  and  make 
discoveries  in  the  Californias,  but  he 
transferred  his  rights  to  Carbonel.  The 
case  arose  over  the  following  charges 
against  Carbonel :  that  he  was  a 
Frenchman;  that  he  had  Frenchmen 
with  him,  some  of  them  from  New- 
France,  who  said  that  a  strait  through 
the  continent  existed ;  and  that  he 
had  secretly  been  building  a  very 
large  boat  on  the  Rio  Santiago.  It 
was  thought  that  he  planned  to  seek 
the  strait,  sail  through  to  France,  and 
thus  open  to  that  country  a  passage 
to  the  Spanish  possessions  of  the  Paci- 
fic. 


12  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA        [Ch.  I 

ment  as  far  north  as  San  Miguel  de  Culiacan,  Sinaloa,  in 
1531.  By  1550  an  audiencia  for  the  government  of  Nueva 
GaHcia,  the  name  of  Guzman's  conquests,  was  estabHshed ; 
this  was  located  for  a  time  at  Compostela,  but  soon  after- 
ward moved  to  Guadalajara.  Lopez,  writing  between  1571 
and  1574,  said  that  there  were  as  many  as  1500  Spaniards 
in  Nueva  Galicia,  which  at  the  time  included  most  of  New 
Spain  north  of  Mexico  City.^^  There  were  thirty-one  or 
thirty-two  settlements,  of  which  fifteen  or  sixteen  were 
mining  camps.  Guadalajara  was  the  largest  place,  with  a 
Spanish  population  of  150.  The  only  settlement  in  what 
later  became  Sinaloa  was  San  Miguel  de  Culiacan  with 
about  thirty  Spaniards.  There  were  no  Spaniards  in 
Sonora.^^  An  increase  in  the  population  of  Sinaloa  came  in 
1596,  when  the  presidio  of  San  Felipe  de  Sinaloa,  the  first 
in  that  province,  was  estabhshed,  with  a  garrison  of  twenty- 
five  men.  Meanwhile,  the  Franciscans,  Dominicans,  and 
Jesuits  had  been  making  converts,  so  that  the  region  south  of 
Sinaloa  had  become  Christian,  nominally  at  least,  by  the 
end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and,  after  futile  revolts,  was 
definitely  reduced  to  the  Spanish  crown.  The  erection  of  a 
bishopric  in  Michoacdn  in  1537  may  be  regarded  as  a  first 
step  in  the  third  phase  of  the  conquest.  So,  despite  the 
scant  white  population  of  Nueva  Galicia,  that  part  of  it 
lying  south  of  Sinaloa  was  fast  losing  the  characteristics 
of  a  frontier  province. 

Up  to  1591  not  many  conversions  had  been  made  in 
Sinaloa,^^  but  in  that  year  the  Jesuits  reached  there,  and  the 
real  work  began.  Father  Zapata's  report  of  1678  shows 
that  by  that  time  Sinaloa  had  been  thoroughly  reduced. 
The  province  had  been  Christianized,  and  had  a  white 
population  of  600.  In  addition,  there  were  many  more  of 
part  Spanish  blood;    at  San  Felipe  de  Sinaloa  alone  there 

w  The  provinces  as  he  named  them  them.  California  was  correctly  de- 
were  those  of  Guadalajara,  Xalisco,  scribed  as  a  peninsula. 
Zacatecas,  Chiametla,  Culiacdn,  Nueva  "  L6pez,  260-82. 
Vizcaya,  Cinaloa,  Cibola,  Tuzdn,  Pen6n  "  L6pez,  276,  says  that  there  were 
de  Acuco,  Llanos  de  las  Vacas,  Quivira,  over  2000  peaceful  Indians  at  San 
and  California.  Only  the  first  six  Miguel  de  Culiacdn,  and  these  rep- 
named    had    Spanish    settlements    in  resent,  very  likely,  the    number    that 

had  been  converted. 


1521]      THE  SPANISH  ADVANCE  FROM  MEXICO  CITY         13 

were  1200  of  Spanish  or  mixed  blood.  The  missionaries  and 
civihans  were  supported  by  two  presidios,  Fuerte  de  Mon- 
tesclaros  having  been  added  in  1610.  The  occupation  of 
Sonora  did  not  begin  until  early  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
the  successful  military  campaigns  of  Diego  Martinez  de 
Hurdaide  paving  the  way.  The  Jesuits  took  charge  of 
mission  work,  and  made  rapid  progress.  By  1678  there 
were  twenty-eight  missions  in  Sonora,  serving  seventy-two 
villages  with  a  combined  papulation  of  about  40,000. 
There  were  perhaps  500  people  of  Spanish  or  part  Spanish 
blood,  a  large  proportion  of  them  engaged  in  mining. 

The  conquest  had  been  carried  almost  to  the  limits  of 
modern  Sonora  by  way  of  the  Sonora  valley.  This  route 
led  the  Spaniards  somewhat  inland,  leaving  a  large  stretch 
of  coast  to  the  south  and  west  as  yet  unoccupied.  In  this 
district  were  the  Seri  Indians,  destined  to  cause  trouble 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  eighteenth  century.  North- 
east of  the  Sonora  valley  was  a  little-known  region  whence 
was  to  come  an  even  more  terrible  enemy  —  the  savage 
Apaches.  Due  to  the  hostility  of  these  two  peoples,  Sonora 
was  destined  to  remain  a  frontier  province.  Until  near  the 
close  of  the  seventeenth  century  another  district  of  Sonora, 
offering  less  difficulties  than  the  other  two,  though  by  no 
means  an  easy  field  for  conquest,  remained  open.  This 
was  the  region  between  the  Altar  and  Gila  rivers,  known  as 
Pimeria  Alt  a,  beyond  which  to  the  northwest  lay  Alta 
California.  A  beginning  was  made  there  by  the  entrance 
of  the  Jesuits  in  1687.  Thenceforth,  by  comparison  with 
earlier  years,  the  Spanish  advance  overland  was  to  be  very 
slow  and  increasingly  difficult. 


CHAPTER   II 

EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  BY  WAY  OF  THE   COLORADO 
AND   GILA  RIVERS,    1687-1752 

There  is  abundant  evidence  that  an  advance,  at  least 
as  far  as  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  was  officially  planned 
for  three-quarters  of  a  century  before  the  Anza  expedition 
of  1774.  This  raises  the  questions  why  such  an  advance 
should  have  been  considered  desirable  by  Spain,  and  why  it 
was  so  long  delayed.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to 
give  evidence  which  shall  answer  both  questions,  although 
much  will  be  said  regarding  them  in  later  chapters  as  well. 
Causes  for  such  an  advance  may  be  summarized,  in  inverted 
order  of  their  importance,  before  proceeding  to  the  proof, 
with  an  indication,  also,  of  what  was  accomplished  in  the 
period  covered  by  this  chapter. 

Conquest  in  itself  would  not  have  induced  such  a  move- 
ment. The  most  cursory  examination  of  the  documents 
would  satisfy  one  as  to  that.  Conquests  involved  ex- 
penditure, and  it  will  appear  clearly  that  Spain  was  often 
unwiUing  to  go  to  expense,  even  where  prospects  of  a  good 
return  were  promising.  Mere  vainglory  of  conquest  was, 
therefore,  no  reason  at  all  for  an  advance.  Nor  was  the 
fabled  wealth  of  the  north  any  longer  a  sufficient  lure,  as 
in  the  past,  to  cause  an  expedition,  certainly  not  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  Too  many  times  the  marvels  of  the 
north  had  failed  to  materialize.  Nevertheless,  this  in- 
centive plays  a  part  in  the  documents,^  although  not  seriously 
considered  by  governmental  authorities. 

Conversion  of  Indians  to  Christianity  is  constantly  al- 
leged as  an  object  of  prime  importance.  Writers  who  have 
used  but  one  or  two  documents  are  apt  to  be  misled  in 

1  For  example,  in  C-178. 
14 


/^ 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  15 

consequence,  and  to  assert  that  Spain's  conquests  were 
actuated  primarily  by  Christian  motives.^  Unquestionably 
this  was  the  principal  motive  of  the  missionary  orders,  but 
was  hardly  at  all  a  motive  of  the  government.^  It  was 
merely  a  means  to  an  end,  just  as  were  pr^sidial  troops  and 
settlements,  not  itself  an  end ;  the  government  did  not 
undergo  expense  for  missions,  unless  it  had  some  other 
object  in  view.  As  an  agency,  missions  were  very  im- 
portant; for  example,  to  pave -the  way  for  a  proposed  con- 
quest, to  hold  the  more  securely  an  already  conquered 
territory,  or  to  take  steps  toward  providing  a  labor  supply 
for  existing  or  future  Spanish '  colonies."*  Much  was  ac- 
complished by  the  Jesuits  in  this  era,  notably  the  conversion 
of  large  parts  of  Baja  California  and  Pimeria  Alta,  together 
with  journeys  of  exploration  and  pastoral  visitation  to  the 
Colorado  and  Gila. 

Definite  discovery  of  wealth  might  induce  governmental 
expenditure  for  a  conquest.  Stories  of  wealth  had  to  be 
very  convincing,  however,  before  the  government  would 
take  a  hand,  and  save  in  the  case  of  mineral  wealth  in  gold 
or  silver,  it  probably  would  not  move  even  then.  Gold 
and  silver  mining  meant  an  increase  in  royal  revenues; 
for  example,  by  the  royal  fifth  exacted  oi;i  products  of  pre- 
cious metals,  or  by  the  sale  of  quicksilver.  An  official 
advance  might  then  follow  an  earlier  one  on  the  part  of 
Spanish  miners.  Tales  of  mineral  wealth  were  frequent 
in  this  era,  and  often  the  government  displayed  interest,  but 
the  only  striking  discovery  was  that  of  the  Arizonac  mine. 

A  second  cause  for  frontier  advance  was  the  fear  lest  some 

2  For  example,  see  Guppy,  Solomon  less,  the  object  for  which  alone  expenses 

Islands,  lQ4i.     In  stating  "  the  principal  were   incurred   was   political."     Again, 

object"    of    the    Mendana    expedition  II,    6:     "The   men   who    presumed   to 

which  discovered  the  Solozaoxu  Islands  guide  the  destinies  of  Spain  then,  and 

in  1567,  Guppy  says:    "It  was  for  the  as  a  rule  ever  since,  cared  naught  for 

propagation    of    the     Christian     faith  the  success  of  Religion  or  the  welfare 

amongst  the  peoples  of  the  unknown  of  its  ministers,  except  in  so  far  as  both 

islands  of  the  West  that  this  expedi-  could    be    used    to    promote    political 

tion  was  dispatched  from  the  shores  of  schemes." 

Peru."  *Ibid.,   II,   4:     "The  experience  of 

» Englehardt,  I,  142-43,  says:   "The  two  centuries  in  Lower  California  had 

kings,   indeed,    desired   the   conversion  demonstrated  that,  while  soldiers  might 

of    the    Indians    to    Christianity,    and  defend     the     country  against    foreign 

frequently    declared    this    to    be    the  enemies,     they     could     not    transform 

chief  aim  of  the  conquest ;    neverthe-  savages  into  loyal  subjects." 


X 


16  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  II 

other  European  power  might  occupy  lands  that  would 
threaten,  those  already  possessed  by  Spain.  Many  docu- 
ments will  be  adduced,  and  more  might  be,  to  show  that 
Spain^s  fear  of  foreign  enemies  in  the  Pacific  was  constant. 
Whatever  other  countries  did  or  planned  to  do,  Spain  was 
unceasingly  distrustful.  Mere  unauthenticated  reports  of 
foreign  aggression  were  enough  to  cause  the  government  to 
go  to  considerable  expense  in  this  period,  whereas  the  most 
exaggerated  guesses  at  the  wealth  of  unoccupied  lands  failed 
to  induce  the  expenditure  of  a  peso.  There  were  many  proj- 
ects of  conquest  on  this  account,  but  they  got  no  farther  at 
this  time  than  foundation  of  presidios  within  territory  already 
occupied,  although  this  was  a  forward  step  by  no  means  to  be 
despised.  What  might  have  happened,  if  definite  proof  of 
foreign  aggression  had  been  received,  is  a  question,  but  such 
proof  was  never  obtained.  Suspicion  there  was,  always.  In 
this  period  it  was  directed  primarily  against  the  French. 

It  was  necessary  that  the  two  last-named  factors,  but 
especially  that  of  foreign  aggression,  should  be  combined 
with  another,  if  they  were  to  result  in  important  action ;  a 
man  must  be  found  of  sufficient  energy  and  ability  to  carry 
plans  into  execution.  Leaders,  like  missions,  may  be  re- 
garded as  an  agency  of  conquest,  rather  than  a  cause,  but 
on  them  depended  in  more  than  usual  degree  whether  under- 
takings should  be  executed,  the  causes  being  always  exis- 
tent. Hindrances  to  conquest  were  such  that  none  but  an 
extraordinary  leader,  with  such  scant  means  as  Spain  was 
willing  to  supply,  could  hope  to  succeed.  No  such  individual 
appeared  at  this  time. 


Indian  wars  were  a  continual  factor  tending  to  check  the 
Spanish  northwestward  advance.  The  Apaches  began  their 
raids  into  Sonora  before  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
although  Chihuahua  to  the  east  was  their  principal  ob- 
ject of  attack.  The  presidio  of  Corodeguache  de  Fronteras 
was  established  in  northeastern  Sonora  as  a  check  against 
them.  Janos  and  Casas  Grandes  in  Chihuahua  were 
founded  to  cooperate  with  it.     In  1695,  there  was  a  serious 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  17 

revolt  of  the  Pimas  in  Pimeria  Alta.  In  1696-97,  Indians 
of  the  eastern  Sonora  missions  were  in  revolt.  The  year 
1699  saw  the  beginning  of  Seri  wars  in  the  region  between 
the  Yaqui  and  Sonora  rivers. 

Yet,  toward  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century  and  in 
the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth,  not  a  little  was  done  in 
the  way  of  exploration  and  reports  with  regard  to  an 
advance  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers.  These  events 
were  very  closely  related  to  the  affairs  of  Baja  California, 
some  mention  of  which  may  first  be  given.  After  repeated 
failures  a  permanent  settlement  had  been  made  in  Baja 
California  in  1697,  success  being  attained  by  the  Jesuit 
order  under  the  leadership  of  Father  Juan  Maria  Salva- 
tierra.  By  the  terms  of  their  contract  the  Jesuits  were  to 
have  entire  control  over  the  province,  spiritual,  economic, 
civil,  and  even  military.  Through  the  institution  of  the 
pious  fund,^  supplemented  by  government  aid,  Baja  Cal- 
ifornia did  not  suffer  greatly  from  lack  of  funds  under  Jesuit 
rule,  although  there  were  several  occasions  when  abandon- 
ment of  the  missions  was  narrowly  averted.  Its  develop- 
ment, however,  was  greatly  hindered  by  three  factors : 
opposition  by  the  Jesuits  to  development  of  a  sort  that 
would  bring  in  many  Spanish  settlers,  or  lessen  their  own 
authority ;  sterility  of  the  peninsula ;  and  difficulty  of  the 
voyage  across  the  Gulf.  The  ground  for  Jesuit  opposition 
was  that  Spanish  settlements  would  interfere  with  conver- 
sions. Aside  from  that,  however,  the  other  two  factors 
were  enough  in  themselves  to  prevent  a  great  development 
of  the  peninsula.  For  eight  hundred  miles  it  stretches 
out,  a  mountainous,  arid  waste,  —  unfit  for  mining,  stock- 
raising,  or  agriculture,  in  Spanish  colonial  days,  on  any 
but  a  modest  scale.  Baja  California  could  not  serve  as  a 
base  of  supply  for  more  northerly  lands.     Rather  it  stood  in 

'  The  pious  fund  had  its  origin  in  objects  and  mode  of  accumulation,  i.e. 

1697  in  sums  given  by  private  individ-  by  gifts.     For  a  summary  of  its  history 

uals  for   propagation   of   the   faith   in  down  to  the  present  day,  for  the  Mexi- 

the   Californias.     It   was   managed   by  can  government  still  owes  an  annual 

the    Jesuits    until    their    expulsion    in  sum    of    $43,050.99    to    the    Catholic 

1767,  after  which  it  became  a  branch  authorities     of     Alta     California,     see 

of  the  reaZ /laciendo,  retaining,  however,  Englehardt,   I,   595-99.      Cf.  chap.  V, 

its   original    characteristics    as   regards  n.  78. 


18  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  II 

need  of  aid,  which  had  to  come  by  sea,  unless  a  land  route 
could  be  found.  The  severity  of  storms  in  the  Gulf,  and 
the  likelihood  of  shipwreck  were  such  that,  despite  the  short- 
ness of  the  voyage,  a  land  route  was  desirable,  even  though 
involving  a  detour  around  the  head  of  the  Gulf  .^ 

Father  Eusebio  Kino  of  the  Jesuit  order  had  served  in 
Baja  California  diimig  Dtondo's  unsuccessful  attempt  of 
1683-85  to  found  a  colony  there;  and  he  never  ceased, 
thereafter,  to  be  interested  in  the  Calif ornias.  It  was 
Kino  who  inspired  Salvatierra  to  make  the  attempt  which 
led  to  the  Jesuit  entry  into  Baja  California  in  1697.  After 
exploring  the  Gila  and  Colorado  valleys.  Kino  became 
interested  in  the  northern  lands  as  well,  hoping  to  reach 
Monterey.  He  trusted  that  the  Manila  galleon  might  be 
ordered  to  stop  there  and  send  goods  overland  to  Sonora  ; 
and  he  grew  to  believe  that  a  settlement  should  be  founded 
on  the  Colorado  River,  to  serve  as  a  base  for  operations 
against  the  Apaches  and  Moquis,  and  for  the  conquest  of  the 
Calif  ornias  and  the  lands  between  Sonora  and  New  Mexico. 
Yet,  aside  from  his  missionary  zeal  for  conversions,  the 
development  of  a  supply-route  from  Sonora  to  Baja  Cali- 
fornia may  be  regarded  as  his  most  immediate  object,  and 
this  too  was  keenly  desired  by  Salvatierra.  This  project 
was  the  result  of  Kino's  explorations  in  Pimeria  Alta. 

« In  1768  it  took  Gdlvez  forty  days  going  outside  the  cape,  as  the  Philip- 
to  go  from  San  Bias  to  Baja  California,  pine  galleon  did  without  encountering 
a  voyage  of  less  than  a  hundred  leagues.  storms,  and  the  return  made  by  cross- 
In  the  same  year  the  San  Carlos  and  ing  to  the  coast  of  Sinaloa  and  follow- 
the  San  Antonio  required  nearly  three  ing  down  the  coast.  C-1075.  Gdlvez's 
months  for  the  voyage,  after  which  statement  is  borne  out  by  the  facts. 
they  had  to  be  careened  and  repaired.  Instances  need  not  be  multiplied  here ; 
Gdlvez  felt  that  voyages  to  the  Call-  one  has  only  to  note  voyages  men- 
fornias  should  be  made  at  particular  tioned  in  Bancroft,  N.  M.  St.  &  Tex.,  I. 
seasons  so  as  to  avoid  dangerous  Otondo's  voyage  of  1683  may  be  cited 
storms.  After  referring  to  difficulties  as  an  illustration  of  what  often  hap- 
of  Alta  California  voyages  on  this  pened.  Otondo  spent  over  two  months 
account,  he  said  that  it  was  worse  yet  trying  to  get  across  the  Gulf,  and  then 
in  the  Gulf,  owing  to  the  added  danger  did  it  in  one  night,  although  it  took 
of  shipwreck,  for  there  were  many  him  three  days  more  before  he  was 
islands  there.  Gdlvez,  Informe,  141-  able  to  approach  the  coast.  The 
47 ;  also  C-1834,  Writing  to  the  Jesuits  lost  five  vessels  between  1712 
viceroy  on  this  subject,  September  8,  and  1717,  and  yet  another  was  wrecked 
1768,  Gdlvez  said  that  voyages  to  the  but  saved.  These  are  but  a  few  in- 
peninsula  had  always  been  difficult  on  stances  of  the  many  mentioned  in 
account  of  storms.  He  suggested  that,  the  same  volume  of  Bancroft. 
in    future,    they   should    be   rnade    by 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  19 

In  1687  Kino  had  established  the  mission  Dolores  on 
one  of  the  upper  branches  of  the  Sonora  River,  the  initial 
step  in  the  advance  across  Pimeria  Alta.  In  the  next 
quarter  century  he  and  his  companions  pushed  the  frontier 
of  missionary  work  and  exploration  from  this  outpost  to 
the  Gila  and  lower  Colorado  rivers.  By  1695  Kino  had 
established  a  chain  of  missions  up  and  down  the  valley  of 
the  Altar  River,  San  Ignacio,  Tubutama,  Caborca,  Coco- 
spera,  Santa  Maria  Suamca,  and  others.  In  1691,  accom- 
panied by  Father  Salvatierra,  he  began  his  expeditions  in 
the  valley  of  the  Gila,  going  as  far  as  Tumacdcori,  an  Indian 
village  on  the  Santa  Cruz.  Three  years  later  he  descended 
the  Santa  Cruz  to  Casa  Grande.  In  1697  he  went  again  to 
Casa  Grande,  accompanied  by  a  guard  of  soldiers  from 
Front  eras  under  Captain  Bernal.  In  the  following  year 
he  went  to  the  Gila,  and  returned  across  Papagueria,  by 
way  of  Sonoita,  Caborca,  and  the  Altar  valley.  In  1699  he 
went  to  Sonoita,  continued  northward  east  of  the  Gila 
Range,  and  reached  the  Gila  River,  which  he  ascended  to 
Casa  Grande. 

Kino  had  come  to  America  in  the  belief  that  California 
was  a  peninsula,  but,  under  the  influence  of  current  teach- 
ings, had  accepted  the  doctrine  that  it  was  an  island.  Dur- 
ing his  last  journey  to  the  Gila,  however,  he  had  been  given 
some  blue  shells,  such  as  he  had  seen  on  the  western  coast 
of  Baja  California,  and  nowhere  else.  He  now  reasoned  that 
California  must  after  all  be  a  peninsula,  and  that  it  might 
be  possible  to  find  a  land  route  Over  which  to  send  supplies 
to  Salvatierra's  struggling  missions.  To  test  this  view 
was  the  principal  object  of  his  later  explorations.  In  1700 
he  for  the  first  time  descended  the  Gila  to  its  junction  with 
the  Colorado.  In  the  following  year,  accompanied  by 
Salvatierra,  he  tried  to  reach  the  head  of  the  Gulf  by  going 
up  the  coast  from  Sonoita.  FaiHng  in  this,  he  went  to  the 
Gila  junction,  descended  the  Colorado  nearly  to  its  mouth, 
and  crossed  over  on  a  raft.  In  1702  he  again  descended  the 
Colorado,  this  time  reaching  the  Gulf.  He  had  now  proved, 
to  his  own  satisfaction  at  least,  that  California  no  es  ysla, 


20  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  II 

sino  penisla.  Meanwhile,  Kino  and  his  companions  had 
pushed  the  missionary  frontier  to  the  Gila.  In  1700  he 
founded  the  mission  of  San  Javier  del  Bac,  and  within  the 
next  two  years  those  of  Tumacacori  and  Guebavi,  all  in 
the  Santa  Cruz  valley  and  within  modern  Arizona.  Kino's 
exploring  tours  were  also  itinerant  missions,  and  in  the 
course  of  them  he  baptized  and  taught  in  numerous  villages, 
up  and  down  the  Gila  and  Colorado,  and  throughout 
Pimeria  Alt  a. 

Kino's  work  and  his  reports  aroused  new  interest  in 
northwestward  expansion.  The  map  which  he  made  of 
his  explorations,  published  in  1701,  was  not  improved  upon 
for  more  than  a  century.  The  principal  writing  of  Father 
Kino  was  his  Favores  Celestiales,  which  constitutes  a  his- 
tory of  his  life-work  on  the  frontier.  It  was  written 
at  the  mission  Dolores  at  different  times  within  a  period 
embracing  more  than  a  decade.  The  first  part  was  finished 
in  December,  1699,  and  was  carried  to  Rome  in  1701  by  the 
Jesuit  procurators  Bernardo  Rolandegui  and  Nicolas  de 
Vera.7 

It  was  just  about  at  that  time  that  governmental  interest 
in  the  Californias  began  to  reawaken.  This  cannot  be 
traced  directly  to  Kino,  but  the  inference  that  his  memorials 
were  the  moving  cause  of  action  is  so  strong  that  it  cannot 
reasonably  be  doubted.  Burriel  says  that  no  attention  was 
paid  in  Madrid  to  the  earliest  reports  of  the  settlement,  but 
that  affairs  took  a  new  turn  on  the  accession  of  Philip  V, 
who  as  a  result  of  private  advices  brought  the  matter  before 
the  Council  of  the  Indies.  Royal  orders  followed,  dated 
July  17,  1701,  that  all  possible  aid  should  be  given  the  new 
establishments;    that  the  royal  treasury  should  pay  6000 

7  The    foregoing    sketch    of    Kino's  For    an    account    of    the    discovery, 

work  was  written  by  Professor  Bolton,  identification,     and     contents     of     the 

who   based  it  on  Kino's  Favores  celes-  work    see    Bolton,    Father    Kino's    lost 

tiales,  a   manuscript   volume   which   is  history,   its  discovery,   and  its  value,  in 

still    unpublished.     After    the    middle  Bibliographical     Society    of     America, 

of    the    eighteenth    century    little    ad-  Papers,    VI,    9-34.     Richman,    in    his 

vance    was    made    in    the    history    of  California    under    Spain    and    Mexico, 

Father    Kino's    achievements    until    a  gives    a    chapter    based    on    Bolton's 

few  years  ago,  when  Bolton  discovered  translation  of  the  manuscript, 
and    identified    this    rare    manuscript. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  21 

pesos  a  year  toward  their  maintenance;  that  reports  be 
called  for,  giving  information  as  to  the  nature  of  the  land, 
the  means  of  advancing  the  conquest,  communication  with 
the  mainland,  the  state  of  the  missions  of  Sinaloa,  Sonora, 
and  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  and  whether  these  might  aid  the  Jesuit 
establishments  in  the  Californias.^  It  will  be  noted  that 
Kinoes  project  of  a  supply-route  was  prominently  to  the 
fore,  and  it  is  likely  that  Rolandegui  and  Vera  furnished  the 
"private  advices/'  They  had  just  passed  through  Spain.^ 
Further  action  was  taken  in  1703.  In  that  year,  says 
Burriel,  Fathers  Rolandegui  and  Vera  presented  a  memorial 
to  the  king  about  the  Californias.-^^  This  was  reviewed  by 
the  Council  of  the  Indies  on  June  16,  the  king  himself 
being  present.  In  consequence,  there  were  enacted  five 
decrees  on  September  28,  1703,  the  most  important  of  which 
was  one  directed  to  the  viceroy.  Besides  adding  7000 
pesos  to  the  annual  charge  of  the  missions  against  the  royal 
treasury,  ordering  the  purchase  of  a  boat,  and  making  other 
provision  for  the  missions,  the  king  called  for  a  junta  in 
Mexico  in  order  to  provide  for  establishing  a  presidio  of 
thirty  soldiers,  to  be  placed  as  far  north  as  possible  oii^the 
Pacific  coast  of  the  peninsula,  to  serve  as  protection  to  the 
land,  and  as  a  way-station  for  the  Manila  galleon,  the  pre- 
sidio captain  to  be  chosen  by  the  viceroy.  Pearl-fishing 
was  to  be  encouraged,  and  settlers  sent  from  New  Spain.^^ 
A  junta  was  held,  June  6,  1704,  at  which  all  agreed  that  the 
royal  wishes  should  be  fulfilled,  although  the  matter  of  the 
presidio  was  left  to  be  discussed  with  the  missionaries  and 
others.^^ 

The  Jesuits  eventually  got  the  additional  sum  of  money, 
but  the  rest  of  the  decree  was  blocked,  largely  by  their 
own  action.  Their  objections  appear  in  a  memorial  of 
Salvatierra  to  the  viceroy.  May  25,  1705.     "One  ship,  he 

8  Burriel,  Noticia,  II,  62-64.  a  second  visit  the  statement  is  in  error. 

*  The   Kino   manuscript   carried   by  It    is    probable    that    the    matter    was 

Rolandegm  and  Vera  was  received  at  associated  with  their  names  by  reason 

Rome    in    December,     1701.     Favores  of   their   former   visit,    and   that   they 

celestiales,  part  II,  chap.  1.  were  not  present  on  this  occasion. 

>" Burriel   says    that   they  had    just  "Burriel,   Noticia,   II,    139-41. 

come  from  Mexico,  but  unless  this  was  "  Ibid.,  II,  141,  152. 


22  THE   FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  II 

said,  could  not  adequately  perform  the  service  required, 
nor  was  the  liberal  allowance  of  13,000  pesos  sufficient  to 
make  ends  meet.  He  did  not  wish  pearl-fishing  to  be  en- 
couraged, as  it  led  to  trouble  with  the  natives.  Nor  did 
the  Jesuits  desire  the  presence  of  Spanish  settlers  to  breed 
dissensions.  As  to  a  presidio  on  the  western  coast,  it  would 
be  an  unnecessary  expense,  as  the  missions  would  soon 
be  extended  there.  The  suggestion  that  the  garrison  officers 
should  be  appointed  by  the  government  was  very  ill- 
advised,  since  only  by  this  power  of  appointment  could  the 
padres  restrain  the  natives  and  soldiers.'^  ^^ 

In  ensuing  years  there  were  a  number  of  decrees  which, 
like  those  already  mentioned,  evinced  the  royal  will  to 
develop  the  Californias.  Especially  notable  is  one  of 
January  29,  1716,  for  which  Alberoni,  then  dominant  in 
Spanish  politics,  is  said  to  have  been  responsible,  although 
it  is  likely  that  he  was  influenced  by  the  memorials  of  Kino, 
whose  ideas  appear  in  the  decree.  The  decree  itself  was 
like  many  another,  asking  information  as  to  the  progress  of 
conversions  in  the  Californias,  referring  to  the  great  im- 
portance of  promoting  spiritual  conquest  there,  and  order- 
ing the  viceroy  to  fulfill  a  decree  of  July  26,  1708,  requiring 
him  to  take  steps  in  that  regard.  At  the  same  time  orders 
were  given  to  promote  the  advancement  of  the  Sonora 
missions ;  and  verbal  instructions  were  issued  to  the  viceroy 
to  explore  the  Pacific  coasts  and  to  found  colonies  and 
presidios  there.  In  addition  to  these  colonies  Alberoni 
planned  ^4n  like  manner  to  advance  the  Spanish  domain 
with  new  settlements  in  the  vast  unknown  territories  to 
the  north  of  Sonora  from  the  Gila  and  Colorado  rivers  on- 
ward." The  last-named  settlements  might  send  their 
products  to  the  new  colonies  on  the  coast,  and  receive  in 
exchange  what  they  needed.  These  regions  were  not  to 
rely  on  New  Spain  and  Europe  for  trade,  but  were  to  develop 
commerce  with  the  Philippines,  which  islands  he  designed 
to  be  the  centre  of  the  trade  of  the  orient. ^^ 

"Bancroft,   N.   M.   St.    &    Tex.,   I,       in  Burriel,  Noticia,  II,  154-66.'*' 
419.     The  memorial  is  inserted  entire  ^^TSmriel,  Noticia,  II,  287-94. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  23 

Alberoni  was  not  left  in  peace  to  work  out  his  ideas. 
A  few  years  later,  after  a  stormy  career  in  power,  he  found 
himself  an  exile  from  Spain.  The  viceroy  called  a  juntaj 
however,  to  act  upon  the  decree  of  1716,  announcing  that 
he  proposed  to  found  at  least  one  colony  on  the  west  coast 
of  the  Californias.  All  present  approved,  with  one  excep- 
tion. Father  Romano,  the  Jesuit  procurator,  who  asserted 
that  the  peninsula  was  too  sterile  to  maintain  such  a  colony. 
Other  Jesuits  were  of  the  same  opinion,  and  the  matter 
was  dropped  for  the  time  being.  Another  decree  of  1719 
urged  furthering  the  conquest,  holding  as  especially  im- 
portant the  occupation  of  west  coast  ports  up  to  Monterey, 
and  ordering  the  viceroy  to  take  action.  There  was  an- 
other decree  to  the  same  effect  in  1723,  and  others  of  later 
date.  These  at  least  show  a  desire  of  the  government  for 
an  advance  to  the  northwest.  The  chief  result  in  Baja 
California  of  the  decrees,  however,  seems  to  have  been 
the  growth  of  the  royal  subsidy.  This,  at  length,  reached 
some  30,000  'pesos  a  year.  The  Jesuits  remained  in 
authority. 

From  Kino's  time  on,  the  project  of  a  settlement  on  the*  ll 
Colorado  plays  a  prominent  part  in  memorials  and  govern- 
mental plans.  Enough  documents  have  been  found  to 
show  that  interest  was  continuous,  although  the  event  had 
to  wait.  This  was  one  of  the  keynotes  in  the  documents 
already  referred  to  with  relation  to  Baja  California.  The 
same  idea  appears  in  those  concerning  Sonora.  Father 
Campos  fell  heir  to  Kino's  ideas.  In  1715  he  wrote  to  Vice- 
roy Linares  that  Indians  of  the  north  w6re  coming  to  his 
mission  to  have  their  children  baptized,  and  suggested  that 
he  be  sent  to  their  country  to  administer  the  sacrament. 
He  also  proposed  that  the  territory  between  Pimeria  Alta 
and  Moqui  be  taken  from  the  Franciscans,  to  whose  ju- 
risdiction it  then  belonged,  and  given  to  the  Jesuits ;  the 
latter,  he  said,  were  nearer  than  the  former  who  were  in 
New  Mexico,  and  moreover  the  Indians  did  not  like  the 
Franciscans.^^     Campos  seems  to  have  made  the  visit  that 

"  Cited  in  ReboUedo  to  Vizarr6n,  Apr.  11,  1737,  in  C-1872. 


24.  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  II 

he  suggested,  a  number  of  times. -^^  Bancroft  says  that  the 
Jesuits  were  not  so  much  interested  in  getting  to  Moqui 
as  they  alleged ;  that  was  merely  a  pretext  to  enable  them 
to  get  missions  and  a  presidio  in  the  lower  Gila  valley. 
These  obtained,  they  had  in  mind  the  ultimate  occupation 
of  the  Californias  or  of  the  territory  northeastward,  accord- 
ing as  events  should  decide.  The  Jesuits  were  partially 
successful  in  their  petition ;  in  1719  the  king  granted  to 
them  the  Moqui  field,  but  the  missions  and  the  presidio 
were  not  founded.  In  1725  there  was  a  royal  order  au- 
thorizing expeditions  from  Pimeria  Alta  to  New  Mexico, 
but  none  were  made  in  consequence.^^  A  few  years  later 
royal  funds  were  forthcoming.  Several  Jesuits  were  sent 
from  Europe  and  assisted  to  their  stations  at  state  expense. -^^ 
Three  of  them  came  to  northern  Sonora,  and  were  escorted 
to  their  posts  by  the  captain  of  Fronteras,  Juan  Bautista 
de  Anza,  father  of  that  Anza  who  was  later  to  discover  the 
route  from  Sonora  to  Alta  California. -^^  Abandoned  mis- 
sions, such  as  Santa  Maria  Suamca,  Guebavi,  Tumacacori, 
and  San  Javier  del  Bac,  were  reestablished ;  and  Jesuit 
visits  to  the  Gila  were  resumed.  "" 

Shortly  afterward  occurred  an  event  which  seemed  likely 
for  a  time  to  lead  to  vigorous  governmental  action  in  north- 
westward advance,  and  the  papers  in  connection  with  it 
were  also  used,  several  decades  later,  when  authority  was 
given  for  the  Anza  expedition  of  1774.  In  1736  a  most 
remarkable  silver  mine  was  discovered  at  or  near  a  place 
called  Arizonac,  or  Arizona,  just  south  of  the  border  of  the 
present-day  state  of  Arizona.  The  more  usual  name  for 
the  mine  at  that  time  was  Bolas  de  Plata,  or  Planchas  de 
Plata;  because  the  precious  metal  was  found  in  balls  or 
nuggets  of  almost  pure  silver.  These  were  on  or  near  the 
surface,  and  were  of  immense  size,  some  of  them  weighing 
a  ton  or  more.     Accounts  differ,  but  there  are  several  stating 

i«  See  infra  note  85.  is  ReboUedo   to  Vizarron,  Apr.    11, 

In     1723     Campos    wrote    to     the  1737,  in  C-1872. 
viceroy  describing  the  country  as  far  i'  For    his  work    on    this    occasion 

as  the  Gila.     Bolton,  Guide.  Anza  won  encomiums,   not  only  from 

1^  Stated  in  Bishop  of  Puebla  to  the  Jesuit  writers,  but  also  from  the  king 

king,  Apr.  16,  1737,  C-182.  of  Spain.     Alegre,  245-46. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  25 

that  the  largest  nugget  weighed  3500  pounds ;  one  of  the 
reputed  finders,  Fermin,  spoke  of  a  4000-pound  nugget,  and 
said  that  there  were  many  of  about  500  pounds. 

There  was  an  immediate  rush  of  miners  to  the  spot. 
Captain  Anza  of  Fronteras  interfered  with  them,  claiming 
that  the  holas  belonged  properly  to  the  king.  According  to 
law,  one-fifth  of  the  silver  accrued  to  the  king  if  the  discovery 
were  a  mine,  but  if  a  hidden  treasure,  the  king  was  entitled 
to  all.  Anza  claimed  that  if  not  a  hidden  treasure,  it  was 
at  least  a  criaderOj  or  growing-place  of  silver,  and  therefore 
belonged  to  the  national  treasury.  The  viceroy  reversed 
Anza's  decision,  but  the  royal  decree  of  1741  sustained  the 
Fronteras  captain.  It  is  doubtful  whether  Anza  could  have 
held  back  the  miners,  if  the  mines  had  proved  to  be  exten- 
sive. Cavo  intimates  that  Anza's  interference  was  not  very 
effective  anyway,  the  greater  part  of  the  wealth  going  to 
the  discoverers,^^  and  Anza  himself  stated  that  he  had 
difficulty  in  saving  any  for  the  king.^^  Although  the  region 
was  rich  in  mineral  wealth  of  the  ordinary  type,  the  bolas 
seem  to  have  been  but  a  superficial  deposit,^^  and  nothing  is 
heard  of  them  after  1741.  Nevertheless  the  bolas  incident 
did  lead  to  an  official  consideration  of  northwestward  con- 
quest by  way  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  and  to  some 
action  by  the  government.  The  bolas  de  plata  were  a 
definitely  proved  item  of  wealth,  which  was  infinitely  more 
important  than,  for  example,  a  fabled  mountain  of  gold. 
Where  so  much  silver  had  been  found,  there  was  good 
reason  to  expect  that  more  existed. 

In  a  letter  of  January  7,  1737,  to  Benito  Crespo,  bishop 
of  Puebla,  Anza  tells  of  the  discovery  of  the  bolas,  and 
says  that  this  should  prove  an  impetus  to  further  advance 
of  the  Spanish  conquests.  He  urges  Crespo  to  use  his 
influence  to  bring  about  such  action.^^  On  January  13, 
1737,  Anza  reported  to  Viceroy  Vizarron  what  he  had  done 

MCavo,  271.  (Mexico,  1850),  185-205.     Portions  of 

21  C-177.  the  Velasco   work  were   translated   to 

22  For  a  brief  history  of  mining  in  English  by  William  F.  Nye  under  the 
Sonora,  see  Jos6  Francisco  Velasco,  title  of  Sonora  (San  Francisco,  1861). 
Noticias  eatadisticas  del  estado  de  Sonora  23  C-177. 


26  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  II 

in  relation  to  the  holas}^  The  next  day  he  wrote  again 
proposing  an  expedition  to  the  north  with  himself  as  leader. 
He  quoted  a  number  of  the  reports  of  early  explorers,  and 
reviewed  the  evidence  for  belief  in  the  wealth  of  the  north. 
The  vast  ruin  on  the  Gila  known  as  the  Casa  Grande  and 
an  even  greater  one  in  Chihuahua;  built,  he  thought,  by 
Aztec  kings  in  the  course  of  their  migration  southward,^^ 
were  mentioned  by  him  in  support  of  this  belief.  Indians 
of  the  Gila  had  told  Jesuit  visitors  of  the  existence  of  quick- 
silver in  the  north.^^  Anza  had  something  to  say  too  of  the 
island  California,  of  the  strait  through  the  continent,  and 
of  the  Seven  Cities,  Gran  Teguayo,  and  Quivira,  and  as 
usual,  the  vast  number  of  Indians  awaiting  conversion  was 
adduced  as  an  argument  for  an  expedition.  His  project 
was  to  make  discoveries  toward  the  Colorado  River,  pay- 
ing visits  to  the  tribes  of  that  river  and  the  Gila  as  a  pre- 
liminary to  founding  a  settlement  on  the  Colorado,  this  to 
be  a  base  for  further  discoveries.  The  expedition  should 
consist  of  fifty  or  sixty  soldiers  and  a  hundred  friendly  Pjmg^. 
Funds  might  be  obtained  from  pious  persons,  while  he  him- 
self was  willing  to  provide  horses,  cattle,  mules,  and  articles 
as  gifts  for  the  Indians.  As  the  Apaches  were  a  constant 
source  of  trouble,  and  Seri  uprisings  no  inconsiderable  dif- 
ficulty, most  of  the  troops  should  be  drawn  elsewhere  than 
from  his  presidio,  Corodeguache  de  Fronteras,  as  this  had 
to  play  a  large  part  in  meeting  these  dangers.^^ 

Anza's  proposal  was  seriously  considered  by  the  govern- 
ments of  Spain  and  New  Spain,  being  discussed  in  connec- 
tion with  the  question  whether  the  holas  were  mine  or  treas- 
ure. A  few  of  the  documents  used  may  be  considered  here, 
and  a  reference  given  to  the  rest  in  a  note.^^     On  April  11, 

24  He  had  first   heard    of   them    on  2^  C-178. 

November  13,  1736.    Anza,  Declaration,  28  The    following    that  bear  on    the 

Nov.  15,  1736,  in  C-192.  subject  were  not  used  by  me :    C-185, 

26  For  an  account  and  bibliography  186,    191-93,    199-201,    203-5,    207-8, 

of  the  Casa  Grande  see  Garces  (Coues  212.     Three   of   these   would    seem    to 

ed.),  I,  89-101.  be    of    particular   value   in    a    detailed 

26  Lack    of    quicksilver  was    one    of  study    of    this    period.     C-191    is    the 

the  prime  causes  for  the  slow  develop-  original  of  a  communication  from  the 

ment  of  Sonora.     The  miners  needed  Council    of    the    Indies    to    the    king, 

it  in  order  to  extract  precious  metals  October  5,  1737,  giving  its  opinion  on 

from  ores.    Cf.  n.  63.  the  matters  arising  from  the  discovery 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  27 

1737,  the  fiscal  J  Juan  Olivar  ReboUedo,  to  whom  Anza's 
petition  had  been  referred  by  the  viceroy,  dehvered  his 
written  opinion.  He  referred  to  various  earher  expeditions, 
among  others  to  a  voyage  up  the  Gulf  of  Cahfornia  by 
Guillermo  Estrajort  in  1730  or  1731.29  This  had  led  to  a 
doubt  whether  California  were  an  island,  as  had  been 
supposed.  ReboUedo  thought  that  an  expedition  such  as 
Anza  proposed  would  make  that  point  clear,  and  give  in- 
formation of  the  lands  and  peoples  of  the  Colorado  River 
and  thence  to  Moqui.  He  therefore  recomQiended  that 
Anza  be  permitted  to  go,  taking  with  him,  besides  the  force 
proposed,  a  man  skilled  in  the  use  of  instruments  for  deter- 
mining latitudes,  and  Father  Campos,  if  the  latter  wished 
to  go,  to  instruct  natives  in  the  catechism.^^  Among  papers 
received  by  the  viceroy  were  certain  memorials  from  one 
Jose  de  Messa,  written  from  Guadalajara  in  July  and  Au- 
gust, 1737.  Messa  told  of  the  mineral  wealth  of  the  Arizo- 
nac  mine,  which  he  claimed  to  have  discovered.  Stories 
of  its  wealth  had  not  been  exaggerated,  he  said.  Moreover, 
Indians  had  told  him  of  great  riches  in  gold,  silver,  pearls, 
and  quicksilver  farther  in  the  interior.  He  spoke  oi  the 
multitude  of  Indians  ripe  for  conversion,  naming  especially 
the  Pima,  Pdpago,  and  Seri  tribes.  In  his  opinion  an  exten- 
sion of  Spanish  conquests  beyond  Sonora  would  be  of  great 
service  to  God  and  the  king.^^ 

It  was  not  until  September  15,  1737,  that  the  viceroy 
wrote  to  the  king  of  the  holas  incident  and  Anza's  project, 
his  letter  of  that  date^^  being  based  on  the  Messa  memorials, 
which  he  enclosed.  Meanwhile,  the  authorities  in  Spain 
had  already  heard  of  the  matter  from  another  source. 
Anza's  letter  to  the  bishop  of  Puebla  had  borne  fruit,  for 
the  latter  had  written  to  the  king  on  April  16,  1737.     It 

of  the  holas  and  Anza's  proposed  ex-  pilot  on  Ugarte's  voyage  of   1721    to 

pedition,    a   manuscript   of^  22    pages.  the  head  of  the  Gulf.     This  may  have 

C-192    and    193    are   great   testimonios  been    the     individual     to     whom     the 

of    respectively    263    and    124    pages.  fiscal    was    referring.     Probably,     too. 

Both  are  certified  copies,  dated   1738,  the  1721  voyage  was  meant,  and  not 

of   files  of   papers   in   Mexico   on   this  1731     as     stated.     Estrafort     kept     a 

subject  matter.  diary  of  the  Ugarte  voyage. 

»  An  Englishman  called    Guillermo  ^  In  C-1872. 

Estrafort     (William     Strafford?)     was  ^  C-184.                                  « C-187. 


28  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

seemed  to  the  bishop  a  propitious  moment  for  fresh  con- 
quests. There  was  reason  to  believe  that  great  mineral 
wealth  would  be  found  on  the  other  side  of  the  Gila  and 
Colorado.  Nobody. had  yet  gone  beyond  the  above-named 
rivers.^^  The  bishop's  letter  and  the  two  of  Anza,  for  the 
latter  had  sent  to  the  bishop  a  copy  of  his  letter  to  Vizarron, 
were  considered  by  the  Council  of  the  Indies.  The  fiscal 
gave  his  opinion,  September  18,  1737,  that  a  junta  should 
be  called  in  Mexico  to  consider  the  advisability  of  the  pro- 
posed conquests  beyond  the  Colorado  and  Gila.^^  The 
Council  concurred,  embodying  the  recommendation  of  the 
fiscal  in  its  decree  of  September  27,  1737.^^  Much  the  same 
procedure  was  ordered  in  a  royal  decree  of  June  13,  1738. 
The  viceroy  was  reminded  of  a  report  made  by  Benito  Crespo 
when,  as  bishop  of  Durango,  he  had  just  completed  a  dioce- 
san tour  in  1731.  Crespo  had  gone  from  Pimeria  Alta  by 
way  of  El  Paso  to  New  Mexico.  He  had  stated  that  it 
was  easy  to  get  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  as  had  been 
proved  by  repeated  trips  there,  but  had  regarded  such  jour- 
neys as  a  needless  expense,  believing  that  settlements  there 
could  not  be  maintained.  He  had  thought  that  an  advance 
to  territories  of  the  Pimas  of  the  Gila  was  feasible,  as  these 
people,  being  natural  enemies  of  the  Apaches,  might  be 
expected  to  welcome  them.  Moqui  probably  was  not  far 
away,  according  to  the  bishop,  but  was  on  the  other  side  of 
a  very  deep  river  which  only  an  occasional  Indian  had  been 
able  to  cross.^^  Proceeding,  the  royal  decree  ordered  the 
viceroy  to  call  a  junta  of  practical,  intelligent  men  to  con- 
sider Anza's  proposal,  examining  former  projects  and  re- 
ports, and  getting  the  advice  of  missionaries  and  others  then 
in  service.  A  full  account  was  to  be  sent  to  the  king  for 
his  decision  in  the  matter.^^ 

The  expedition  was  not  in  fact  made,  and  no  materials 
have  yet  come  to  light  stating  reasons  for  abandonment  of 
the-^lan,  but  they  may  be  inferred  with  a  fair  degree  of 
certainty.     A   series    of   Indian   wars  had  broken  out  in 

33  C-182.  36  The   Grand   Canyon  of   the  Colo- 

34C-188.  rado? 

36  C-189.  37  C-202. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  29 

Sonora.  In  1737  the  Pimas  of  the  coast  revolted  and  took 
refuge  in  the  Cerro  Prieto,  an  almost  impregnable  moun- 
tain stronghold  in  the  vicinity  oi  Guaymas ;  the  Cerro 
Prieto  was  to  play  an  important  part  in  the  history  of  Sonora 
from  that  time  forth.  On  this  occasion  Anza  subdued  the 
Pimas.  He  was  unsuccessful,  however,  with  the  Apaches, 
who  continued  to  be  troublesome,  losing  his  life  in  a  battle 
with  them  in  1739.  In  1740-41  the  Mayo  and  Yaqui  In- 
dians were  in  revolt  against  the  mission  system.  Probably 
quite  as  important  as  these  events,  even  more  than  the 
death  of  Anza,  was  the  fact  that  the  bolas  proved  to  be  only 
a  superficial  deposit.  They  were  at  length  adjudged  to  have 
been  buried  treasure.  Yet,  if  no  striking  advance  was  made 
at  this  time,  the  bolas  incident  was  not  without  result ; 
something  was  done  to  clear  the  way.  Two  presidios  were 
established  in  1741 ;  Pitiqui  as  a  protection  against  the  Seris, 
Pimas,  Yaquis,  and  Tepocas,  at  modern  Hermosillo ;  and 
Terrenate  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Arizonac  mine  as  an  outpost 
against  the  Apaches.  In  1745  there  were  at  these  two  pre- 
sidios and  at  Fronteras,  with  also  a  garrison  at  Buenavista, 
a  total  of  183  soldiers,  not  enough  to  overawe  the  Seris  and 
Apaches  who  gave  much  trouble,  but,  as  matters  went  in  the 
frontier  provinces,  the  establishing  of  two  presidios  must  be 
regarded  as  a  considerable  step  in  northwestward  advance. 
Meanwhile,  the  Jesuits  of  Sonora  and  Baja  California 
were  continually  petitioning  for  the  occupation  of  the 
Colorado-Gila  country,  and  were  displaying  not  a  little 
activity  in  exploring  that  region.  After  1736,  frequent 
trips  to  the  Gila  and  Colorado  were  made  by  Fathers 
Ignacio  Keller  and  Jacobo  Sedelmayr.  Journeys  of  explora- 
tions became  even  more  frequent  after  174 Las  a  result  of  a 
royal  decree  in  that  year  awarding  the  Moqui  field  to  the 
Jesuits,  —  another  step,  it  would  seem,  in  the  projected 
northwestward  conquest.  It  now  behooved  the  Jesuits  to 
reach  their  charges,  Moqui  being  regarded  as  not  far  beyond 
the  Gila.  In  journeys  made  between  1743  and  1750  the 
most  prominent  name  is  that  of  Father  Sedelmayr.  On 
one  occasion  he  seems  to  have  gone  up  the  Colorado  as 


30  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

far  as  Bill  Williams  Fork,  and  on  another  he  descended  the 
Colorado  nearly  to  its  mouth.  These  and  other  Jesuit 
expeditions  failed  of  their  purpose  if  they  were  intended  to 
prove  the  nearness  of  Moqui,  but  if,  as  Bancroft  asserts, 
the  real  object  was  to  interest  the  king  in  founding  estab- 
lishments on  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers  as  a  preliminary 
to  a  further  advance,  they  were  decidedly  successful.  One 
noteworthy  statement  of  Sedelmayr,  much  quoted  in  later 
years,  was  that  the  Indians  had  told  him  that  the  Colorado 
flowed  to  the  west,  a  little  north  of  where  he  had  gone. 
This  led  to  conjectures  that  there  might  be  a  branch  of  the 
Colorado  emptying  into  the  Pacific,  possibly  the  Carmelo. 
These  Jesuit  explorations  also  had  some  effect  upon  the 
much  broached  project  of  uniting  the  Sonora  missions  to 
those  of  Baja  California  by  way  of  the  Colorado  River. 

An  Indian, revolt  occurred  in  Baja  California  in  1734, 
which  was  not  suppressed  until  two  years  later.  Questions 
arising  out  of  this  revolt  have  a  bearing  upon  the  proposed 
land  route  in  the  official  correspondence  of  the  next  decade. 
Meanwhile,  war  broke  out  between  Spain  and  England  in 
1739,  which,  coupled  with  Anson^s  appearance  off  the  Pacific 
coast  of  Mexico  in  1742,  tended  still  more  to  direct  attention 
to  the  Californias  and  the  Sonora  coast.  The  Marques  de 
Aysa,  president  of  the  Audiencia  of  Guadalajara,  took  steps 
to  get  information  with  regard  to  the  islands  and  pearl- 
fisheries  off  the  coast  of  Sonora,  and  about  the  ports  an3 
mmeraT wealth  of  the  coasb.^^  In  a  letter  to  the  king  of 
January  21,  1743,  he  proposed  that  these  places  be  occupied, 
and  settlements  made,  utilizing  for  that  purpose  criminals 
and  other  disturbers  of  the  peace  in  Nueva  Galicia.^®  In  the 
same  year  the  matter  of  the  Baja  California  revolt  came 
before  the  Council  of  the  Indies,  which  approved  the  steps 
taken  by  the  viceroy,  authorizing  such  expense  as  had  been 
incurred."*^  The  ministro  general,  Fernando  Triviiio,  began 
also  to  make  inquiries  with  a  view  to  forwarding  the  spir- 
itual  and   temporal   conquest    of   the    Californias.'^^     The 

»  C-236.  «  C-243,  245M6. 

»  C-242.  «  C-240,  24^-46,  253. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  31 

Jesuits  renewed  their  petitions,  and  the  viceroy,  the  Conde 
de  Fuenclara,  recommended,  June  25,  1744,  that  the  king 
send  as  many  Jesuits  as  possible  for  use  both  in  their  col- 
leges, and  in  converting  the  natives  of  Sinaloa,  Sonora, 
and  the  Californias.'*^  All  of  these  matters  came  to  a  head 
in  the  royal  decree  of  November  13,  1744,  directed  by  Tri- 
vino  to  the  viceroy.  The  keynote  of  it  is  the  necessity  for 
occupying  the  Colorado  River  country.  The  gist  of  the 
decree  follows : 

In  considering  questions  arising  from  the  Baja  California 
revolt  of  1734  the  fiscal  of  the  Council  of  the  Indies  had  made 
a  report.  May  12,  1744,  declaring  that  the  retention  of  Baja 
California  was  a  matter  of  great  importance.  The  Council 
therefore  recommended  the  founding  of  Spanish  settle- 
ments, as  well  as  the  encouragement  of  the  Jesuits  in  their 
work  of  conversion.  It  also  proposed  that  Jesuit  mission- 
aries should  enter  Baja  California  from  the  north,  since  it 
had  been  discovered  that  the  Calif ornias  were  joined  to  the 
continent.  In  this  way  the  reduction  of  the  peninsula 
would  be  simplified,  the  Indians  being  hemmed  in  on  both 
sides.  There  should  be  two  missionaries  in  each  of  the 
frontier  missions,  one  to  travel  among  the  heathen  and  to 
make  converts,  and  the  other  to  be  in  charge  of  the  mission. 
This  applied  not  only  to  the  missions  of  Baja  California, 
but  also  to  those  of  Pimeria  Alta.  When  on  journeys  to 
visit  outlying  tribes  the  missionaries  should  be  furnished 
with  a  military  escort.  Thus,  the  Jesuits  of  Pimeria  Alta 
could  reduce  the  Cocomaricopas  and  Yumas  of  the  Colorado, 
As  these  Indians  were  well  disposed,  it  might  be  possible 
for  the  Jesuits  from  Pimeria  Alta  to  found  a  mission  on  each 
bank  of  the  Colorado,  thus  securing  communications  on 
both  sides  of  the  river.  They  might  then  proceed  southward 
to  the  missions  of  the  peninsula.  The  escort  could  be 
secured  by  dispensing  with  the  presidio  of  Pitiqui.  As 
these  proposals  were  expected  to  produce  many  benefits 
to  the  royal  dominions,  among  others  the  freedom  of  Philip- 
pine commerce,  the  viceroy  was  directed  to  take  immediate 

«  C-259. 


32  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

steps  to  put  them  into  effect.  Furthermore;  the  viceroy 
was  to  consult  with  the  Marques  del  Castillo  de  Aysa,  who 
had  proposed,  January  21,  1743,  that  two  ships  of  war  should 
be  maintained  on  the  Pacific  coast,  both  to  protect  that 
region,  and  to  promote  the  pearl-fisheries  of  the  Gulf ;  and 
that  the  Islas  Marias  ^^  should  be  settled,  so  as  to  prevent 
some  enemy's  ship  from  hiding  there  to  wait  for  the  Manila 
galleon.  The  first  proposal  merited  particular  attention, 
said  Trivino,  but  the  second  required  more  consideration.^^ 
Sixteen  years  later  the  Council  stated  that  the  decree  of 
1744  had  been  enacted  with  a  view  to  checking  foreign 
aggression  from  the  direction  of  New  Mexico.'*^  Develop- 
ments of  the  next  few  years  following  the  1744  decree  make 
it  probable  that  this  was  after  all  the  most  prominent  factor 
in  the  minds  of  the  authorities. 

Trivino  asked  reports  of  various  individuals  who  might 
throw  light  on  the  matter.  Of  the  replies  received  ^^  only 
one  will  be  considered  in  any  detail,  that  of  the  Jesuit  Pro- 
vincial of  New  Spain,  Father  Escobar,  November  30,  1745. 
Escobar  was  assisted  in  drawing  up  his  memorial  by  the 
man  who  knew  the  Colorado  River  country  better  than 
any  one  else.  Father  Sedelmayr,  who  had  just  returned  from 
his  journey  of  1744  to  Bill  Williams  Fork.  Escobar  stated 
that  the  proposed  colonization  of  Baja  California  was  im- 
possible because  of  the  sterility  of  the  land.^^  As  it  was,  the 
missions  already  occupied  could  not  exist  without  the  prod- 
ucts sent  to  them  from  Sinaloa.  The  region  about  Mon- 
terey was  more  fertile,  but  would  be  difficult  to  reduce  by 
an  advance  from  Baja  California,  owing  to  the  [intervening] 
barrenness  and  the  lack  of  laborers.  Therefore,  he  pro- 
posed a  conquest  of  Pimeria  Alta,  which  was  easy  of  access, 

<3  otherwise   Tres   Marias ;    off   the  *'  Among    other    replies    not  noted 

coast  of   Tepic   at   the   mouth   of   the  here  was  one  by  the  bishop  of  Durango, 

Gulf.  June  19,   1745,  giving  his  opinion  con- 

**  In   Burriel,    II,    502-17 ;    Natural  cerning  the  lands  about    Pimeria  Alta, 

arid  civil  history,   II,    165-73.     Except  and  what  Spain  might  do  there.    C-260. 

for  page   513,   the   latter  omits   what  *''  This  was  true,  but  it  is  probable 

appears  from  the  bottom   of  page  511  that   the   traditional   objection   of   the 

of  the  Noticia  to  the  end  of  the  docu-  Jesmts    to    Spanish    settlements    near 

ment.  their   missions   had    something    to    do 

*^  C-1455.  with  Escobar's  argmnent. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  33 

and,  in  the  region  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  fertile ; 
for,  just  as  the  lower  part  o^Baja  California  could  not  exist 
without  products  from  Sinaloa,  the  upper  part  would  be 
unable  to  exist  without  those  of  Pimerla.*^  Such  a  con- 
quest would  facilitate  that  of  Moqui,  in  case  it  did  not  suc- 
ceed by  way  of  New  Mexico,  and  it  would  be  a  check  upon 
the  Apaches.  To  achieve  it,  the  number  of  Jesuits  would 
have  to  be  increased,  the  Gulf  explored  again,  as  the  au- 
thorities in  Mexico  were  not  yet  certain  that  the  Californias 
were  joined  to  the  mainland,  and  a  presidio  of  a  hundred 
men  established  on  the  Gila  in  Apache  territories.  It 
would  not  be  safe  to  do  away  with  the  presidio  of  Pitiqui, 
as  in  that  event  the  Indians  of  that  vicinity,  the  Yaquis, 
Seris,  and  others,  might  rise  in  rebellion.  Brilliant  results 
were  predicted  by  Escobar  if  his  plan  were  adopted :  the 
suppression  of  the  Apaches ;  the  conquest  of  Moqui  and 
intervening  territories ;  conquest  of  the  tribes  of  the  two 
rivers ;  the  opening  of  a  field  for  conversions  beyond  them ; 
and,  above  all,  the  facilitation  of  a  passage  to  the  Cali- 
fornias.^^ Early  in  1746  Sedelmayr  himself  wrote  a  report, 
but  as  it  expressed  much  the  same  views  as  the  Escobar 
memorial,  it  may  be  omitted  here.^° 

The  voyage  of  Father  Fernando  Consag  in  June  and 
July,  1746,  was  one  result  of  this  renewed  interest  in  the 
northwest.  Consag  went  to  the  head  of  the  Gulf,  and  defi- 
nitely proved  the  peninsularity  of  the  Californias.^^     Moqui 

«  There  is  hardly  a  doubt  but  that  done,  a  full  description  of  the  country 
Escobar  referred  to  the  upper  half  of  and  its  people  as  observed  by  himself 
the  peninsula.  The  phrase  is  "Cali-  and  others  and  his  own  ideas  respect- 
fornia  alta"  in  Burriel,  but  the  dis-  ing  the  territory  and  tribes  not  yet 
tinction  had  not  yet  been  made  of  seen.  He  presents  as  motives  for  the 
applying  alta  to  the  California  now  foundation  of  the  missions  the  fertility 
part  of  the  United  States.  Only  the  of  the  soil;  the  great  numbers  of  In- 
lower  part  of  the  peninsula  had  been  dians  awaiting  salvation ;  the  mineral 
occupied ;  hence  alta  might  well  be  wealth  awaiting  development ;  and 
the  upper  part.  Cf.  notes  49,  54,  and  the  desirability  of  a  new  base  of  opera- 
especially-^4.  tions  from  which  to  protect  the  old 
siJ^^C-263)  The  above,  however,  was  missions,  to  reduce  the  Moquis,  to 
taken  from  Burriel,  Noticia,  II,  537-  check  the  Apaches,  to  learn  if  California 
42.  It  is  probable  that  the  last  re-  is  an  island,  to  push  the  reduction  up  to 
mark  refers  to  the  peninsula;  the  one  Monterey,  and  to  solve  the  great  geo- 
preceding  it  doubtless  refers  in  part  graphical  mysteries  of  the  far  north." 
to   the  American  state  of  California.  Bancroft,  N.  M.  St.  &  Tex.,  I,  538. 

60  Sedelmayr  "gives  a  r6sum6,"  says  "  C-266,  272. 

Bancroft,  "of  what  had  already  been 


\. 


34  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  II 

appearing  to  be  much  nearer  to  the  Franciscans  in  New 
Mexico  than  to  the  Jesuits  in  Pimeria  Alt  a,  the  decree  of 
1741  was  reversed  in  17^,  ^^^£21^^  being  reawarded  to  the 
Franciscans.  This  did  not  lessen  interest  in  the  Colorado- 
Gila  region,  although  the  death  of  Philip  V  in  1746,  and  the 
arrival  of  a  new  viceroy,  the  elder  Conde  de  Re  villa  Gigedo, 
in  the  same  year  may  have  tended  to  delay  action.  A 
junta  had  been  held,  prior  to  Revilla  Gigedo^s  arrival, 
about  the  general  subject  of  conquering  the  Calif ornias. 
Its  recommendations  were  considered  by  the  Council  of 
the  Indies,  along  with  the  Escobar  memorial  and  the  re- 
ports of  Consag's  voyage,^^  leading  to  the  royal  decree  of 
December  4,  1747. 

The  decree  of  1747  quoted  in  full  that  of  November  13, 
1744 ;  stated  that  the  preceding  viceroy,  Fuenclara,  had 
begun  to  receive  reports,  and  take  other  action  in  pursuance 
thereof;  remarked  that  the  king  understood  that  Revilla 
Gigedo,  because  so  recently  installed  in  office,  had  been 
unable  to  give  much  attention  to  it ;  and  cited  with  ap- 
proval Father  Escobar's  memorial.  Revilla  Gigedo  was 
to  proceed,  without  awaiting  fresh  royal  orders,  to  do  what 
he  thought  advisable  to  carry  out  the  decree  of  1744,  always 
bearing  in  mind,  however,  the  state  of  the  royal  treasury, 
so  that  he  might  not  cause  needless  expenditures.  He  was 
ordered  to  devote  himself  in  particular  to  reducing  the 
Seris,  also  the  Pimas  Altos  and  Pdpagos,  and  to  check  the 
hostilities  of  the  Apaches. ^^  The  document  is  interesting  in 
that  it  st^es  the  necessary,  prehminaries  to  the  discovery 
and  use  of  a  land  route  to  the  Calif  ornias :    the  conquest 

2^    of  the  Seris  and  allied  tribes ;   the  repulse  of  the  Apaches ; 

3  and  the  occupation  of  the  Colorado-Gila  country.  Thence, 
Spaniards  might  go  to  New  Mexico,  or  to  Alta  or  Baja  Cali- 
fornia ;  but  the  prime  concern  then  was  that  the  decree  might 
bring  about  the  reduction  of  the  peninsula,  Baja  California.^* 

5«  For  papers  considered  by  the  Coun-  decree.     The    special    recommendation 

oil  of  the  Indies  see  C-274,  276-79,  335.  to   reduce   the   Seris   and   other   tribes 

63  C-283,     The  above  account,  how-  was    the    principal    suggestion    of    the 

ever,  was  taken  from  Burriel,  Noticia,  junta  called  by  Fuenclara. 
II,    501-20.      The    Natural    and    civil  "  Richman,     59-60,     says     of     this 

history     does     not    contain    the    1747  decree    that    it    "sanctioned    for    the 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  35 

The  decree  was  not  without  results  so  far  as  Sonora  was 
concerned.  Jos6  Gallardo  was  sent  there  in  1748  as  visi- 
tador,^^  having  to  deal  primarily  with  the  question  of  con- 
quering the  Seris.  Governor  Vildosola  had  neglected  work 
on  the  presidio  of  San  Pedro  (Pitiqui),  and,  as  a  result,  that 
part  of  the  province  was  in  a  defenceless  state.  Such,  at 
least,  was  Gallardo's  report. ^^  Vildosola  was  reheved  from 
office,  being  succeeded  by  Diego  Parrilla  who  arrived  in 
1749.  He  was  instructed  by  Gallardo  to  attack  the  Seri 
strongholds  of  the  Cerro  Prieto  and  Tibur6n  Island.  The 
Seris  were  to  be  exterminated,  or  at  least  removed  from  Ti- 
buron  Island  to  the  mainland,  where  they  might  the  more 
easily  be  punished.  Gallardo  himself  removed  the  presidio 
of  Pitiqui  to  San  Miguel  de  Horcasitas,  regarded  as  a  more  ef- 
fective site  against  the  Seris.  He  also  planned  in  1749  to 
make  explorations  himself  toward  the  Calif ornias  by  way  of 
the  Colorado  River,  doubtless  hoping  to  reach  Baja  Cali- 
fornia, as  ordered  in  the  decree,  but  was  prevented  from  so 
doing  by  Apache  wars.  He  left  orders,  however,  that  pre- 
sidio captains  should  visit  the  more  distant  missions  from 
time  to  time.  In  1750  Governor  Parrilla  made  his  campaign 
against  the  Seris,  and  reported  a  complete  success.  Events 
were  to  prove,  however,  that  the  troublesome  Seris  were 
far  from  being  conquered. 

Further  action  was  soon  taken  by  the  authorities  in 
Mexico  and  Spain.  A  junta  was  held  in  Mexico  in  1751, 
and  a  meeting  of  the  Council  of  the  Indies  in  1752  to  con- 
sider the  affairs  of  Sonora.  The  documents  from  which 
these  bodies  drew  their  conclusions  throw  great  light  upon 

reduction  of  the  Californias  the  exact  ^^  "Whenever  unsatisfactory  reports 
plan  of  Kino.  Pimerla  Alta  (the  came  in  concerning  any  governor  or 
scene  of  Kino's  labors)  was  to  be  magistrate,  the  India  Council,  or  its 
occupied ;  a  presidio  was  to  be  es-  higher  representatives,  at  once  des- 
tablished  on  the  Gila  river;  and  Alta  patched  a  visitador  to  hold  investi- 
California  was  to  be  entered  by  way  of  gation  and  submit  the  result,  although 
the  Arizona  desert."  This  statement  at  times  he  had  power  to  carry  out 
seems  intended  to  convey  the  idea  reforms  and  penalties  on  the  spot." 
that  the  present  American  state  of  Bancroft,  Mex.,  Ill,  521.  Employ- 
California  was  to  be  entered.  The  ment  of  the  words  "  whenever, ""  any, " 
word  " California "  or  the  "  Alta  Califor-  and  "at  once"  may  be  objected  to, 
nia"  of  Burriel  may  have  misled  Mr.  but  otherwise  the  above  definition  of  a 
Eichman.  There  is  nothing  about  an  visitador  will  serve, 
advance  to  Monterey  in  either  decree.  '« C-286-87,  290-91. 


36  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

the  history  of  Sonora   and  northwestward  advance,   and 
some  of  them  will  therefore  be  dealt  with  at  length.     The 
decisions  were  based  primarily  upon  five  representations 
written  in  Mexico  City  by  Fernando  Sanchez  Salvador,  a 
captain  of  cuirassiers  in   Sinaloa   and   Sonora. ^^    E!our   of 
I*"}       these  memQxials  are  dated  March  2,  1751,  and  are  addressed 
^  to  the  Eng;^^  the  ^h,  May  15,  1751,  is  addressed  to  the 
junta  in  Mexico.^^     On  the  latter   date   Sanchez   directed 
G     another  letter  to  the  king,^°  enclosing  documents  tending  to 
sustain  his  proposals.     Most  important  of  these  is  the  map.®^ 
It  was  considered  to  be  of  sufficient  moment  to  be  called 
to  the  attention  of  the  foreign  office,  due  to  Sanchez's  re- 
marks about  the  proximity  of  the  French,  being  forwarded 
October  5,  1751,  to  Jose  Carbajal  y  Lancaster  by  the  Mar- 
ques de  la  Ensenada.^^     Numerous  other  documents  were 
used,  both  in    Mexico    and    in    Spain,    but    the    Sdnchez 
memorials  and  the  map  tell  most  of  the  story. 
••  The  first  memorial  urged  that  the  same  methods  of  govern- 

ment be  employed  in  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  as  in  other  prov- 
inces, which  could  be  brought  about  by  secularizing  the 
missions  of  Sinaloa  where  that  step  had  not  taken  place 
already,  and  those  of  the  Mayo  and  Yaqui  districts  of  Sonora, 
putting  religious  instruction  in  charge  of  the  secular  clergy, 
and  civil  affairs  in  the  hands  of  the  government.  The 
Jesuits  might  be  used  on  the  frontier.  One  of  the  principal 
reasons  for  this  suggestion  was  that  the  Indians  could  then 
be  taxed  ;  as  matters  were,  those  north  of  Culiacdn,  Sinaloa, 
J  .  paid  nothing.  The  second  suggested  that  the  unruly  ele- 
ment of  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  be  sent  to  the  Tres  Marias 

5'  His  rank  appears  in   C-292,     Al-  by  its   presence   in   the   Sdnchez   expe- 

though  he  is  called  Salvador  in  Ban-  diente,  but  also  by    internal    evidence, 

croft,  it  seems  better  to  say  Sdnchez,  Neither  Tubac  not  Altar  appears,  but 

that    being    his    apellido,    or    father's  San    Miguel    (Horcasitas)    is    entered, 

name.     The    documents    usually    refer  The  two  former  were  founded  in  1752, 

to  him  as  Sdnchez,  but  occasionally  as  and  the  last  named  in   1751.     Clearly, 

Salvador.  therefore,  the  map  is  of  the  year  1751. 

M  C-308.     See  also   C-307,   the   re-  Although  drawn  by  Don  N.  N.  Anbile. 

mitting  letter.  Sdnchez    ought    to    be    considered    the 

69  C-310.  real  author,  for  the  map  represents  his 

®'C-311.  ideas,  and  was  made,  no  doubt,  under 

"  The  date  is  given  as  1757  in  Torres  his  direction. 
Lanzas,   I,   no.   206,   but  it  should  be  62  C-316. 

1751.     This  may  be  proved,  not  only 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  37 

Islands,  and  that  a  presidio  be  placed  there  to  guard  them. 
Unruly  whites,  as  well  as  Indians,  should  be  sent  there,  but 
Sdnchez  referred  more  particularly  to  the  latter.  The 
Seris,  Pimas,  Apaches,  and  others  were  mentioned  as 
possible  malcontent  tribes,  but  the  Apaches  deemed  most  i 

apt  to  merit  removal  to  the  islands.  The  third  recommended  O  A4. 
better  provision  for  bringing  about  agricultural  develop- 
ment, and,  even  more,  gold  and  silver  mining.  Missions 
should  not  be  allowed  to  monopolize  the  best  agricultural 
lands,  and  the  price  of  quicksilver  should  be  reduced,  so 
that  mining  might  become  more  profitable.  ^^ 

Sanchez's  chief  interest  was  in  his  fourth  memorial,  to  •4'W 
which  the  first  three  were  but  preliminaries.  In  this  he 
advocated  estabHshing  strong  settlements  on  the  Colorado 
and  Gila  rivers,  coming  to  this  conclusion  largely  because 
the  French  were  said  to  be  extending  their  settlements  west- 
ward. They  were  in  the  vicinity  of  northern  New  Mexico, 
he  said,  and  did  not  need  to  advance  much  farther  to  reach 
the  Carmelo  River  on  the  Pacific  Ocean.  The^^ppsed 
jSgttlements  would  serve  tii£fi£s^|Ui^(pses  :  first,  that  of  check-  \ , 
ing  penetration  by  France  to  the  Pacific  coast ;  second,  as 
a  base  of  operations  for  conquering  the  Indians  of  the  ^' 
Colorado-Gila  region ;  third,  it  would  conduce  to  the  occu-  '^ 
pation  of  'Hhe  richest  and  most  abundant  land  that  this 
vast  kingdom  contains,'^  for  whereas  Baja  California  was 
lacking  in  water,  the  region  to  the  north,  according  to 
[Gonzalez]  Cabrera  [Bueno],  from  the  Carmelo  to  the  south, 
had  a  luxuriant  growth  of  trees,  and  good  sites  for  settle- 
ment, the  Indians,  too,  being  most  tractable.  Sanchez 
referred  to  a  westward  branch  of  the  Colorado  flowing  into 
the  sea  between  Monterey  and  Point  Concepcion  which  he 
believed  to  be  the  Carmelo.  This  should  furnish  an  easy 
route  to  the  coast.  For  the  better  execution  of  his  project 
he  recommended  a  new  viceroyalty  with  its  capital  either 
at  San  Juan  de  Sonora,  or  at  some  point  in  Chihuahua,  with 
jurisdiction  over  Sonora,  New  Mexico,  Nueva  Vizcaya,  '*'"''^' 
and  the  regions  of  the  Colorado  River.  -^w^.-«-----*j  . 

•8  The  government  maintained  a  monopoly  on  the  sale  of  quicksilver.    Cf.  n.  26.  ^^ 


38  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

&tR  Sdnchez's  fifth  memorial,  addressed  to  the  junta  at 
Mexico,  was  similar  to  the  fourth  one  to  the  king,  but  with 
some  additions.  Two  hundred  soldiers  should  be  located 
on  the  Colorado,  he  said,  and  families  sent  there  for  the 
formation  of  three  or  four  strong  villas. ^^  Sonora  could  not 
provide  these  settlers,  as  it  needed  all  it  had ;  they  should 
come  from  Sinaloa,  Nueva  Vizcaya,  and  Mexico.  Climate, 
rich  mineral  wealth,  and  numerous  Indians  were  mentioned 
as  attractive  features  of  the  Colorado  River  region.  Once 
established  there,  communication  should  be  opened  with 
New  Mexico  by  way  of  Moqui.  Just  as  soon  as  peace  was 
secure  in  the  Colorado  settlements,  a  detachment  should 
be  sent  to  explore  a  route  to  the  sea  at  the  point  where  the 
Carmelo  emptied,  and  it  would  not  have  far  to  go,  for  the 
\  \  Colorado  emptied  in  33°  30',  and  the  Carmelo  in  a  scant 
wa)  ^^^^/#36°.  A  settlement  on  the  Carmelo  would  be  useful.  The 
iLiA  W*^  '  Manila  galleon  might  have  recourse  to  it  in  case  of  trouble, 
and  news  of  its  coming  might  be  received  much  earlier  than 
at  the  time.  Such  a  settlement  might  also  give  information 
of  the  presence  of  foreign  enemies  in  that  neighborhood. 
Sdnchez  regarded  his  proposal  as  of  particular  importance 
as  a  means  to  check  French  encroachments  on  Spanish 
territory.  He  referred  to  the  crafty  methods  of  French  con- 
quest, as  by  sending  to  America  their  men  and  women  of 
low  morals  to  marry  Indians.  By  such  methods  they  had 
made  the  French  language  universal,  and  had  conquered 
at  such  a  rapid  rate  that  they  surrounded  the  Spanish  pos- 
sessions from  Texas  on  the  east  to  New  Mexico  on  the  north. 
In  course  of  time  they  hoped  to  possess  themselves  of  the 
Spanish  colonies;  they  were  already  very  near  the  Sierra 
Madre,^^  and  if  they  ascended  that,  they  would  find  the 

^  The  villa   in    Spain    was    a    town  not  defined  in  the  laws  of  the   Indies , 

having     special     privileges,     especially  but  is  merely  distinguished  from   the 

as  regards  civil  and  criminal  jurisdiction,  ciudad,  or  city,  by  having  fewer  local 

as    distinguished    from    the    aldea    or  officials      (Recop.,     lib.    IV,    tit.    VII, 

unprivileged    town.     It    goes    back    to  ley   II).     Book   four   of   the   Recopila- 

the    eleventh    century,    the     villas    or  cion    has     several    titles    which    deal 

concejos  being  in  the  frontier  districts  with   the   settlement   and    government 

facing   the    Moslems,    privileges    being  of  cities  and  towns  in  the    Americas, 
granted    as    an   inducement   to    settle-  b*  That  is,   the    "mother  range,"    a 

ment.     Perhaps   because   the   meaning  descriptive  term  to  indicate  the  princi- 

of  the  word  was  so  well  understood,  it  is  pal  mountain  chain. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  39 

Pacific  before  them.  It  was  quite  possible  that  they  might 
come  upon  the  sources  of  the  Colorado  or  the  Carmelo.  In 
this  connection  it  was  well  to  bear  in  mind  a  suspicious 
French  action  in  1740,  when  ten  Frenchmen  with  Indian 
guides  arrived  in  New  Mexico  near  Albuquerque,  saying 
that  they  had  come  on  foot  from  the  lakes  with  the  inten- 
tion of  making  a  settlement.  It  was  likely,  said  Sdnchez, 
that  they  were  a  scouting  party  from  a  much  larger  force, 
and  that  they  hoped  to  discover  where  the  Spanish  were 
carrying  on  their  conquests.^® 

Among  other  documents  before  the  Council  in  its  con- 
sideration of  the  Sdnchez  memorials,  were  letters  from  the 
viceroy  dated  July  10,"  August,^^  and  October  29,^^  1751. 
Those  of  the  first  and  third  date  treated  of  hostile  Apaches, 
dealing  for  the  most  part  with  presidio  and  mission  condi- 
tions in  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  but  there  were  references  to  north- 
eastern Sonora  as  one  of  the  regions  where  the  Apaches 
committed  depredations.  The  letter  of  August  6  pointed 
out  the  Seris  and  their  neighbors  as  the  disturbing  factor 
that  "for  over  a  century"  had  proved  a  hindrance  to  further 
exploration  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado  rivers,  and  to  establish- 
ing communications  between  the  Californias  and  the  main- 
land. This  obstacle  was  now  of  less  account,  thought  the 
viceroy,  for  by  Governor  Parrilla^s  campaign  of  1750,  the 
Seris  had  been  reduced  in  numbers  to  a  thousand.  In  his 
first  answer  to  the  Council,  January  16,  1752.  the  fiscal^^ 

"  This  may  have  been  the  event  which  verbatim,   this  being    especially  note- 
influenced  the  royal  decree  of  1744.  worthy  in  the  case  of   the   fiscales  of 
«7  C-313-14.  the  Council.     The  fiscal  was  a  lawyer, 
•8  C-315.  but  did  not  confine  his  advice  to  legal 
» C-317.  matters.     It  will   be   noticed   that  he 
70  The  fiscal  was  an  exceedingly  im-  had  become  something  quite  different 
portant  official  of  manifold  functions  in  from    what     the    laws    originally    in- 
Spanish    administration.     As    referred  tended.     The  fiscal  of  the  Audiencias 
to    in    this    work    the    fiscales    of    the  of  Lima  or  Mexico,  for  example,  was 
Council  of  the    Indies    and    Audiencia  supposed  to  be  a  kind  of  prosecuting 
of     Mexico    were     officials    to    whom  attorney,  having  a  special  care  for  the 
matters    were    referred    for    a    report.  royal   interests  in  financial   and   legal 
The  fiscal  would  draw  conclusions  from  matters  as  against  possible  usurpations 
documents  bearing  on  the  case,   sum-  by  other  officers  of  the  king.     By  the 
marize    their    contents,    and     give    an  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  he  had 
opinion    as    to    the    course    of    action  become   in   effect   the   first   servant  of 
to    pursue.      In   most    cases    that   the  the    viceroy.     The    same    thing    had 
writer  has  seen,   although   not  in   all,  occurred   in   Spain,    where   the  fiscales 
opinions  of  the  fiscales  were  followed  occupied  a  similar  relation  to  the  Coun- 


40  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

Jose  de  Goyeneche  stated  that  most  of  these  projects  had 
already  been  suggested  by  the  Council  on  May  12,  1744, 
and  approved  by  the  king.  Therefore  no  action  ought  to 
be  taken  until  the  decision  of  the  junta  in  Mexico  was  re- 
ceived. But  in  view  of  the  fertility  of  the  Colorado-Gila 
country,  the  ease  of  reducing  Indians  there,  and  especially 
the  danger  from  the  French,  he  was  of  the  opinion  that 
Sanchez's  proposal  of  conquest  and  settlement  was  of 
sufficient  importance  to  demand  the  principal  attention  of 
the  viceroy.  The  French  seemed  to  be  desirous  of  occupying 
a  port  on  the  Pacific,  a  contingency  which  must  be  averted. 
He  approved  of  secularizijig  the  missions,  because  the 
Indians  had  been  gathered  into  settlements  and  converted, 
in  which  case  the  laws  provided  that  secularization  should 
take  place,  and  that  the  Indians  should  pay  taxes  to  His 
Majesty.  In  conclusion,  he  approved  of  the  proposal  to  lower 
the  price  of  quicksilver  as  an  aid  to  the  miners  of  Sonora.^^ 

The  fourth  proposal  of  Sdnchez  came  before  the  Council 
again  in  its  meeting  of  March  13,  1752,  to  consider  Sonora 
affairs.  The  Council  thought  that  it  would  be  quite  natural 
for  the  French  in  their  westward  advance  to  descend  the 
Colorado  to  the  Gulf,  and  by  its  branch,  the  Carmelo,  pro- 
ceed to  the  Pacific.  Once  in  possession  of  Monterey  they 
would  dominate  all  that  coast  of  the  Californias,  and  it 
must  be  remembered,  said  the  Council,  that  Monterey  was 
only  350  Spanish  lea^ue3  from  Acapulco.^^ 

On  May  15,  1752,  Goyeneche  delivered  his  second  answer 
to  the  Council.  Referring  to  the  proposed  establishments 
on  the  Colorado,  he  said,  ^^The  conquest  which  has  been 
made  of  Tibur6n  Island,  and  the  dislodgment  of  the  Seri 
Indians  ^^  are  of  great  importance,  for  by  occupying,  as  they 
were,  the  territory  through  which  the  route  to  the  Colorado 
River  lay,  they  rendered  it  difficult  to  make  settlements 
there,  as  appears  from  the  map  of  Don  Fernando  Sdnchez. 

cil  of  the  Indies,     For  their  functions  ^^  C-325. 

as   enacted    by    law,    see    Recop.,    lib.  ^  C-335. 

II,  tit.  V,  for  the  fiscales  of  the  Council ;  '^  The  supposed   conquests  by   Pa- 

and  Recop.,  lib.  II,  tU.  XVIII,  for  the  rrilla  in  1750. 

fiscales  of  the  Audiencias. 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  41 

These  natives  having  been  suppressed,  the  way  remains 
without  hindrance."  This  conquest,  along  with  measures 
that  the  viceroy  had  taken  in  Nueva  Vizcaya  would  result 
in  catching  the  Apaches  between  two  Spanish  forces/^  thus 
not  only  checking  them,  but  also  making  it  possible  to 
conquer,  dislodge,  or  punish  them.  Thanks  were  due  the 
viceroy  for  this  achievement,  but  at  the  same  time  he  should 
be  requested  to  forward  the  determination  of  the  junta 
with  regard  to  Sdnchez's  proposals.  Of  these  projects 
Goyeneche  said  that  they  "seem  to  him  to  be  so  important, 
especially  that  of  the  prompt  conquest  and  settlement  of 
the  Colorado  River,  because  of  the  grave  damage  that 
may  be  occasioned  to  the  kingdom  of  New  Spain  and  its 
provinces  by  any  post  of  vantage  that  may  advance  the 
French  nation,  that  it  will  be  fitting  to  charge  the  viceroy 
to  devote  his  primary  attention  to  the  conquest  and  settle- 
ment which  Don  Fernando  Sdnchez  proposes,  inasmuch  as 
by  the  conquest  and  dislodgment  of  the  Seri,  Tiburon, 
Carrizo,  and  Salinero  Indians  the  way  to  the  Colorado  and 
Gila  rivers  has  become  free."^^ 

After  quoting  the  correspondence  leading  to  the  decree 
of  December  4,  1747,  and  citing  two  royal  decrees  of  August 
19,  1606,^^  with  regard  to  making  a  settlement  at  Monterey, 
the  Council  pointed  out  the  dangers  that  would  result 
from  a  French  advance  to  that  port  by  way  of  the 
Colorado  and  Carmelo  rivers.  The  French  would  then 
dominate  the  Pacific,  and  threaten  Spanish  trade  with  the 
Philippines.  The  question  whether  Spain  should  occupy 
Monterey  was  then  considered.  If  done,  Monterey  would 
serve  as  a  place  of  refreshment  for  the  galleon,  for  it  had  a 
good  port,  the  lands  were  fertile  for  every  kind  of  crop,  and 
good  for  caUle,  and  the  natives  were  docile.  It  would  also 
be  a  place  of  refuge  in  case  of  storms."^^  While  these  de- 
liberations were  going  on,  news  was  received  from  the 
viceroy  which  gave  a  new  turn  to  affairs.  On  January  16, 
1752,  he  wrote  that  the  Pimas  of  Pimeria  Alta  had  risen  in 

^*In  that  the  Sens  could  no  longer  '» C-330. 

make  a  diversion.  »•  C-15,  16.  t?  C-335  . 


42  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

serious  revolt  in  the  preceding  November.  A  junta  held 
in  Mexico  had  decided  to  procure  peace  by  despatching  a 
squadron  of  fifty  men  to  that  region,  but  with  instructions 
'to  deal  gently  with  the  Pimas,  lest  they  form  a  pact  with  the 
Apaches  and  Seris.  Peace  established,  this  troop  was  to 
advance  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  in  order  to  open  com- 
munication with  the  Californias."^^  This  letter  seems  to 
have  been  received  at  the  same  time  with  another  by  the 
viceroy  of  February  10,  1752.  The  latter^*  enclosed  a  testi- 
monio  giving  a  full  account  of  what  had  happened  and  of  the 
measures  taken. ^°  Commenting  on  these  events  the  fiscal 
recommended,  June  26,  1752,  that  action  on  Sanchez's 
proposals  be  postponed  until  Sonora  should  be  restored 
to  peace,^^  and  such  was  the  decision  of  the  Council.^^ 

Consideration  of  the  subject  went  on  in  Mexico,  however, 
another  junta  being  held  in  1752.  Among  the  documents 
considered  was  a  memorial  of  Father  Sedelmayr,  June  25, 
1751,  signed  also  by  other  Jesuits  of  Pimeria  Alt  a.  The 
document  recites  that  the  Jesuits  had  become  discouraged 
because  of  the  lack  of  attention  paid  to  their  previous  memo- 
rials, but  they  were  taking  fresh  hopes,  due  to  the  peace  ^^ 
and  to  "news  of  the  zeal"  of  the  viceroy.  Consequently, 
they  were  urging  an  advance  to  the  Gila  and  Colorado 
rivers,  a  region  of  vast  lands,  mighty  rivers,  great  fertility, 
and  withal,  easy  to  govern.  After  reducing  the  peoples 
there,  they  could  proceed  to  other  important  ends,  such  as 
the    conversion    of    superior   California}^     Moreover,  the 

"0-324.  Monterey."     There  is  no  warrant  for 

"  C-326.     See  also  C-327.  this     statement     except     the     phrase 

*•  C-321.  superior  California,  which,  as  has  been 

81  C-334.  shown,   referred  to   the  upper  part  of 

8*  C-335.     This  document  is  a  long  the    peninsula.     Sedelmayr    speaks    of 

report  by  the  Council  of  the  Indies  to  superior   California   as    a   sterile    land, 

the  king,  July  7,  1752,  citing  most  of  lack  of  provisions  in  which  might  be 

the    documents    mentioned    above    in  remedied    by    sending    them     via    the 

connection  with  the  Sdnchez  memorials,  mouth   of   the    Colorado    River.     This 

and  stating  the  action  of  the  Council.  then    was  the   oft-mentioned    plan    of 

For  a  summary  of  proceedings  to  June  supplying  Baja  California  by  an  over- 

15,  1752,  see  C-332.  land    route.     Besides,    Alta    California 

83  Another     reference    to    Parrilla's  would   not  have   been  called   a  sterile 

campaign  of  1750.  land,  because  belief  in  its  fertility  was 

w  Richman    quotes    this    document  general.     Finally,  why  send  provisions 

to   show  that  Pimeria   was   to   be   "a  from    the    Colorado-Gila    country    to 

base  of  operations"  not  only  to  Moqui  Alta  California  by  way  of  the  mouth  of 

but    also    "northwestward    as    far    as  the  Colorado? 


7 


1687]  EARLY  PROJECTS  FOR  ADVANCE  43 

first-named  reduction  would  be  necessary  before  Moqui 
could  be  reconquered,  besides  which  the  Colorado-Gila 
lands  were  better  and  more  populous  than  those  of  Moqui* 
The  natives  of  these  rivers  desired  Christianity,  as  had 
been  made  clear  to  Sedelmayr  during  his  visit  of  1744,  and 
if  they  had  missions  among  them,  the  Spaniards  would  soon 
get  to  know  of  other  peoples  farther  up  the  Colorado.  Per- 
haps they  were  not  far  distant  from  the  most  westerly  con- 
quests of  the  French,  who  were  said  to  be  seeking  this  same 
Colorado  River.  At  least  eleven  or  twelve  missions  would 
be  necessary,  because  of  the  great  number  of  Indians. 
There  also  should  be  a  presidio  of  more  than  the  usual 
number  of  soldiers,  which  should  be  located  on  the  Gila, 
not  far  from  Apacheria,  as  a  check  against  the  hostile 
Apaches.  This  done,  it  might  be  possible  in  a  short  time 
to  transfer  the  presidio  of  San  Miguel  de  Horcasitas  to  the 
Gila,  provided  the  Seris  should  remain  subjected.^^ 

On  December  16,  1751,  the  Marques  de  Altamira,  auditor.^  f 
of  the  Avdiencia  of  Mexico,  addressed  a  voluminous  memo- 
rial to  the  fiscal  of  that  body  with  regard  to  this  matter. 
It  is  especially  noteworthy  here  as  evidence  that  the  atten- 
tion of  the  authorities  had  been  focussed  upon  the  Colorado- 
Gila  country.  Nearly  one-third  of  the  memorial  is  con- 
cerned with  a  review  of  the  frontier  situation  from  eastern 

"  Sedelmayr  and  others  to  the  vice-  since  1694  Kino,  Campos,  Guilg,  Keller, 

roy,   June  25,    1751,   Tubutama.     The  and  he  himself  had  known,   explored, 

signers  and  their  stations  were :   Jacobo  managed,     and     dealt    with    [havlamoa 

Sedelmayr,   visitador  of   Pimeria   Alta,  conocido,    reconocido,    manijado    y    tra- 

stationed  at  Tubutama ;   Caspar  Stiger  tado].     Adam  Guilg  is  the  Adan  Gil  of 

[of    San    Ignacio] ;      TomAs    Tello    of  Bancroft.     At     probably     about     the 

Caborca :    and  Juan  Nentuig  of  Saric.  same  time,  although  the  letter  is  not 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  surnames  dated,  Father  Felipe  Segesser  wrote  to 

of  these  Jesuits  are  spelled  differently  the    viceroy,    the    letter    being    signed 

than  in  Bancroft,  with  the  single  ex-  also   by  Carlos  de   Roxas,   Nicolas  de 

ception   of    Tello.     The    above    is    the  Perera,  and  Jos6  Fora,  the  last  named 

way     they     themselves     wrote     them.  not  mentioned  in  Bancroft  as  among  the 

Bancroft's  surmise  that   Nentuig   was  Sonora  Jesuits.     This  letter  definitely 

located  at  Saric  proves  to  have  been  includes  Campos  with  those  who  made 

correct.  journeys    to    the    Gila    and    Colorado 

This  letter  contains   an  intimation  rivers.     The    document,     however,     is 

that  Fathers  Campos  and  Adam  Guilg  little    more    than    a    transcript   of    the 

were  among  the  Jesuits  who  engaged  one    written    by    Sedelmayr    and    the 

in  northward  exploration,   a  fact  that  Jesuits  of  Pimeria  Alta,  taking  up  the 

the  writer  had  not  seen  mentioned  else-  same  subject-matter  in  the  same  order, 

where.     Cf.    n     16,    supra.    Sedelmayr  but  in  less  detail.     Both  documents  are 

refers  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  regions  in  Arch,  de  la  Secretaria  de  Gobierno, 

as   places   which   by   various  journeys  Chihuahua,    Siglo    XVIII,    Legaj'o    S. 


44  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  II 

Texas  to  Pimeria  Alta  and  Baja  California.  Concluding  this 
part,  Altamira  said  that  it  was  necessary  to  consider  this 
whole  frontier  as  no  less  worthy  of  attention  than  the 
Calif ornias  and  the  region  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado  rivers. 
By  paying  attention  to  one  part  of  the  j&eld  as  if  there  were 
no  others  equally  worthy  of  consideration,  or  more  so,  would 
mean  that  such  measures  as  might  be  taken  in  the  matter 
of  reductions  would  be  defective,  and  that  but  little  or  no 
progress  would  be  made.  To  the  question  of  advance  by 
way  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  he  devoted  the  remainder 
of  the  memorial.  He  recommended  a  number  of  missions 
and  settlements,  and  a  presidio  in  the  Colorado-Gila  re- 
gion. These  establishments  would  result  in  the  conquest 
of  the  natives,  would  serve  as  a  nucleus  for  an  advance  to 
the  Californias,  and  in  time  might  lead  to  the  opening  of 
communication  with  Moqui  and  New  Mexico.^^ 

The  much  planned  advance  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  did 
not  come  at  this  time.  Much  was  done,  however,  which 
o  tended  toward  it,  such  as  the  transfer  of  the  presidio  at 
/(  .  Pitiqui  to  Horcasitas  in  1751,  the  founding  of  Tubac  and 
Altar  presidios  in  1752,  and  the  preparation  of  general  cam- 
paigns against  the  Apaches  along  the  whole  northern  fron- 
tier, all  of  which  matters  were  related  to  the  problems  which 
produced  the  Sdnchez  memorials.  The  way  was  not  clear 
for  expansion  of  the  quiet,  normal  kind.  Sonora  was  a 
seething  hot-bed  of  Indian  war  and  attendant  evils.  Thus 
the  PiiaauXSyolt  i^^y  be  regarded  in  a  double  light ;  as  causing 

\ »         the  postponement  of  an  advance  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila, 
and  as  hastening  measures  which  would  in  fact   conduce 

iL  *  to  that  end.  As  these  events  relate  to  the  subject-matter 
of  the  next  chapter,  discussion  of  them  will  be  reserved  until 
then.  Enough  has  been  said  here  to  indicate  the  contmuQus 
desire  of  the  government  for  an  advance  to  the^twoLriyers,.,. 
showing  also  that  it  was  not  great  enough  to  bring  about 
fulfillment  of  the  project,  unless  there  should  be  some 
powerful  impelling  cause,  or  the  way  of  advance  be  easy. 


CHAPTER  III 

OBSTACLES  IN  THE   WAY  OF  AN  ADVANCE,    1752-1765 

The  revolt  of  the  Pimas  of  Pimeria  Alta  broke  out  in 
November,  1751;  headed  by  an  Indian  chief  named  Don 
Luis.  All  of  the  missions,  villages,  mining  camps,  and 
ranches  in  the  northwest  were  speedily  destroyed.  Governor 
Parrilla  and  the  presidio  captains  rushed  troops  to  the 
scene  in  1752,  and  the  revolt  died_  as  suddenly  as  it  had 
begun.  Two  missionaries  and  perhaps  a  hundred  other 
whites  had  been  killed.  In  the  next  twenty  years,  plans 
for  an  extension  of  the  frontier  by  way  of  the  Gila  and 
Colorado  rivers  were  secondary  to  the  question  of  establish- 
ing good  order  in  Sonora,  a  necessary  preliminary  to  further 
permanent  advance.  The  principal  prerequisites  to  good 
order  were :  an  adjustment  of  the  differences  between 
the  religious  and  secular  authorities ;  the  subjection  or 
annihilation  of  the  Seris,  and  the  repulse  of  Apache  raids; 
and  a  sufficiently  great  increase  in  the  white  population  of 
Sonora  to  develop  its  resources,  in  order  to  render  its  reten- 
tion permanent,  and  to  ensure  a  commensurate  return  to 
the  central  government  for  the  expense  of  its  reduction. 

One  of  the  purposes  of  this  chapter  will  be  to  show  the 
status  of  these  problems  in  the  period  elapsing  between  the 
suppression  of  the  Pima  revolt  and  the  coming  of  Jose 
de  Galvez  as  visitador  of  New  Spain.  A  second  object 
will  be  to  account  for  Spain^s  failure  to  cope  with  the  situa- 
tion. Third,  it  will  be  shown  that  plans  for  northwestward 
advance  were  at  no  time  given  up,  although  they  failed  to 
result  in  great  accomplishment,  for  the  same  reasons  as 
those  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter. 


Most  of  the  missions  of  Pimeria  Alta  were  reoccupied  in 
1752,  after  the  Pima  revolt  had  been  suppressed,  but  pros- 

45 


46  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  Ill 

perity  did  not  return.  Decline  was  fostered  by  a  bitter 
controversy  that  broke  out  between  the  Jesuits  and  Governor 
"ParriUa  as  to  the  causes  of  the  outbreak.  Father  Keller 
said  that  Parrilla  was  at  fault  for  flattering  Don  Luis,  the 
revolt  following  as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  latter's 
conceit.  Parrilla  claimed  that  the  Jesuits  had  ill-treated 
the  Indians  intolerably  oppressing  them  with  work  and 
punishments.  Many  Indians  and  white  settlers,  probably 
the  majority,  supported  Parrilla^s  charges,  although  others 
took  the  Jesuit  side,  the  arguments  depending  usually, 
perhaps,  on  the  interests  of  those  making  them.  Many 
of  the  Indians  did  not  like  the  restraints  of  mission  life; 
the  whites  wanted  secularization,  which  would  give  them 
a  chance  to  appropriate  the  mission  lands,  and  virtually 
enslave  the  Indians;  and  secularization,  if  possible,  was 
also  in  the  interests  of  the  government,  as  the  Indians  would 
then  have  to  pay  tribute.  The  dispute  dragged  on,  re- 
sulting in  many  great  testimonios  that  came  before  the 
Council  of  the  Indies  for  consideration.  Not  until  Sep- 
tember 27,  1759,  was  the  case  declared  officially  at  an  end,^ 
the  Jesuits  being  exculpated.^  Whatever  may  have  been 
the  merfts  of  the  controversy,  the  Jesuits  became  less  and 
less  influential  in  Sonora.  Few  neophytes  were  obtained 
from  this  time  forth.  Indian  women  and  children,  and 
old  and  infirm  men  resided  at  the  missions,  but  others 
rarely  came  in,  unless  impelled  by  hunger  or  by  fear  of  the 
Apaches.  At  other  times  they  remained  in  the  mountains, 
or  aided  the  Seris  in  stirring  up  trouble.^  Meanwhile, 
complaints  against  the  Jesuits  continued. 

The  Seris,  as  well  as  the  Pimas,  had  given  trouble  in  1751, 
continuing  from  that  time  until  1771  in  almost  constant  war 
with  the  Spaniards,  taking  refuge  when  hard  pressed  in  the 
Cerro  Prieto.  Apache  campaigns  also  occupied  attention 
along  the  entire  northern  frontier  from  Sonora  to  Texas. 

1  C-460.  324,  326-27,  334-40,  346,  348-53,  356- 

2C-459.  65,   367-71,   379,   382,   384,   388,   393, 

3  Among    documents    that    bear   on  398,    402-5,    438,    440-41,    450,    453, 

the   dispute   arising   out   of   the   Pima  458-60. 

revolt  of  1751  are  the  following  :  C-322, 


1752]        OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY   OF  AN  ADVANCE  47 

Expeditions  against  the  Apaches  accompHshed  Httle,  as 
they  could  never  be  brought  to  a  general  engagement. 
About  the  only  result  worth  noting  is  the  conclusion  that 
Moqui  might  be  reached  by  way  of  the  upper  Gila,  if  such 
a  route  were  desired,  a  project  considered  in  connection  with 
the  plans  for  conquest  toward  and  beyond  the  Colorado  and 
Gila.  This  conclusion  was  arrived  at  because  the  Apaches 
had  blankets  supposed  to  have  been  made  by  Moquis.  Often 
the  Apaches  took  advantage  of  expeditions  against  them  to 
raid  the  country  about  the  presidios,  thus  deprived  of  its 
usual  guard.  ^'It  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  damages 
suffered  in  Sonora,"  writes  Burriel,  '^especially  since  the 
death  of  the  brave  Captain  Anza,  in  villages,  settlements, 
farms,  roads,  pastures,  woods,  and  mines,  many  of  which 
have  been  abandoned  on  that  account,  although  very- 
rich."  ^  Even  the  mission  Indians  could  no  longer  be 
controlled,  the  Jesuits  fearing  to  discipline  them,  lest  they 
provoke  revolt.     General  lawlessness  prevailed. 

Internal  conditions  of  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  are  well  illus- 
trated by  the  statistics  of  population  obtained  by  Bishop 
Tamaron  while  on  a  diocesan  tour  from  1759  to  1763.  At 
that  time  there  were  in  the  two  provinces  32,000  of  Spanish 
or  mixed  blood,  and  31,000  Indians  professing  Christianity, 
of  whom  25,000  lived  in  missions.  There  were  fifty  mis- 
sions, most  of  them  in  Sonora.  The  number  of  uncon- 
verted Indians  was  very  large,  but  no  estimate  of  them 
was  made. 

The  greater  part  of  the  white  population  lived  in  Sinaloa. 
White  settlements  ^  were  the  rule  there,  the  exceptions 
being  a  few  Indian  villages  along  the  coast,  where  there 
was  not  the  inducement  of  mineral  wealth  to  draw  the 
Spanish  settler.  There  were  some  considerable  towns  in 
Sinaloa.  San  Felipe  de  Sinaloa  had  a  white  population  of 
3500 ;  Fuerte,  otherwise  San  Juan  de  Montesclaros,  1886 ; 
Rosario  2459;    San  Sebastian  2500;    Culiacdn  2216;    and 

*  Burriel,  Noticia,  II,  556.  ment"  of  Mazatldn,  for  example,  was 

^  The  term   "white  settlements"  is  composed     of     mulattoes.     Of.     chap. 

intended  to  include  all  elements  of  the  I,  n.  2. 

gente    de    razdn.     The    "white    settle- 


48  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  Ill 

Mazatlan  966.  These  places  had  nearly  half  the  total 
white  population  of  the  two  provinces.  Secularization  of 
missions  had  taken  place  in  most  of  Sinaloa,  although  the 
Jesuits  were  more  numerous  than  secular  clergy,  but  they 
usually  served  as  parish  priests,  the  mission  system  pre- 
vailing but  little.  Much  of  this  change  came  as  a  result 
of  the  Sanchez  memorials,  having  occurred  prior  to  the 
Tamaron  visita}  There  were  probably  not  many  uncon- 
verted Indians  in  Sinaloa,  or  if  there  were,  they  caused  no 
trouble. 

In  Ostimuri,  as  that  part  of  Sonora  below  the  Yaqui  was 
then  called,  conditions  were  almost  as  good  as  in  Sinaloa. 
Alamos  had  a  population  of  3400  of  white  or  mixed  race ; 
Bayorca  1004;  Rio  Chico  1400;  Trinidad  de  Plata  715; 
and  Soyopa  or  San  Antonio  de  la  Huerta  300.  All  of  these 
were  mining  towns.  Farther  north,  in  the  mountain  dis- 
tricts near  the  Sonora  valley,  there  were  a  number  of  mining 
towns  at  considerable  distances  from  a  presidio,  such  as 
Arivechi,  Sahuaripa,  Nacori,  and  Arispe.  In  northeastern 
Sonora,  where  the  Apaches  were  wont  to  make  raids,  most 
of  the  white  population  was  grouped  around  presidios  there 
and  near  by  in  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  there  being  484  at  Front  eras. 
Near  the  coast,  where  the  Seris  and  their  allies  were  numer- 
ous, and  precious  metals  not  plentiful,  there  were  no  whites. 
The  case  with  Pimeria  Alta  was  a  little  better,  due  to  the 
existence  of  gold  and  silver.  There  were  eight  missions, 
Suamca,  Guebavi,  Bac,  Saric,  Tubutama,  Ati,  Caborca, 
and  San  Ignacio,  and  three  presidios,  Terrenate,  Tubac, 
and  Altar.  Subsidiary  to  these  were  a  number  of  visitas, 
villas,  and  reales  de  minas.     In  the  mission  districts  there 

'  In  addition  to  documents  already  to  the  mountains  if  deprived  of  their 
cited  in  connection  with  the  Sdnchez  missionaries.  The  government  over- 
memorials  the  following  may  be  re-  ruled  these  objections,  and  the  viceroy 
f  erred  to  :  C-341,  348,  355,  379, 381,  383,  was  able  to  write,  March  9,  1755,  that 
397,  These  documents  are  for  the  the  twenty-two  missions  had  been 
years  1753  to  1755,  dealing  with  the  secularized.  This  relieved  the  govern- 
cession  of  twenty-two  Jesuit  missions  ment  of  an  annual  expenditure  of 
to  the  secular  clergy  under  jurisdiction  over  7000  pesos,  the  amount  required 
of  the  bishop  of  Durango.  The  Jesuits  by  the  missionaries  for  wine,  oil,  and 
objected  to  the  cession,  saying  that  other  articles  used  in  administering 
the  Indians  were  opposed  to  it,  and  sacraments,  and  rendered  the  Indians 
that  they  had  threatened  to  withdraw  liable  for  tribute. 


1752]  OBSTACLES  IN  THE   WAY   OF  AN  ADVANCE  49 

were  4223  Indians  and  348  whites,  the  latter  being  at  the 
mining  camps  of  Guebavi,  Santa  Barbara,  Buenavista, 
Arizonac,  and  Santa  Ana.  At  the  presidios  there  were 
no  Indians,  but  there  were  1117  whites,  including  garrisons 
of  fifty  men  at  each  presidio.  All  of  the  white  settlements 
of  Pimeria  Alta  were  within  easy  reach  of  presidios,  without 
which  they  could  not  have  existed. 

From  the  above  it  will  appear  that  Sinaloa  had  undergone 
adjustment  to  white  rule,  removing  it  from  the  status  of  a 
frontier  province ;  that  a  great  part  of  Sonora,  including 
all  prominent  mining  regions,  except  Pimeria  Alta  and  the  , 
northeast,  was  in  a  fair  way  to  become  adjusted;  that 
northeastern  Sonora,  Pimeria  Alta,  and  the  coast  regions 
were  far  from  such  adjustment ;  that  the  line  and  progress 
iif  conquest  depended  largely  upon  the  existence  of  mineral 
wealth.  Thus  it  seems  that  the  situation  in  Sonora  was 
not  hopelessly  bad,  if  only  the  government  would  exert 
itself  to  conquer  the  Seris  and  repulse  the  Apaches,  but  this  it 
did  not  do  for  a  long  time.  As  a  result  Spanish  settlements 
were  abandoned,  and  to  many  it  seemed  that  Sonora  might 
be  lost.  The  authorities  in  Mexico  and  Spain  were  memo- 
rialized by  a  vast  horde  of  officials  and  priests  as  to  the  most 
effective  methods  for  saving  the  province.  In  1763  Father 
Lizazoin  reported  that  it  was  in  a  fair  way  to  become 
depopulated,  and  urged  steps  to  prevent  it,  laying  stress 
on  the  mineral  wealth  to  be  obtained  there,  should  good 
order  prevail.  He  suggested  two  new  presidios  as  additional 
checks  against  the  Indians :  at  Guaymas  against  the  Seris 
and  Pimas,  and  at  Babispe  against  the  Apaches.  The 
anonymous  author  of  the  Descripcion  Geogrdfica  Natural  y 
Curiosa  de  la  Provincia  de  Sonora ,  writing  in  1764,  recom- 
mended that  the  Seris  and  Pimas  Bajos  be  transported ; 
mining  and  agriculture  might  then  revive.  Pedro  de 
Aragon,  September  6,  1765,  recommended  concentrating  on 
Ostimuri,  and  establishing  a  presidio  south  of  the  Yaqui 
River.  These  three  memorials  were  only  a  few  out  of  many, 
and  although  similar  views  were  held  in  high  quarters,  they 
probably  exhibited   more  pessimism  than  the  facts  war- 


50  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     ICh.  Ill 

ranted/  The  official  correspondence  of  the  time  shows 
that  affairs  were  bad  enough,  but  it  was  not  so  despondent 
in  tone  as  were  letters  of  the  religious,  and  of  private  in- 
dividuals.^ It  must  be  remembered  that  affairs  were  prob- 
ably as  bad,  or  possibly  worse,  along  the  frontiers  of 
Nueva  Vizcaya,  where  the  Apaches  caused  far  more  trouble 
than  in  Sonora,  the  problem  of  restoring  peace  being  one 
of  a  long  frontier,  and  not  of  a  single  province.  As  regards 
the  matter  of  a  permanent  advance  to  the  Colorado  and 
Gila  rivers,  the  situation  was  worse  in  1765  than  in  1752. 
The  other  two  objects  of  this  chapter  involve  a  consideration 
of  the  general  policy  of  the  Spanish  government  for  the 
period  under  review. 

The  establishment  of  Bourbon  rule  in  Spain  in  1700, 
although  carrjdng  in  its  train  a  number  of  disastrous  wars, 
was  accompanied  by  sincere  efforts  for  regeneration  of  the 
country.  Spain^s  object  in  this  period  was  not  primarily 
one  of  aggrandizement,  but  rather  to  make  herself  so  strong 
that  she  could  ensure  retention  of  what  she  already  had. 
Subordinate  to  this  was  the  natural  desire  for  the  recovery 
of  what  had  been  taken  from  her,  and  for  the  removal  of 
certain  onerous  restrictions  upon  her  freedom  of  action,  as, 
for  example,  those  resulting  from  the  Asiento  treaty  with 
England.^    At  every  turn  in  the  accomplishment  of  these 

^  Yet,  at  a  later  date,  in  a  private  years     1761     to     1765,     of    governors 

letter  to   his   brother,    May   29,    1767,  Cuervo  and  Pineda,  Viceroy  Cruillas, 

Viceroy  Croix  wrote  that  Sinaloa  and  and  Arriaga,  the  ministro  general. 
Sonora  were  almost  deserted  by  reason  '  One  of  the  results  of  the  War  of 

of    Indian    invasions.     If    the    Indians  the    Spanish    S^uccgssion    was    Spain's 

could  be  defeated,   and   the  provinces  grant  of  the  Asiento  treaty  to  England 

repopvilated,    they    would    yield    more  in  1713.     By  its  terms  British  subjects 

treasure  than  the  rest  of  the  kingdom,  were  allowed  to  sell  4800  slaves  a  year 

he  said,  for  they  were  the  richest  prov-  in  the  Spanish  colonies  for  thirty  years, 

inces  in  New  Spain  in  gold  and  silver.  They  might  also  send  one  ship  a  year 

Croix,     Correspondance,     207.     Condi-  of  five  hundred  tons  burden  with  goods 

tions  in  1767  were  not  materially  differ-  ^;  for  the  annual  fairs  at  Vera  Cruz  and 

ent  from  what  they  were  in  the  period ''^  Porto    Bello.     These    privileges    were 

covered  in  this  chapter.  used    by   the    English   as   an   entering 

*  The   three   memorials   quoted    are  wedge  for  smuggling.     They  were  set 

cited    from    Bancroft.     Among    other  aside  on  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1739, 

documents  about  internal  conditions  of  and  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  England 

Sonora  are  the  following :    C^95,  499,  surrendered  her  rights  for  the  unfinished 

501-3,    511-13,    518-21,    524,    527-28,  term    of    the    treaty    (the    four   years 

530-31,    546,    549-50,    560,    564,    569,  lost  by  war),  upon  Spain's  payment  of 

690,    596.     These    are    for    the    most  an  indemnity  of  £100,000. 
part    official    correspondence    for    the 


1752]  OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY   OF  AN  ADVANCE  51 

policies  Spain  found  herself  confronted  and  threatened  by- 
England.  Five  times,  in  little  more  than  the  first  half 
century  of  Bourbon  rule,  Spain  and  England  were  oppo- 
nents in  war.^^  Through  violations  of  the  Asiento  treaty,  ^''^f^'^^^;**^ 
England  was  breaking  down  Spain's  monopoly  of  its  colonial 
trade.  English  imperialism  was  a  constant  menace  as 
against  Spain's  retention  of  her  colonies.  British  subjects 
trespassed  upon  Spanish  domains,   as  in  the  case  of  the  ^ 

dye-wood  cutters  in  Honduras,  and  were  sustained  by  their  ' 

own  government.  Gibraltar  and  Minorca  were  held  by 
England,  a  standing  affront  to  the  national  dignity  of  Spain, 
and  a  danger  to  the  peninsula  itself.  The  British  govern- 
ment supported  Portugal  in  the  latter's  claim  to  the  Sacra- 
mento region  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  in  South  America. 
British  vessels  claimed  a  right  to  search  Spanish  ships  on 
the  high  seas,  and  even  seized  some  of  them. 

One  obvious  way  to  a  successful  issue  of  these  contro- 
versies was  the  building  up  of  a  strong  army  and  navy,  but 
this  required  more  money  than  Spain's  revenues  supplied. 
To  get  it  Spain  pursued  two  courses :    the  wise  one  of  eco-     / 
nomic  regeneration  at  home,  so  that,  by  attainment  of  greater 
wealth,  greater  amounts  in  taxation  might  be  levied ;   and 
the  unwise  policy  of  bleeding  the  colonies,  by  exacting  great  «^' 
sums  from  them,  without  attempting  in  equal  measure  their 
development.     The  primary  intention   in  the   latter  case 
seems  to  have  been  to  get  the  greatest  amount  of  revenue 
possible,  not  ultimately,  but  at  once,  at  least  so  far  as  was 
commensurate    with    retention    of    the    colonies.     This    is 
not  the  place  to  treat  in  detail  of  the  results  of  this  policy, 
temporary  or  ultimate.     Suffice  then  to  say  that  Spanish   1  \ 
revenues  were  increased,  the  economic  wealth  of  Spain  devel-   1 1 
oped,  and  an  army  and  navy  created.     But  the  need  never    '  ' 
caught  up  with  the  danger.     The  resources  developed  under 
Ferdinand  VI  were  wasted  by  Spain's  brief  participation  in 
the  Seven  Years'  War.     Whatever  funds  Spain  got,  she 
constantly  needed  more.     It  was  for  this  reason  that  Jos6 
de  Gdlvez  was  sent  to  New  Spain  in  1765,  for  that  vice- 

"To  wit:  1701-13,  1718-21,  1727-29,  1739-48.  1762-63. 


52  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  Ill 

royalty  produced  far  more  revenue  than  the  other  Spanish 
colonies. ^^     More  yet  was  wanted. 

It  is  now  time  to  consider  how  this  policy  affected  the 
region  of  which  Sonora  forms  a  part.  Materials  have  been 
found  in  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias  by  the  writer  show- 
ing the  receipts  and  disbursements  of  the  Real  Caja  (royal 
treasury)  of  Guadalajara  for  each  year  from  1743  to  1781. 
This  was  the  principal  real  caja  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Audiencia  of  Guadalajara,  and  until  the  arrival  of 
Gdlvez  the  only  one  dealing  with  the  region  west  of  the 
central  plateau  of  Mexico.  Gdlvez  founded  a  real  caja 
at  Alamos,  June  1,  1769.-^^  Later  there  was  another  at 
Rosario.  Figures  of  the  Real  Caja  of  Guadalajara  may  be 
used,  although  with  reservations,  owing  to  lack  of  informa- 
tion as  to  the  extent  of  its  jurisdiction  and  the  inter-relations 
of  different  cajas  realeSy  as  some  evidence  that  Spain  did 
not  make  a  supreme  effort  to  put  down  the  Indian  wars. 
The  means  for  so  doing  were  at  hand,  had  the  authorities 
not  considered  other  matters  as  of  more  consequence.  For 
the  entire  period,  1743  to  1781,  an  average  of  86  per  cent  of 
the  receipts  at  the  Real  Caja  of  Guadalajara  were  sent  to 
the  Real  Caja  of  Mexico,  or  in  later  years,  to  that  and  other 
cajas  reales  of  the  viceroyalty.  Not  only  is  this  the  average 
for  the  entire  period,  but  about  the  usual  percentage  for 
each  year.  From  amounts  remitted,  however,  should  be 
deducted  sums  sent  back  for  maintaining  the  presidios  of 
Sonora.  This  in  some  cases  was  about  half  of  the  total 
remitted  to  Mexico,  but  certainly  after  1761  was  always  less 
than  that,  falling  to  a  general  average  of  about  one-third. ^^ 
Sums  remitted  to  Mexico  grew  steadily  greater.  In  the 
decade  from  1743  to  1752  the  average  annual  remission 
amounted  to  222,663  pesos.  In  the  next  decade,  ending 
1762,  remissions  had  jumped,  despite  disorder  in  Sonora,  to 

"  Wilhelm     Roscher,    The    Spanish  but  was  in  most  cases  about  20,000 . 

colonial    system    (tr.    ed.    by    Edward  In  1771   the  annual  fund  for  each  of 

Gaylord  Bourne.       New  York.    1904),  the   six   in   Sonora   was   20,665   pesos, 

p.  40.  except    Horcasitas    which    got    24,065, 

"C-1271.     See  also  C-1290.  the  added  amount  being  for  the  gov- 

"  The    annual    cost    of    a    presidio  ernor's  salary.     C-1760. 
ranged   from    18,000   to    25,000   pesos. 


1752]        OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  AN  ADVANCE  53 

an  annual  average  of  263,285  pesos.  The  very  next  year, 
1763,  the  year  of  Lizazoin's  despondent  memorial,  the 
amount  sent  to  Mexico  was  higher  than  it  had  been  in  pre- 
vious years,  certainly  since  1743,  no  less  than  372,497  pesos. 
In  the  years  that  Gdlvez  was  most  prominent  in  his  reforms 
of  real  hacienda j  1765  to  1769,  it  was  more  than  that  in 
each  year,  reaching  the  high-water  mark  of  477,209  pesos 
in  1766,  a  figure  that  was  never  surpassed  in  the  thirty- 
nine  year  period  considered  here.  From  1770  on,  receipts 
were  lower,  though  averaging  well  over  300,000  pesos  a  year, 
but  Guadalajara  was  then  sharing  activities  with  Alamos 
and  Rosario." 

Had  these  sums  been  applied  for  the  protection  and 
development  of  the  regions  from  which  they  were  collected, 
a  stronger  establishment  or  even  additional  conquests 
might  have  resulted.  Probably,  however,  the  greater  part 
of  the  funds,  after  deducting  the  presidial  situados,  found 
their  way  to  Europe.  Certainly  this  was  the  case  at  a  later 
time,^^  and  it  may  confidently  be  assumed  to  have  been 
so  in  the  period  under  review.  It  is,  therefore,  a  reason- 
ably safe  conclusion  that  Spain  failed  to  cope  with  the 
situation  in  Sonora,  because  it  would  not  go  to  the  expense, 
or  rather  reduce  its  profits,  in  order  to  apply  a  remedy. 
There  being  no  definite  foreign  danger  from  the  direction 
of  Sonora,  no  discoveries  of  unusually  rich  mines,  and  no 
man  of  such  exceptional  ability  as  to  be  able  with  the 
means  at  hand  to  bring  order  to  Sonora,  it  was  left  without 
great  assistance  from  the  government  in  its  problems  of 
development. 

Whether  or  not  an  advance  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila 

"  For  financial  operations  of  the  Real  amount  of  receipts  a  year  for  the  entire 

Caja  of   Guadalajara    outlined    above  viceroyalty  of  New  Spain  was  10,747,- 

see    legajos     104-3-9     and     104-3-21,  878    pesos.     The    largest   item    of   ex- 

Archivo  de  Indias,  Seville.     The  writer  pense    was    the    amount    devoted    to 

has  prepared   a  table   showing  results  situados   of   presidios,   3,011,664   pesos. 

for    the    entire    period    from    1743    to  Yet   there   remained   for   remission    to 

1781,    which    appears    as    Appendix  I.  Spain,  after  deducting  costs  of  carriage. 

Sample  estados  or  tables  for  a   single  "5,843,438   pesos,   oyer    half    the    total 

year,   showing  receipts    and    disburse-  receipts.     Fonseca     and     Urrutia,      I, 

ments,    item    by   item,    will    follow    as  Estados  1  and  2,  between  pp.  XXXVIII 

Appendix  II.  and  1. 

"  Between  1785  and  1790  the  average 


54  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  Ill 

rivers  might  have  resulted,  but  for  the  Pima  Revolt  of 
1751,  this  event  did  not  cause  the  government  to  lose  in- 
terest in  the  project.  Investigations  as  to  the  causes  of  the 
outbreak  were  often  linked  with  questions  or  proposals 
as  to  the  advisability  of  an  advance.  The  same  subject 
came  up  in  considering  Indian  diflSiculties  along  the  frontiers 
of  Nueva  Viz  cay  a.  Presidios  were  established  in  Sonora, 
primarily  with  a  view  to  clearing  the  way  to  the  Colorado 
and  Gila ;  for  that  reason  mention  of  their  establishment 
has  been  reserved  for  this  part  of  the  chapter. 

On  June  18,  1751,  the  viceroy,  urged  to  this  course  by 
Parrilla  and  Gallardo,  authorized  the  transfer  of  the  presidio 
of  Pitiqui  to  San  Miguel  de  Horcasitas.  Lands  were  al- 
lotted to  settlers  in  hopes  that  the  region  might  ultimately 
be  defended  by  its  inhabitants,  allowing  the  presidio  to  be 
moved  to  a  more  advantageous  site  for  northward  conquests,^^ 
but  the  hoped-for  removal  did  not  occur.  In  August  of  the 
same  year  steps  were  taken  to  clear  the  way  of  Apaches. 
The  captains  of  San  Felipe  de  Sinaloa,  Fronteras,  and 
Terrenate  were  ordered  to  make  a  general  campaign 
against  them.-^^  In  1752  the  presidio  of  San  Ignacio  de  Tu- 
bac  was  founded,  and  a  garrison  placed  at  Altar  which  soon 
became  a  presidio.  Tubac,  at  least,  was  to  aid  against  the 
Apaches,  and  bpth  were  intended  to  serve  not  only  as  a 
check  against  the  Pimas  Altos,  but  also  as ,  bases  for  ex- 
tending the  conquest  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  once  the 
Seris  and  their  allies  should  be  suppressed.^*  Campaigns 
were  also  made  in  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  and  presidios  founded 
in  accord  with  the  general  plan  for  crushing  the  Apaches.^' 
Even  there,  the  ideas  of  Sanchez  were  operative,  the  object 

i«  Referred  to  in  Amarillas  to  Airiaga,  partial  list  of  the  materials  that  might 

Jan.   13,   1758.     C-444.     See  also  the  be  used,  over  half  of  them  being  great 

voluminous  testimonio,  C-433.  testimonios :     C-372-75,    377,    394-95, 

"C-366.  399-401,  418,  420,  431,  437,  448,  451, 

«>  Anza  is   authority  for  this  state-  454-55,  477-78,  489,  493,  571-74,  597. 

ment.     Anza    to    Bucarely,     Mar.    7,  These  are  dated  1754  to  1765,  but  refer 

1773.     In    C-2113.     Bancroft    has    a  to  campaigns  begun  in  1751,  as  well 

reference    to    a    presidio    at'  Bayorca.  as   to  those  made  between  the  above 

A'^.  M.  St.  &  Tex.,  I,  554,  note  6.     This  dates.     They  do  not  include  some  docu- 

would  seem  to  be  an  error.  ments  used  in  another  connection  in 

"  The  subject  of  these  wars  cannot  this  work,  but  which  also  refer  to  the 

be  taken  up  here.     The  following  is  a  Apache  wars. 


1752]  OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  AN  ADVANCE  55 

being  to  defend  the  frontier  against  the  French.  All  of 
these  activities  seem  to  have  grown  out  of  the  events  which 
produced  the  Sanchez  memorials. 

Sanchez's  fear  of  a  French  approach  to  the  Pacific  by 
way  of  New  Mexico,  against  which  the  Colorado-Gila  es- 
tablishments were  to  be  a  check,  seemed  confirmed  when 
two  Frenchmen  were  apprehended  in  New  Mexico  in  1753. 
While  this  event  was  still  being  discussed,  a  French  settle- 
ment on  the  Trinity  River,  Texas,  was  discovered  in  1756. 
French  deserters  from  New  Orleans,  and  French  traders 
from  the  same  place  were  a  source  of  worry.  These  events 
were  not  regarded  lightly,  but  occupied  the  attention  of 
the  highest  authorities  in  Spain,  and  were  taken  up  diplo- 
matically with  the  court  of  France.  The  captured  French- 
men were  condemned  to  death,  but  had  their  sentence 
commuted  to  imprisonment.  Strict  orders  were  given  to 
the  viceroy  not  to  permit  Frenchmen  or  other  foreigners 
to  enter  Spanish  dominions,  and  the  attention  of  the  gov- 
ernors of  New  Mexico  and  Texas  was  especially  directed  to 
this  injunction.  The  documents  used  on  this  subject  run 
to  the  year  1761,  when  the  Family  Compact  between  France 
and  Spain  was  signed.  In  1762  France  ceded  its  territories 
west  of  the  Mississippi  to  Spain,  and  its  other  continental 
possessions,  in  the  next  year,  to  England.  This,  of  course, 
meant  an  end  of  danger  from  the  French.  As  regards 
northwestward  advance  it  is  significant  that  the  Sdnchez 
memorials  were  used  in  dealing  with  these  events ;  if  French- 
men were  in  New  Mexico,  that  was  regarded  as  threatening 
the  Pacific,  and  Texas  was  considered  but  a  step  from 
New  Mexico.^^  The  direct  heir  of  Sanchez's  ideas  was 
one  Pedro  de  Labaquera,  but  as  his  memorials  dealt  with 
the  whole  question  of  northwestward  advance,  of  which 
fear  of  the  French  was  but  a  part,  and  as  they  were 
written  a|^  a  time  when  the  French  were  no  longer  con- 

*>  As  to  French  aggressions,  1753  to  French   aggressions   not  only   for   the 

1761,  see  C-344,   354,   380,   386,   389,  region  and  period  named,  but  also  for 

391,  411-13,  415,  421,  427-29,  434-35,  the  entire  Texas-New  Mexico  frontier 

468-69,  472,  492,  496.     Bolton,  French  in  the  first  half  of  the  eighteenth  c^- 

intrusions  into  New  Mexico,  1749-1752  tury. 
(manuscript),     gives     a    summary    of 


56  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  Ill 

sidered  dangerous,  it  is  more  appropriate  to  take  them  up 
in  another  connection. 

One  of  the  most  important  documents  in  the  history  of 
northwestward  advance  is  the  Noticia  de  la  California  of 
Father  Andres  Burriel,  pubhshed  anonymously  in  Madrid 
in  1757.  The  body  of  the  Noticia  was  taken  from  the 
manuscript  of  Father  Miguel  Venegas,  written  in  Mexico, 
1739.  Venegas  in  turn  had  been  indebted  largely  to  the 
unpublished  work  of  Father  Tarabal.^^  Burriel  began  his 
work  at  Toledo  in  1750,  employing  additional  materials  as 
well  as  the  manuscript  of  Venegas,  writing  the  important 
appendices,  and  making  the  map,  which,  like  the  book,  is 
usually  ascribed  to  Venegas.  Early  in  1754  the  work  was 
completed.  Then  followed  a  period  of  two  years  before 
authorization  to  print  was  granted,  not  only  that  of  the 
government  being  required,  but  also  that  of  the  Jesuit  order. 
Burriel,  writing  May  3,  1754,  to  Father  Pedro  Alt  amir  ano, 
the  Jesuit  procurador  general  de  Indias,  enjoined  that  his 
own  name  was  on  no  account  to  appear,  saying  that  most  of 
the  work  was  Venegas',  anyway.  "Aside  from  that,'' 
he  added,  "affairs  of  considerable  delicacy  are  touched 
upon,  and  it  is  well  that  I,  an  employe  of  the  king,^^  do 
not  appear,  while  we  do  not  know  how  they  will  be  re- 
ceived . "  M  any  of  these  cosas  bastante  delicadas  were  stricken 
out  in  course  of  various  official  readings  before  publica- 
tion ;  for  example,  remarks  which  seemed  in  any  way  to  re- 
flect upon  the  government  for  its  delays  or  failures  to  execute 
royal  decrees  were  expunged,  to  the  bitter  regret  of  Father 
Burrial.23 

The  bpok  is  in  a  sense  a  defence  of  the  Jesuits,  and  a  plea 
for  the  extension  of  their  missionary  field.  Before  it  was 
published,  many  Jesuit  missions  of  Sinaloa  and  elsewhere 

"  Tarabal  came  to   Baja  California  Bancroft,  N.  M.  St.  &  Tex.,  1,  455. 
in  1730  when  thirty  years  of  age.     He  22  As  an  archivist  in  Toledo, 

was  charged  by  the  provincial  with  the  's  Yot  the   facts   of   this  paragraph, 

duty  of  writing  a  history  of  the  Jesuit  see    Real    Academia    de    la    Historia, 

missions  of  Baja  California.     That  he  Boletin,Lll,  396-438.     Additional  docu- 

did  so  is  testified  to,  not  only  by  Vene-  ments,  1754  to  1756,  haying  to  do  with 

gas,   but  also   by  Clavigero,  who  saw  the  grant  by  the  Council  of  the  Indies 

over  twelve  volumes  of  his  manuscripts  of    leave    to    print,    are    C-387,    409, 

at  the  Jesuit  college   of   Guadalajara.  416-17,  419. 


1752]        OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY   OF  AN  ADVANCE  57 

had  been  secularized,  as  already  noted.  Competition  of 
other  orders  had  to  be  met,  and  Jesuit  mission  work,  just 
then  much  criticized,  to  be  defended.  Whatever  the  ulti- 
mate objects,  the  arguments  of  Burriel  were  convincing,  and 
their  effect  upon  northwestward  advance  was  such,  that  the 
book  merits  considerable  space  here. 

The  Noticia  deals  with  Baja  California,  and  is  divided  into 
four  parts,  as  follows  :   a  description,  of  Baja  California  and     I  'J^"^^^ 
its  people;    a  history  of  the  peninsula  up  tp  the  coming  oa^"'/<i17) 
of  the  Jesuits  in  1697,  noting  repeated  attempts  to  settle  r^ 

it,  all  ending  in  failure ;  a  history  of  the  peninsula,  and  of  <.  Kjqi-ns^. 
related  events  occurring  on  the  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  coast,  '  ^ 
from  1697  to  1752 ;  and  a  series  of  appendices  commenting  *4  G^fij*-*^ 
on  documents  relating  to  Baja  California,  with  the  idea  of 
showing  why  this  "most  disagreeable,  barren,  and  wretched 
country  in  the  world''  should  be  a  matter  of  so  much  con- 
cern to  the  Spanish  crown  and  to  the  Jesuits.  Parts  one  and 
two  need  not  be  considered  here.  Only  a  little  need  be  said 
of  part  three.  The  Jesuits  had  planted  a  number  of  mis- 
sions in  Baja  California  southward  to  the  cape,  and  north 
to  a  point  between  27°  and  28°,  about  due  west  of  the 
Yaqui  River  in  southern  Sonora.  One  project  constantly 
in  their  mind,  as  has  been  shown,  was  to  advance  to  the 
Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  and  there  to  meet  their  brethren 
from  Sonora,  the  Sonora  Jesuits  being  possessed  with  the 
same  idea,  and  likewise  entertaining  projects  of  further 
advance  to  Moqui  and  Alta  California.  The  junction  of 
the  Colorado  and  Gila  may  be  said  to  have  been  the  goal 
of  the  Jesuits  on  both  sides  of  the  Gulf.  So  far  as  Baja 
California  was  concerned,  this  advance  was  designed  merely 
as  a  means  of  preserving  the  peninsula,  by  getting  the  prod- 
ucts of  Sonora ;  the  peninsula  was  not  regarded  as  head- 
quarters for  general  northward  advance.  The  royal  decree 
of  December  4, 1747,  had  furthered  this  aim  of  a  connection 
between  Sonora  and  Baja  California.  Finally,  says  Burriel, 
"On  both  sides,  in  Pimeria  and  California,  there  are  the 
most  ample  gateways  for  spreading  the  gospel.  To  the 
north  side  of  both  are  vast  lands,  inhabited  by  infidel  nations. 


58  THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  Ill 

who  never  heard  of  the  most  sweet  name  of  Jesus,  through 
whom  alone  are  salvation  and  eternal  life/^  ^* 

The  introduction  to  part  four  is  particularly  important 
on  the  question  of  northwestward  advance.  It  was  because 
of  the  location  of  the  peninsula,  said  Burriel,  that  the  con- 
quest of  this  barren  land  had  been  preferred  to  that  of  any 
other  American  country ;  if  the  peninsula  were  unoccupied, 
the  whole  western  coast  of  New  Spain,  "from  Acapulco  to 
the  Colorado  River/ ^  would  be  unsafe.  This  was  not  due 
to  any  great  danger  from  savages,  but  pirates  might  locate 
there,  as  in  the  past,  and  upset  trade.  Moreover,  "What 
would  be  the  consequence  if  some  European  power  should 
erect  colonies,  forts,  and  presidios  on  the  coast  of  Califor- 
nia?'^ Then  again,  for  the  safety  of  any  northward  exten- 
sion of  the  frontier  the  Spanish  missions  must  be  connected 
with  those  of  New  Mexico,  and  extended  beyond  the  Gila 
and  Colorado  to  the  farthest  known  coasts  of  the  Califor- 
nias,  that  is,  to  San  Diego,  Monterey,  and  Aguilar's  River 
in  43°.  The  Colorado  and  Gila  and  the  lands  beyond,  es- 
pecially Monterey  and  Mendocino,  were  too  far  from  Mexico 
to  be  supplied  by  land ;  therefore,  maritime  communication 
was  necessary.  Thus  the  peninsula  must  be  occupied,  if 
further  advance  were  to  occur.  Possession  of  the  peninsula 
cA  was  also  necessary  for  retention  of  the  Philippines.  They 
could  not  be  held,  were  it  not  for  the  commerce  between 
Manila  and  Acapulco  by  the  annual  galleon.  The  trade 
of  this  galleon  would  be  attended  with  less  loss  of  life,  if 
there  were  some  port  in  the  Californias  where  the  voyage 
might  be  broken.  Equally  important,  however,  was  the 
danger  to  this  trade,  if  a  foreign  nation  should  possess  the 
Californias.  The  Russians  had  extended  their  territory 
eastward  to  the  Pacific,  and  had  even  touched  North 
America,  as  in  1741,  when  they  landed  in  55°  36'.  If  the 
CaUfornias  were  abandoned,  the  Russians  might  be  expected 

^  Burriel,  Noticia,  II,  563 ;  Natural  above.     The    author   refers    to'  infidel 

and    civil    history,     II,     212.       As    an  nations    "who    never    have    heard    of 

example    of    the    translation    in    the  Christianity,   and   the   glad   tidings   of 

Natural  and  civil  history,  compare  the  salvation  it  offers  to  the  human  race." 
following   with    the    translation    given 


1752]  OBSTACLES  liST  THE   WAY  OF  AN  ADVANCE  59 

to  extend  their  possessions  to  the  southernmost  extremity 
of  the  peninsula.  Similary,  there  was  danger  from  the 
EngHsh  who  had  repeatedly  tried  to  reach  the  Pacific  by 
way  of  a  strait  north  of  America,  or  from  Hudson  Bay,  such 
an  attempt  being  made  as  late  as  1753.  Should  they  suc- 
ceed, the  Spanish  dominions  of  the  Pacific  would  be  in 
danger.  Newspapers  had  told  of  an  English  project  to 
make  settlements  north  of  the  Californias,  by  expeditions 
coming  from  the  East  Indies.  One  had  only  to  note  how 
the  English  took  Jamaica,  Georgia,  and  other  places  to 
realize  that  they  might  do  the  same  in  the  Californias.^^ 
Burriel  should  not  be  construed  as  urging  the  substitution 
of  Baja  California  for  the  Colorado-Gila  country  as  the  base 
for  an  advance  to  Monterey.  Rather,  he  was  thinking  of 
the  direct  sea  route  from  New  Spain  to  Alta  California, 
for  the  security  of  which  the  peninsula  had  to  be  occupied. 
In  speaking  of  the  distance  from  Mexico  as  necessitating  the 
sea  route,  he  must  have  had  in  mind  only  such  things  as 
had  to  come  from  Mexico,  notably  manufactured  articles. 
Settlers  (if  desired),  domestic  animals,  and  food  supplies 
might  reasonably  have  been  expected  to  be  procurable  nearer 
at  hand,  although  the  last  named  had  in  fact  to  come  by 
sea  in  later  years.  Burriel  hoped  to  accomplish  his  aims  by  \  I 
extending  Jesuit  rule;  it  is  unlikely  that  he  contemplated 
any  such  radical  departure  from  Jesuit  policy  as  would  have 
been  involved  in  establishing  presidios  and  settlements 
under  secular  authority.  It  is  clear  too  from  part  three  of 
his  work  that  he  favored  the  old  Jesuit  ideas  of  an  advance  to 
the  Colorado  and  Gila,  and  thence  to  Baja  and  Alta  Cali- 
fornia and  Moqui.  The  three  last-named  regions  should  be 
regarded  as  ends  of  branch  lines  of  northwestward  con- 
quest, looking  back  to  the  Colorado-Gila  junction  as  a  base. 
Special  circumstances,  primarily  fear  of  foreign  coloniza- 
tion, led  to  the  occupation  of  the  two  California  ends  before 
the  intervening  regions,  but  that  should  not  be  allowed  to 
obscure  the  fact  that  Sonpra  was.  the  real  key  to  north- 
westward progress  of  a  permanent  nature. 

25  Burriel,  Noticia,  III,  1-19. 


60  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  Ill 

Burriel  concluded  his  introduction  by  saying  that  his 
object  in  this  fourth  part  was  to  show  what  was  already 
known  of  the  coasts  of  the  Calif ornias/^  the  intimation  being 
that  further  exploration  and  extension  of  the  frontier  should 
7  follow.  In  quoting  Walter's  account  of  Anson's  voyage  to 
'  the  Pacific,  1740  to  1744,  during  which  Anson  captured 
the  Manila  galleon  and  learned  its  route,  Burriel  used  that 
event  as  an  argument  for  occupying  Alt  a  Cahfornia.  Walter 
had  stated  that  the  voyage  from  Manila  could  be  made  in 
much  better  time  by  going  north  as  far  as  40°  or  45°,  in- 
stead of  keeping  south  of  30°  ;  by  the  more  northerly  course 
one  could  take  advantage  of  the  trade  winds.  Burriel 
agreed,  but  stated  that  it  would  necessitate  a  Spanish  settle- 
ment at  San  Diego,  Monterey,  or  Cape  Mendocino.^^  Other 
considerations  conduced  to  the  same  end.  The  Walter 
account  was  only  one  of  many  writings  in  foreign  tongues, 
Russian,  German,  French,  and  English,  mentioned  by  Burriel 
as  having  been  published  in  recent  years  with  relation  to 
discoveries  in  the  Pacific,  or  projects  therefor. 

Pubhcation  of  the  Noticia,  1757,  directed  attention  more 
than  ever  to  the  Cahfornias,  and  especially  so,  it  may  be 
assumed,  because  of  the  reception  which  the  work  got  in 
foreign  countries.  A  translation  into  English  promptly 
appeared  at  London  in  1759.  Within  a  short  time  this  was 
in  turn  translated  to  Dutch,  French,  and  German  in  the 
years  1761,  1767,  and  1769-70,  respectively.  Later  there 
were  yet  other  translations.  The  complacent  view  taken 
in  the  preface  to  the  London  edition  might  well  have  stirred 
misgivings  in  the  minds  of  Spanish  authorities.  The 
reader  will  be  able  to  learn,  says  the  editor  in  his  preface, 
''that  the  discovery  of  a  northwest  passage,  is  far  less 
problematical  there,  in  the  opinion  of  those,  who,  from  their 
situation,  are  the  ablest  judges,  than  it  is  here,  and  that  the 
dread  of  seeing  the  English  form  an  establishment  in  the 

*«  In   a   letter   of   May   3,  1754,    to  the  peninsula],  are  well  worth  while." 

Father  Altamirano,  he  put  it  that  his  Real  Academia  de  la  Historia,  Boletin, 

object   was    "to    justify    the    expenses  LII,  403. 

for    the    maintenance    of     California,  ^  Burriel,  Noticia,  III,  212-17. 

which,    wretched    land    that  it  is  [i.e. 


1752]        OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  AN  ADVANCE  61 

remoter  parts  of  this  country,  ...  is  held  by  those  who 
have  the  best  means  of  knowing,  to  be  a  very  probable 
thing.  Lastly,  he  will  see  it  made  plain  to  a  demonstration, 
that  while  the  Spaniards  have  the  hard  task  imposed  on 
them,  of  settHng,  improving,  and  fortifying  the  very  wildest, 
and  worst  parts  of  this  country ;  the  English,  if  they  should 
ever  think  of  making  any  attempt,  may  seat  themselves  in 
a  pleasant  climate,  fruitful  soil,  and  in  regions  well  peopled, 
from  whence  they  may,  with  certainty,  command  the  most 
valuable  branches  of  commerce  that  have  been  hitherto 
discovered.^'  ^^  At  the  same  time,  reports  began  to  come  in 
that  the  Russians  were  making  discoveries  in  the  far  north- 
west. An  account  of  these  appeared  in  German  at  St. 
Petersburg  in  1758,  in  the  third  volume  of  Mtiller's,  Samm- 
lung  russischer  Geschichten.  This  part  was  translated  to 
English,  and  published  at  London  in  1761  under  the  title 
Voyages  from  Asia  to  America.  A  second  English  edition 
appeared  in  1764,  and  a  French  edition  in  1766.  Torrubia's 
brief  work  in  Italian,  I  Moscoviti  nella  California^  was 
published  in  1759.  Official  reports  of  Russian  discoveries 
were  forwarded  from  St.  Petersburg  by  the  Spanish  am- 
bassadors there,  by  the  Marques  de  Almodovar  in  1761, 
and  the  Vizconde  de  la  Herreria  in  1764.^^  It  would  have 
been  strange  if  the  Spanish  government  did  not  feel  a  meas- 
ure  of  apprehension. 

Meanwhile,  other  individuals  both  public  and  private 
had  memorialized  the  government  concerning  conditions 
in  Sonora  and  projects  for  northwestward  conquest,  and 
occasionally  these  were  followed  by  action  on  the  part  of 
the  authorities.  The  transfer  of  Pitiqui  to  Horcasitas  in 
1751,  the  founding  of  Tubac  and  Altar  in  1752,  and  the 
general  campaigns  against  the  Apaches  along  the  entire 
northern  frontier  of  New  Spain  have  already  been  noted. 
Father  Altamirano,  cognizant  of  Burners  work  on  the 
Noticia,  and  eager  like  him  for  an  extension  of  the  Jesuit 
field  of  effort,  wrote  to  the  king  in  1752  urging  that  more 

^  Burriel,  Natural  and  civil  history,       lator'a  preface. 
I,  last  page  [unnumbered]  of  the  trans-  »  C-442,  494,  545,  561. 


62  THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  Ill 

effective  measures  be  taken  than  had  hitherto  been  the 
case  for  the  reduction  and  conversion  of  the  CaUfornias.^^ 
Father  Juan  Antonio  Balthasar,  Jesuit  provincial  of  New 
Spain,  in  a  long  memorial  to  the  king,  August  15,  1753, 
concerning  the  Pima  revolt  of  1751,  had  much  to  say  about 
the  general  subject  of  further  conquests.  He  gave  an  ac- 
count of  Jesuit  labors  in  Baja  California,  Sonora,  and  the 
region  toward  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  referring  to  the  San- 
chez projects  for  an  advance.^^  Viceroy  Revilla  Gigedo 
had  written  to  the  king  on  the  same  subjects  a  month  before, 
July  3,  1753,  laying  particular  stress  on  the  Sdnchez  pro- 
posals.^^ 

In  this  year  the  Seris  were  tolerably  quiet ;  so  letters  were 
sent  to  Governor  Arce  y  Arroyo  (1753-55),  asking  whether 
the  presidio  at  Horcasitas  might  be  dispensed  with.  Arce 
reported  to  Mexico  in  due  time,  and  his  memorials  were,  on 
February  28,  1754,  ordered  sent  to  the  fiscal,  but  were 
not  in  fact  acted  upon  for  a  year  and  a  half,  due  to  a  change 
of  fiscal  at  this  time.  Arce  was  relieved  early  in  1755  by 
Juan  de  Mendoza.  By  this  time  the  Seris  were  more 
troublesome,  so  that  Mendoza  wrote  to  the  Marques  de' 
Amarillas,  successor  of  Revilla  Gigedo,  on  August  31,  1755, 
asking  permission  to  subject  them.  Permission  was  granted,, 
and  in  the  following  year  a  campaign  was  undertaken.  It 
was  not  successful.  When  the  news  came  to  Mexico  a 
junta  was  called,  which  decided  that  San  Miguel  de  Horcasi- 
tas should  be  retained,  without  diminution  of  its  garrison, 
for  the  Seris  were  cutting  every  route  northward,  and  needed 
to  be  held  in  check.  Governor  Mendoza  was  authorized 
to  take  fitting  action  against  them  at  the  expense  of  the- 
royal  treasury. ^^  On  February  15,  1757,  Mendoza  wrote 
three  letters  to  Amarillas  in  which  he  told  of  the  campaign 
against  the  Seris,  urged  provision  for  additional  troops  and 
presidios  in  Sonora,  and  advised  an  extension  of  Spanish 
conquest  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila.     In  one  of  them  he 

»  C-331.  32  C-348. 

31  C-352.     For   the   opinion   of    the  ^Fot  the  testimonio  of  the  proceed- 

fiscal  of  the  Council  of  the  Indies,  see  ings  of  the  junta  concerning  Mendoza's 

C-382.  campaign,  see  C-432. 


1752]  OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  AN  ADVANCE  63 

reported  having  gone  into  the  interior  so  far  as  to  explore 
the  banks  of  the  two  rivers,  and  stated  that  his  campaign 
had  involved  an  expense  of  over  3000  pesos.  A  junta  was 
called  to  consider  Mendoza's  projects,  and,  mindful  of 
expense,  it  decided  against  them,  holding  that  the  time  had 
not  yet  come  for  conquest  of  the  Indians  of  the  Colorado  and 
Gila,  and  that  the  royal  treasury  must  not  be  burdened  by 
erecting  new  presidios.  Such  was  the  situation  when  on 
January  13,  1758,  Amarillas  wrote  of  it  to  the  ministro 
general}^  The  expediente  was  referred  to  the  fiscal  of  the 
Council  of  the  Indies,  who  on  July  31,  1758,  advised  ap- 
proving what  had  been  done  in  the  matter.^^  The  following 
year,  September  27,  1759,  a  royal  order  approved  the 
action  of  the  viceroy  and  the  several  juntas,  both  as  to  the 
suppression  of  Indian  wars  in  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  and  the 
handling  of  Sonora  affairs  bearing  upon  Seri  wars  and  proj- 
ects of  frontier  advance,  —  with  one  striking  reservation. 
Despite  the  junta's  decision  against  conquering  the  Indians 
of  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  the  viceroy  should  be  very  much 
on  the  alert,  said  the  royal  order,  lest  foreign  nations 
approach  that  region  as  there  was  reason  to  fear  that  they 
might.  Even  the  least  lack  of  care  in  that  very  important 
matter  might  result  in  the  establishing  of  communications 
by  a  foreign  power  with  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  and  that 
would  have  fatal  consequences  to  Spain.  The  viceroy  was 
instructed,  therefore,  to  take  all  such  measures  as  prudence 
might  dictate,  and  to  report  the  results  of  his  action.^® 

At  about  this  time,  probably  in  1760  or  1761,  four  in- 
teresting memorials  were  directed  to  the  king  by  Pedro  de 
Labaquera.  From  internal  evidence  of  the  documents  it 
is  clear  that  Labaquera  was  in  Spain,  when  he  wrote  them, 
but  he  had  long  been  a  resident  of  New  Spain,  he  said,  hav- 
ing been  in  Nueva  Galicia  for  twelve  years  as  lieutenant 

"C-444.     The   writer   has  seen    no  Bucarely,  March  7,  1773  (in  C-2113), 

other  reference   to   Mendoza's  expedi-  there  is  room  for  doubt  whether  the 

tion  to  the  Colorado   and  Gila.     The  expedition  was  in  fact  made.     Cf.   p. 

Spanish  in  Amarillas'  letter  is  asentando  153. 
haver    internado    hasta     reconocer     las  ^  C-449. 

mdrgenes  de  los  Rios  Gila  y  Colorado.  3«C-^61. 

Judging    from    a    letter    by    Anza    to 


64  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  Ill 

captain-general.  One  of  the  documents  is  a  petition  for 
certain  privileges,  and  the  other  three,  which  probably 
accompanied  the  first  named,  are  recitals  respectively  of 
conditions  at  Cape  San  Lucas,  at  the  Colorado  and  Gila 
rivers,  and  in  Apacheria  (the  region  northeast  of  Sonora), 
with  suggestions  for  their  betterment.  The  effect  of  these 
memorials  is  hard  to  determine,  as  they  do  not  appear  in  a 
file  with  other  documents,  nor  has  the  writer  seen  any  refer- 
ence to  them,  but  clearly  they  reached  the  authorities  in 
Spain;  otherwise  they  would  not  have  appeared  in  their 
papers. ^^ 

In  his  petition,  Labaquera  referred  to  the  bolas  de  plata 
mines  of  1738  as  evidence  that  that  part  of  Pimeria  Alta 
must  contain  veins  of  precious  nietal,  much  of  it  in  the 
form  of  treasure,  all  of  which  by  law  belonged  to  the  king. 
He  asked  permission  to  explore  the  country  around  Ari- 
zonac  at  his  own  expense,  and  that  a  presidio  be  erected 
there  under  his  command,  to  be  supported  out  of  royal 
duties  from  mines  and  discoveries  of  treasure.  As  rec- 
ompense he  wanted  half  the  net  proceeds  of  virgin  silver, 
or  treasure,  after  the  expenses  of  the  establishment  had  been 
deducted.^^ 

With  regard  to  Cape  San  Lucas,  he  stated  that  English 
pirates  landed  there  in  1686,  a  Dutch  ship  came  in  1746, 
and  the  Manila  galleon  always  stopped  there.  In  1750 
at  that  point  Manuel  de  Ocio  discovered  a  vein  of  silver 
which  for  a  time  yielded  well.  The  falling  off,  he  thought, 
might  be  more  apparent  than  real,  because  of  illicit  arrange- 
ments that  the  settlers  might  have  made  with  the  galleon, 
something  that  it  was  difficult  to  prevent.     These  mines 

^  The   papers   of    legajo    104-6-13,  been  the  case   in  1763,    when  France 

in  which  these  memorials  appear,  are  had  lost  her  own  colonies,  and  probably 

for    the    years     1760    to     1768.     The  would  not  have   been  alleged  in   1762, 

latest    date    mentioned    in    the    Laba-  when  Spain  and  France  were  allies  in 

quera  documents  is  1754,   a  reference  war    against    England.      Either    1760 

to   the   publication   of  the   Apostdlicos  or    1761    would  therefore   seem   to   be 

afanes.      This    reference  is   made,    not  the  year  in  which  they  were  written 

as  if  to  a  new  book,  but  casually,  as  and    more    likely    the  latter;    lack    of 

if  it  were  already  well  known.     Danger  action  on  them  may  have  been  due  to 

that  the  French  might  come  overland  knowledge  by  higher  ofl&cials  that  the 

to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  and  threaten  Family  Compact  had   been   arranged, 

Spanish    possessions    is    discussed    in  that  treaty  being  made  in  1761. 
one  document,   which  could  not  have  ^  C-483. 


.AN  AD 


cl 


1752]  OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  >N  ADVANCE  65 

might  be  made  a  source  of  profit,  but  they  were  even  more 
a  danger,  serving  to  make  Cape  San  Lucas  a  desirable  con- 
quest for  foreign  powers.  Yet,  in  all  of  the  Calif ornias 
there  were  but  sixty  soldiers,  few  of  whom  were  at  the  cape. 
Mineral  wealth  being  there,  it  should  be  developed,  if  only 
to  cause  an  increase  in  population  to  such  a  point  that  Cape 
San  Lucas  could  be  defended  in  case  of  a  foreign  attack.^® 

Of  the  Colorado  River  he  told  what  was  known  as  a  result 
of  explorations  by  Kino,  Sedelmayr,  and  Consag,  and  said 
that  further  exploration  was  necessary,  for  three  reasons- 
There  was  reason  to  believe  that  the  source  of  the  Colorado' 
was  not  far  from  French  territory,  and  if  the  French  should 
descend  the  Colorado,  the  possibility  of  further  expansion 
by  Spain  in  that  promising  region  would  end.  In  the  second 
place,  it  should  be  ascertained  whether  the  Colorado  in 
fact  connected  with  a  certain  Rio  Amarillo,  of  which  the 
Indians  told  Sedelmayr ;  this  might  be  an  arm  of  the  sea, 
or  a  strait,  and  if  so,  it  was  important  to  know  it,  as  the 
English  were  reawakening  to  the  idea  of  discovering  a 
northwest  passage  to  the  Pacific ;  precautions  ought  to  be 
taken  to  avoid  -dangers  which  were  to  be  feared  on  that 
account.  Finally,  an  exploration  would  prove  whether  it  '^ 
were  desirable  to  establish  a  settlement  on  the  Colorado  as 
a  base  for  reduction  and  conversion  of  the  Indians.  The 
expedition  should  be  made  in  boats,  which  ought  to  pro- 
ceed as  far  as  possible,  not  only  up  the  Colorado,  but  also 
along  such  rivers,  bays,  or  straits  as  might  be  found.*° 

The  remaining  memorial  is  in  some  respects  the  most 
interesting  of  all,  showing  a  keen  knowledge  of  frontier 
conditions,  in  accounting  for  the  failure  to  conquer  the 
Apaches.  The  Apaches,  when  attacked,  habitually  retired 
to  the  mountains  which  were  inaccessible  to  the  presidial 
troops.  This  was  due  not  merely  to  the  fact  that  the 
latter  were  cavalrymen,  but  to  the  nature  of  the  soldiers 
themselves.  Most  of  them  were  mulattoes  of  very  low 
character,  without  ambition,  and  unconquerably  unwill- 
ing to  travel   on  foot,   as  was   necessary   in   a   mountain 

39  C^84.  40  C-485. 


66  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  Ill 

attack.  Moreover,  their  weapons  carried  so  short  a  dis- 
tance that  the  Apaches  were  wont  to  get  just  out  of  range 
and  make  open  jest  of  the  Spaniards.  Furthermore,  some 
presidial  captains  were  more  interested  in  making  a  per- 
sonal profit  out  of  their  troops,  arising  from  the  fact  that 
part  of  the  latter's  wages  was  paid  in  effects,  than  they  were 
in  subjecting  the  enemy,  nor  did  the  various  captains 
work  in  harmony  when  on  campaigns.  Continuance  of  the 
Apaches  in  Apacheria  was  in  the  highest  degree  prejudicial. 
Not  only  were  they  a  hindrance  to  conquests  toward  the 
Colorado,  and  in  the  direct  route  between  Sonora  and  New 
Mexico,  but  also  they  endangered  regions  already  held  by 
Spain,  leading  subjected  Indians,  either  from  fear  or  from 
natural  inclination,  to  abandon  missions  and  villages, 
and,  whether  in  alliance  with  the  Apaches  or  by  them- 
selves, to  commit  the  same  kind  of  atrocities  as  the  Apaches 
did.  Labaquera  recommended  that  two  hundred  moun- 
tain fusileers  of  Spanish  blood  be  recruited  in  Spain,  equipped 
among  other  things  with  guns  of  long  range,  and  despatched 
to  New  Spain  for  service  against  the  Apaches.  These  men, 
under  a  disinterested  leader,  would  quickly  subject  the 
Apaches,  and  might  then  be  given  lands  in  that  region. 
Being  of  a  higher  stamp  than  the  presidial  soldiers  they  would 
be  eager  to  develop  their  lands,  and  would  be  a  permanent 
source  of  strength  to  that  country.*^ 

It  seems  natural  to  expect  that  official  attention  to  proj- 
ects of  conquest  in  the  Colorado-Gila  region  would  be  very 
slight  after  1761  for  a  few  years,  despite  Spain^s  intention 
to  develop  communications  ultimately  by  that  route  with 
the  Calif ornias  and  New  Mexico.  From  the  time  of  signing 
the  Family  Compact  in  1761  Spain  was  preparing  to  engage 
in  the  war  against  England,  and  in  1762  to  1763  she  did 
take  part.  The  alliance  with  France  withdrew  the  pressure 
occasioned  by  the  supposed  nearness  of  the  French  to  the 
sources  of  the  Colorado ;  no  other  definite  situation  arose 
to  compel  an  advance ;  and  the  actual,  immediate  interest 
of  the  war  demanded  all  that  Spain  had.     The  same  reasons 

«  C-486. 


1752]  OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  AN  ADVANCE  67 

for  an  advance  existed,  but  it  could  wait,  as  it  already  had 
done  for  so  many  years ;  true,  the  French  danger  was  gone, 
but,  as  Labaquera  pointed  out,  Spain  had  now  to  consider 
the  English.  Governmental  attention  to  Sonora  until 
1765,  if  the  documents  seen  by  the  writer  are  a  fair  criterion, 
directed  itself  more  to  questions  of  defence  against  Indian 
outbreaks,  which  have  already  been  considered,  than  with 
aggressive  or  indirectly  defensive  measures  of  conquest. 
Some  straws  show  that  the  wind  still  blew  in  that  direction, 
as,  for  example,  the  satisfaction  with  which  the  news  was  i 
received  of  the  defeat  of  the  Indians  of  San  Luis  Gonzaga,  <^^ 
Baja  California,  in  1763,  and  the  resultant  progress  in 
conversions ;  ^^  similarly,  the  governmental  inquiry  of  1764 
as  to  the  status  of  the  rental  of  pearl-fishing  rights  in  the 
Calif ornias.'*^  In  February,  1766,  Father  Wenceslao  Link 
of  San  Francisco  de  Borja,  Baja  California,  set  out  with  a 
large  party  from  Borja  with  the  intention  of  going  by  land 
to  the  Colorado  River.  He  came  within  some  twenty  or 
thirty  leagues  of  the  river,  as  he  believed  ;  but  the  difficulties 
of  the  route,  and  the  exhaustion  of  the  animals  forced  him  to 
turn  back.^*  These  events  were  in  line  with  Spain's  ideas 
for  protecting  and  developing  the  Californias.  Of  more  con- 
sequence was  the  establishment,  late  in  1765,  of  the  presidio  of 
Buenavista,  north  of  the  Yaqui  River,  as  an  additional  check 
against  the  Seris.  At  about  this  time,  in  August,  1765,^^ 
Jose  de  Gdlvez  reached  Mexico,  and  took  up  his  work  as 
visitador  of  New  Spain.  The  effects  of  his  visita  were  to  be 
of  tremendous  import ;  in  one  of  its  ramifications  it  led  to 
real  accomplishment  in  the  long-planned  northwestward 
advance.  To  the  progress  made  in  this  matter  under  his 
influence,  the  next  chapter  will  be  devoted. 

«  C-533,  542,  558.  **  Bancroft,  N.   M.   St.    &    Tex.,   I. 


«  C-540,  54ft,  56^.  473 


«  Gdlvez,  Informe,  118.    C-1834. 

■is   l^•v^,.^X 


CHAPTER  IV 

ACHIEVEMENTS   OF  JOSE   DE   GALVEZ,    1765-1771 

The  coming  of  Jose  de  Gdlvez  marks  a  turning-point  in 
the  history  of  northwestward  advance.  Prior  to  his  arrival 
there  had  been  nearly  a  century  of  memorials  and  plans, 
and  something  had  been  done  to  strengthen  the  line  of 
advance  already  held,  but  beyond  that  not  much  had  been 
accomplished.  In  Galvez  the  long-needed,  forceful,  ener- 
getic man  had  appeared,  and  he  proceeded  to  put  into  effect 
a  series  of  measures,  touching  every  phase  of  northwestward 
conquest,  that  were  fairly  bewildering  both  in  number  and 
results.  True,  his  work  was  in  large  measure  not  destined 
to  endure,  partly  because  of  his  own  mismanagement  after 
he  became  ministro  general.  Furthermore,  if  the  occupa- 
tion of  Alta  California  in  1769  be  excepted,  most  that  he 
did  with  relation  to  the  proposed  conquest  was  indirect, 
even  though  leading  inevitably  to  direct  action.  Finally, 
his  work  most  likely  would  have  been  in  vain,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  exceptional  ability  of  Viceroy  Bucarely,  the 
man  who  carried  it  on.  For  these  reasons  a  detailed  recital 
of  his  acts  is  unnecessary  here ;  they  were  rather  of  the  nature 
of  preliminaries  to  the  real  overland  advance,  although  ex- 
ceedingly important.^ 

From  the  Pima  revolt  of  1751  to  the  suppression  of  the 
Seris,  twenty  years  later,  northwestward  advance  by  way  of 
Sonora  trembled  in  the  balance.  For  the  greater  part  of 
this  period  it  looked  as  if  the  frontier  might  recede  toward 

^  The  need  for  detail  is  still  less,  in  ley,  Assistant  Curator  of  the  Academy 
view  of  the  fact  that  a  history  of  the  of  Pacific  Coast  History,  is  now  in 
Gdlvez  visita  by  Mr.  Herbert  I.  Priest-       press. 

68 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS   OF  JOSfi    DE    GALVEZ  69 

Mexico,  rather  than  advance  toward  Alta  Cahfornia,  owing  to 
the  hostihty  of  the  Indians,  and  to  the  government's  inabihty, 
or  unwiUingness,  to  spend  enough  to  cope  with  the  situation. 
That  Sonora  was  not  lost  was  due  very  largely  to  the  efforts 
of  the  visitadoVj  Jose  de  Gdlvez.  He  it  was  who  organized 
the  expedition  under  Elizondo  which  in  1771  restored  peace 
to  the  greater  part  of  Sonora,  by  suppressing  the  Seris  and 
their  allies.  The  royal  order  for  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits,  L 
too,  was  carried  out  under  his  direction,  in  1767,  an  event 
having  important  effects  in  Sonora.  Galvez  also  instituted  .^ 
a  number  of  administrative  reforms  tending  to  the  same  -5- 
end,  although  he  was  cut  short  in  this  work  by  illness.  In 
the  closing  years  of  the  Elizondo  campaign  rich  mines  were 
discovered,  notably  Cieneguilla  in  Pimeria  Alta,  which 
meant  a  sudden  increase  in  population.  This  gain  in  popula- 
tion seems  to  have  been  retained  permanently  and  added  to, 
because  the  mines  continued  to  3deld  richly.  Thus,  Sonora, 
far  from  being  a  financial  burden,  was  able  to  produce  a 
surplus  for  the  royal  treasury. 

The  result  of  all  these  things  was  the  temporary  establish-  v 
ment  of  good  order  in  Sonora,  making  possible  a  farther  1 
advance  of  the  frontier.     Only  one  prominent  disturbing  I 
factor  seemed  to  remain,  —  the  Apaches  had  not  been  sub- 
dued.    They  affected  but  one  part  of  the  province,  however, 
the  northeast.     Steps  were  taken,  notably  by  the  Marques 
de  Rubl,  which  led,  subsequently,  to  the  reglamento  of  1772, 
a  measure  calculated  to  prove  effective  against  the  Apaches, 
although  it  did  not  in  fact  do  so. 

Meanwhile,  plans  for  an  advance  of  the  frontier  were  not 
forgotten.  The  question  of  occupying  the  junction  of  the 
Gila  and  Colorado  rivers  as  a  base  for  approaches  to  New 
Mexico,  Moqui,  Alta  and  Baja  California,  was  several  times 
discussed,  but  was  invariably  postponed  until  the  disorders 
in  Sonora  might  be  overcome.  In  all  of  these  plans  the  route 
of  advance  was  to  be  by  way  of  Sonora ;  without  aid  from 
Sonora  and  the  more  populous  provinces  behind  it,  a  per- 
manent advance  on  a  large  scale  was  regarded  as  difficult 
or  impossible. 


70  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

The  history  of  Baja  Cahfornia  in  this  period  does  not 
indicate  a  change  of  base  from  Sonora  to  Baja  California. 
The  overland  expeditions  of  1769,  and  the  use  of  the  penin- 
sula by  Galvez  as  a  base  of  supplies  for  Alta  Cahfornia, 
represent  only  temporary  ideas,  —  exploration  of  the  land, 
support  of  the  sea  expeditions,  and  aid  to  Alta  California 
until  such  time  as  a  Sonora  route  should  become  possible. 
Meanwhile,  the  real  base  for  both  Californias  was  on  the 
mainland  at  San  Bias,  established  by  Gdlvez  with  that  ob- 
ject in  view.  As  noted  before,  the  sterile  peninsula  rep- 
resented the  end  of  one  line  of  advance,  rather  than  a 
fresh  starting-point,  and  so  too  in  the  case  of  Alta  California. 
In  the  meantime,  until  overland  communication  could  be 
established,  both  were  dependent  upon  the  sea  route  from 
San  Bias  for  certain  things  that  they  needed. 

The  occupation  of  the  Alta  Cahfornia  extremity  in  1769 
was  due  in  a  measure  to  a  fear  of  the  supposed  aggressions 
of  a  foreign  power,  Russian  activity  in  the  Pacific  having 
been  reported.  The  danger  was  not  greater,  however,  nor 
believed  to  be  so,  than  on  many  previous  occasions.  More- 
over, Galvez  seems  already  to  have  planned  expeditions 
to  Monterey,  before  he  had  heard  of  the  Russian  aggressions. 
Thus,  it  is  to  the  initiative  of  the  visitador,  impelled  by 
permanent  rather  than  temporary  motives  for  such  expedi- 
tions, that  we  may  ascribe  the  occupation  of  Alta  California, 
although  it  is  probable  that  his  action  was  hastened  by  the  re- 
ports of  Russian  action.  The  sea  route  from  San  Bias  was  em- 
ployed, because,  for  the  moment,  a  land  route  was  not  avail- 
able, and  in  any  event  occupation  by  sea  would  be  quicker. 

Meanwhile,  important  explorations  bearing  upon  the 
selection  of  an  overland  route  were  undertaken  by  the 
Franciscan  missionary  of  Bac,  Father  Francisco  Garces, 
but  as  they  seem  rather  to  belong  to  the  subject  matter  of 
a  later  chapter,  their  discussion  will  be  postponed.  This 
chapter  will  deal,  therefore,  with  plans  and  measures  bearing 
upon  problems  that  were  in  their  nature  preliminary  to  an 
overland  advance  to  and  beyond  the  junction  of  the  Gila  and 
Colorado  rivers. 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  71 

As  the  visita  worked  out,  Gdlvez  was  practically  ruler  of 
New  Spain  during  his  stay,  rather  than  the  actual  viceroys, 
Cruillas  and  Croix  ;  certainly  was  this  true  in  the  case  of  the 
latter.^  His  primary  object  was  to  procure  an  increase  of 
revenues  to  the  government  of  Spain,  but  to  accomplish 
this  he  employed  constructive  measures  to  develop  the  land, 
as  well  as  the  purely  destructive  ones  of  increased  taxation. 
Until  1768  he  was  engaged  primarily  in  matters  of  real 
hacienda  in  the  central  regions  of  the  viceroyalty,  although 
taking  measures  even  then  that  affected  the  outlying  prov- 
inces. 

In  1764,  the  king  ordered  the  viceroy  to  devote  himself  to  \ 
restoring  peace  in  Sinaloa  and  Sonora.  Thereafter,  various  i 
juntas  were  held  in  Mexico,  resulting  ultimately,  in  1768, 
in  the  sending  of  an  expedition  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Domingo  Elizondo.  In  the  work  of  preparation  Gdlvez 
played  a  large  and  probably  the  most  important  part.  He 
began  as  early  as  the  close  of  1765  to  seek  for  funds  other 
than  those  of  the  royal  treasury,  with  which  to  finance  the 
reduction  of  the  disturbed  provinces,  the  government  being 
unable,  or  unwilling,  to  expend  money  on  it.  He  wrote  to 
Captain  Lorenzo  Cancio  of  Buenavista,  saying  that  he 
could  get  nothing  from  the  royal  treasury,  but  that  he  ex- 
pected to  obtain  contributions  from  merchants.  In  this 
he  was  successful,  the  Consulado  of  Mexico  and  merchants 
of  the  Jalapa  fair  contributing  considerable  amounts.  Gal- 
vez  wrote  again  to  Cancio,  July  22,  1766,  saying  that  he 
planned  to  conquer  Sonora,  and  to  establish  thirty  Spanish 
settlements  in  southern  Sonora  on  the  Yaqui.     Replying, 

2  As  regards  Croix  this  may  be  de-  to  see  the  time  pass,  bringing  him  nearer 
duced  not  merely  from  the  official  acts  the  end  of  his  term.  Croix,  Corre- 
of  Croix  and  Gdlvez,  but  also  from  the  spondance,  218.  In  a  letter  of  January 
former's  private  correspondence  with  25,  1771,  he  spoke  of  asking  permission 
his  elder  brother,  the  Marquis  to  retire  from  New  Spain  on  account 
d'Heuchin  of  Pr6vot6,  near  Lille,  of  advanced  age,  ill-health,  and  the 
France.  In  this  Croix  appears  as  an  immense  work  which  he  had  to  do.  He 
amiable  man,  not  fond  of  hard  work,  had  heard  news  of  the  possibility  of  war 
nor  markedly  ambitious,  although  by  between  France  and  England,  and  fore- 
no  means  inefficient.  His  favorable  saw,  much  to  his  regret,  a  terrible  in- 
disposition to  Gdlvez  also  appears  in  crease  in  labor  (un  terrible  surcroU  de 
several  of  these  letters.  In  a  letter  travail).  Ibid.,  22^.  Other  citations  to 
of  May  20,  1769,  he  said  that  he  had  so  the  same  work  might  be  adduced  in 
much  to  do  as  viceroy  that  he  rejoiced  support  of  this  estimate  of  Croix. 


72  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

October  31,  Cancio  stated  that  the  Yaqui  region  was  less 
in  need  oT settlers  than  other  parts  of  Sonora.  It  would  be 
better  to  reenforce  old  settlements  or  reoccupy  abandoned 
ones.  First,  however,  it  was  necessary  to  conquer  the  Seris 
and  Pimas,  who  were  the  real  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of 
progress. 

Since  1766,  wars  with  the  Seris  and  Pimas  had  not  been 
prosecuted  with  much  vigor  by  either  side.  Everybody 
was  waiting  for  the  coming  of  Elizondo's  expedition.  The 
Indians  were  somewhat  in  fear  of  what  might  happen  to 
them  if  they  continued  to  resist.  The  white  population, 
settlers,  religious,  and  military  alike,  looked  forward  to  the 
expedition  as  the  solution  of  their  difficulties.  One  of  these 
elements  was  suddenly  removed  from  the  scene  before  the 
arrival  of  Elizondo.  In  1767  the  Jesuits  were  expelled  from 
all  Spanish  dominions.  This  action  came  so  suddenly  in 
Sonora  that,  for  a  time,  there  were  no  religious  to  take  their 
places.  In  the  following  year  the  Franciscans  of  the  college 
of  Quer^taro  took  charge  of  the  missions  of  Pimeria,  the 
Jaliscan  Franciscans  were  given  the  rest  of  Sonora,  and 
Sinaloa  was  put  in  charge  of  secular  clergy.  Henceforth, 
the  religious  were  to  exercise  only  spiritual  jurisdiction. 
This  was  limited  in  the  case  of  the  friars  to  the  Indians,  the 
white  people  being  subject  to  secular  clergy,  no  matter  how 
far  away  from  the  parish  of  their  spiritual  advisers.  The 
new  arrangement  seems  to  have  been  very  unsatisfactory 
to  the  clergy,  who  complained  that  the  Indians  were  no 
longer  amenable  to  religious  instruction,  and  that  the  whites 
were  too  free  from  moral  restraints.  Yet,  whether  due  to 
this  change  or  not,  substantial  advantages  seem  to  have 
followed.  For  a  while  at  least,  there  were  no  more  revolts 
by  Christianized  Indians,  a  matter  in  no  small  degree  con- 
ducive to  ultimate  good  order  in  Sonora.  Again,  whatever 
may  have  been  the  motives  of  the  settlers  in  checking  the 
powers  of  the  missionaries,  one  great  element  of  discord 
that  had  divided  Sonora  for  years,  strife  between  the  reli- 
gious and  civil  elements,  was  now  tempered,  though  not 
removed.     Whether  the  Indians  themselves  gained  or  lost 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  73 

by  the  expulsion  is  not  the  concern  of  this  work.  There 
remained  the  hostile  Indians  and  the  need  for  settlers. 

Meanwhile,  Gdlvez  continued  to  manifest  interest  in  the 
frontier  provinces.  He  offered  to  go  there  himself,  as  soon 
as  the  military  expedition  should  be  successful,  and  found 
settlements.^  Arriaga  asked  Croix,  July  20,  1767,  to  call  a 
junta  that  it  might  consider  Gdlvez's  proposal."*  The  junta 
rendered  its  decision  on  January  21,  1768,  holding  that 
settlements  were  necessary,  not  only  in  Sonora,  but  also 
in  Nueva  Vizcaya  and  the  Californias,  if  the  best  results 
from  the  Elizondo  expedition  were  to  be  obtained  and  the 
frontiers  extended.  The  work  was  too  important  to  be  in 
charge  of  anybody  but  Gdlvez.^  Croix  was  of  the  same 
opinion,^  and  Gdlvez  announced  his  willingness  to  undertake 
the  task.^ 

Croix  and  Gdlvez  had  drawn  up,  independently  of  the 
junta,  a  most  elaborate  plan  for  a  separate  government  of 
the  frontier  provinces.  It  was  enclosed  in  Croix^s  letter  of 
January  26,  1768,  to  Arriaga,  but  although  forwarded  as  his 
plan,  was  also  signed  by  Gdlvez,  who  had  shared  with  Croix 
in  drawing  it  up,^  and  was  probably  the  one  primarily  re- 
sponsible for  it. 

The  idea  was  not  a  new  one.  Several  times  in  the  preced- 
ing three  decades  similar  plans  had  been  proposed,  in  some 
cases  for  the  coast  regions  of  Nueva  Galicia,  and  in  others 
for  the  provinces  of  the  northern  frontier.  In  such  plans, 
foreign  danger  and  the  difficulty  of  administration  from 
Mexico,  owing  to  distance,  were  the  moving  factors.  It 
came  up  in  Nueva  Galicia  as  a  result  of  Anson^s  expedition 
to  the  Pacific,  1740  to  1742,  Anson  having  appeared  off 
that  coast. ^     The  question  was  raised  again  in  1750.     A 

'  Referred   to  in   Croix   to   Gdlvez,  of     the     Audiencia     of     Guadalajara, 

Jan.  23-24,  1768,  A.G.I.,  103-3-23.  governor  and  captain-general  of  Nueva 

*  C-842.  Galicia,  was  very  active  in  taking  pre- 
'  Plan  of  the  junta,  Jan.  21,   1768,  cautions   against  Anson.     He   pointed 

A.G.I. ,   103-3-23.  out    the    danger   of    leaving    the    Islas 

"  Croix   to  Arriaga,   Jan.   26,    1768,  Marias  unoccupied,  as  they  might  be 

A.G.I. ,  103-3-23.  taken   by   a  foreign  power,   and   serve 

'  G^lvez  to  Arriaga,  Jan.  26,  1768,  as  a  base  of  operations,  or  at  least  as 

C-940.  shelter,   in  which  foreign  ships  might 

'  Gdlvez,  Informe,  150.     C-1834.  await  the  coming  of  the   Manila  gal- 

•  The  Marques  de  Aysa,  president  leon.     Sdnchez  and  others  later  made 


74  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

royal  decree  of  October  31  in  that  year  referred  to  the  coming 
of  two  Dutch  ships  to  Nueva  Gahcia  to  trade  in  1747,  and 
stated  that  it  had  involved  considerable  expense  to  bring  the 
matter  to  the  attention  of  the  viceroy.  The  decree  ques- 
tioned whether  the  viceroy  were  not  too  far  away  from  Pacific 
coasts  to  deal  effectively  with  similar  arrivals  of  foreign 
boats,  and  asked  whether  that  part  of  Nueva  Galicia  should 
be  put  under  a  government  by  itself.  ^^  A  testimonio  on  the 
subject  was  made  up  at  Guadalajara,"  but  a  new  govern- 
ment was  not  formed.  Sdnchez^s  recommendation,  in  his 
fourth  memorial  of  March  2,  1751,  for  a  separate  viceroyalty 
of  the  northern  provinces  has  already  been  noted.^^  In 
December,  1760,  a  separate  government  of  the  frontier 
provinces  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Audiencia  of  Guadala- 
jara was  planned,^^  but  it  did  not  go  into  operation.  We 
may  now  consider  the  Croix-Gdlvez  plan  of  January,  1768.^* 
The  opening  paragraphs  (1-7)  stated  general  reasons  why 
the  plan  should  be  inaugurated.  Although  Sonora  and 
Nueva  Vizcaya  were  very  rich,  Spain  had  not  preserved 
order  in  them,  due  to  the  excusable  neglect  of  the  viceroys, 
because  of  their  distance  from  the  city  of  Mexico,  and  the 
pressure  of  other  business.  The  present  viceroy,  desirous 
of  restoring  prosperity  to  the  distant  provinces,  as  well 
as  of  enlarging  the  Spanish  domain  and  extending  the 
CathoHc  faith,  was  proposing  a  comandancia  general  with 
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  Sonora,  Sinaloa,  Nueva  Vizcaya, 
and  the  Calif ornias,  the  visitador  joining  in  this  proposal. 
The  latter  had  already  been  authorized  to  proceed  to  those 

the   same  point.     Aysa's   efforts  were  ^°  C-295. 

not  too  greatly  appreciated,  the  Mar-  "  C-343. 

qu6s  de  Ensenada  writing  him,   June  ^'  Supra  p.  37. 

8,  1743,  that  the  considerable  expense  "  Referred    to    in   the  Croix-Gdlvez 

which  he  must  have  undergone  ought  plan.     Cf.  infra  n.  14. 
not  to  be  repeated,  except  in  case  of  "  Croix    and   Gdlvez,    Jan.    23-24, 

extreme    danger    to    those    coasts,     a  1768,   A.G.I. ,  103-3-23.     Croix  signed 

danger    which    no    longer    existed    in  on   the   23d,    and  Gdlvez  on  the  24th. 

view  of  the  retirement  of  Anson.     In  A   translation    made   from   a   copy    of 

fact,    however,    Aysa's    expenses    had  a    copy    in   the   Mexican   archives,   or 

been  met  by  private  gifts,  and  not  by  from  a  copy  of  the  draft,  appears  in 

sums   taken  from   the   royal   treasury.  Richman.     It    differs    in    arrangement 

For  the  correspondence  on  the  entire  from  the  plan  as  sent  to  Spain,  the  one 

affair,   1740  to   1744,  see  C-213,  217,  followed   here,    but   otherwise   is   sub- 

219,    224-25,    228,    231-32,    239,    241,  stantially  the  same. 
249,  254,  256. 


17651  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  75 

provinces  and  reorganize  them,  with  a  view  to  facilitating 
erection  of  such  a  government  as  the  one  here  set  forth,  in 
which  the  comandante  was  to  be  practically  independent  of 
the  viceroy.  If  the  plan  were  adopted,  these  vast,  naturally 
rich  provinces  might  in  a  few  years  equal  or  even  surpass 
those  of  New  Spain. 

Next  (8-11)  came  the  inevitable  plea  for  the  project  as  a  «L 
necessary  safeguard  against  foreign  attack.  Such  a  govern^ 
ment  would  avert  dangers  from  foreign  powers  who  now 
had  the  opportunity  and  the  keen  desire  to  establish  a 
colony  at  Monterey,  or  at  some  other  port  on  that  coast. 
France  and  England  had  for  two  centuries  been  trying  to 
find  a  passage  to  the  Pacific  from  their  colonies  on  the 
Atlantic.  Russia  was  penetrating  Spanish  coasts  in  the 
northwest.  Besides,  the  Spanish  government  knew  that 
England  would  not  rest,  now  that  it  had  taken  the  colonies 
of  France,  until  it  should  push  forward  its  discoveries  as 
far  as  the  Lake  of  the  Woods,  whence  a  great  river  flowed 
westward.  If  it  reached  the  Pacific,  or  should  prove  to  be 
the  Colorado,  then  the  English  were  near  New  Mexico, 
and  not  far  from  the  Pacific.  The  Spanish  court  knew  too, 
from  books  published  in  Europe,  how  the  Russians  were  en- 
croaching upon  Spanish  coasts,  they  being  already  engaged 
in  the  fur  trade  on  an  island  reckoned  to  be  about  eight 
hundred  leagues  west  of  the  Californias.  Again,  since 
Anson's  voyage  in  1743,  the  English  and  Dutch  from  the 
East  Indies  had  been  acquiring  knowledge  of  Pacific  coast 
ports,  especially  those  of  the  Californias.  It  would  not  be 
difficult  for  one  of  these  three  nations  to  plant  a  colony 
at  Monterey,  a  port  with  excellent  facilities  for  an  establish- 
ment. Thus,  Spain's  possessions  in  the  Pacific  might  be 
invaded  and  exploited  as  were  those  of  the  Atlantic. 

Regarding  projects  of  conquest  (12-13),  the  memorial  ^^ 
stated  that  Spain  should  take  precautions  at  once  by  des- 
patching vessels  to  Monterey  to  plant  a  colony  there.  Later, 
the  government  of  the  comandancia  general  could  develop 
the  settlement,  and  establish  others  on  that  coast,  for  there 
were  good  harbors  there,  and  the  soil  was  productive.     A 


76  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

comandante  on  the  ground  might  also  secure  a  considerable 
extension  of  the  frontiers  of  Sonora  and  Nueva  Vizcaya  in 
other  directions. 

Concerning  the  choice  of  a  capital  (14-16),  the  governor 
should  not  reside  at  Durango,  as  the  plan  of  1760  had  sug- 
gested, because  that  was  too  far  from  Sonora,  and  farther 
still  from  the  Californias,  which  at  the  time  needed  his 
presence ;  even  in  Nueva  Vizcaya  the  place  for  the  governor 
was  at  San  Felipe  de  Chihuahua  on  the  frontier,  an  im- 
portant mining  centre.  The  new  capital  should  be  in  Sonora, 
and  some  central  settlement  ought  to  be  established  imme- 
diately on  the  Sonora  frontier,  at  or  near  the  Gila  River. 
Meanwhile,  the  government  should  be  set  up  at  the  mission 
of  Caborca,  that  being  farthest  toward  the  frontier,  or  else 
at  the  junction  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers.  It  would 
then  be  almost  equi-distant  between  the  Cahfornias  and 
Nueva  Vizcaya,  enabling  the  comandante  to  travel  to  either 
with  equal  faciHty. 

Then    follow  miscellaneous   provisions    (17-20).     There 
j      should  be  a  mint  at  the  new  capital,  to  avoid  the  necessity 
of  transporting  ores  to  Mexico.     There  should  also  be  a 
c3      bishopric  there  for  Sinaloa,  Sonora,   and  the  Californias. 
That  would  advance  the  conversion  of  the  natives,  who  were 
very  numerous.     The  expense  would  not  be  great  as  the 
lands  were  fertile,  and,  if  placed  under  cultivation,  would 
yield  abundantly.     The  royal  treasury  would  be  more  than 
,  repaid,  because  of  the  mineral  wealth  of  those  provinces. 
\   j      Coming  finally  to  questions  of  government   (21-26),  — 
\  I  the    comandante    general    should    be    independent    of    the 
'    Avdiencia  of   Guadalajara,  and   have   a   salary  of   20,000 
pesos.     This  and  the  salaries  of  the  intendentes  of  separate 
provinces,  proposed  in  another  plan,  would  be  more  than 
repaid,  especially  by  the  royal  fifths  on  gold  and  silver,  for 
these  metals  abounded  in  Sonora  and  the  Californias.     There 
would  be  a  great  saving  in  presidios,  for  the  frontier  settle- 
ments   would    guard    against    the    Indians.     The    present 
presidio  system  was  ineffective ;    for  example,  there  were 
six  presidios  in  Sonora  which  was  invaded  more  often  than 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  77 

any  other  province.  This  was  because  they  were  nothing 
but  settlements  for  the  enrichment  of  the  captains  and  their 
backers.  A  garrison  of  five  hundred  troops,  stationed  at 
the  capital  in  Sonora  and  in  frontier  settlements,  replacing 
the  presidios,  would  save  so  much  that  the  salaries  of  the 
comandante  general  and  the  three  intendentes  could  be  paid, 
the  frontiers  in  fact  protected,  and  the  Spanish  domain 
extended.  If  more  troops  should  be  required  for  the  ad- 
vancement of  conversions  and  discoveries,  they  would  be 
easy  to  get,  when  the  great  advantages  of  these  provinces 
should  become  known,  for  they  were  undoubtedly  richer 
in  mineral  products  than  any  that  had  been  discovered 
in  North  America.  The  three  intendentes  of  Nueva  Vizcaya, 
Sonora,  and  the  Californias  were  to  be  directly  subordinate 
to  the  comandante  general. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  land  route  by  way  of  Sonora 
was  regarded  as  the  permanent  method  of  approach  to  the 
Californias,  the  sea  route  being  a  temporary  expedient. 
Northward  advance  by  way  of  Baja  California  was  not  even 
considered.  Archbishop  Lorenzana,  to  whom  the  Croix- 
Galvez  plan  had  been  submitted  for  an  opinion,  wrote  to 
Croix,  January  27,  1768,  approving  it.  He  reviewed  fron- 
tier extension  since  the  time  of  Cortes,  and  said  that  still 
more  was  possible,  as  nobody  knew  how  long  the  Californias 
were.  A  comandancia  general  would  certainly  help  to  ad- 
vance the  frontier.^^  A  junta  had  also  favored  establishing 
the  comandancia  general}^  Upon  receipt  of  the  plan  Arriaga 
forwarded  it  to  the  Duque  de  Alva,  president  of  the  Council 
of  the  Indies,  asking  his  opinion.^^  Alva  replied,  July  13, 
1768,  approving  it  and  calling  attention  to  the  importance 
of  the  provinces  involved, ^^  Meanwhile,  he  had  drawn  up 
an  elaborate  report,  June  4,  1768,  discussing  the  plan  in  more 
detail.  He  approved  generally  of  proposals  which  involved 
an  extension  of  the  faith,  but  advised  modifications  of  this 

1*  Lorenzana    to     Croix,    Jan.     27,  "  Croix  to  Arriaga,  Jan.   26,    1768, 

1768,     A.G.I.,      103-3-23.        On     the  A.G.I.,  103-3-23. 

following  day  the  Bishop  of  Puebla,  to  ^^  Arriaga   to   Alva,   Jan.    26,    1768, 

whom  also  the  plan  had  been  submitted,  A.G.I. ,  103-3-23. 
wrote  to  Croix  saying  that  he  agreed  ^^  A.G.I. ,  103-3-23. 

with  Lorenzana. 


78  THE   FOUNDING   OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

particular  plan.  Settlements  should  be  made  in  Sonora 
to  overcome  the  lamentable  conditions  there,  and  Monterey 
should  be  occupied,  but  settlements  on  the  Gila  should  not 
be  made  unless  at  its  junction  with  the  Colorado.  He  was 
somewhat  sceptical  of  the  wealth  of  the  provinces,  thought 
that  the  capital  should  be  at  Durango,  and  beheved  that  a 
bishopric  of  Sonora  ought  not  to  be  established  until  the 
settlements  had  been  founded. ^^ 

Although  the  plan  did  not  go  into  effect  until  1776, 
G^lvez's  activities  of  1768  and  1769  in  Sonora  and  the 
Californias  were  directed  with  a  view  to  its  enactment,  and 
but  for  his  illness  in  1769  more  might  have  been  accomplished 
at  the  time.  Galvez's  immediate  object  was  to  pacify  the 
lands  to  be  embraced  by  the  comandancia  general.  It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Elizondo's  expedition  and  subse- 
quent campaigns  were  directed  to  the  subjugation  not 
merely  of  Sonora,  but  also  of  the  entire  frontier  considered 
as  an  unit.  This  feature  had  been  brought  out  in  the  deci- 
sion of  a  junta,  January  8,  1767,  although  the  war  in  Sonora 
had  received  primary  attention.^^  Troops  raised  in  accord- 
ance with  that  decision,  those  destined  to  accompany 
Elizondo,  were  enlisted  for  an  expedition  to  Sonora  and  the 
frontiers  of  Nueva  Vizcaya.^^  Gdlvez,  writing  to  Arriaga, 
May  27,  1767,  said  he  had  received  gifts  of  300,000  pesos 
for  the  campaign,  but  as  he  had  learned  that  the  war  against 
the  Apaches  in  Nueva  Vizcaya,  Coahuila,  and  New  Mexico 
was  less  pressing  than  that  against  the  Seris  and  Pimas  of 
Sonora,  he  would  undertake  to  subjugate  Sonora  first.^^ 
Croix's  letter  of  July  16,  1767,  to  Arriaga  is  even  more 
specific.  He  said  that  the  expedition  was  designed  to  bring 
peace  not  only  to  Sonora,  but  also  to  the  other  frontier 
provinces,  and  that  as  soon  as  the  first-named  object  had 
been  attained,  it  would  proceed  to  New  Mexico  and  Nueva 
Vizcaya.^^  Such,  indeed,  had  been  the  orders  of  Julidn 
de  Arriaga  three  months  before.^*     Other  documents  to  the 

M  A.G.I.,  103-3-23.  "  C-840. 

MC-735.  «C-712.  2<  Arriaga  to  Croix,  Apr.  20,   1767. 

«C-811.      Acknowledged     by     Ar-  C-775. 
riaga,  Oct.  21,  1767.     C-880. 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  79 

same  eifect  have  already  been  quoted  in  connection  with 
the  plans  of  the  junta  and  of  Croix  and  Galvez  in  January, 
1768.  In  the  following  month  plans  were  made  for  the 
journey  which  Gdlvez  was  to  make  to  the  Calif ornias, 
Sonora,  and  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  he  to  visit  them  in  the  order 
named.^^  Such  too  is  the  tenor  of  Galvez's  letter  of  February 
26,  1768,  to  Arriaga,  with  regard  to  the  mission  with  which 
he  had  been  charged ;  ^^  and,  similarly,  Croix's  letter  to 
Arriaga  of  February  29,  1768.2^  On  May  18,  1768,  the 
Audiencia  of  Guadalajara  informed  the  king  that  the 
inhabitants  of  Guadalajara  had  made  a  free  gift  of  3000 
pesos  for  the  expedition  to  Sonora  and  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  and 
an  exploration  of  the  Californias.^^  On  the  same  day, 
Gdlvez  ordered  Diego  Ferndndez  to  visit  the  silver  mines 
of  the  Islas  Marias,  the  Californias,  Sonora,  Sinaloa,  and 
Nueva  Vizcaya,  and  to  arrange  their  affairs  in  accordance 
with  royal  orders.^^  While  this  order  does  not  relate  to  the 
expedition,  it  shows  a  tendency  to  treat  the  region  involved 
as  an  unit.  Squarely  on  the  point  are  letters  exchanged 
between  Lope  de  Cuellar  and  Gdlvez  in  1769.  The  former 
wrote,  June  20,  of  his  march  to  Janos,  Nueva  Vizcaya,  and 
gave  his  opinion  that  no  peace  should  be  made  with  the 
Apaches,  for  as  they  occupied  territories  from  the  Gila 
River  to  Texas,  a  treaty  with  one  group  would  not  be 
recognized  by  the  others.^^  Galvez  replied,  July  4, 
ordering  Cuellar  to  continue  the  campaign  against  the 
Apaches,  doing  what  he  could  until  Colonel  Elizondo, 
after  suppressing  the  revolts  in  Sonora,  might  advance  by 
way  of  the  Gila  to  his  assistance.^^  A  summary  for  the 
Council  of  the  Indies,  September,  1769,  of  notices  received 
from  Mexico  refers  to  what  Gdlvez  had  done  to  subject  the 
Apaches,  and  punish  the  Seris,  Pimas,  and  other  tribes 
in  Sonora,  Sinaloa,  Pimeria  Alta  and  Baja,  and  the  frontiers 
of  Nueva  Vizcaya.^^     Other  evidences  might  be  adduced, 

"  C-954.  the  plans  resolved  upon  in    February, 

"  C-956.  1768  (cited  supra  n.  25).    C-1167. 
2'C-961.     Acknowledged    and     ap-  2*  C-993.  «•  C-994. 

proved    by    Arriaga,    Sept.    20,    1768.  so  C-1305. 

C-1080.     In  reply,  Jan.  3,  1769,  Croix  «  C-1317. 

reiterated  that  he  would  put  into  effect  ^2  C-1365. 


80  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

but  perhaps  it  will  be  sufficient  to  point  out  that  in  1776 
when  accounts  were  made  up,  the  expeditions  to  Sonora,  the 
Californias  (including  the  founding  of  San  Bias  and  the 
occupation  of  Alta  California),  and  Nueva  Vizcaya,  were 
treated  as  one  general  project,  and  not  separately. ^^ 

The  unity  of  the  frontier  had  long  been  understood  by 
the  Spanish  government,  certainly  since  early  in  the  eigh- 
teenth century.  Between  1724  and  1728  the  presidios  of 
the  entire  frontier  had  been  inspected  by  Pedro  de  Rivera, 
sent  for  that  purpose  as  visitador.  Teodoro  de  Croix's  long 
memorial  of  October  30,  1781,  cites  a  long  list  of  documents 
from  1735  on,  dealing  with  the  question  of  placing  frontier 
presidios  with  a  view  to  the  defence  of  the  whole  line.'* 
Something  approximating  real  accomplishment,  however, 
began  to  appear  in  the  Galvez  era,  though  independently  of 
the  visitador.  In  1765,  the  Marques  de  Rubi  was  commis- 
sioned to  make  an  inspection  of  the  presidios  of  New  Spain.'^ 
He  took  up  his  work  in  January,  1766,'^  and  did  not  complete 
it  until  early  in  1768.  With  the  exception  of  the  Califor- 
nias, he  traversed  the  entire  frontier  from  Texas  to  Sonora, 
even  the  New  Mexico  salient,  making  detailed  investiga- 
tions of  each  post  visited  by  him,  and  inspecting  lands  with 
a  view  to  a  new  alignment  of  the  presidios.^^  In  his  report 
to  Arriaga,  dated  April  10,  1768,  he  made  recommendations 
for  the  better  location  of  the  presidios  from  Sonora  to  Texas, 
urging  that  a  line  of  seventeen  be  formed,  dropping  seven 
presidios  and  two  provincial  companies  then  in  existence.'^ 

33  C-3254,  3319.  relating,     most    of    them,     to     Rubi'a 

3*  C-4430,  at  paragraph  417.  inspections  of  presidios,   but  including 

35  The    only    establishments     called  some  reports  of  a  more  general  nature. 

"presidios"  were  those  of  the  frontier  These  are  by  no  means  all  of  the  Rub! 

provinces.  documents   in   the    Catalogue.     Among 

38  C-622.  others  the  most  important  of  a  general 

37  Abundant  materials  for  a  history  nature,    both    sent    direct    to   Arriaga, 

of  the  inspection  by  the  Marques  de  are   the  one   cited  in   note  38,   and   a 

Rubi    appear    in    my    Catalogue.     See  chart,    dated   April    3,    1768,    sent    by 

especially  C-731,  which  refers  to  fifty-  Rubi  to  Arriaga,  specifying  the  number 

one     subordinate     entries.     Of     these,  of  officers  and  soldiers  in  the  frontier 

one    is    Croix's    instruction    of    July  provinces,   the  number  of  horses,   the 

18,  1771,  for  the  formation  of  a  line  of  time  when  each  presidio  was  founded, 

fifteen    presidios ;      another,     a     chart  the  annual  expense  for  each  presidio, 

of  July  23,  1771,  showing  the  forces  of  and  the  authority  approving  the  com- 

the  presidios  at  the  time,  and  as  they  mission  of  each  captain  then  in  charge 

would    be    under    Croix's    reglamento;  of  a  presidio.     C-974. 

the    other    forty-nine    are    testimonios  38  C_977. 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS  OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  81 

This  was  eventually  to  bear  fruit  in  the  establishment  of 
such  a  line,  the  decree  coming  in  1772,  at  which  point  the 
problems  which  occasioned  the  recommendation  of  a  line  of 
presidios  will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail. 

This  is  perhaps  a  good  place  to  accord  recognition  to  a,cu^t--f-y^>' 
man  who  has  hardly  received  the  credit  that  is  due  him.  If  '9>h,ov^^^ 
more  was  accomplished  in  northwestward  advance  in  the 
period  of  Gdlvez  and,  later,  of  Bucarely  than  at  other  times 
in  the  eighteenth  century,  it  was  owing  in  no  small  measure 
to  the  man  who  was  then  ministro  general  de  Indias,  Julidn 
de  Arriaga.  He  had  been  promoted  to  the  post  in  1750 
or  1751.^*  Gdlvez,  Rubi,  Bucarely,  and  others  carried  out 
his  ideas,  and  while  they  often  acted  wisely  on  their  own 
initiative,  he  sustained  them  in  their  measures.  While  it 
will  require  much  further  work  to  determine  his  place  in 
history,  negative  evidence  of  his  importance  appears  in  the 
change  for  the  worse  that  occurred,  certainly  as  regards  the 
problems  of  northwestward  advance,  after  his  death  in 
1776.  Yet  he  was  succeeded  in  that  year  by  a  man  who  had 
been  one  of  his  most  efficient  workers  on  that  very  problem, 
Galvez  himself.       -\<^Ao- 

Galvez's  interest  reached  beyond  the  immediate  problem 
of  establishing  order  in  the  frontier  provinces.  It  is  prob- 
able that  as  early  as  1767  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  occupy 
Monterey,  before  the  occurrence  of  the  events  usually 
alleged  as  causing  the  expeditions  of  1769.  The  determina- 
tion of  this  point  is  involved  in  another,  the  idea  which  lay 
back  of  the  founding  of  the  Department  of  San  Bias.  In 
the  instruction  which  Viceroy  Croix  left  to  his  successor, 
September  1,  1771,  he  said  that  Gdlvez  had  some  ships  built 
to  facilitate  transporting  Elizondo^s  troops  to  Sonora,  and 
for  that  reason  had  established  a  shipyard  at  San  Bias. 
The  boats  were  used  for  the  Sonora  expedition,  and  later  for 
the  one  which  went  to  San  Diego  and  Monterey.*^  Croix's 
instruction  for  a  settlement  at  San  Bias,  January  11,  1768, 
stated  that  after  having  taken  the  measures  necessary  for 

89  Bernard  Moses,    The   Spanish  de-       London.  1914),  II,  354. 
pendencies    in    South    America    (2     v.  *^  Croix,  Correapondance,  289. 


82 


THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 


S    t 


ST 


/A 


the  pacification  of  Sonora  and  the  other  frontier  provinces,  it 
had  been  deemed  indispensable  to  found  a  port  for  the  advan- 
tage of  boats  employed  on  such  expeditions  and  in  commerce 
with  that  region,  and  for  the  preservation  and  advancement 
of  the  Californias.'*^  Before  this  time,  in  December,  1767, 
we  learn  that  Gdlvez  was  already  ardently  at  work  on  plans 
for  the  department,  having  charged  one  Rivero  with  the  duty 
of  establishing  a  port  there.^^  Gdlvez  had  come  from  Spain 
at  a  time  when  many  books  were  being  circulated  concerning 
foreign  interest  in  the  Californias,*^  and  the  direction  of 
his  mind  toward  Monterey  appears  strongly  in  the  Croix- 
Gdlvez  plan  of  January  23-24,  1768,  noticed  above.  The 
Audiencia  of  Guadalajara  in  reporting  Gdlvez's  passage 
through  that  city  referred  to  his  project  of  exploring  the 
Californias,^*  which  would  indicate  that  Gdlvez  had  spoken 
for  such  a  project  while  there.  It  was  not  until  the  day  after 
he  left  Guadalajara,  namely,  on  May  5,  1768,  while  on  his 
way  to  San  Bias,  that  he  received  mail  from  Croix  telling 
of  Russian  explorations  in  the  Americas."*^ 

In  a  letter  dated  November  31  [sic],  1767,  the  Vizconde  de 
la  Herreria  had  written  to  the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  Spanish 
minister  of  state,  that  the  Russian  empress  was  not  desisting 
from  her  attempt  to  establish  communications  with  the 
Pacific  coasts  of  America,  and  was  preparing  expeditions."*^ 
The  papers  were  forwarded  to  Julidn  de  Arriaga,  who  wrote 
to  Croix,  January  23,  1768,  that  the  Russians  were  planning 
to  found  settlements  on  the  North  American  coast,  or  had 
done  so  already,  as  some  believed.  He  bade  Croix  order 
the  governor  of  the  Californias  to  exercise  vigilance  to  ob- 
serve these  attempts,  frustrating  them  if  possible."*^  This 
letter,  it  will  be  observed,  did  not  order  an  expedition  to 
Monterey,  as  has  usually  been  stated,  but  it  was  sufficient 
to  give  an  active  man  all  the  authority  that  he  needed. 


«C-93i 

ract  from  a  letter  of  Rada  to 
Arriaga,  Dec.  27,  1767,  in  C-908. 

«Cf.  pp.  60-61. 

**  C-993.  The  phrase  is  Peninsula 
de  California  which  was  habitually- 
used   interchangeably  with    the    Cali- 


fornias to  connote  Baja  and  Alta 
California  combined. 

*^  Juan  Manuel  de  Viniegra,  June 
10, 1771,  Madrid.  A.H.N.,  Estado,  Leg. 
2845. 

«  C-888. 

«  C-938. 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS  OE  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  83 

Gdlvez  afterward  said  that  Croix  directed  him  to  despatch 
an  expedition  to  Monterey  in  the  ships  that  had  been  con- 
structed to  carry  troops  to  Sonora/^  which  statement  is 
confirmed  by  Croix.  Croix's  letter  is  not  at  hand,  but  his 
instruction  of  1771  to  Bucarely  tells  the  nature  of  it.  He 
thought  that  the  Russians  might  occupy  Monterey,  and 
directed  Gdlvez  to  make  an  expedition  by  sea  toward  the 
threatened  port.  In  view  of  the  difficulties  of  a  maritime 
expedition  and  because  of  his  desire  to  explore  the  Califor- 
nias,  Galvez  sent  two  expeditions,  one  by  sea,  and  the  other 
by  land.^^ 

Soon  after  receiving  the  news  from  Croix,  Gdlvez  on  May 
13,  1768,  reached  San  Bias,  where  he  busied  himself  for 
twelve  days  establishing  that  department.  On  May  16, 
he  called  a  junta  to  discuss  the  details  of  an  expedition  to 
Monterey,  such  as  the  boats  to  be  used,  the  best  season  for 
a  voyage,  and  the  route  to  be  followed. ^^  On  May  20,  he 
wrote  to  Croix  of  his  plans  for  the  expedition.  He  had 
determined  upon  it  as  a  result  of  the  news  of  Russian  en- 
croachments, he  said,  and  in  pursuance  of  discussions  that 
he  had  formerly  had  with  Croix.  ^^  On  the  same  day  he 
recommended  that  care  should  be  taken  along  the  coasts  of 
the  Pacific,  because  of  the  pretensions  of  the  Russians, ^^  and 
urged  that  settlements  be  made  on  the  Islas  Marias,  lest 
that  group  serve  as  a  place  of  refuge  for  enemies'  ships,  in 
which  they  might  await  the  Manila  galleon,  or  whence  they 
might  attack  mainland  ports.^^  Of  Gdlvez's  other  acts  at 
San  Bias  nothing  need  be  said,  beyond  the  fact  that  he 
put  the  establishment  on  its  feet.^^  Croix  heard  from  Gdlvez 
in  time  to  write  to  Arriaga,  May  28,  1768,  of  the  proposed 
expedition, ^^  and  the  announcement  met  with  favor,  Arriaga 
writing  to  Croix,  October  18,  1768,  that  the  king  was  eagerly 
awaiting  news  of  it.^^ 

^  Gdlvez,  Informe,  141.     C-1834.  Gdlvez's    activities    at    San    Bias,    but 

**  Croix,  Correspoiidance,  290.  also  for  its  history  in  detail  to  the  end 

^  C-990.  of    the    eighteenth    century,    see    my 

^1  C-1002.  Catalogue.     Several  hundred  references 

^2  C-1001.  will  be  found  there. 
S3  C-1000.  "  C-1014. 

"  For  materials  not  only  concerning  ^«  C-1100. 


THE   FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

It  seems  clear  from  these  documents  that  Galvez  intended, 
all  along,  at  least  to  explore  Alta  California.  It  is  equally 
clear  that  Croix  did  not  contemplate  anything  more  than 
a  naval  expedition  at  the  time,  and  did  not  plan  to  occupy 
the  province.  The  royal  order  did  not  even  call  for  an  ex- 
pedition. Finally,  the  Department  of  San  Bias  from  its  in- 
ception served  primarily  as  a  supply-depot  for  the  Califor- 
nias,  its  relation  with  Sonora  being  of  hardly  any  account 
in  comparison.  The  Russian  encroachments  were  simply 
in  the  long  chain  of  permanent,  continuing  causes  for  an 
advance  of  the  Spanish  frontier,  and  were  not  reported  as 
more  pressing  at  this  time  than  had  been  the  foreign  aggres- 
sion of  other  periods.  The  real  cause  of  advance  was  that 
a  man  of  energy  had  appeared,  Jos6  de  Gdlvez,  who  achieved 
what  others  had  for  a  long  time  planned.  Contemporary 
reports  of  aggressions,  however,  may  have  had  the  effect  of 
accelerating  his  plans,  but  not  more  than  that." 

The  story  of  the  occupation  of  Alta  California  need  not 
be  told,  other  than  to  review  the  outstanding  facts.  In 
1769,  five  expeditions  were  despatched,  two  by  land  up  the 
peninsula,  and  three  by  sea.  A  junction  of  four  of  them  was 
effected  at  San  Diego,  one  of  the  ships  having  been  lost. 
From  there  the  commander  in  chief,  Caspar  de  Portold, 
proceeded  northward  in  search  of  Monterey,  and  actually 
visited  that  port,  but  failed  to  recognize  it  from  the  descrip- 
tion of  Gonzdlez  Cabrera  Bueno.  Pushing  on,  he  reached 
and  discovered  San  Francisco  Bay,  after  which  he  returned 
to  San  Diego.  The  year  1769  saw  a  mission  established  at 
San  Diego,  and  a  garrison  was  left  there  which  eventually  be- 
came a  presidio.  In  1770,  PortoM  again  marched  north 
from  San  Diego.  This  time  he  convinced  himself  of  the 
identity  of  Monterey,  and  a  mission   and    presidio    were 

5^  It  may  be  wondered  why  such  a  wrote  his  1771  report,  that   the   Alta 

self-centred    man    as    Gdlvez  certainly  California  establishments   would   be   a 

was    should    give    so    much    credit    to  success.     Gdlvez  was  capable  of  making 

Croix,     They  were  friendly,  to  be  sure.  himself  appear  to  be  the  instrument  of 

Furthermore,   he   could   not  ignore  or  the   viceroy   in    case   of   failure,    while 

belittle    the    viceroy's    part.     Possibly  sure  at  the  same  time  of  receiving  the 

another  reason  for  his  generosity  was  major    credit    in    case    of    success,    as 

that  it  was  not  yet  certain,  when  he  actually  happened. 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS   OF   JOSfi    DE    GALVEZ  85 

founded  there.  Great  hardships  had  been  endured  in  mak- 
ing these  small  beginnings,  and  but  for  the  capable  prepara- 
tions of  Gdlvez,  and  the  cgjaiageous  Jeadership  of  PortoII, 
ably  seconded  by  the  efforts  of  the  Franciscan  missionary, 
Father  Serra,  and  of  others,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  result  could 
have  been  other  than  failure. ^^  It  had  required  a  remark- 
able effort  to  gain  a  foothold  at  all,  but  even  more  striking 
endeavors  were  to  be  necessary  if  the  new  lands  were  to  be 
held.  The  battle  for  permanent  establishments  had  only 
begun. 

As  the  Indian  wars  of  Sonora  rendered  communication  w 
with  Alta  California  from  that  province  temporarily  out  of  A 
the  question,  Baja  California  became  important  for  a  time, 
although  in  less  degree  than  San  Bias,  as  an  aid  to  San  Diego 
and  Monterey.  Events  in  the  peninsula  are  also  of  inter- 
est on  the  old  grounds  of  its  defensive  importance  against 
^Sl^iffl-^^i't^'^fe^  and  of  its  own  need  of  an  overland  sup;gly- 
routfe.  Moreover,  it  is  certain  that  at  this  time  Baja 
California  was  believed  to  be  very  rich  in  precious  metals, 
an  opinion  prevailing  that  the  Jesuits  had  wilfully  concealed 
the  fact.  We  may  therefore  pay  some  attention  to  Gdlvez's 
activities  in  the  peninsula.  As  regards  its  supposed  wealth 
we  may  note  a  memorial  by  officials  of  the  Real  Caja  oT 
Guadalajara,  October  8,  1765,  which  stated  that  there  were 
two  mines  in  Baja  California,  and  might  be  more,  if  quick- 
silver for  extracting  ores  could  be  had,  and  if  persons  of 
expert  mining  knowledge  might  be  sent  there.  The  land 
was  worth  being  developed.  Gold  mines  were  being  dis- 
covered ;  pearls  were  found  in  many  places ;  the  soil  was 
fertile ;  and  there  were  great  numbers  of  cattle.  Yet  the 
inhabitants  were  for  the  most  part  Indians.  Eight  years 
before,  in- 1757,  they  had  made  the  same  suggestions  to 
Viceroy  Amarillas,  but  got  no  reply. ^®  On  February  25, 
1766,  Arriaga  forwarded  this  memorial  to  the  Council  of 
the  Indies. ^^     Croix's  letters  to  his  brother  show  that  reports 

"  An  idea  of  the  difficulties  attend-  »•  C-593. 

ing  the  Portold  expedition  is  given  in  •»  C-628. 

chapter  five. 


86  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

of  this  character  were  believed.  In  a  letter  of  December 
29,  1768,  he  remarked  that  the  Calif ornias,  which  had 
always  passed  for  a  sterile  country,  would  be  able  from  1769 
on  to  maintain  themselves  without  costing  the  king  a  sou. 
Judge  what  a  profit  the  Jesuits  must  have  had,  he  said,  and 
yet  they  had  drawn  a  subsidy  from  the  king  for  many  years 
on  the  pretext  of  the  land's  sterility.^^  Again,  January  25, 
1769,  he  mentioned  Gdlvez's  work  in  the  peninsula,  saying 
how  pleased  the  king  would  be  with  that  province,  because 
of  its  Pg^S;  gold,  and  silver,  a  wealth  which  the  Jesuits 
had  in  great"  part  concealed. ^^ 

Galvez's  characterization  of  Baja  Calif ornia,^^  and  the 
measures  that  he  took  while  there  show  that  he  had  Bur- 
rieFs  idea  of  the  importance  of  the  peninsula  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  defence  of  New  Spain.^*  He  seems  to  have  held 
the  same  opinion  about  occupying  the  entire  coast,  including 
Alta  California,  as  appears  from  some  correspondence  con- 
cerning the  Bay  of  San  Bernabe  near  Cape  San  Lucas. 
Miguel  Costanso  was  sent  there,  and  made  a  careful  ex- 
amination of  the  port  in  the  bay,  recommending  measures 
for  the  protection  of  the  site  in  a  report  of  September  1, 
1768,^^  accompanying  it  with  a  map  of  the  bay.^®  Writing 
to  Croix,  September  8,  1768,  Galvez  told  of  his  own  visit  to 
Cape  San  Lucas,  which  he  described  as  the  key  to  Spanish 
possessions  in  that  part  of  the  Californias.  He  had  decided 
to  place  a  Spanish  colony  there,  he  said,  arid  added  that 
there  ought  to  be  a  colony  and  presidio  in  every  good  port 
of  the  lands  about  to  be  reduced  to  Spanish  control.^^ 

Little  need  be  said  of  his  other  measures  in  Baja  California. 
Galvez  found  the  peninsula  in  a  very  bad  condition.  Its 
population  had  fallen  away,  until  it  consisted  of  but  7888 
of  all  races.  This  necessitated  reducing  the  missions  from 
fifteen  to  thirteen,  but  a  new  one  was  added  in  the  north, 
San  Fernando  de  Velicatd,  to  facilitate  expeditions  to  Alta 

«i  Croix,  Correspondance,  216.  by  Burriel,  though  he  later  character- 

«2  Ibid.,  217.  ized  the  Noticia  as  grossly  inaccurate. 

63  Gdlvez,  Informe,  139-40.    C-1834.  C-41 89-90. 

"  In  many  respects,  as,  for  example,  ^  C-1066. 

in    his    desire    to     occupy     Monterey,  ^5  C-1068. 

Gdlvez  seems  to  have  been  influenced  ^"  C-1076. 


^/: 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS   OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  87 

California.  For  the  same  reason  he  increased  the  garrison 
of  the  peninsula,  and  provided  ships  for  northward  voyages. ^^ 
Nor  did  the  expected  wealth  of  the  peninsula  materialize. 
In  Croix's  instruction  of  September  1,  1771,  to  his  successor, 
Croix  said  that  the  Californias  were  not  so  rich  as  people 
had  beheved.  It  would  be  necessary  to  encourage  agri- 
culture, mining,  and  pearj-g^lyjig^  and  would  be  well  to 
employ  men  who  could  rouse  the  Indians  from  their  habit- 
ual indolence.^^  In  fine,  Galyez  did  not,  and  could  not, 
succeed  in  making  Baja  California  a  permanent  storehouse 
for  advancement  of  the  settlements  in  Alta  California ;  I  | 
the  need  for  an  overland  connection  with  Sonora  was,  if  I  j  |  I  | 
anything,  made  only  more  evident.  In  Galvez's  mind,  as  ' 
appears  from  his  plan  of  January,  1768,  Sonora  was  the 
centre  from  which  all  lines  of  advance  were  to  radiate.  In 
his  own  words,  one  of  his  reasons  for  going  to  the  peninsula  '  /' 

was  to  occupy  his  time  pending  the  advancement  or  con-      X  / 

elusion  of  the  campaign  in  Sonora.^^    This  view  is  confirmed  ,         1^ 
by  one  of  his  letters,  written  while  he  was  yet  in  Baja  Cali-\t-' 
fornia.      Upon   receiving  notice   of   a   royal   order   asking  ,    -^  n  . 
reports  as  to  the  advisability  of  establishing  a  mint  in  the      i   -    '^ 
frontier  provinces,  he  wrote  to  Croix,  August  15,  1768,  that 
he  was  in  favor  of  it,  but  it  should  not  be  in  Durango   or 
Guadalajara,  as  had  been  proposed,  but  in  Sonora,  so  as  to 
be  at  the  most  convenient  point  of  resort  from  the  mines 
of  Sonora,  Sinaloa,  and  the  Calif ornias.'^^ 

The  great  expedition  under  Colonel  Elizondo  had  reached 
Sinaloa   in  February,    1768.     In   May  headquarters   were 
established  at  Guaymas,  and  Elizondo  was  ready  to  begin     ,.,,s,..,_*.tc 
the  campaign.     The  military  details  need  not  be  mentioned.^^  ^. 

The  war  centred  about  the  Cerro  Prieto,^^  and  it  was  three 
years  before  the  conquest  was  complete,  so  vigorous  was 
the  resistance  of  the  Seris  and  their  allies,  the  Pimas  and 
Sibubapas.     The  conquest  was  not  as  thorough,  however 

^  « Gdlvezj  Informe,  142-46,     C-1834.  available    in    great    quantity,    but    by 

■^ly  *  In  Croix,  Correspondance,  291.  use  of  documents  cited  in  the  Catalogue 

^°  Gdlvez,  Informe,  140.     C-1834.  the  story  in  detail  may  now  be  learned. 

71  C-1051.  "  For  maps  of  the  Cerro  Prieto  see 

^  Heretofore  materials  for  the  study  C-1150,  1207. 
of  the  campaign  itself  have  not  been 


f 


88  THE   FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

as  it  has  been  regarded."'^    Had  it  in  fact  brought  lasting 
peace  to  Sonora,  the  history  not  only  of  that  province,  but 
of  Alta  California  as  well  would  have  followed  a  very  different 
course.     But,  taken  with  other  events  which  will  be  mentioned 
presently,  it  seemed  to  be  final  at  the  time,  and  was  followed 
[   by  a  few  years  of  actual  peace.     An  advance  to  the  Colorado 
1   and  Gila  now  appeared  to  be  possible;   the  way  had  been 
I  ^1    1  cleared.     Thus,  the  Elizondo  campaign  was  of  considerable 
^^  \\  importance  as  affecting  the  problem  of  communication  be- 
tween Alta  California  and  Sonora. 

Other  events  had  occurred  in  course  of  the  campaign 
that  tended  toward  the  stability  of  Sonora,  and  therefore 
toward  northwestward  advance.  Gdlvez  came  to  Sonora 
in  May,  1769.  Two  months  later,  he  was  stricken  with  a 
severe  illness,  but  he  had  shown  all  his  characteristic  activity 
in  the  meantime.  He  established  a  royal  treasury  at  Alamos, 
lowered  the  price  of  quicksilver,  and  did  may  other  things 
calculated  to  improve  mining,  agricultural,  and  com- 
mercial conditions  in  Sinaloa  and  Sonora,  as  well  as  to 
provide  revenue.  He  wished  to  secularize  the  missions  of 
Sinaloa  and  many  of  those  of  Sonora,  but,  unable  to  obtain 
a  sufficient  number  of  parish  priests,  he  gave  over  Sonora 
to  the  Franciscans  of  Jalisco  and  Queretaro,  and  Sinaloa 
alone  to  the  secular  clergy.^^  What  he  might  have  done, 
had  he  retained  his  health  can  only  be  conjectured,  but 
it  is  likely  that  he  would  have  taken  steps  looking  to  the 
long-planned  advance  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila.  That  the 
progress  of  the  Alta  California  settlements  was  near  to  his 
heart  is  proved  by  the  best  of  evidence.  On  August  22, 
1769,  he  wrote  to  Croix  about  his  illness,  saying  that  he 
expected  it  to  be  his  last,  reiterating  his  feelings  of  personal 
friendship  for  Croix,  and  commending  his  subordinate  officers 
to  the  latter's  attention.  Yet,  the  greater  part  of  the  letter 
concerns  the  expeditions  to  Alta  California,  Galvez  urging 
Croix,  in  what  he  believed  to  be  his  death-bed  message, 

7*  Bancroft,  N.  M.  St.&  Tez.,!,  680,  parts  of  the  country,  the  people  entered 
says,  "The  danger  of  attacks  from  upon  an  indolent  uneventful  career." 
savages  having  been  averted  from  most  '*  Gdlvez,  Informe,  148-50.    C-1834. 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS   OF  JOSfi   DE    GALVEZ  89 

to  aid  and  protect  the  new  establishments  that  were  being 
founded  there.^^  Over  two  months  before,  June  10,  1769, 
he  had  proposed  to  Croix  that  the  Indians  of  Tibur6n  Island 
be  brought  to  the  mainland,  and  reduced  to  a  mission,^^ 
thus  to  remove  another  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of 
northwestward  conquest,  for  the  Indians  had  used  this 
island,  like  the  Cerro  Prieto  on  the  mainland,  as  a  place  of 
refuge,  whence  they  might  attack  Spanish  posts  in  Sonora. 
Gdlvez  later  said  that  he  and  Croix  had  taken  steps  after 
the  former's  return  to  Mexico  City  to  promote  measures 
looking  to  the  exploration  of  routes  from  New  Mexico  and 
Sonora  to  the  Californias,  but  that  both  returned  to  Spain 
before  they  found  time  to  put  their  plans  into  execution.^^ 
Coincident  with  the  termination  of  the  military  campaign 
occurred  an  event  which  served  better  than  bullets  to  make  tv^AX<^t 
for  peace.  While  pursuing  a  band  of  Indians  in  1771  a  ~^^a^^ 
detachment  of   Elizondo's   army  discovered  the   rich  gold  » 

placers  of  Cieneguilla,  near  Altar.  Vast  quantities  of  gold  """^^jl!^ 
were  found  near  the  surface.  There  was  an  immediate  rush 
to  the  scene,  over  two  thousand  men  reaching  there  within 
a  few  months  of  the  discovery.  Official  reports  were  quite 
on  a  level  with  rumor  in  their  enthusiasm.  Between  April 
24  and  May  13,  1771,  EHzondo^^  and  Pedro  Corbaldn  »<^ 
wrote  to  Croix,  and  Corbaldn  ^^  and  Father  Manuel  Gil 
Samaniego  ^^  wrote  to  Gdlvez  of  the  immense  wealth?  of 
Cieneguilla  and  of  other  mines  discovered  in  the  same  neigh- 
borhood. Croix  in  turn,  June  27, 1771,  reported  to  Arriaga,^^ 
who  gave  orders  to  Croix's  successor,  Bucarely,  November 
23,  1771,  that  he  should  take  measures  to  maintain  the 
peace  achieved  by  Galvez  and  Croix,  and  to  facilitate'  the 
successful  operation  of  the  newly  discovered  mines.^^  Un- 
like the  Arizonac  mine  of  other  days,  Cieneguilla  continued 
to  yield  richly  for  a  decade,  and  other  mines  in  the  neighbor- 
hood did  so  for  the  rest  of  the  century  and  later.     At  about 

'6C-1356.  80C-1731. 

"  C-1294.  81  C-1735. 

"Gdlvez  to  Arriaga,  Mar.  8,  1774.             «  C-1738. 

C-2566.  M  C-1752. 

79  C-1725.  w  C-1810. 


90  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  IV 

the  same  time,  other  mines  were  discovered  elsewhere  in 
Sonora,  that  of  San  Antonio  de  la  Huerta  on  the  Yaqui  being 
especially  rich.  This  was  the  most  flourishing  place  in  the 
province  between  1772  and  1776.  The  royal  revenues  from 
Huerta  and  Cieneguilla  were  sufficient  at  this  time  to  sup- 
port the  province,  according  to  Captain  Anza.^^ 

Statistics  are  not  at  hand  to  show  the  exact  effect  of  these 
discoveries  upon  the  population  of  Sonora,  but  Bancroft 
furnishes  some  figures  worth  noting.  In  1769  there  was 
a  white  population  of  970  in  all  Pimeria,  exclusive  of  the 
soldiery,  of  whom  but  178  were  in  Pimeria  Alta,  as  compared 
with  1315  in  Pimeria  Alta  alone  at  the  time  of  Bishop 
Tamaron's  diocesan  tour  of  a  few  years  before,  showing  how 
population  had  declined  as  a  result  of  the  wars.  The  dis- 
covery of  the  Cieneguilla  mines  in  1771  had  brought  a 
population  to  that  one  place  of  more  than  double  the  number 
for  all  Pimeria  two  years  before,  and  fifty  per  cent  more 
than  for  all  of  Pimeria  Alta  as  it  was  in  Tamaron's  day. 
Even  by  1770  Pimeria  had  become  a  paying  investment  to 
the  government.  In  that  year  revenues  exceeded  expendi- 
tures by  $77,277.^®  Prosperity  seems  also  to  have  come 
to  the  regions  farther  south,  if  amount  of  revenues  is  any 
criterion.  The  troubles  of  Sonora  as  regards  Indian  wars 
were  not  at  an  end,  but  from  this  time  forth  it  seems  to 
have  had  a  sufficiently  great  population  to  ward  off  actual 
dangers,  if  not  the  fear  of  them. 

With  the  pacification  of  Sonora,  Elizondo  and  most  of 
his  troops  returned  to  Mexico,  abandoning  the  original  plan 
for  a  descent  upon  Nueva  Vizcaya.  This  was  not  because 
there  was  no  need  for  such  a  campaign ;    on  the  contrary, 

8*  Between  January  1,  1773,  and  that  day  must  also  be  borne  in  mind. 
November  17,  1774,  no  less  than  4832  As  late  as  1792  both  Cieneguilla  and 
marcos  of  gold  from  Cieneguilla  were  Huerta  were  yielding  appreciable 
a,ccounted  for  at  the  royal  treasury  of  amounts  in  excises  collected  for  the 
Alamos,  from  which  the  royal  revenues  royal  treasury,  respectively  686  and 
amounted  to  72,348  pesos  4  tomines.  4186  pesos  in  that  year. 
Cavo,  317.  Mayer,  I,  248-49.  This  ^^  This  probably  means  pesos.  Ban- 
is  not  an  exact  indication  of  the  wealth  croft,  Mayer,  and  others  frequently 
of  Cieneguilla.  Fully  a  third  part  render  pesos  as  dollars.  A  peso  is 
had  been  removed  by  robbery  or  worth  half  a  dollar,  but  if  purchasing 
other  unlawful  act.  Cavo,  supra.  The  value  at  that  time  were  considered,  a 
greater  purchasing  power  of  money  in  dollar  would  be  nearer  the  mark. 


1765]  ACHIEVEMENTS   OF  JOSfi   DE   GALVEZ  91 

along  the  whole  line  from  Sonora  to  Texas,  the  Apaches 
were  as  hostile  and  bold  as  ever.  Although  Apache  attacks 
in  Sonora  were  confined  to  the  northeast,  that  was  sufficient, 
however,  to  interfere  seriously  with  the  best  of  the  north- 
westerly routes,  —  by  way  of  Tubac  to  the  Gila,  and  down 
that  river  to  the  Colorado.  Of  the  obstacles  impeding 
an  advance  in  1752  all  but  the  Apaches  had  been  cleared 
away.  But  for  them,  granted  need  for  a  route  and  a  leader 
of  energy,  the  long-planned  advance  might  now  have  been 
expected.  The  need  had  long  been  felt,  and  with  the  occupa- 
tion of  Alta  California  became  more  pressing.  Moreover 
a  man  was  to  appear,  a  greater  than  Galvez  in  many  respects, 
and  certainly  a  more  noble  character,  the  new  viceroy, 
Antonio  Maria  Bucarely  y  Ursiia. 


^  O- 


.v^V.»-> 


-1  7  G.  1 


CHAPTER  V 

ALTA  California's  need  for  an  overland  route, 
1769-1773 


n 


The  general,  long-operative  reasons  for  an  advance  of 
the^Spanish  frontier  by  way  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers 
Eave  been  discussed  in  preceding  chapters,  and  in  the  last 
chapter  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  by  the  establishment 
qf^jBomparative  good  order  in  Sonora,  such  an  advance 
had  become  possible.  On  May  2,  1772,  Juan  Bautista  de 
Aiiza,  captain  of  the  presidio  of  Tubac,  proposed  that  he 
be  allowed  to  seek  an  overland  route  from  Sonora  to  Alta 
California.  On  September  13,  1773,  he  was  authorized  to 
make  the  expedition,  and  early  in  1774  he  did  so.  Before 
tracing  the  course  of  official  action  on  this  proposal,  it  is 
necessary  to  take  into  account  several  other  contemporary 
factors.  These  were :  the  character  of  Bucarely,  the  new 
viceroy ;  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Californias ;  status 
of  the  other  frontier  provinces ;  the  events  which  led  Anza 
to  make  his  proposal;  and  the  events  tending  to  promote 
its  favorable  reception  by  the  viceroy.  The  third  and 
fourth  factors  will  be  reserved  for  the  following  two  chap- 
ters. The  fifth  will  be  taken  up  in  a  measure  in  chapter 
seven,  but  so  far  as  it  related  to  danger  of  foreign  aggres- 
sion, its  discussion  will  be  postponed  until  chapter  ten, 
where  the  subject  is  treated  in  detail.  In  this  chapter 
some  idea  will  first  be  given  of  Bucarely's  character,  although 
it  is  expected  that  the  documents  used  later  in  this  work 
will  more  amply  show  him  forth.  Evidence  will  be  sub- 
mitted also  to  show  that  Baja  California  could  not  be 
counted  upon  to  sustain  the  new  establishments,  nor  to 
serve  as  a  fitting  route  for  transmission  of  supplies  brought 

92 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND    ROUTE  93 

there  from  San  Bias,  having  much  ado  to  take  care  of  it- 
self. Most  of  the  chapter,  however,  will  deal  with  condi- 
tions in  Alta  California. 

Alta  Cahfornia^s  greatest  need,  if  it  were  to  be  retained 
or  its  full  possibilities  developed,  was  a  ^ood  overland  route 
from  New  Spain.  It  lacked  manufactured  articles,  food 
even  (for  civilized  people  could  not  live  on  what  sufficed 
for  the  Indians),  and  perhaps  most  important  of  all,  per^ 
manent  settlers  and  domestic  animal^J  There  were  no 
Spanish  families,  and  no  Spaniards,  beyond  an  occasional 
straggler  from  San  Bias,  except  the  men  of  the  garrison  and 
the  missionaries.  There  were  few  food  animals,  and  fewer 
beasts  of  burden,  not  enough  of  either  to  supply  needs. 
The  province  could  be  kept  alive  at  great  expense  by  receiv- 
ing what  it  required  by  sea  direct  or  by  way  of  the  peninsula, 
but  either  route  was  a  long  one,  at  the  mercy  of  an  enemy's 
navy,  and  impracticable  (unless  at  great  expense,  by  in- 
crease of  the  marine  department)  for  the  sending  of  families 
and  domestic  animals  in  sufficient  number  to  establish  the 
settlements  on  a  strong  basis.  As  a  result  the^Diew  estafe-  I 
lishments  were  maintained  at  a  loss^  not  with  the  idea  of 
developing  their  wealth  in  great  degree,  but  £.rima<rily_tP  » 
prevent  occupation  by  a  foreign  power.  With  settlements 
as  weak  as  those  of  Alta  California  there  was  ^nstant  dan- 
ger that  the  province  might  be  lost.  There  were  numerous 
Indians,  unwarlike  indeed,  but  showing  scant  desire  for 
conversion  to  Christianity  and  subjection  to  Spanish  rule. 
Nor  were  there  enough  Spanish  troops  in  the  entire  province 
to  have  resisted  a  determined  attack  by  a  single  ship's 
crew  of  a  foreign  power. 
These  dangers  led  to  suggestions  for  their  remedy  by  the 
I  internal  development  of  Alta  California,  and  by  opening 
2,  a  route  from  jonora.  Thus,  at  least,  the  expense  of  main-'^ 
taming  the  province  might  be  reduced  or  might  even  cease  ; 
the  Indians  could  be  fed,  that  being  the  most  effective  means 
to  their  conversion  and  subjection;  and  l&nally,  the  prov- 
ince might  become  populous  enough  to  resist  internal  re- 
volt or  foreign  attack.     Bucarely  acted  promptly  to  relieve 


94  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

the  immediate  needs  of  the  colony,  but  its  life  was  still  hang- 
ing by  a  precarious  thread  until,  in_1774^  his^a^a^j^s^^^ 
enduring  nature  began  at  length  to  make  their  influence  felt. 
"~'One  other  matter  in  Alta  California  occupied  the  at- 
tention of  the  authorities  during  this  period.  A  vast  bay 
had  been  discovered  in  1769  which  might  prove  to  be  a  good 
port.  Unexplored  and  unoccupied,  it  might  fall  into  foreign 
hands,  and  endanger  the  Spanish  Empire.  How  good  a 
port  it  was  the  Spaniards  did  not  know,  but  deemed  it 
wise  to  find  out,  and  to  possess  themselves  of  it.  Thus, 
the  formation  of  establishments  on  San  Francisco  Bay,  to 
which  they  were  referring,  was  one  of  the  aims  of  the  period. 


Antonio  Maria  Bucarely  y  Ursua  succeeded  the  Marques 
de  Croix  as  viceroy  on  September  23,  1771.  Early  in  the 
next  year  the  visitador,  Jos6  de  Gdlvez,  returned  to  Spain, 
leaving  Bucarely  in  entire  control.  In  him  the  viceroyalty 
was  to  find  one  of  the  ablest  rulers  it  ever  had.  As  concerns 
Alta  California,  if  Gdlvez  founded  the  new  establishments, 
Bucarely  was  to  save  them  from  failure.  The  new  viceroy 
"was  a  native  of  Seville,  and  related  to  the  most  noble 
families  of  Spain  and  Italy,  being  on  his  paternal  side  a 
descendant  from  a  very  distinguished  family  of  Florence, 
which  boasted  among  its  connections  three  popes,  six  car- 
dinals, and  other  high  officers  of  the  state  and  church ;  and 
on  the  maternal,  the  Ursuas  were  related  to  several  ducal 
families.  The  knight  entered  the  military  service  of  his 
country  as  a  cadet,  and  rose  by  gallantry  and  honorable 
service  to  be  lieutenant-general.  He  had  distinguished  him- 
self in  several  campaigns  in  Italy  and  Spain,  in  engineering 
work,  and  as  the  inspector-general  of  cavalry.  Lastly, 
he  was  called  to  be  governor  and  captain-general  of  Cuba, 
where  he  again  rendered  valuable  services  to  the  crown, 
which  were  rewarded  with  the  promotion  to  the  viceroyalty 
of  New  Spain.^     Nor  was  this  the  only  reward.     He  was 

1  Bucarely's  name  and  titles,  as  they  Enestrosa,  Laso  de  la  Vega,  Villacis  y 

appear  in  a  document  of  March  9,  1776,  Cdrdova,  Caballero  Gran  Cruz  y  Comen- 

were   as   follows :    El   Bailio    F?    D.  dador  de  la  Bdbeda  de  Toro  en  el  Orden 

Antonio  Maria  Bucareli  y  Ursua,  de  S.  Juan,  Gentil  Hombre  de  Cdmara  de 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  95 

not  only  permitted  to  grant  offices  to  twelve  of  his  friends 
and  attaches,  a  privilege  that  had  been  withheld  for  some 
years  from  his  predecessors,  but  was  given  by  royal  order 
of  January  22,  1777,  an  increase  of  $20,000  a  year  above 
what  had  been  the  viceroy's  salary,  making  it  $80,000,  as 
a  mark  of  special  favor."  ^  Numerous  instances,  besides 
those  just  mentioned,  prove  the  esteem  in  which  he  was 
held,  both  for  his  abilities  and  for  his  characteristics  as  an 
honorable  man.  On  one  occasion  the  merchants  loaned 
him  $2,500,000  with  no  security  except  his  word ;  at  his 
death  the  king  ordered  that  there  should  be  no  residencia, 
or  examination  into  his  conduct  while  in  office,  "a  course'' 
says  Bancroft,  ^^unprecedented  in  the  history  of  royal 
representation."  ^  Rivera  says  :  "The  period  during  which 
Senor  Bucarely  ruled  was  an  uninterrupted  sequence  of 
peace  for  New  Spain ;  it  seemed  as  if  Providence  wished  to 
reward  the  virtues  of  the  viceroy  by  scattering  upon  his  sub- 
jects everj^thing  that  contributed  to  their  well-being;  he 
was  one  of  those  men  whose  memory  will  never  be  erased 
from  the  heart  of  Mexicans.  His  administration  is  a  clear 
example  of  what  this  land  was  able  to  be,  when  a  man  of 
integrity  and  inteUigence  resolutely  undertook  the  difficult 
task  of  developing  its  elements  of  wealth."  *  In  fine,  for 
ability  and  high  character  Bucarely  stands  out  as  one  of 
the  greatest  men  in  the  history  of  New  Spain.  Far  from 
being  a  narrow  bureaucrat,  he  was  capable  of  a  broad  point 
of  view  which  grasped  both  the  patent  and  the  under- 
lying problems  of  the  entire  viceroyalty.  A  well-developed 
sense  of  perspective  was  one  of  his  most  marked  traits,  en- 
abling him  to  see  HvS>t'^rs  as  they  were,  but  not  checking 

S.M.,  con  entrada,  Temente  General  de  others  that  I   have   seen   "Bucarely." 

los  Reales  ex^rdtos,  Vir'tei/  Gobernador  y  Coues  holds  that  the  "y"  is  a  flourished 

Capitdn   General   del   Reyno   de   Nueva  "i,"  but  as  it  certainly  formed  a  perfect 

Espafia,  Presidente  de  su  Real  Audiencia,  eighteenth  century  "  y,"  I  have  adopted 

Superintendente    General    de    Real    Ha-  the  form  "Bucarely."     Bucarely 's  full 

cienda  y  Ramo  del  Tabaco,  Juez  Conser-  signature  included  the  "Urstia,"  after 

vador  de  este,  Presidente  de  su  Junta,  y  which  he  placed  his  rubric ;  thus  there 

Subdelegado    General    de     la    Renta    de  can  be  no  confusion  with  the  rubric  in 

Correos    en    el    mismo    Reyno.     Garc6s  that  case. 

(Coues  ed.),  I,  56.     Although  his  name  2  Bancroft,  Mex.,  Ill,  370-71. 

was   written    "Bucareli"    in   print,    he  ^  Ibid.,  Ill,  373. 

himself  signed  this  document  and   all  ^  Rivera,  I,  422. 


96  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  V 

him,  however,  from  taking  measures  to  circumvent  ills 
which  to  him  did  not  appear  greatly  threatening.  His 
letters  show  him  to  have  been  a  simple,  straightforward, 
unselfish,  clear-thinking,  sincerely  religious  man,  without 
a  shadow  of  conceit  or  pretence,  and  even  without  great 
personal  ambition  except  to  perform  his  duty  to  the  full. 
Finally,  he  was  keenly  interested  in  the  problems  that  he 
encountered  and  was  an  indefatigable  worker,  and  these 
facts,  joined  to  the  rest,  make  clear  why  he  achieved  such 
success  in  the  face  of  difficulties  that  would  have  proved 
insuperable  to  a  less  capable  ruler. ^  Between  1771  and  the 
close  of  1773,  he  got  acquainted  with  conditions  in  the 
Californias,  made  timely  remissions  of  supplies,  and  de- 
cided upon  the  main  lines  of  his  policy. 

It  is  difficult  for  a  Calif ornian  of  to-day  to  think  that  his 
state  could  ever  have  been  lacking  in  food  supplies.  Yet 
that  was  the  case  for  a  number  of  years  after  the  occupation 
of  Alta  California  in  1769.  The  land  and  climate  were 
suited  to  agricultural  wealth,  but  the  richest  land  cannot 
be  developed  without  man,  animals,  or  machinery  to  do  the 
work,  or  without  a  market  for  its  products.  In  all  of  these 
prerequisites  Alta  California  was  ill  provided  or  entirely 
lacking.  As  for  manufactured  articles  the  province  lacked 
everything  from  a  plough  or  a  smithy's  forge  to  a  piece  of 
cloth  or  a  nail.  The  only  remedy  for  this  condition  was 
by  importation  of  goods,  which  in  this  period  had  to  come 
from  New  Spain  by  way  of  San  Bias. 

ailure  of  the  new  settlements  due  to  a  lack  of  food 
supplies  was  narrowly  averted  at  the  outset.  There  is  abun- 
dant evidence  to  this  effect  in  the  various  official  diaries  and 
accounts  of  the  1769  expeditions.^  One  of  the  best  brief 
accounts,  however,  is  a  narrative  by  Portold  several  years 
after  the  event,  being  dated  at  Madrid,  September  4,  1773. 
The  official  documents  confirm  the  statements  of  the  Por- 

5  My  opinion  is  based  upon  a  read-  tion  have  already  been  published  both 

ing  of  several  hundreds  of  his  official  in  Spanish  and  in  English  translations 

letters,  besides  some  private  correspond-  in  volumes  one  and  two  of  the  Publica- 

ence  with  General  O'Reilly.  tions  of  the  Academy  of  Pacific  Coast 

'  Many  of  the  diaries  and  contem-  History, 
porary  accounts  of  the  Portola  expedi- 


i        SllDT 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  97 

tola  narrative,  but  the  latter  has  the  advantage  of  having 
been  told  without  restraint.  For  that  reason,  perhaps,  it 
gives  a  more  graphic  idea  of  the  difficulties  encountered 
than  would  be  the  case  in  the  other  documents,  which,  it 
must  be  remembered,  would  have  been  written  in  full 
knowledge  that  they  might  be  read  by  Gdlvez,  who  had 
set  his  heart  upon  this  conquest,  and  would  not  be  pleased 
with  remarks  that  seemed  to  disparage  it.  The  Portold 
account  is  in  the  form  of  intimate  remarks  to  a  friend,  the 
word  amigo  (friend)  appearing  several  times  in  the  docu- 
ment. Until  they  had  passed  the  last  peninsula  mission, 
said  Portold,  the  expedition  experienced  no  hardships  worthy 
of  notice,  but  he  found  it  necessary  to  make  provision  for 
the  future  by  taking  nearly  all  the  supplies  that  the  mis- 
sions had,  just  as  Gdlvez  had  done  in  the  south  in  order  to 
stock  the  ships.  Yet  Portola  lacked  even  sufficient  pro- 
visions to  reach  San  Diego,  and  had  to  resort  to  hunting 
and  fishing.  Furthermore,  his  party  had  to  go  without 
water  for  several  days.  Arrived  at  San  Diego  they  learned 
of  the  horrors  of  the  voyage  experienced  by  those  who  had 
come  by  sea.^  Portola  held  a  junta  which  decided  to  send 
back  the  San  Antonio  to  San  Bias  for  supplies  and  men, 
leaving  the  San  Carlos  and  the  sick,  with  a  few  others,  at 
San  Diego,  while  Portola  marched  on  in  search  of  Mon- 
terey. Portold  took  with  him  the  small  number  of  '^skel- 
etons'' whom  the  scurvy,  thirst,  and  hunger  had  spared 
sufficiently  for  the  march.  Alt  a  California  certainly  made 
no  appeal  to  these  early  explorers.  All  that  there  was  to 
covet  in  that  disagreeable  country,  said  Portold,  ironically, 
was  rocks,  underbrush,  and  rugged  mountains  covered  with 
snow.  Moreover,  he  and  his  men  did  not  know  where  they 
were,  and  their  food  supplies  had  given  out.  Thus,  al- 
though they  could  not  feel  certain  that  they  had  reached 
Monterey,  they  were  checked,  not  by  the  Russians,  but  by 
hunger,  and  resolved  to  return  to  San  Diego.  Upon  the 
return  they  would  have  perished,  but  for  eating  twelve  of 

^  Aside    from    delays    from    storms,       the  three  ships  reached  San  Diego  ;  the 
most  of  those  on  board  got  scurvy,  and       third  was  never  heard  from, 
over  half  of  them  died.     Only  two  of 

H 


98  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

the  mules.^  Finally,  they  reached  San  Diego  oliendo  d 
Mulas.  The  San  Antonio  had  not  yet  returned,^  but  after 
almost  nine  months'  absence  it  at  length  arrived.  Most 
of  the  crew  had  died  of  scurvy,  but  despite  that  fact  Por- 
told  and  his  men  received  ^^very  particular  consolation '' 
from  the  cargo  of  maize,  flour,  and  rice.  During  the  ab- 
sence of  the  San  Antonio  they  had  had  to  subsist  on  geese, 
fish,  and  other  food  given  to  them  by  the  Indians  in  ex- 
change for  clothing,  with  the  result  that  some  of  the  Span- 
iards had  hardly  enough  clothes  left  with  which  to  cover 
themselves.  Now  that  provisions  had  come  Portold  again 
decided  to  seek  the  port  of  Monterey.  The  San  Antonio 
y  was  despatched  by  sea,  and  Portold  led  a  force  by  land. 
A  After  erecting  the  establishments  at  Monterey,  Port  old 
took  ship  for  San  Bias. 

Referring  to  the  hardships  that  he  had  endured  in  Alta 
California,  he  remarked  that  the  unfortunate  Spaniards 
who  remained  there  were  suffering  as  much  as  he  had  suf- 

'iered.  In  his  opinion  it  would  be  virtually  impossible  to 
send  aid  to  them  by  sea,  and  even  more  difficult  to  do 
so  by  land,^°  unless  at  the  cost  of  thousands  of  men   and 

Jmmense  quantities  of  money.  The  Indians  were  docile 
enough,  but  as  for  mines  or  other  kinds  of  wealth,  he  and 
his  men  had  not  seen  them,  their  first  care  being  to  find 
meat  to  keep  from  dying  of  hunger.  Finally,  even  if  Mon- 
terey were  moderately  well  fortified,  and  if  through  strange 
caprice  the  Californias  were  coveted  by  the  Russians,  there 
were  many  other  ports  where  they  might  land  and  establish 
themselves  without  any  opposition.  ^^ 

The  crucial  moment  in  the  Portold  expeditions  had  come 
after  Portold's  return  from  San  Francisco  to  San  Diego, 
prior  to  the  reappearance  of  the  San  Antonio^  from  Jan- 

8  Without  salt  or  other  condiment,  or  the  as  yet  undiscovered  route  from 

says  Portold,  we  closed  our  eyes  and  Sonora. 

assailed  the  filthy  mule   (oh  misery !)  "  The  document  appears  in  the  Juan 

like  hungry  lions.  Manuel  de  Viniegra  screed  concerning 

•  It  had  sailed  for  San  Bias  in  July,  Gdlvez's  acts  as  visitador  in  New  Spain. 

1769,  and  was  again  at  San  Diego  late  A.H.N. ,    Estado,    lejago     2845.      Both 

in  March,  1770.     Portold  had  returned  Viniegra  and  Portold  call  it  a  conversa- 

from  the  north  two  months  before.  tion,  and  the  former  said  that  he  wrote 

10  It  is  not  clear  whether  Portold  was  it  at  the  order  of  Pedro  Rada,  a  high 

referring  to  the  Baja  California  route,  official  of  the  Indies  department. 


1769]  NEED  FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  99 

uaiy  to  March,  1770.  A  story  has  sprung  up  that  PortoU 
might  have  abandoned  Alta  CaHfornia  but  for  Father  Serra. 
The  latter  is  said  to  have  prevailed  upon  the  commander 
to  delay  his  departure,  with  the  result  that  the  San  Antonio 
was  sighted  the  very  day  before  Portold  planned  to  leave. 
If  this  is  true,  then  Serra  is  to  be  credited  with  having  saved 
the  Alta  California  establishments  in  their  first  hour  of 
need.  It  seems  probable,  however,  that  this  is  an  injustice 
to  Portola.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Serra  wanted  to  stay,^ 
and  that  Portold  was  not  enthusiastic  ove/^he  new  coun- 
try, but  the  commander  in  chief  was  a  soldier  whose  every 
action  in  1769-70  seems  to  show  an  intention  to  carry  out 
his  orders  and  hold  the  country  to  the  last  moment  com- 
patible with  the  safety  of  the  forces  under  his  command. 
In  his  diary  sent  back  from  San  Diego  in  February,  1770, 
he  tells  of  the  lack  of  provisions,  on  which  account  he  held 
a  junta  which  resolved  ^4n  order  to  make  it  possible  to  hold 
this  port  longer^'  that  Rivera  should  take  a  strong  force 
and  go  back  to  Baja  California,  whence  he  was  to  return 
with  the  cattle  intended  for  San  Diego  mission.  ^^The 
remainder  of  the  expedition,"  decided  the  junta,  which  must 
almost  certainly  have  expressed  Portold's  views,  "was  to 
hold  this  important  port."  ^^  It  is  even  more  clear  from 
Costanso's  narrative  that  Pprtold  did  not  wisk_±a  abandon 
Alta  California,  except  as  a  last  resort.  Speaking  of  the 
possibility  of  abandonment  because  supplies  were  so  low, 
Costanso  says:  "lest  he  should  incur  such  discredit,  the 
commander  gave  orders  that  the  captain  of  the  presidio  in 
California  with  forty  men,  should  continue  the  march  to 
the  peninsula,  to  obtain  from  its  missions  all  provisions  he 
could,  and  to  bring  the  cattle,  which,  as  was  said  in  the  be- 
ginning, had  been  left  at  Velicatd,  being  too  weak  to  con- 
tinue the  journey.  This  wise  measure  [not  only]  aimed 
at  the  present  conservation  of  what  had  been  acquired  by 
reducing  the  increased  number  of  consumers  of  the  avail- 
able provisions,  [but  also]  provided  for  the  future  subsist- 
ence, even  if  the  relief  by  sea  —  so  important  for  the  suc- 

"PortoU  (Smith  and  Teggaxt,  ed.),  Diary,  in  A.P.C.H.,  Publications,  I,  81. 


100         THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

cess  of  the  desired  enterprise  of  Monterey  —  should  fail  to 
arrive.  This  detachment  set  out  for  the  purpose  men- 
tioned on  February  10, 1770."  ^^  Both  accounts  are  confirmed 
by  a  writing  which  would  certainly  have  insisted  upon 
Serra's  claim  to  the  principal  credit,  if  it  had  been  regarded 
by  anybody  at  that  time  as  his  due,  namely,  a  long  memorial 
of  February  26,  1776,  to  the  king  by  the  religious  of  the 
Franciscan  college  of  San  Fernando,  Mexico,  telling  of  the 
achievements  of  the  Fernandinos  in  Alta  California  from 
1769  to  1776.  The  San  Diego  crisis  is  described  in  sub- 
stantially the  same  terms  that  Costanso  employed.-^*  Finally, 
;.Palou's  life  of  Serra,  a  work  published  in  1787,  from  which 
comes  the  story  of  Serra's  part  in  saving  Alta  California 
from  abandonment,  is  not  in  fact  inconsistent  with  the 
accounts  just  mentioned,  except  perhaps  by  literary  em- 
phasis. A  letter  by  Serra  to  Palou,  February  10,  1770, 
is  inserted  in  which  nothing  is  said  about  Portold's  having 
an  intention  of  abandoning  the  conquest,  although  aban- 
donment is  mentioned  by  Serra,  without  complaint,  as  a 
possible  contingency.  To  be  sure,  he  remarked  that  he 
and  Father  Crespi  intended  to  remain  in  any  event. ^^  Then 
follows  Palou^s  chapter  telling  what  Serra  did  to  prevent 
the  abandonment  of  San  Diego.  Reduced  to  its  essentials 
it  amounts  to  this.  Portola  set  March  20  as  the  date  for  a 
return  to  Baja  California  in  case  provisions  should  not 
arrive  beforehand,  and  from  the  date  of  Portola's  announce- 
ment all  were  talking  of  the  expected  departure.  These 
words  were  like  arrows  in  the  heart  of  Serra,  who  not  only 
was  determined  to  remain  himself,  but  is  said  to  have 
persuaded  Vila,  commander  of  the  San  Carlos,  to  under- 
take a  voyage  to  Monterey  after  the  withdrawal  of  Portold. 
On  March  19,  however,  the  long-absent  San  Antonio  was 
sighted,  and  although  it  did  not  make  port  until  four  days 
later,  all  thought  of  abandoning  San  Diego  was  at  once 
given  up}^     It  comes  to  no  more  than  that  Serra  himself 

M  Costans6     (Engert    and     Teggart,  i^  Palou,  Vida,  90-94. 

ed.),  Narrative,  in    A.P.C.H.,  Publica-  ^^  Ibid.,    94-97.     Substantially    the 

tions,  1,  149.  same  account  appears  in  Palou,  Noticias. 

i«  C-3156.  II,  254-55. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  101 

intended  to  stay  whether  the  expedition  should  depart  or 
not.  Other  than  this  the  chapter  is  mainly  psychological 
as  to  what  was  passing  in  Serra's  mind,  except  for  the  Vila 
incident.  In  any  event/  what  Serra  and  Vila  or  Portold 
might  have  done  is  swallowed  up  in  the  fact  that  Portold 
did  remain.  In  fine,  there  seems  to  be  no  just  reason  for 
depriving  Port ola_  of  the  credit  that  by  common  consent 
is  assigned  to  the  commander  of  an  enterprise,  unless  there 
are  circumstances  which  compel  a  different  attribution. 
Serra  and  others  played  their  parts  with  abundant  courage 
—  their  fame  is  secure  —  but  to  Portold  goes  the  credit^ 
for  holding  Alta  California  in  1770,  —  and  indeed,  the 
province  was  saved  by  a  very  narrow  margin. 

The  early  settlements  consisted  of  the  garrison  at  San 
Diego,  the  presidio  of  Monterey,  founded  in  1770,  and  the 
missions,  founded  respectively  at  San  Diego  in  1769,  Mon- 
terey in  1770  (moved  to  Carmelo  in  the  following  year), 
and  San  Antonio  and  San  Gabriel  in  1771.  Conversions 
carne  very  slowly,  the  friars  assigning  as  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal reasons  the  lack  of  food  supplies,  which  were  regarded 
as  a  highly  effective  spiritual  argument.  In  1772  provisions 
got  so  low  that  the  settlements  were  again  in  danger,  Mon- 
terey and  San  Antonio  being  almost  wholly  dependent  on 
gifts  of  the  Indians,  and  much  the  same  condition  existed 
in  the  southern  missions.  Fages  managed  to  relieve  the 
necessity  by  engaging  in  a  three  months^  bear  hunt.  At 
length,  two  boats  from  San  Bias  reached  San  Diego.  Mon- 
terey and  San  Antonio  subsisted  on  bear  meat  for  a  time 
longer,  but  were  presently  relieved.  The  province  had  for 
a  second  time  been  saved  by  the  timely  arrival  of  supplies. 

The  founding  of  the  mission  of  San  Luis  Obispo,  shortly 
after  the  arrival  of  the  supply  ships,  in  1772,  seems  to  have 
had  some  connection  with  the  question  of  provisions,  this 
being  in  the  region  of  Fages'  successful  bear  hunt.  The 
natives  were  so  grateful  for  the  killing  of  the  bears  that  they 
willingly  aided  the  mission  with  their  labor  and  their  seeds, 
and  on  the  latter  the  mission  was  frequently  dependent  for 
food.     In  a  letter  of  December  2,  1772,  to  Fages,  Bucarely 


102  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

approved  of  the  site  selected,  not  only  because  the  land  was 
good,  but  also  because  of  the  plentifulness  of  game. 

As  regards  domestic  animals,  perhaps  more  emphasis 
was  placed  upon  a  need  for  beasts  of  burden,  but  Igod 
animals  were  also  in  demand.  Some  animals  were  ob- 
tained at  the  outset  from  Baja  California ;  in  1769,  Rivera 
brought  along  two  hundred  head  of  cattle  and  nearly  an 
equal  number  of  horses  and  mules,  but  these  were  only  for 
purposes  of  the  expedition,  and  were  to  be  restored  to  the 
Baja  California  missions.  In  the  course  of  a  year,  more 
were  taken,  much  against  the  objection  of  some  of  the 
Franciscans.  On  July  20,  1770,  an  official  of  the  Franciscan 
college  of  San  Fernando  wrote  to  Croix  that  five  hundred 
head  of  stock  in  all  had  been  taken,  and  if  they  were  not 
given  back,  the  peninsula  Indians  could  not  be  fed.^^  Two 
years  later,  the  Franciscans  gave  up  the  peninsula  to  the 
Dominicans,  but  retained  Alta  California;  so  the  animals 
were  not  returned.  Enough  of  these  animals  survived  the 
difficult  northward  marches  to  give  hope  for  the  future  from 
their  natural  increase.  '  The  colony  was  far  from  being 
relieved  of  anxiety,  however,  and  greater  projects  were 
hindered  by  the  necessity  of  providing  for  bare  subsistence. 
Under  date  of  November  29,  1770,  in  his  diary  of  an  ex- 
pedition to  San  Francisco  Bay,  Fages  explains  that  he 
turned  back  without  reaching  his  goal  [Drake^s  Bay], 
because  of  his  "anxiety  .  .  .  for  the  camp,  the  cultivation 
of  the  land,  and  the  raising  of  stock. ^'  ^^  For  various 
reasons,^'  increase  in  the  number  of  stock  was  slow.  Nor 
could  Alta  California  depend  upon  San  Bias  or  the  penin- 
sula for  its  animals.  The  animals  could  not  come  by  sea, 
because  there  were  not  boats  enough,  nor  was  there  a 
sufficient  marine  establishment  at  San  Bias  to  allow  of  that 
mode  of  shipment. ^^  P^j^  California  could  not  supply  the 
more  northerly  province,  for  despite  the  fact  that  it  had 
been  settled  for  three-quarters  of  a  century,  it  could  hardly 

"  Richman,  400,  n.  34.  =»  Some  idea  of  the  diflScultiea  of  the 

^*  A.P.C.H.,  Publications,  II,  152-53.  Department  of  San  Bias  in  these  respects 

i»  For  example,  a  lack  of  male  ani-  will  be  given  in  chapter  XVI. 
mals. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  103 

raise  enough  animals  or  agricultural  products  for  its  own 
subsistence. 

As  the  insufficiency  of  Baja  California  as  a  source  of 
supply  played  a  prominent  part  in  the  plan  for  opening  a 
route  from  Sonora,  it  requires  notice  here.  Detailed  proof 
of  the  sterility  of  the  peninsula  is  hardly  necessary,  as  it  is 
a  well-known  fact.^^  Diaries  of  the  northward  marches  to 
Alta  California  show  that  even  as  a  route,  entirely  aside 
from  the  difficult  voyage  across  the  Gulf,  Baja  California 
was  not  a  satisfactory  medium  between  Mexico  and  the 
new  establishments.  So  barren  and  dry  was  this  land  that 
water  was  not  to  be  had  for  days  at  a  time  on  the  marches, 
necessitating  its  carriage  for  both  men  and  animals.  Fur- 
thermore, the  Indians  of  northern,  Baja  California  were 

^2?^ii^-i2-i^i2-§£.^£i^l^^«  ^^  ^®  attested  in  various  documents. 
One~such  is  the  memorial  of  February  26,  1776,  of  the  re- 
ligious of  San  Fernando.  Some  sites  for  missions  between 
Velicata  and  San  Diego  might  be  found,  they  said,  if  the 
natives  could  be  made  to  maintain  peace.  From  the  first 
they  had  had  little  affection  for  the  Spaniards,  and  had  re- 
peatedly shown  hostility  to  parties  passing  that  way.  De- 
spite the  Indians'  audacity  no  Spaniard  had  lost  his  life,  but 
many  Indians  had  been  killed.^^ 

For  a  general  description  of  the  peninsula  a  letter  of 
Father  Rafael  Verger  to  Manuel  Lanz  de  Casafonda,  June 

'*  One  of  the  most  notable  works  on  sky,  and  that  in  the  shade  at  least  it 
the  Californias  from  the  standpoint  of  is  not  too  hot  but  always  very  cool, 
criticism  of  the  Baja  California  part,  is  California  has  pretty  well  nothing  which 
the  Nachrichten  attributed  to  Jacob  Bae-  merits  to  be  praised,  valued,  or  envied 
gert,  first  published  in  1772.  Baegert  by  even  the  poorest  inhabited  country 
had  spent  many  years  in  the  peninsula  on  this  globe."  Putting  it  in  positive 
as  a  Jesuit  missionary,  and  was  inspired  form,  he  said,  California  solo  est  arido, 
to  write  his  own  work  in  order  to  correct  sterili  atque  deserto.  Baegert,  Nach- 
what  seemed  to  him  the  flagrant  errors  richten,  313-14.  Although  published 
of  Burriel's  Noticia,  or  rather  the  in  1772,  it  is  doubtful  if  it  had  any  im- 
French  translation  from  the  English  mediate  effect  on  Spanish  opinion  of 
translation,  which  was  the  only  edition  the  peninsula,  not  only  because  it 
that  he  had  seen.  Baegert's  criticisms  might  take  some  time  for  the  contents 
are  most  strikingly  portrayed  in  his  of  a  German  work  to  become  known, 
first  appendix  entitled  Falsche  Nach-  but  also  because  the  works  of  Jesuits 
richten  von  Californien  und  den  Cali-  at  that  time,  so  shortly  after  their  ex- 
fomiern,  313-31.  His  opinion  may  be  pulsion  from  Spain,  would  not  be  re- 
summed  up  in  his  own  words,  as  fol-  garded  by  Spanish  officials  as  trust- 
lows:  "Aside  from  its  pearls,  its  worthy, 
three  different  species  of  fruit,  the  fact  "(5-3156. 
that  it  nearly  always  has  a  clear,  sunny 


104         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH    CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

30,  1771,  may  be  quoted.  The  former  as  Father  Superior 
of  the  College  of  San  Fernando,  Mexico,  was  the  one  to  whom 
the  Franciscans  of  the  Calif ornias  were  subject.  Casafonda 
was  at  that  time  fiscal  of  the  Audiencia  of  Mexico.  Sum- 
ming up  the  experience  of  his  order  in  the  peninsula,  since 
entering  there  in  1768,  Verger  said  that  the  Baja  California 
missions  never  had  been,  were  not,  and  never  would  be 
substantial  foundations.  Some,  but  for  the  impoverish- 
CM.  ment  occasioned  by  providing  for  the  expeditions  to  Alta 

^■^.^AC^^'wvCalifornia  and  other  burdens  placed  upon  them,  might 
^  r  0  t^  have  been  able  to  clothe  the  Indians,  badly  to  be  sure,  and 
^^Sj*'  A  to  give  them  food,  but  most  of  the  missions  never  could 
have  done  so.  The  soil  was  fertile,  yielding  in  some  cases  an 
hundredfold,  on  which  account  many  had  been  led  to  be- 
lieve that  Baja  California  was  a  terrestrial  paradise,  when 
in  fact  it  was  a  wretched,  unhappy  land.  This  was  because 
there  was  very  little  good  land,  and  because  the  rain  did 
not  come  at  the  right  times  for  crops.  Thus,  only  such  crops 
were  raised  as  could  be  produced  by  irrigation,  and  as 
hardly  any  water  was  to  be  had,  not  much  land  could  be 
sown.     In  many  years  locusts  ate  the  entire  crop. 

Nor  was  Verger  enthusiastic  over  the  prospect  in  Alta 
California.  The  foundations  there  could  on  no  account 
be  approved,  he  said.  They  would  result  in  the  sacrifice 
of  many  lives,  a  loss  of  many  ships,  and  the  expenditure  of 
an  excessive  amount  of  money,  and  perhaps  nothing  would 
be  gained,  despite  what  was  said  of  the  docility  of  the  natives. 
The  College  of  San  Fernando  had  in  no  way  agreed  to  found- 
ing so  many  missions  at  one  time,  and  had  sent  missionaries 
only  because  compelled  to  do  so.  The  whole  undertaking 
was  unsound,  and  unless  God  worked  miracles,  success 
could  not  be  expected. ^^ 

In  a  long^^^  memorial  to  Casafonda  of  August  3,  1771, 
Verger  took  up,  in  more  detail,  matters  concerning  the 
missions  of  the  Californias.  As  this  is  a  good  exposition 
of  conditions,  and  as  it  tends  to  counterbalance  the  more 
optimistic    (although  not  inaccurate)    accounts   of  Father 

23  B.M.,  Ms.  vol.  13974,  Sec.  G. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND    ROUTE  105 

Serra,  which  will  presently  be  quoted,  it  will  be  considered 
here  in  some  detail.  The  memorial  drew  in  most  part  for 
its  facts  on  letters  of  Ortega,  an  officer  at  San  Diego,  and  of 
Fathers  Crespl,  Palou,  and  Serra,  then  in  the  Calif ornias.^* 
When  the  Jesuits  were  expelled  from  Baja  California, 
said  Verger,  their  place  was  taken  for  a  time  by  military 
commissaries  who  killed  the  mission  animals  and  wrought 
havoc  generally.  The  situation  became  worse  as  a  result 
of  the  expeditions  of  1769  to  Alta  California,  many  beasts 
being  taken  which  were  never  replaced.  The  Franciscans 
of  San  Fernando  had  succeeded  to  the  spiritual  control  of 
the  missions,  April  6,  1768,  and  to  temporal  authority  over 
them  by  order  of  G^lvez,  August  12,  1768.  Gdlvez  had 
also  enacted  other  measures  for  the  benefit  of  the  missions 
and  Indians,  but  had  subsequently  revoked  some  of  them, 
and  there  was  no  certainty  that  others  not  revoked  would 
be  enforced.  For  example,  Gdlvez  had  compelled  Indians 
to  serve  the  king  in  salt  mines  and  in  oth^r  tasks  without 
pay,  which  was  worse  treatment  than  was  accorded  to 
slaves ;  the  latter,  at  least,  got  food  and  clothing.  Verger 
was  telling  these  things  so  as  to  show  that  it  would  not  be 


M  The  letters  referred  to,  all  in  B.M.,  13.    1770,  June  30,  Monterey,  Serra 

Ms.  vol.  13974,  Sec.  G,  were  the  fol-  to  Antonia  Valladolid. 
lowing:  14.    1770,  July  5,   Monterey,  Serra 

1.  1769,  June  9,  San  Diego,  Crespl  to  Antonia  Valladolid  (?). 

to  Palou.  15.    1770,  Aug.  15,  Santa  Ana,  Palou 

2.  1769,  July  3,  San  Diego,  Serra  to  Juan  Andr6s. 

to  Antonia  Valladolid  (?).  16.    1770,  Oct.  10,  Santa  Ana,  Palou 

3.  1769,  July  3,  San  Diego,  Serra  to  Juan  Andr6s. 

to  Antonia  Valladolid  (?).  Juan   Andr6s  was   the   Father   Su- 

4.  1769,    Nov.   24,   Loreto,   Palou  perior    at    San     Fernando    preceding 
to  Juan  Andres.  Verger ;  Antonia  Valladolid  was  a  nun. 

5.  1770,    Jan.    10,    Loreto,    Palou  The  letters  of  Serra  to  the  latter,  and 
to  Juan  Andr6s.  the  last  two  of  Palou  to  Juan  Andrfes 

6.  1770,    Jan.    23,    Loreto,    Palou  are  mere  fragments.     Crespl  and  Ortega 
to  Juan  Andres.  treat  of   routes,    places,    Indians,    and 

7.  1770,  Feb.  6,  San  Diego,  Crespi  conditions  generally  in  Alta  California, 
to  Palou.  Palou    deals    with    mission    affairs    of 

8.  1770,  Feb.  9,  San  Diego,  Ortega  Baja    California,    and    especially    with 
to  Palou.  Gdlvez's  measures.     Serra  discusses  the 

9.  1770,  Feb.  10,  San  Diego,  Serra  expeditions  to  Monterey,  conditions  in 
to  Antonia  Valladolid  (?).  Alta     California,     and     prospects     for 

10.  1770,    Mar.    16,   Loreto,    Palou  founding   new   missions,    of   which   he 
to  Juan  Andres.  was  earnestly  desirous.     This  did  not 

11.  1770,  June  11,  Monterey,  Crespl  accord  well  with  the  wishes  of  Verger 
to  Juan  Andr6s.  who  says  of  Serra  in  his  memorial  of 

12.  1770,  June  12,  Monterey,  Serra  August  3,  1771,  es  preciso  moderar  aigo 
to  Juan  Andr6s.  au  ardiente  Zelo. 


106         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

the  fault  of  the  college,  if  the  missions  should  fail  altogether, 
or  not  advance. 

He  then  proceeded  to  complain  of  the  scant  funds  as- 
signed to  the  Fernandinos  in  comparison  with  those  granted 
to  others,  despite  the  greater  present  needs  of  the  Cali- 
fornias.  Each  Jesuit  had  received  five  hundred  pesos  a 
year,  whereas  the  Fernandinos  were  receiving  from  two 
hundred  to  three  hundred  and  fifty,  the  higher  amount 
going  to  those  in  Alta  California,  but  Palou  had  written  that 
the  pay  of  the  last  named  was  to  be  cut  to  two  hundred  and 
seventy-five  pesos.  Gdlvez  would  claim  to  have  founded 
many  missions,  and  to  have  taken  measures  to  insure  their 
permanence.  In  a  few  years  they  would  fail,  and  the 
missionaries  would  be  blamed.  The  missions  of  Baja 
California  were  already  as  good  as  dead,  and  those  of  Alta 
California  were  missions  in  name  only.  The  latter  were 
assigned  only  a  thousand  pesos  as  the  amount  for  their 
foundation,  which  was  absurdly  little  (mds  parece  funcion 
de  D^  Quijote) .  Yet  this  had  to  serve  for  everything,  — 
tools,  pots,  buildings,  cattle,  and  other  things  for  places  two 
hundred  to  three  hundred  and  fifty  leagues  from  one  an- 
other, and  eight  hundred  from  Mexico,  whence  most  things 
had  to  come,  unless  a  way  should  be  opened  from  Sonora, 
for  there  was  nothing  in  Baja  California.  Along  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  where  the  problems  were  much  simpler,  a  great 
deal  more  was  assigned  for  founding  missions,  including  an 
allowance  for  presents  to  the  Indians. 

Verger  was  opposed  to  the  kind  of  establishments  that 
were  being  made  in  Alta  California,  but  made  suggestions 
in  case  they  were  to  be  maintained.  The  good  will  of  the 
Indians  must  be  obtained,  if  they  were  to  subject  themselves 
to  the  Catholic  faith,  as,  for  example,  by  making  promises 
to  protect  them  against  their  enemies.  This  would  re- 
quire enough  troops  to  enable  the  Spaniards  to  fulfil  such 
promises,  and  to  provide  adequate  security  against  reduced 
Indians.  These  were  dangerous  because  of  their  free  type 
of  life,  the  bad  conduct  of  Spanish  soldiers,  and  the  in- 
citement of  priests  of  native  religions  for  whom  the  intro- 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND    ROUTE  107 

duction  of  Christianity  meant  loss  of  position.     Thus,  a 
sudden  rebellion  might  put  an  end  to  everything.     If  the 
Indians  should  not  receive  Christianity,  more  troops  would 
be  required.     With  this  in  view,   articles  to   attract   the    ^^ 
Indians  should  be  sent,  as,  for  example,  tobacco.     Agricul-      c^ 
tural  and  pastoral  laborers  were  needed,  but  this  meant  the        -5 
sending  of  yet  more  soldiers  to  guard  animals  and  crops. 
It  would  be  well  not  to  attempt  a  too  rapid  development 
at  one  time,  because  of  the  correspondingly  greater  expense         / 
and  the  greater  number  of  soldiers  and  laborers  required.    "^1  ■ 
The  latter  class  was  quite  essential  for  the  continuance  of 
the  colonies,  the  only  alternative  being  to  transport  food 
supplies  from  Sonora. 

Verger  then  gave  instances  showing  the  danger  of  revolt 
by  the  Indians,  and  made  specific  recommendations  to  meet 
that  contingency.  Between  Velicata  and  San  Diego,  the 
Indians  had  threatened  the  Spanish  march,  'he  said,  and  in 
one  instance  there  had  been  a  fight  in  which  ten  Indians 
were  killed.  They  were  not  peaceful,  as  Serra  had  re- 
ported, but  had  not  molested  a  later  expedition,  because 
they  had  learned  of  the  Spanish  establishment  at  San  Diego, 
and  were  awaiting  a  better  chance.  On  August  15,  1770, 
a  revolt  occurred  at  San  Diego  resulting  in  the  loss  of  sev- 
eral lives.  Serra  reported  that  no  Indians  were  killed,  but 
in  fact  three  were,  and  two  died  later.  Previous  to  this  the 
San  Diego  Indians  had  tried  to  rob  the  Spaniards.  At 
another  place,  at  the  lake  of  tar  [the  La  Brea  ranch],  two 
Indians  were  killed  in  an  encounter  with  Spanish  soldiers. 
What  the  San  Diego  Indians  had  done,  others  might  do, 
and  perhaps  they  might  be  even  more  likely  to  do  so,  as 
elsewhere  in  Alta  California  they  were  more  able  and  proud 
than  the  Indians  of  San  Diego.  It  was  noticeable  that  the 
Indians  of  Alta  California  had  not  promised  to  obey  the 
church,  and  only  one  village  between  San  Diego  and  Mon- 
terey, a  village  near  the  lake  of  tar,  had  offered  lands. 
There  was  doubt,  even  in  that  case,  it  being  probable  that 
the  Spaniards  misunderstood  the  Indians,  as  neither  peo- 
ple knew  the  other's  language.     Thus,  a  greatermilii5J5!Lfia=-_ 


108         THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH    CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

cort  for  the  missions  was  necessary,  the  presidios  of  San 
Diego  and  Monterey  should  be  maintained,  and  another  in 
between  would  be  eminently  desirable.  As  it  was,  there 
were  but  eighteen  soldiers  at  Monterey  of  whom  only  the 
seven  soldados  de  cuera  could  take  the  field.  There  were 
twenty-eight  soldados  de  cuera  at  San  Diego,  none  too  many 
because  of  the  cows  and  mules  there  to  be  guarded.  The 
mission  of  San  Diego  was  already  in  its  third  year,  but,  as 
Father  Paterna  had  written  to  Verger,  it  was  not  yet  worthy 
of  being  called  a  mission.  As  for  five  missions  that  had 
been  ordered  erected  between  Velicatd  and  San  Diego, 
nothing  had  been  done,  for,  Igracias  d  Dios !  there  were  no 
soldiers,  mules,  or  horses,  for  them,  and  Palou  had  written 
that  there  were  no  mules  in  Baja  California  to  carry  them 
provisions. 

Verger  recognized  that  in  accordance  with  the  royal  de- 
cree of  October  15,  1733,  founding  the  college,  the  College 
of  San  Fernando  was  obliged  to  send  missionaries  at  com- 
mand. He  was  merely  recording  his  opinion  that  the 
present  settlements  were  injudicious,  and  that  not  so  many, 
missionaries  should  be  sent  as  Gdlvez  had  asked  for,  namely 
forty,  because  it  was  inadvisable  to  found  so  many  missions 
at  one  time,  in  view  of  the  unwillingness  of  the  Indians  to 
accept  Christianity.  He  was  opposed  to  wasting  royal 
funds  or  pious  gifts  under  the  gilded  title  of  propagating 
the  faith  and  extending  the  king's  domain.  It  was  well 
enough  to  found  missions,  but  it  ought  to  be  done  with 
an  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  the  verb  to  found, 
which  did  not  mean  to  paint  pretty  pictures  (pintar  per- 
spectivas).  It  should  not  be  said,  however,  that  the  col- 
lege did  not  want  to  spread  the  faith ;  on  the  contrary,  its 
missionaries  had  gone  forth  to  their  unspeakable  labors 
rejoicing.^^ 

Several  other  letters  of  Verger  to  Casafonda  may  be 
cited  as  cumulative  evidence  of  his  point  of  view,  based 
upon  letters  received  from  missionaries  in  the  Calif ornias. 
On  August  27,  1771,  he  laid  renewed  emphasis  on  the  cost 

28  B.M.,  Ms.  vol.  13974,  Sec.  G. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  109 

in  boats  and  men  for  maintaining  the  Alta  California  es- 
tablishments. Voyages  to  San  Diego  and  Monterey  were 
exceedingly  difficult  because  the  winds  were  usually  con- 
trary, and  because  of  the  danger  of  shipwreck  on  the  many 
uncharted  rocks  and  islets.  Crews  were  wont  to  get 
sick,  and  skilled  navigators  were  few ;  if  the  pilot  got  sick, 
there  might  be  no  one  to  take  his  place.  The  short  voyage 
to  Baja  California  was  also  an  exceedingly  hard  one,  be- 
cause of  the  storms  in  the  Gulf.  In  that  same  year  a  sloop 
and  four  launches  had  been  lost,  and  the  San  Carlos,  which 
left  San  Bias  on  February  2,  had  not  reached  Loreto  by 
June  29,  and  might  prove  to  have  been  lost.  Unless  the 
king  had  special  reasons  for  establishments  at  San  Diego 
and  Monterey,  it  would  be  better  to  let  the  conquest  pro- 
ceed at  the  normal  pace.^^ 

Writing  next  day,  Verger  said  that  the  missions  in  the 
Calif ornias  were  all  "appearances"  without  solid  founda- 
tion, the  mere  shadow  of  great  works,  and  afterward,  when 
by  their  failure  the  truth  should  become  known,  blame 
would  be  cast  upon  the  missionaries,  who  would  be  charged 
with  the  responsibility  therefor.     The  rest  of  this  letter 
concerned    Baja    California,    treating    graphically    of    the     / 
status  of  the  missions,  the  wretchedness  of  the  Indians,    ^, 
the  failure  of  crops  due  to  locusts,  the  lack  of  animals,  and    ^ 
want  of  church  utensils.     Matters  were  better  under  the   1- 
Jesuits,  he  said,  because  the  government  supported  them 
better  than  it  was  then  supporting  the  Fernandinos}'^ 

On  September  27,  1771,  Verger  wrote  that,  contrary  to 
what  had  been  alleged,  his  college  would  welcome  a  grant 
of  missions  in  Baja  California  to  the  Dominicans,  for  the 
field  was  too  large  for  the  Fernandinos  alone.  All  that  he 
asked  was  that  the  division  be  made  in  such  a  way  as  not 
to  hinder  the  communication  of  Fernandino  missions  with 
Sonora,  and  that  a  separate  route  for  spiritual  conquest  be 
assigned  to  each  order.  Verger  was  beginning  to  believe, 
due  to  the  continued  docility  of  the  natives,  that  the  Alta 
California  missions  might  be  rendered  permanent,  although 

M  B.M.,  Ms.  vol.  13974,  °"  ^         -  tm::':? 


110         THE   FOUNDING   OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

he  was  unwilling  to  put  too  mucli  faith  in  Indian  peaceful- 
ness.  The  land  seemed  to  be  good.  Monterey,  however, 
had  proved  to  be,  far  from  the  excellent  port  it'  had  been 
reputed,  hardly  a  port  at  all.  Similarly,  the  wealth  of 
Baja  California  in  pearls  had  been  greatly  overrated.^^ 

In  Palou's  Noticias  there  is  printed  a  memorial  of  De- 
cember, 1771,  by  Verger  to  Bucarely  concerning  the  needs 
of  Alta  California.  Its  most  notable  suggestions  were  that 
the  mule  drove  be  increased,  so  that  Alta  California  could 
be  supplied  mth  provisions  from  Baja  Cahfornia  or  Sonora 
in  case  of  need,  and  that  two^  boats  with  provisions  for  the 
presidios  and  missions  for  a  year  and  a  half  should  be  sent 
forthwith.  It  also  pointed  out  theJackj)f^k,borers,  urging 
that  converted  Indians  be  sent  to  work  on  the  lands,  and 
to  assist  in  tasks  at  the  missions.  Bucarely  replied  that  he 
would  take  fitting  action  on  Verger's  requests.^^ 

In  his  letter  of  January  23,  1772,  Verger  spoke  of  deser- 
tions  by  soldiej^s  of  San  Diego  as  threatening  the  contin- 
uance of  that  settlement,  although  in  these  instances  the 
deserters  had  returned.  The  San  Carlos  had  at  length 
reached  Loreto  on  August  23,  after' a  voyage  of  nearly  seven 
months  from  San  Bias.  It  had  been  blown  nearly  to  Pan- 
amd  by  storms.  The  proper  season  for  voyages  was  June 
to  September,  or  at  most  May  to  October.  He  reiterated 
his  support  of  the  royal  order  for  placing  the  Dominicans 
in  the  peninsula,  saying  that  Gdlvez  and  Croix  were  the 
ones  who  objected  to  that  course,  not  the  college.^^ 

Such  were  the  views  of  Verger,  which  may  be  regarded 
as  accurately  representing  affairs  in  the  Calif ornias.  Even 
his  pessimism  was  warranted  by  the  conditions,  despite 
the  fact  that  he  was  to  prove  a  false  prophet.  It  should 
be  noted  that  Baja  California  could  not  be  looked  to  for 
supplies  of  any  sort  for  the  new  establishments.  On  the 
other  hand,  Verger  several  times  mentioned  the  possibility 
of  a  supply  route  from  Sonora  as  a  solution  of  the  ills  of 
the   Calif  ornias.     Another  feature  worthy   of  emphasis  is 

28  B.M.,  Ms.  vol.  13974,  Sec.  G.  ^  B.M.,  Ms.  vol.  13974,  Sec.  G. 

29  Palou,  Noticias,  I,  127-31. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  111 

his  reference  to  the  cost  of  maintaining  Alta  California, 
especially  the  c o&t_in^ jtoats .  rt  was  this  that  held  feack 
the  advancement  of  the  conquest  to  a  permanent  basis, 
mecessitatin^.  the  finding  of  land  routes.  Attention  may 
also  be  called  to  his  remarks  reflecting  upon  the  Indian  rep- 
utation for  docility  and  the  consequent  need  for  soldiers, 
an  important  factor  calling  for  the  opening  of  an  overland 
route  for  a  satisfactory  solution.  These  remarks  are  strik- 
ingly confirmed  in  two  documents  of  later  date,  a  memorial 
by  Pedro  Fages,  November  30,  1775,^^  and  another  by  the 
religious  of  the  College  of  San  Fernando,  February  26, 
1776,^^  both  of  which  will  be  taken  up  in  more  detail  in  a 
later  chapter. 

Verger's  opinions  are  borne  out  also  by  contemporary 
official  reports.     The  two  Californias  were  then  under  one 
government,  the  capital  being  at  Loreto,  Baja  California, 
where  the  governor,  Felipe  Barry,  resided.     Pedro  Fages, 
the  lieutenant-governor,  was  stationed  in  Alta  California 
at  Monterey.     In  letters  of  July  21  and  23,  August  27  and  ,  / 
30,  1771,  Fages  told  Barry  that  he  was  about  to  found  mis-  V 
sions  at  San  Gabriel  and  San  Buenaventura,  and  conse-' 
quently  needed  more  men  and  horses.     Barry  sent  twenty- 
one  soldiers,  five  mule-drivers,  and  sixty-three  horses,  which 
were  all  that  he  could  spare,  but  Fages  asked  for  yet  more 
soldiers  and  horses.     He  was  much  troubled  because  of  the 

f reguency^^^^of 4^^^^^^^^.     On   one   occasion   nine   soldiers 

and  a  mule-driver  had  taken  provisions  and  fifty  horses,  and 
started  for  Sonora,  but  later  returned.  Then  five  soldiers 
took  forty-nine  horses,  and  set  out  for  Sonora.  They,  too, 
changed  their  minds,  and  took  refuge  in  San  Diego  mis- 
sion, where  they  were  protected  by  the  missionaries  from  the 
wrath  of  Fages.  He  wrote  that  he  had  no  confidence  in 
any  of  his  men.  Commenting  on  these  letters  in  his  own 
to  Bucarely  of  October  24,  1771,  jBarry  said  that  there  were 
only  eighty-two  soldiers  in  all  the  Californias^  of  whom  fifty- 
one  were  with  Fages.  He  asked  that  forty  more  be  sent  to 
him,  as  also  four  or  five  hundred  mules  and  two  hundred 

31  C-3042.  »  C-3156. 


112         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

horses,  the  animals  being  required  to  transport  provisions, 
and  as  mounts  for  the  troops.  As  things  were,  nothing  was 
being  done,  for  he  lacked  the  means  with  which  to  work.^^ 
Bucarely  informed  Arriaga,  November  26,  1771,  that  he 
would  send  eighteen  more  soldiers,  enough  to  give  the 
Californias  a  total  of  a  hundred,  and  that  he  had  ordered 
Barry  to  punish  those  soldiers  who  deserted  repeatedly. 
These  were  temporary  steps,  as  the  Californias  were  about 
to  be  divided  between  the  Franciscans  and  the  Dominicans, 
when  more  enduring  measures  would  be  taken.^^ 

Fages  continued  to  ask  aid  of  Barry,  especially  in  horses, 
mules,  and  cattle.  The  latter  wrote  Fages,  January  7, 
T773,  that  he  had  forwarded  thirty  horses  and  forty  mules, 
which  were  all  that  he  could  get  together  in  the  peninsula, 
but  he  sent  no  cattle.  Prior  to  the  cession  of  Baja  Califor- 
nia by  the  Franciscans  to  the  Dominicans,  the  latter  agreed 
that  the  former  might  take  some  of  their  animals  to  Alta 
California.  But  when  confronted  with  the  actual  condi- 
tions of  the  peninsula,  they  contended,  as  had  certain  Fran- 
ciscans in  1770,  that  the  animals  could  not  be  spared, 
although  acknowledging  their  previous  agreement.  Bu- 
carely at  first  inclined  toward  the  Franciscans,  ordering 
Rivera  to  take  the  animals  to  Alta  California.^^  Later, 
he  changed  front,  and  the  Dominicans  were  allowed  to  keep 
them.  Clearly,  no  help  in  this  respect  was  to  come  from 
Baja  Calif ornia.^^ 

The  Puerto  of  San  Francisco  had  long  been  known  to  the 
Spaniards,  but  by  that  name  they  meant  the  modern  Drake^s 
Bay.  What  we  now  call  San  Francisco  Bay  was  discovered 
by  PortoU  in  1769,  taking  the  name  of  the  Ester o  of  San 
Francisco.  For  several  years  thereafter,  expeditions  in  that 
direction  aimed  to  get  around  the  Estero  in  order  to  reach 
the  Puerto.  The  distinction  seems  to  have  been  lost  sight 
of  in  Mexico,  possibly  because  the  name  and  location  were 

wC-1792.  SB  Bucarely  to  Rivera,  Nov.  3,  1773, 

«  C-1813.     For  Arriaga's  acknowl-  A.G.P.,  Californias,  66. 
edgment   see  C-1915.      C-1820  is  an-  ^  Late  in  1776,  after  many  animals 

other  letter  from  Barry,  much  as  before,  had  already  been  brought  from  Sonora,  a 

reported    by    Bucarely    to   Arriaga   in  supplementary  lot  was  ordered  sent  from 

C-1910.  Baja  California.     C-3070,  3300,  3455. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  113 

SO  nearly  the  same.  Very  soon  the  name  San  Francisco 
became  understood  as  connoting  the  site  of  the  present  city 
and  bay  of  that  name.  Scarcity  of  provisions  and  the 
consequent  necessity  of  returning  to  San  Diego  had  pre- 
vented an  exploration  of  the  bay  by  Portold.  Thence- 
forth, however,  the  project  of  exploring  and  occupying  the 
new  port  was  constantly  in  the  minds  of  the  authorities 
and  missionaries,  until  it  was  achieved  in  1776  by  the  found- 
ing of  San  Francisco.  Rivera,  who  had  accompanied  the 
Portold  expedition,  wrote  to  Croix,  March  2,  1770,  that  the 
newly  discovered  port,  if  deep  enough,  might  prove  better 
than  that  of  San  Diego.  Moreover,  it  was  a  good  site  for 
settlement,  as  it  had  timber  and  firewood,  running  water, 
good  lands,  and  numerous  Indians.^^  Doubtless,  he  was 
considering  the  availability  of  the  Indians  as  laborers,  in 
referring  to  their  numbers  as  an  advantage. 

News  of  the  achievements  of  the  1769  expeditions  had 
hardly  been  received  in  Mexico,  when  orders  were  sent  by 
Croix,  November  12,  1770,  to  explore  the  port  of  San  Fran- 
cisco and  to  found  a  mission  there  to  secure  it  fr^pn,  ff?rCf1S^ 
occupation.  This  order  was  not*  received  until  May,  1771. 
Meanwhile,  Fages  had  paid  a  brief  visit  to  San  Francisco 
Bay  in  November,  1770,  but  had  made  no  extensive  ex- 
ploration.^^ From  the  first,  Serra  was  most  eager  to  estab- 
lish a  mission  there,  but  Fages  regarded  it  as  impossible, 
owing  to  his  lack  of  troops  for  mission  guards.  Serra  would 
not  be  satisfied,  and  voiced  his  complaint  in  a  long  letter  to 
the  viceroy,  June  18,  1771.  He  stated  that  Santa  Clara 
mission  ^®  had  not  been  founded  because  G^lvez  had  ob- 
jected, due  to  the  lack  of  escort.  As  for  San  Francisco, 
the  viceroy  had  ordered  an  exploration  of  its  port  before- 
hand, but  Fages  and  Perez,  the  latter  being  captain  of  the 
San  Antonio,  had  decided  that  there  were  not  enough 
people  for  the  attempt  to  be  made  by  land,  and  that  it 
would  occasion  too  great  a  delay  to  the  San  Antonio,  if 
made  by  sea.     Serra  wished  to  see  the  mission  placed  there 

^  A.G.P.,  Californias,  66.  ^9  This  refers,  not  to  the  later  mission 

^  Fages,  Diary,  in  A.P.C.H.,  Pub-  of  that  name,  but  to  a  site  south  of 
lications,  II,  141-59.     Also  C-1583.  Santa  Barbara. 


114         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH    CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

as  soon  as  possible ;  there  would  be  no  delay  on  his  part."*^ 
This  letter  must  have  reached  Mexico  at  about  the  time 
that  Bucarely  became  viceroy,  or  only  shortly  before. 
Its  statements  are  confirmed  by  Fages,  who  wrote  to  Croix 
that  he  could  not  found  the  mission  at  San  Francisco  until 
he  got  more  soldiers.'*^  Exploration  of  the  port  of  San 
Francisco  was  also  urged  by  Father  Verger  in  his  petition 
of  December,  1771.  ^^They  say  that  Monterey  is  not  a 
port,  and  that  San  Francisco  may  be  a  very  good  one ;  but 
there  is  need  of  exploring  its  entrance  and  [ascertaining] 
its  depth.''  *^  Knowing  Verger's  objections  to  making  new 
settlements,  we  may  conclude  that  he  was  recommending 
exploration  rather  than  a  too  early  attempt  at  settlement. 
At  length,  in  March  and  April,  1772,  Fages  made  an  over- 
land expedition  to  explore  the  Puerto  of  San  Francisco,  but 
failing  to  get  around  the  Ester Oj  returned.  He  made  no 
examination  of  San  Francisco  Bay,  and  its  merits  remained 
unknown. 

The  aftermath  of  the  San  Gabriel  revolt  illustrates  an- 
other problem  that  the  viceroy  had  to  consider.  Serra 
asserted  that  the  revolt  was  due  to  the  mismanagement  of 
Fages,  charging  that  he  had  not  taken  steps  to  prevent 
outrages  by  soldiers  against  native  women.  In  other  words, 
the  old  feud  between  friars  and  soldiers  was  already  in  evi- 
dence in  Alta  California,  the  missionaries  believing  that 
they  should  have  wider  powers  than  the  lay  authorities 
were  willing  to  give  them.  Thus,  every  untoward  incident 
might  be  cause  of  mutual  recriminations.  Whatever  may 
have  been  the  merits  of  the  case,  these  disputes  were  a 
factor  to  reckon  with.  A  similar  situation  existed  in 
Baja  California.  Writing  to  Arriaga,  July  26,  1772,  Bu- 
carely said  that  the  discord  between  the  governor  and  the 
missionaries  was  so  great  that  it  was  difficult  for  him  to 
learn  the  truth,  as  each  side  appeared  to  found  its  repre- 
sentations on  a  sound  basis.  He  hesitated  to  take  meas- 
ures, lest  they  prove  mistaken  and  irremediable,  but  was 
seeking  information  from  various  sources.     He  had  asked 

«  A.G.P.,  Californias,  66.  «  Ibid.  *^  Palou,  Noticias,  1,  128. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND    ROUTE  115 

further  reports  from  the  Father  Superior  of  San  Fernando, 
and  had  inquired  the  amount  of  funds  supphed  to  the 
CaHfornias  by  the  royal  treasury,  what  the  pious  fund 
paid,  and  the  expense  of  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  all 
with  a  view  to  ascertaining  the  exact  cost  of  the  Californias, 
and  to  enable  him  to  take  fitting  measures."*^ 

The  leading  facts  as  regards  the  status  of  the  Californias, 
and  opinions  concerning  them  have  now  been  traced  up  to 
the  time  when  Bucarely  received  Anza's  petition  to  explore 
a  route  to  Monterey  from  Sonora.  The  logic  of  events 
and  conditions  pointed  to  a  need  for  such  a  communication, 
if  the  new  settlements  were  to  be  maintained.  Meanwhile, 
steps  had  been  taken  which  emphasized  that  need.  Meas- 
ures having  to  do  with  the  grant  of  a  mission  field  in  the 
Californias  to  the  Dominicans  had  also  been  taken  which 
emphasized  the  importance  of  having  a  route  to  the  Cali- 
fornias from  Sonora. 

As  far  back  as  1760  a  royal  decree  of  April  17  in  that 
year,  had  granted  Father  Juan  Pedro  Iriarte's  petition  for 
a  mission  field  in  New  Spain  for  twenty-five  of  the  Domin- 
ican order. ^^  By  another  decree,  February  18,  1768,  more 
missionaires  were  granted,  including  ten  who  were  to  serve 
in  missions  from  which  the  Jesuits  had  been  expelled."*^ 
The  necessity  of  filling  places  left  vacant  by  the  Jesuits 
imposed  a  demand  upon  other  orders  that  they  could  not 
supply,  and  the  Father  Superior  of  San  Fernando,  the 
archbishop  of  Mexico,  Viceroy  Croix,  and  others  joined  in 
petitions  for  more  missionaries,  which  resulted  in  a  grant 
of  forty-five  to  the  College  of  San  Fernando  by  a  decree  of 
September  2,  1768."*^  The  same  day  the  Council  of  the 
Indies  reported  to  the  king  a  new  petition  of  Iriarte's,  a 
proposal  now  being  made  for  the  first  time  that  the  Domin- 
icans be  assigned  a  field  in  the  Californias.  Iriarte  wished 
to  go  alone,  or  with  others  of  his  order,  to  the  western  coast 
of  the  peninsula,  stating  that  there  were  many  natives 
there  and  many  good  harbors.     It  was  a  known  fact,  he 

«C-1995.     Acknowledged     by    Ar-  « C-952. 

riaga,  Nov.  11,  1772,  C-2060.  «  C-1070. 

**  C-470. 


116  THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

said,  that  foreign  enemies  had  taken  shelter  in  them  in 
times  of  war,  a  danger  which  he  thought  could  be  avoided, 
if  he  were  allowed  to  convert  the  Indians  of  that  coast  be- 
tween 25°  and  28°.  The  Council  was  uncertain  about  the 
proper  course  of  action  on  this  petition,  suspecting  that  it 
was  an  entering  wedge  for  an  extension  of  Dominican  rule 
to  Cape  Mendocino,  stated  to  be  in  41°  30/  All  presidios 
and  missions  thus  far  erected  in  the  Californias  had  been 
on  the  side  of  the  Gulf,  but  the  Council  realized  the  im- 
portance of  the  spiritual  and  temporal  conquest  of  other 
parts  of  the  Californias  as  against  the  possibility  of  foreign 
establishments;  if  the  latter  were  formed,  it  would  be  a 
mortal  wound  to  the  entire  coast  of  New  Spain,  and  "^^uld, 
cut  off  trade  with  the  Philippines.  The  Council  had 
planned  to  avoid  this  danger  by  its  decrees  of  May  12, 
1744,  and  August  22,  1747,  when  it  proposed  that  the 
Jesuits  should  enter  the  Californias  by  way  of  the  Colorado 
River,  but  nothing  had  been  accomplished  at  that  time. 
It  recommended  that  Iriarte's  petition  be  referred  to  the 
viceroy  and  the  archbishop  of  Mexico,^^  and  this  was  done 
in  an  order  of  November  4,  1768.  Croix^s  reply,  April  22, 
1769,  stated  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  assign  a  field  in 
the  Californias  to  the  Dominicans,  as  it  would  lead  to 
quarrels  between  them  and  the  Fernandinos  to  whom  that 
territory  had  been  given  upon  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits.^* 
The  archbishop,  however,  writing  May  22,  1769,  said  that 
such  a  great  territory  as  the  Californias  ought  not  be  given 
to  the  Franciscans  alone,  as  they  might  resist  measures  that 
would  be  desired  in  future.  So  the  Dominicans  should  be 
given  a  field  there,  and  secular  clergy  placed  in  towns  that 
were  more  advanced  in  a  settled  type  of  life.**  Gdlvez 
opposed  Iriarte^s  petition.  Not  only  was  there  no  multi- 
tude of  natives  between  25°  and  28°  on  the  west  coast  of  the 

*''  C-1069.     This  document  contains  the  early  period  of  settlement.     More 

a  definite  statement  as  to  the  northern  likely,    however,    this    was    merely    an 

boundary  of  the  Californias,  placing  it  instance    of    careless    phraseology    in 

in  36**  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Carmelo.  framing   the   document.     A  few  years 

Thus  Monterey  was  deemed  beyond  it.  later  the   boundary  was  extended   in- 

This  may  account  for  the  name  Mon-  definitely  northward.     Cf.  infra  n.  59. 
terey  (or  Estahledmientos  de  Monterrey)  ^  C-1237, 

often  applied  to  Alta  California  during  *»  C-1253. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND    ROUTE  117 

Californias,  he  said,  but  there  were  not  any  at  all  between 
31°  and  Cape  San  Lucas  nor  on  the  adjacent  islands.  As 
for  danger  from  foreigners,  permission  had  already  been 
granted  to  establish  nine  new  missions  between  Velicatd, 
the  northernmost  mission  of  Baja  California,  and  Mon- 
terey, where  a  presidio  was  also  to  be  placed.  These  would 
hold  back  foreign  encroachments,  especially  those  of  the 
Russians  who  had  lately  been  active  in  their  designs.  There 
was  no  room  for  the  Dominicans,  as  the  Franciscans  had 
all  the  desirable  territory.  The  former  might  be  used  on 
the  Sonora  frontier.  ^°  G41vez  expressed  the  same  views  in 
his  Informe  of  1771  to  Bucarely.  Let  the  Dominicans  be 
assigned  missions  in  Sonora,  he  suggested,  leaving  the  Fran- 
ciscans of  the  College  of  Quer^taro  to  found  five  missions 
farther  on,  among  peoples  of  the  Gila  and  those  at  the  con- 
fluence of  that  river  with  the  Colorado. ^^  Father  Juan  de 
Dios  de  Cordova,  Dominican  provincial  in  Madrid,  recom- 
mended, January  17,  1770,  that  Iriarte's  petition  be  granted, 
making  a  point  of  the  necessity  for  conquests  in  the  Califor- 
nias  as  a  check  against  foreign  encroachments,  for  which 
purpose  decrees  aiming  to  secure  the  peninsula  had  been 
passed  in  1744,  1747,  and  1752,  without  anything  being 
done.^^  The  fiscal  on  February  6,  1770,  advised  the  Coun- 
cil to  permit  the  Dominicans  to  enter  the  Californias,  but 
in  separate  regions  from  those  of  the  Franciscans,^^  and  so 
it  was  proposed  by  the  Council  in  its  recommendation  of 
March  2,  1770,  to  the  king.  Reference  was  made  in  this 
document  to  the  decree  of  1744  ordering  the  Jesuits  to  seek 
routes  to  the  Californias  by  way  of  the  Colorado  River. 
This  was  still  recommended  as  desirable  on  the  part  of  their 
successors  in  Sonora. ^^  A  royal  decree  in  the  terms  suggested 
by  the  Council,  was  sent  to  the  viceroy,  dated  April  8, 
1770,^^  being  modified  later,  November  16,  1770,  by  another 
stating  that   the   viceroy   might   employ   the   Dominicans 

«>  Gdlvez  to   Croix,   June   10,  1769,  «  G&lvez,  Informe,  145. 

C-1284.     This  was  forwarded  to   Arri-  w  C-1441. 

aga  by  Croix,  July  29,   1769,  C-1348,  "  C-1447. 

and  sent  by  the  former  to  the  Council  "  C-1455. 

of  the  Indies,  January  1,  1770,  C-1434.  "  C-1460. 


118       '  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

elsewhere,  if  he  thought  best.^^  Croix,  however,  made  no 
use  of  the  Dominicans  who  had  already  been  sent  to  New 
Spain,  which  drew  forth  a  protest  from  the  archbishop  of 
Mexico  to  the  Council,  dated  February  28,  1771.  He 
doubted  if  the  Dominicans  provided  for  by  the  recent 
decrees  were  going  to  be  used  in  the  Californias,  because 
Gdlvez  was  opposed,  but  urged  that  the  decrees  be  fulfilled. ^^ 
A  new  decree  was  enacted,  September  21,  1771,  expressly 
ordering  that  the  Dominicans  be  given  stations  in  the 
Californias.^^  Bucarely  had  called  a  junta  to  consider  the 
matter,  before  the  last-named  order  was  received,  but  it 
had  come  prior  to  the  determination  of  the  matter.  Vari- 
ous decrees  and  reports  were  examined,  among  them  being 
a  petition  of  the  Franciscans  of  Queretaro  that  they  be 
allowed  to  erect  five  missions  along  the  Colorado  and  Gila 
rivers.  A_decision  was  reached  in  May,  1772,  that  the 
Dominicans  should  have  the  peninsula,  and  the  Fernandinos 
Alta  California.  The  former  were  to  have  up  to  a  point 
just  short  of  San  Diego,  and  thereafter  proceed  to  the  east 
or  east-northeast  toward  the  Gulf  and  the  Colorado  River, 
or  yet  farther  in  that  direction,  but  without  prejudice  to 
such  other  orders  as  might  precede  them.  This  division  was 
being  made  with  the  consent  of  the  Father  Superior  of  the 
Fernandinos.  The  latter  were  to  have  a  field  extending 
mdefinitely  northward. ^^  Various  consequences  of  this  di- 
vision of  the  Californias  will  be  taken  up  later  in  another 
connection.  For  the  present  only  one  may  be  noted,  which 
was  expressed  by  Galvez  in  criticizing  the  division.     Was 

5«  C-1579.     So  the  Council  had  ad-  first  case  is  that  the  Dominicans  were 

vised,  C-1514,  upon  advice  of  the  fiscal,  to  proceed  hasta  llegar  d  los  confines  de 

C-1504.  la  Misidn  de  S^    Diego  en  su  Puerto, 

*7  C-1712.  poniendo  la  ultima  en  el  Arroyo  de  Sv- 

"  C-1782.  Juan  Bautista  g?  finalizaria  cinco  leguas 

^'  Proceedings  of  the  junta,  C-1602,  mds  adelante  de  una  Punta  que  saliendo 

forwarded  to  Spain  by  Bucarely  in  a  de  la  Sierra   Madre,   termina  antes  de 

letter  of  May  25,  1772,  C-1959.     The  llegar  d  la  Playa,  donde  podrian  torcer 

boundaries    named    were    accepted    by  al   Leste  con   poca   inclinacion   at   Les- 

the  Council  of  the  Indies  in  a  consulta  Nordeste  con   g?    saltan  al  fin  del  Golfo 

of  May  11,  1775,  C-2906,  and  thus  be-  Calif drnico    y    Rio    Colorado.     As    for 

came   the   first   definite   boundary   be-  the  northern  boundary  the  Fernandinos 

tween  Alta  and  Baja  California,  and  a  were  to  go  hasta  donde  pudiesen  estender 

new    expression    as    to    the    northern  sus  Conquistas  Espirituales.     Cf.  supra 

boundary    of    the    former.     The    Ian-  n.  47. 
guage  employed  by  the  Council  in  the 


17691  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND    ROUTE  119 

it  proper,  he  asked,  to  deprive  Alta  California  establish- 
ments of  the  support  which  they  needed  from  the  penin- 
sula? Was  it  wise,  in  view  of  their  importance,  to  force 
them  to  rely  solely  on  the  boats  from  San  Bias  ?  ^^  Wise 
or  not,  it  had  been  done.  Clearly,  however,  the  discovery 
of  a  good  route  from  Sonora  had  bejcome  all  Hhe  more 
desirable.  ^^ 

The  division  having  been  made,  some  sort  of  modus  vivendi 
had  to  be  devised,  and  this  could  be  done  only  with  a  knowl- 
edge of  conditions.  For  several  years  the  matter  of  a 
reglamento  for  governing  the  Californias,  a  temporary  one 
to  begin  with,  to  be  followed  as  soon  as  might  be  by  a  per- 
manent reglamento  was  a  matter  much  in  the  minds  of  the 
authorities  in  Mexico  and  Spain,  but  what  to  do  was  a 
question.  Prospects  in  the  Californias  were  none  too  favor- 
able. In  a  letter  to  Arriaga,  February  24,  1773,  Bucarely 
wrote  of  the  Alta  California  establishments  that  discord 
between  Fages  and  the  missionaries  was  so  great,  and  de- 
sertions of  soldiers  so  oft-repeated,  that  a  deplorable  situ- 
ation had  resulted,  and  the  early  ruin  of  the  settlements 
might  be  expected.^^  He  had  done  all  that  he  could  to  remedy 
matters,  urging  the  religious  and  Fages  and  Barry,  who 
also  quarrelled  with  the  missionaries,  to  greater  harmony, 
and  he  had  forwarded  supplies,  but  without  appreciable 
results.  Affairs  of  San  Bias  also  required  attention,  the 
port  itself  showing  signs  of  filling  in.  Until  matters  there 
were  arranged,  and  until  such  time  as  he  could  learn  the 
causes  of  disputes  in  the  Californias,  there  was  not  likely 
to  be  any  good  news  from  that  province.^' 

Most  important  of  the  reports  received  from  men  who 
had  been  in  the  province  were  two  from  Father  Junipero 
^erra,  president  of  the  Alta  California  missions.  Serra  had 
reached  Mexico  in  February,  1773,  having  made  the  trip 

*>  G&lvez  to  Arriaga,  Dec.  18,  1773,  "Among  other  letters  of  Bucarely 

C-2454.  bearing  on  desertions  of  the  military 

w  For  a  summary  of  the  documents  are  three  to  Fages,  Oct.  14  and  Dec.  2, 

concerning  division  of  the  Californias,  1772,    and    May  26,    1773.     A.P.C.H., 

with  subsequent  action  to  May  11,  1775,  Prov.  St.  Pap.,  I,  75-85. 
see  the  recommendation  of  that  date  by  «'  C-2177. 

the  Council  of  the  Indies,  C-2906. 


120         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

from  Alta  California  largely  with  a  view  to  securing  the 
removal  of  Fages.  Bucarely  asked  him  to  prepare  a  memo-, 
rial  setting  forth  his  views  as  to  the  needs  of  Alta  California. 
Serra's .,memorial  of  March  13,  1773,  was  the  response  to 
this  request.  In  it  he  embodied  thirty-two  suggestions, 
most  of  which  are  worthy  of  record  here,  for  the  light  they 
\  .      throw  upon  conditions  in  the  new  settlements.     A  store 

' '  should  be  established  at_.Msaifi£fi3r?  he  said,  so  that  the 
soldiers  would  not  have  to  deal  with  the  far  distant  one  at 
Loreto ;  in  that  case,  they  would  be  better  satisfied,  and 
others  would  be  induced  to  go  there.  It  would  be  well  to 
2«  .send  thirty  to  forty  more  soldiers,  some  of  them  married ; 
with  but  two  families  at  each  mission,  other  persons  would 
soon  begin  to  marry.     Each  mission  ought  to  have  from  four 

-r  to  six  men  to  serve  as  laborers,  cowboys,,  and  mule-drivers, 
thus  providing  for  the  j^lanting  of  crop^  and  the  general 
advancement  of  the  province.     The  men  could  be  sent  by 

.    sea  from  San  Bias.     Indian  families  might  also  be  sent  from 

u  Baj^a^jCalifornia  to  serve  as  laborers,  and  to  show  the  Alta 
California  Indians  that  the  Christians  approved  of  mar- 
riage;   thus  far  there  had  been  no  Christians  with  wives 
>^    in  Alta  California.     A  fQjge  and  a  smith  were  needed  at 
San  Diego  and  at  Carmelo,  Monterey  being  the  only  place 

.    in  the  province  thus  far  to  have  them,  and  ,iron  was  re- 

^.  quired  for  the  forges.  Two  carpenters  were  wanted,  one 
for  the  northern  and  the  other  for  the  southern  missions. 
The  commissary  of  San  Bias  should  be  instructed  to  be 

"7^  more  careful  about  the  cofld^Ltipn  of  proyisions  sent  to  Alta 
California.     All  the  missions  were  in  very  great  need  of 

Y.  mules,  especially  the  inland  missions,  with  which  to  transr 
port  provisions  from  the  ports ;  the  only  mules  in  the 
province  were  those  of  the  presidio  of  Monterey,  and  they 
were  likely  to  become  extinct  because  they  were  being  em- 
ployed in  somewhat  unnecessary  labors,  and  because  of 
thefts  by  deserters  who  took  them  away,  and  by  natives 

9^,»who  ate  them.  Above  all,  asses  and  jnaares  should  be 
sent,  for  procreation  of  more  mules,  or  the  province  would 
never  be  free  from  trouble  because  of  its  lack  of  pack- 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  121 

animals.     Cows  destined  for  the  proposed  San  Francisco  /  0  • 
and  Santa  Clara  missions  should  in  the  meantime  be  kept 
at  the  existing  missions,  rather  than  at  the  presidios,  so  that 
there  might  be  milk  for  Christian  converts,  the  only  aliment 
that  the  missionaries  had  been  able,  thus  far,  to  give  them. 
Since  the  departure  of  Pedro  Prat,  Alta  California  had  been     . 
without  a  doctor;    it  needed  one.     Some  reward  ought  .to 
be  given  to  soldiers  who  should  marry  native  women,  —  for    \>ri 
example,  two  cows  and  a  mule,  or  whatever  might  be  deemed 
best. 

The  above  shows  the  lagk  in  elements  of  permanence  of 
the  Alta  California  settlements  at  this  time,  and  the  need 
for  families  and  animals.  The  memorial  laid  even  greater 
stress  upon  the  relations  between  missionaries  and  soldiery,  Vn 
and  sought  that  Fages  be  relieved  of  his  command. ^^  Most  \ 
of  Serra's  requests  were  granted,  either  at  this  time  or  not 
long  afterward,  but,  for  the  present,  discussion  of  the  action 
taken  may  be  postponed.  The  interest  here  is  his  descrip- 
tion of  existing  conditions. ^^ 

Serra's  proposals  formed  an  important  document  before 
Bucarely  and  the  junta  in  their  work  of  preparing  a  regla^ 
mento  for  the  Californias  and  San  Bias,  but  they  did  not 
contain  all  the  information  that  Bucarely  desired.  In  a 
letter  to  Arriaga  of  May  27,  1773,  Bucarely  said  that  the 
reports  thus  far  received  had  not  served  to  clarify  the 
situation  in  the  Californias ;  so  he  had  ordered  steps  taken 
to  form  a  permanent  reglamento.  "No  subject  of  the  many 
that  this  very  vast  government  produces  has  given  me 
more  to  do  than  the  regulation  of  the  Department  of  San 
Bias  and  the  Peninsula  de  Californias.'^  ^^     One  of  the  docu- 

■  w  Serra's    complaint  against    Fages  Serra's    request    for    the    removal    of 

came  at  a  time  when  it  was  apt  to  be  Fages  was  granted. 

heard  favorably.     Shortly  before,   De-  s^  Yot  the  whole  expediente,  C-2103. 

cember  2,  1772,  Bucarely  had  written  Serra's  memorial  is  in  Palou,  Noticias, 

to  Fages  remarking  upon  the  latter's  III,   37-66 ;  also  the  resolution  of  the 

failure  to  give  an  account  of  conditions  junta    concerning    his    proposals.    III, 

at  the  presidio  and  missions,   and  re-  67-82. 

questing   him   in   future   to   report   all  «« C-2278.     The  term  Peninsula  de 

that    occurred.     A.P.C.H.,     Prov.     St.  Californias  continued  to  be  used  to  in- 

Papers,  I,  76-77.      Reference  to  "the  elude  both  Californias,  even  after  Alta 

presidio"    meant     Monterey,    for    San  California  had  been  settled. 
Diego  was  not  so  regarded  at  the  time. 


122         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

ments  sought  by  Bucarely  to  help  in  that  regard  was  another 
from  Father  Serra,  who  was  asked  to  draw  up  a  report  on 
the  state  of  the  missions  in  his  charge.  This  he  did,  basing 
the  report;  completed  May  21,  1773,  bn  his  recollection  of 
conditions  as  they  were  when  he  left  in  September  of  the 
preceding  year,  together  with  such  news  as  he  had  received 
since  departure.^^ 

His  opening  paragraphs  concerned  the  military  needs  of 
the  missions.  Because  of  the  vast  number  of  Indians, 
sentinels  were  necessary  at  night,  four  men  and  a  corporal 
being  required,  each  with  a  three-hour  watch,  except  the 
corporal,  who  escaped  duty.  If  there  should  be  but  five 
men,  they  would  have  that  duty  every  night,  and  could  not 
be  counted  upon  to  assist  the  missionaries  during  the  day, 
as  for  example  when  they  went  to  wash  clothes,  to  seek  a 
stray  cow,  or  to  do  other  similar  tasks.  The  use  of  Chris- 
tian Indians  for  purposes  of  defence  had  been  impossible 
thus  far,  because  most  of  those  baptized  were  children,  and 
the  few  men  converts  had  to  absent  themselves  in  order  to 
get  food  by  hunting.  The  missions  j^e  Jherefore  at 
mercy  of  the  Indians,  if  they  should  6e  tempted  to  make  an 
end  of  them.  He  had  previously  suggested  an  establish- 
ment of  a  hundred  soldiers,  but  now  submitted  that  the 
number  could  be  cut  down  to  eighty,  if  the  founding  of  the 
proposed  new  missions  should  be  postponed,  although  he 
hoped  that  one  of  the  two,  San  Buenaventura,  might  not 
be  delayed.  With  the  exception  of  fifteen  soldiers  at  the 
presidio  of  Monterey,  the  soldiers  should  be  distributed 
among  the  missions,  the  largest  number,  fifteen,  to  be  at 
San  Buenaventura,  if  that  were  founded. 

The  greater  part  of  the  memorial  dealt  with  mission 
conditions  proper.  In  this  respect  it  agreed  substantially 
with  a  later  report  drawn  up  by  Father  Francisco  Palou 
on  December  10,  1773,  the  latter  constituting  the  first  of  a 
series  of  annual  reports  concerning  the  Alta  California  mis- 
sions. Both  Serra  and  Palou  covered  the  same  ground, 
giving  a  history  of  each  mission,  stating  the  progress  each 

^  For  the  memorial,  C-2108. 


1769] 


NEED   FOR   OVERLAND    ROUTE 


123 


had  made  in  conversions,  and  in  material  welfare  as  regards 
site,  domestic  animals,  crops,  and  other  details.  Palou^s 
report,  being  made  on  the  ground,  with  the  advantage  of 
mission  records,  is  the  more  complete  and  the  more  spe- 
cific, but  is  so  nearly  like  that  of  Serra  that  the  two  may 
be  treated  together,  despite  the  difference  in  date.  Palou 
will  be  followed  here,  with  some  additional  comment  from 
Serra. 

The  principal  features  of  the  situation  may  be  presented 
by  two  tables,  adapted  from  the  two  in  Palou.  The  first 
covers  the  religious  achievements  of  the  missions  from  their 
foundation  to  December,  1773. 


Mission 

Baptisms 

LiVINO 

Marriages 

San  Diego .... 

83 

73 

12 

158 

165 

76 

71 

11 

150 

154 

12 

San  Gabriel 

0 

San  Luis  Obispo 

San  Antonio 

0 

18 

San  Carlos  de  Monterey 

32 

Totals 

491 

462 

62 

From  this  it  appears  that  after  nearly  five  years  of  mis- 
sion work,  remarkably  slight  progress  had  been  made  in 
view  of  the  great  number  of  Indians  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
missions,  and  in  comparison  with  the  rapidity  of  conver- 
sions by  Spanish  missionaries  in  other  fields.  Results, 
when  analyzed,  seem  even  more  slender  than  the  figures 
show.  Serra  stated  in  his  March  13  memorial  that  most  of 
those  baptized  were  children.  At  San  Luis  Obispo  there 
were  as  y^Fno  adiilt  converts.  Such  men  as  were  baptized 
could  not  always  be  kept  at  the  missions,  going  away  oc- 
casionally for  days  and  weeks  at  a  time,  said  Serra.  There 
had  been  only  sixty-two  Christian  marriages  in  the  whole 
period,  which  Bancroft  regards  as  representing  the  total 
number  of  adult  converts.  The  San  Diego  Indians  had 
persistently  resisted  conversion,  although  the  mission  was 
already  in  its  fifth  year  at  the  time  of  Palou^s  report ;  mat- 
ters there  were  showing  signs  of  improvement,  however. 


124  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  V 

It  was  almost  as  bad  at  San  Gabriel,  then  in  its  third  year, 
while  San  Luis  Obispo,  founded  in  September,  1772,  had 
accomplished  almost  nothing  in  a  populous  field.  Con- 
versions at  San  Carlos  had  come  for  the  most  part  in  its 
first  year,  after  which  there  had  been  few,  said  Serra,  but 
by  the  time  of  Palou's  report  they  had  become  more 
numerous. 

The  failure  to  win  converts  at  San  Diego  and  San  Gabriel 
was'  partly  accounted  for  by  the  eariy  revolts  at  those  mis- 
sions, caused  at  the  latter  place,  says  Palou,  by  the  im- 
proper conduct  of  a  Spanish  soldier,  although  Serra  ascribed 
it  to  the  excessive  precautions  of  Fages.  The  most  im- 
portant iveason  for  the  lack  of  conversions,  according  to  both 
Serra  and  Palou,  was  the  scarcity  of  food  with  which  to 
attract  the  natives  to  the  missions.  On  that  account,  said 
Serra,  they  had  abstained  from  making  more  converts  at 
San  Carlos  until  a  more  fitting  time,  for  they  had  nothing 
but  milk  to  give  the  Indians,  and  very  little  of  that.  Palou 
said  that  there  was  not  enough  to  eat  at  San  Carlos  for  those 
who  were  already  Christians,  because  of  the  failure  of  the 
crops,  and  because  the  supply  ship  had  not  come.  At  San 
Antonio  the  Indians  had  rather  to  assist  the  missionaries 
with  food  than  be  supplied  by  them.  Palou  felt  certain 
that  conversions  at  San  Antonio  would  be  rapid,  if  the  mis- 
sion might  maintain  and  clothe  its  converts,  for  the  Indians 
had  been  quite  friendly.  The  difficulty  at  San  Luis  Obispo 
was  the  abundance  of  foods  that  the  natives  were  able  to 
procure,  for  which  reason,  said  Palou,  it  would  not  be  easy 
to  reduce  them  to  living  at  the  mission.  San  Gabriel 
hoped  to  have  large  crops  with  which  to  make  gifts  to  new 
Christians,  and  to  attract  other  natives,  having  already 
obtained  promising  crops  of  grain,  vegetables,  and  various 
kinds  of  melon.  At  the  other  missions  agriculture  had  not 
thus  far  proved  successful.  It  was  almost  impossible  to 
grow  grain  because  of  the  difficulties  of  irrigation.  San 
Diego  lacked  a  sufficient  rainfall.  Yet,  Serra  and  Palou 
were  optimistic  as  to  the  future  of  the  missions. 

No  estimates  of  the  number  of  unconverted  Indians  were 


1769] 


NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE 


125 


made,  but  the  number  must  have  been  very  large,  only  a 
small  proportion  of  the  Indians  having  been  converted.^^ 
The  unconverted  Indians  had  no  agriculture,  but  Uved 
chiefly  on  acorns,  pine  nuts,  and  certain  wild  seeds ;  they 
hunted  for  hare,  rabbits,  squirrels,  and  occasionally  for  deer, 
while  those  who  lived  near  the  sea  caught  fish.^^  The 
missionaries  at  San  Diego  had  sent  to  San  Bias  for  a  canoe 
and  net,  that  their  Christian  converts  might  assist  the  mis- 
sion by  fishing. 

The  second  table  in  Palou  gives  an  account  of  the  hve 
stock  at  the  missions,  as  follows : 


Cows 

Sheep 

Goats 

Pigs 

Asses 

Breed- 
ing 
Mares 

Colts 

Horses 

Saddle 
Mules 

Pack 
Mules 

San  Diego 
San  Gabriel 
San  Luis 
San  Antonio 
San  Carlos 

40 
38 
41 
38 

48 

64 

30 

0 

0 

0 

55 

12 

0 

0 

0 

19 

20 

5 

30 

28 

4 
0 
0 
0 
0 

17 
4 
4 
4 
4 

3 

1 
0 
0 
0 

9 
6 
5 
5 
5 

4 
2 
2 
2 
2 

18 
14 
14 
9 
10 

205 

94 

67 

102 

470 

33 

471 

30 

12 

65 

From  this  it  appears  that  San  Diego  was  best  off  in 
number  and  variety  of  animals,  with  San  Gabriel  a  good 
second.  The  northern  missions  had  a  few  cows  and  pigs, 
but  little  else.  The  explanation  is  that  the  original  supply 
of  animals  came  from  Baja  California,  there  being  none  in 


« Henry  K.  Norton,  The  story  of 
California  (Chicago,  1913),  1,  in  a 
chapter  entitled  "California  in  1540," 
says:  "The  number  of  Indians  at 
that  time  living  within  the  boundaries 
of  the  present  state  has  been  estimated 
at  700,000."  While  this  estimate  is 
almost  certainly  too  high,  possibly  ten 
times  too  much,  Alta  California  cer- 
tainly had  a  considerable  native  popu- 
lation. When  the  Spaniards  came  in 
1769,  there  may  have  been  15,000 
Indians  along  the  route  that  they  took 
between  San  Diego  and  San  Francisco. 
Fages  said  that  there  were  more  than 
twenty  villages  between  San  Diego 
and  Monterey  along  or  near  the  route 
followed  by  the  Spaniards.  They  were 
particularly  numerous  along  the  Santa 
Barbara  Channel,  where  there  were 
some  towns  of  over  a  thousand  Indians, 


and,  according  to  Fages,  chiefs  capable 
of  mustering  six  hundred  warriors. 
Memorial  of  Pedro  Fages,  Nov.  30, 
1775,  C-3042.  The  last  statement 
makes  one  wonder  if  Fages'  estimates 
were  of  the  men  alone.  If  so,  then  the 
total  population  would  be  much  greater 
than  the  estimate  just  given  and  the 
danger  to  the  Spanish  establishments 
was  correspondingly  greater. 

<»  Bancroft,  Native  races,  I,  322-442, 
gives  a  most  vivid,  and  far  from  flat- 
tering account  of  the  California  Indians. 
A  more  wretchedly  bestial,  lazy,  or 
filthy  race  could  scarce  ever  have 
existed  than  they.  Among  other  things 
he  shows  that  vermin  and  reptiles  were 
among  their  articles  of  food. 

™  Two  were  she-asses. 

"  Three  of  the  four  were  fillies. 


126  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  V 

Alta  California,  and  none  coming  by  sea ;  so  the  southern 
missions  got  a  start  over  those  in  the  north,  being  nearer 
the  source  of  supply.  There  had  been  scant  increase  in 
animals  over  the  original  number  brought  from  the  penin- 
sula, but  this  does  not  allow  for  those  that  had  died  or 
were  eaten.  In  the  case  of  San  Diego,  at  least,  there  had 
been  a  noteworthy  increase.  That  mission  had  obtained 
eighteen  cows  from  Baja  California,  and  the  number  had 
increased  to  forty.  Included  in  the  list  of  horses  was  a 
stallion  apiece  at  each  mission.  San  Diego  had  also  one 
colt  and  one  jack.  At  every  mission  there  was  excellent 
pasture. 

These  figures,  to  be  understood,  must  be  considered  in 
relation  to  other  factors.  Food-animals,  while  not  numer- 
ous enough  to  serve  as  a  material  argument  of  the  benefits 
of  Christianity,  might  be  expected  in  time  to  increase  to 
jconsiderable  proportions.  Three  things,  however,  might 
prevent :  animals  for  breeding  purposes  were  not  plentiful ; 
there  were  not  enough  men  to  watch  the  herds  and  flocks ; 
^  and  the  unconverted  Indians  showed  a  fondness  for  meat, 
and  an  inclination  to  indulge  that  appetite  without  per- 
mission of  the  Fathers.  The  same  drawbacks  applied  also 
as  regards  pack  animals,  as  may  be  seen  from  Serra's  memo- 
rial of  March  13,  and  over  a  year  later  from  a  letter  of 
Palou,  April  22,  1774,  to  Father  Verger.'^^  In  all  Alta  Cali- 
fornia there  were  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  such  ani- 
mals. Serra  laid  particular  stress  on  the  need  for  them, 
and  Palou's  letter  pointed  out  that  more  horses  and  mules 
and  every  kind  of  cattle  for  breeding  purposes  must  be 
brought,   if  the  missions  were  to   become  permanent. 

The  principal  drsjiWbMk^  although  not  expressed  in  the 
Serra  and  Palou  reports,  which  were  dealing  with  mission 
conditions,  was  a  lack  of  settlers  with  families.  Laborers 
without  families  would  tide  over  affairs  only  temporarily, 
leaving  them  at  their  departure  or  death  as  bad  as  before. 
Serra's  memorial  of  March  13  had  urged  the  sending  of 
families,  so  that  a  permanent  population  might  develop. 

«  M.N.,  Doc.  Rel.  Mis.  Cal.,  v.  2. 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  127 

Thus  far,  there  was  not  a  white  woman  in  Alta  CaUfornia, 
but  three  soldiers  at  San  Carlos  and  three  more  at  San 
Antonio  had  married  native  women.  The  missions  reported 
that  they  had  farming,  masons'  and  carpenters'  tools,  but  a 
total  lack  of  workmen.  San  Diego  had  acquired  a  forge,  but 
had  no  smith.  Architecture  was  of  the  simplest.  A  stock- 
ade enclosed  the  wooden  mission  building,  and  another  sur- 
rounded the  soldiers'  barracks.  Roofs  were  of  mud,  later 
changed  to  tule,  when  it  was  found  that  mud  roofs  were 
not  proof  against  rain.  At  San  Diego  and  San  Antonio 
there  were  some  adobe  structures.''^ 

To  the  preceding  facts  but  little  need  be  added.  To' 
support  these  distant  establishments  in  a  populous  Indian 
country,  covering  approximately  five  hundred  miles  from 
Monterey  to  San  Diego,  there  were  but  sixty  soldiers,  eleven 
mission^,i^s,  and  an  occasional  mechanic  in  the  service  of 
{Eegovernment.  Clearly,  Alta  California  was  not  on  a. 
very  substantial  basis.  During  the  period  that  Verger  was 
writing  his  pessimistic  memorials  of  1771-72  it  is  not  likely 
that  the  government  would  have  authorized  such  an  ex- 
pedition as  Anza  wished  to  make,  and  not  even  as  late  as 
February,  1773,  if  we  may  judge  from  Bucarely's  letter  of 
the  24th,  for  it  seemed  more  than  likely  that  the  establish- 
ments would  have  to  be  abandoned.  In  the  course  of 
the  year  1773,  however,  a  change  occurred,  for  something, 
although  little  enough,  had  been  accomplished.  Even 
Verger's  opinion  seems  to  have  become  more  favorable. 
On  November  5,  1773,  he  wrote  to  Bucarely  of  news  that 
he  had  received  from  Alta  California,  telling  of  good  crops 
and  numerous  conversions.'*  There  was  already  a  growing 
hope  for  the  future. 

This  summary  of  conditions  in  the  Californias  preceding 
the  Anza  expeditions  may  be  brought  to  a  close  with  a 
reference  to  the  cost  of  the  establishments  from  the  found- 
ing of  San  Bias  to  the  end  of  the  year  1773.  Complete 
figures  are  not  at  hand,  but  the  most  important  of  them, 

"For    the    Palou    report,   C-2446 ;  74C-2425;    reported  to  Arriaga  by 

also  in  Palou,  Noticias,  III,  228-54.  Bucarely,  Nov.  26,  1773,  C-2441. 


128  THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  V 

those  of  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  are  available.  The 
beginning  of  the  department  may  be  dated  January  11, 
1768,  when  Croix  issued  an  instruction  for  the  guidance  of 
its  commissary,  or  head/^  Operations  to  the  end  of  1773 
are  clearly  presented  in  two  reports  of  July  20,  1774,  by 
Francisco  Hijosa,  the  commissary.  One  of  these  deals 
with  the  history  of  San  Bias  both  before  and  after  its  es- 
tablishment on  a  new  basis  in  1768,  giving  not  only  local 
items,  but  also  much  that  bears  upon  its  principal  raison 
d^Ure,  supplying  the  Californias.'^^  The  other  concerns  the 
town  of  San  Bias  and  the  officers  of  the  department.^^  They 
show  that  between  March  1,  1768,  and  December  31,  1773, 
the  department  had  given  aid  to  Baja  California  to  the 
extent  of  207,006  pesos,  6  reales,  and  10  granos,  and  to  Alta 
California,  250,753  pesos.  These  figures  did  not  include  the 
cost  of  goods  sent  from  Mexico  to  each  of  the  Californias, 
nor  such  sums  as  were  supplied  from  confiscated  goods  of 
the  Jesuits  and  from  the  pious  fund.^*  Hijosa  complained 
that  the  amounts  supplied  to  Baja  California  should  have 
come  from  the  two  last-named  funds.  The  department 
itself  had  cost  112,542  pesos,  7  reales,  4  granos,  resulting 
in  a  total  expenditure  of  570,302  pesos,  6  reales,  2  granos, 
an  average  of  about  100,000  pesos  a  year.  As  an  offset  the 
salt  mines  of  San  Bias  had  yielded  about  25,000  pesos  a 
year.  Bucarely  forwarded  these  reports  to  Arriaga,  De- 
cember 27,  1774,  giving  high  praise  to  Hijosa  for  his  manage- 

"  C-930,  allowances    {sinodoa)    to    missionaries, 

^'  C-2679.  troops,  and  ships  of  the  same  Peninsula, 

''"'  C-2680.  and  for  the  establishment  of  the  mis- 

™  The  pious  fund  at  this  time  was  a  sions  of  San  Diego  and  Monterey,  and 

special   branch   of   real   hacienda,    con-  not  diverted  to  other  objects."   Quoted 

sisting  of  free  gifts  of  individuals  for  in  a  decree  of  the  Council  of  the  Indies, 

furtherance  of  mission  work  in  the  Cal-  Dec.    16,    1776,    C-3394.     Engelhardt, 

ifornias.     It    was    managed,    however,  II,  655-60,  has  an  appendix  on  the  un- 

by  government  officials,   and  portions  lawful  use  of  the  pious  fund  in  connec- 

were    occasionally    diverted    to    other  tion  with  the  expeditions  of   1769   to 

objects.     Protests    against  such  diver-  Alta     California.     "San     Diego     and 

sions  were  made,  leading  to  directions  Monterey"   was  employed  to  indicate 

that  they  must  not  occur  again,  or  that  all  of  the  establishments  of  Alta  Cali- 

such  an  one  was  to  be  permitted  "for  fornia.     "Monterey"   alone  was  often 

this  once  only."     In  a  decision  by  the  used    to    connote   Alta    California,    as 

Real   Tribunal  de  Cuentas  of   Mexico,  also    were   "the    new  establishments," 

July  27,   1773,  it  is  stated   "that  the  "northern  California"  and  "new  Cali- 

said  pious  fund  of  California  .  .  .  ought  fornia."     Cf.  chap.  II,  n.  5. 
to   be   employed   only   in   payment   of 


1769]  NEED   FOR   OVERLAND   ROUTE  129 

ment  of  the  department  J®  These  figures  help  to  explain 
the  importance  that  was  attached  to  the  Californias.  They 
were  a  drain  on  the  treasury,  but  despite  that  and  other 
burdens  involved  in  their  retention,  the  government  never 
slackened  in  its  desire  to  keep  them,  so  great  was  their 
strategic  importance  as  against  foreign  attack. 


t  ^rt.--^  '•^■'^^'^'^^-*^^"<^  i^^zMuJM 


w  C-2785. 


CUCii.^' 


^^ 


a 


CHAPTER  VI 

STATE  OF  AFFAIRS  IN  THE  FRONTIER  PROVINCES,   1771-1773 

The  need  for  an  overland  route  to  Alta  California  has 
just  been  pointed  out.  As  such  a  route  must  come  from 
Sonora  or  New  Mexico,  we  may  now  consider  whether  there 
was  anything  to  prevent  the  opening  of  a  route  from  one 
region  or  the  other,  bearing  in  mind  the  significant  dates 
with  regard  to  Anza's  proposal.  May  2,  1772,  when  he  asked 
to  be  allowed  to  make  an  expedition,  and  September  13, 
1773,  when  his  petition  was  granted.  As  between  New 
Mexico  and  Sonora,  the  latter  was  more  likely  to  prove  the 
better  starting-point.  That  Anza  was  not  authorized  to 
go  until  late  in  1773  was  due  in  part  to  Bucarely's  uncer- 
tainty concerning  the  affairs  of  the  Californias,  and  partly 
to  fear  that  Sonora  was  not  entirely  pacified,  but  also  in 
great  degree  to  the  continuance  of  Apache  wars  along  the 
frontier  from  northeastern  Sonora  to  Texas ;  these  wars 
might  have  threatened  communications  with  Alta  California, 
had  a  route  been  open.  New  Mexico,  like  the  Californias, 
was  in  a  measure  separated  from  the  problems  of  the  frontier 
line,  but,  aside  from  its  distance  from  the  Californias, 
affairs  there  were  less  favorable  than  in  Sonora.  Although 
the  Apaches  confined  their  attacks  in  Sonora  to  its  north- 
eastern corner,  that  region  was  constantly  exposed,  because 
internal  revolts  might  draw  off  attention  from  its  defence. 
Moreover,  Apache  attacks  interfered  seriously  with  the 
best  of  the  northwesterly  routes,  down  the  Santa  Cruz 
to  the  Gila,  and  by  way  of  the  last-named  river  to  the  Col- 
orado. Steps  were  taken  in  accord  with  Rubi's  suggestions 
to  remedy  the  frontier  situation,  but  with  little  effect  in 
the  period  under  review.  They  formed  a  basis,  however, 
for  hopes  of  the  future. 

130 


17711  STATE   OF  AFFAIRS  131 

Following  Elizondo's  conquest  an  effort  was  made  to 
develop  the  wealth  of  Sonora,  thus  to  insure  retention  of 
the  province.  Early  in  1771  a  proposal  was  made  to  form 
a  stock  company  to  exploit  the  mineral  wealth  of  Sinaloa 
and  Sonora,  and  the  government  showed  interest  in  it, 
which  is  noteworthy,  although  the  plan  was  soon  given  up.^ 
Nevertheless,  rich  discoveries  were  frequently  reported. 
Governor-intendant  Pedro  Corbalan  ^  wrote  from  Alamos, 
September  24,  1771,  of  the  finding  of  new  mines  at  Aygame,^ 
which  occasioned  correspondence  between  Bucarely  and 
Arriaga,  the  latter  suggesting  appropriate  methods  of  ex- 
amining into  the  truth  of  similar  reports.'*  Of  most  im- 
portance, however,  were  the  already  existing  Cieneguilla 
mines,  which  were  a  matter  of  great  concern  to  the  govern- 
ment. Bucarely  wrote  to  Arriaga,  July  26,  1772,  that  he 
was  taking  steps  to  learn  the  true  status  of  the  Cieneguilla 
placers.^  Pedro  Tueros,  the  officer  in  charge  at  Cieneguilla, 
reported,  December  1,  1772,  that  the  mines  were  producing 
scantily.  He  planned  to  induce  the  Indians  to  work  an- 
other part  of  the  camp  in  search  of  gold,  for  if  no  new 
placers  were  found,  the  Indians  might  desert,  —  a  matter 
of  moment,  as  they  constituted  three-fourths  of  the  workers.^ 
Bucarely  ordered  the  governor  of  Sonora  to  prevent  the 
abandonment  of  the  work  and  of  the  territory  already 
settled."^  A  little  later,  better  news  came  from  Cieneguilla. 
Tueros  wrote  to  Pedro  Corbaldn,  January  14,  1773,  that 
although  gold  was  less  abundant  than  formerly,  more  than 
7000  men  were  engaged  in  mining  it.  Moreover,  new  placers 
had  been  found  which  promised  extraordinary  wealth.  This 
information  was  passed  on  to  Bucarely,  and  by  him  to 
Arriaga,  March  27,  1773.^  Soon  afterward,  reports  of  an 
encouraging  nature  from  the  Real  Caja  of  Alamos  were 
received.     For  the  year  1772  the  royal  fifth  had  been  taken 

iC-1720,    1729,    1807,    1841,    1926^  <C-1 802,  1922,  1992. 

1983.    *^~"^  .6C-1993.     Approved     by    Arriaga, 

2  Corbaldn  as  governor-intendant  of  Nov.  7,  1772,  C-2058. 
Sinaloa  and  Sonora  exercised  a  superior  *  C-2074. 

authority  to  that  of  Mateo  Sastre  who  '  Bucarely  to  Arriaga,  Feb.  24,  1773, 

was  governor  of  Sonora.  C-2178. 

3  C-1783.  8  C-2204. 


132        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VI 

from  4857  marcos  of  gold,^  whereas  1854  marcos  had  already 
been  presented  in  the  first  four  months  of  1773/°  an  advance 
over  the  average  for  the  preceding  year.^^  On  the  whole, 
therefore,  the  situation  as  regards  mineral  production  in 
Sonora,  and  the  consequent  maintenance  there  of  a  large 
population,  was  satisfactory,  and  prospects  were  improving. 

Meanwhile,  there  had  been  rumblings  of  internal  revolt 
in  Sonora,  as  well  as  Apache  forays.  Although  Elizondo's 
'^bops  had  been  withdrawn  after  the  pacification  of  Sonora 
in  1771,  the  original  plan  of  proceeding  to  conquer  the 
Apaches  was  not  entirely  given  up.  The  presidio  captains 
of  Terrenate,  Tubac,  and  Fronteras  were  ordered,  late 
in  that  year,  to  unite  at  San  Simon,  and  proceed  with  a 
force  from  Janos  against  the  Apaches.  The  captains  asked 
for  reinforcements,  provisions,  and  equipment  before  at- 
tempting the  campaign,  but  were  informed  by  Corbalan 
that  he  could  send  no  troops  from  Altar,  Pitic,  or  Buena- 
vista,  for  he  needed  all  that  he  had  to  enable  him  to  watch 
the  Pimas,  protect  Cieneguilla,  cover  the  port  of  Guaymas, 
and  check  Yaqui  uprisings.  Nor  could  he  send  provisions,  as 
they  were  scarce,  due  to  a  dry  season.  He  did  issue  orders, 
however,  that  settlers  should  sell  equipment  and  provisions 
to  the  captains  at  reasonable  prices.  Here  the  matter  might 
have  rested,  but  Bucarely  took  measures  to  see  that  the 
captains  got  the  needed  supplies  without  damage  to  Sonora. ^^ 

The  campaign  seems  not  to  have  been  made,  however, 
due  in  a  measure,  perhaps,  to  an  outbreak  of  the  Pimas  in 
December,  1771.  A  body  of  these  set  out  to  conquer  the 
recently  reduced  Seris,  wishing  to  induce  them  to  take  up 
arms  again.  The  uprising  was  checked  in  an  unusual  way. 
Gifts  of  horses  were  promised  by  Spanish  officials  to  the 
Seris,  if  they  would  attack  the  Pimas,  whereupon  the  Seris 
killed  ten  of  the  twelve  Pimas  who  had  started  the  trouble. 
The  affair  pleased  Bucarely,  who  reported  it  to  Arriaga, 
February  24,  1772,  as  a  proof  of  the  loyalty  of  the  Seris.^^ 

»  C-2246.  "  C-1778,  1799,  1895,  1908,  1969. 

wC-2247.  "C-1909.     Also    on    this    subject, 

"  Reported  to  Arriaga  by  Bucarely,  C-1821,  1969. 
July  27,  1773,  C-2334. 


1771]  STATE    OF  AFFAIRS  133 

Later,  the  Sibubapas  committed  some  robberies  in  the 
vicinity  of  Buena vista.  Writing  of  this  to  Arriaga,  August 
27,  1772,  Bucarely  spoke  of  the  variety  of  opinions  in  re- 
gard to  governing  Sonora,  some  recommending  exceedingly 
harsh  penalties  for  such  risings  as  that  of  the  Sibubapas. 
He  was  getting  reports  preparatory  to  calling  a  junta. 
Meanwhile,  he  had  ordered  Governor  Sastre  to  reduce  the 
Sibubapas,  but  to  use  force  only  in  case  other  means  failed.^* 
By  April  26,  1773,  Bucarely  was  able  to  report  that  the  Sibu- 
bapas, as  also  the  Seris,  were  at  peace.^^  Disturbances  had 
occurred  in  another  quarter,  however.  The  Tiburon  In- 
dians had  been  transferred  from  their  island  retreat  to  the 
mission  of  Carrizal  on  the  mainland.  In  March,  1773, 
they  rebelled  and  killed  Father  Gil,  president  of  the  Sonora 
missions.^^  Soon  afterward,  the  Sibubapas  again  left  their 
missions,  but  on  proof  that  it  had  been  from  lack  of  the 
necessities  of  life  and  not  with  the  idea  of  rebellion,  Bucarely 
gave  orders  to  provide  them  with  agricultural  tools,  seed, 
and  provisions,  with  the  condition  that  they  should  event- 
ually be  paid  for.-^^  He  also  took  measures  which  tended 
to  root  the  Seris  more  firmly  in  their  settlement  at  Pitic.^ 
If  they  should  continue  to  sow  the  fields,  he  wrote  to  Arriaga, 
March  27,  1773,  they  could  begin  to  sustain  themselves  by 
the  middle  or  end  of  June,  thus  relieving  the  royal  treasury 
from  the  expense  of  supplying  rations.  A  Queretarano 
Franciscan  was  to  be  sent,  and  by  his  management  the 
permanence  of  the  settlement  on  a  self-supporting  basis 
should  be  assured.  All  crops  were  to  be  in  his  control  for 
distribution  according  to  needs.^^  Writing  again,  six  months 
later,  Bucarely  said  that  he  had  increased  the  fund  available 
for  mission  work  among  the  Seris,  the  more  effectually  to 
attract  them  to  the  faith.^^ 

The  keynote  to  the  situation,  even  in  Sonora,  was  the 
war  against  the_Apaches.     In  Nueva  Viz  cay  a  it  had  gone 

"C-2010.  C-2389.    Approved  by  Arriaga,  C-2508. 
"  C-2237.  18  C-2203. 

"  C-2229.     For  measures  taken  by  "  C-2390.     Approved    by    Arriaga, 

Bucarely,  C-2218.  C-2509. 
"  Bucarely  to  Arriaga,  Sept.  26,  1773, 


\W 


134        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VI 

on  without  ceasing,  seeming  victories  having  slight  result. 
Thus,  after  hearing  of  some  victories  on  the  Chihuahua 
frontier,  Bucarely  warned  Hugo  Oconor,  in  command  there, 
to  take  special  pains  to  avoid  surprises  and  exposure  of  the 
troops  to  the  danger  of  being  defeated  in  detail,  for  the 
Apaches  were  wont  to  take  advantage  of  carelessness.^^ 
It  was  this  practice  of  the  Apaches  that  made  an  unit  of 
the  whole  frontier  in  a  military  way.  Bucarely  expressed 
this  clearly  in  a  letter  of  February  24,  1773,  to  Arriaga.  It 
would  be  easier  to  keep  the  Indians  of  Sonora  in  subjection, 
he  said,  if  the  Apaches  might  first  be  beaten.  Nueva 
Vizcaya  had  recently  been  strengthened ;  therefore,  an 
attack  in  Pimeria  Alta  might  be  expected,  and  indeed  the 
Apaches  had  already  made  a  raid  at  Tubac.  Governor 
Sastre  had  ordered  forty-eight  men  from  Terrenate  and  thirty 
from  Tubac  to  reenforce  Captain  Vildosola  of  Fronteras  in 
order  that  a  campaign  might  be  made  toward  Janos,  and 
Bucarely  had  supplemented  this  order  by  directing  Vildo- 
sola to  arrange  his  movements  to  accord  with  those  of  the 
Chihuahua  expedition,  so  that  the  Apaches  might  be  beaten 
simultaneously  on  both  frontiers.  In  case  of  need  ten  or 
twenty  men  were  to  be  detached  from  Altar,  Buenavista, 
and  Horcasitas,  provided  those  presidios  were  left  with 
forces  enough  to  check  the  Piatos,  Pimas,  Seris,  and  Sibu- 
bapas,  and  to  pursue  the  evildoers,  bandits,  and  vagabonds, 
with  whom  Sonora  was  infested.  Full  success  could  not 
be  expected  until  the  new  line  of  frontier,  presidios  should 
be  established  and  the  new  reglamento  become  effective. 
By  the  latter,  one  hand  was  to  direct  all  military  opera- 
tions of  the  frontier  provinces,  and  it  would  then  be  more 
easy  to  bring  about  cooperation  in  warfare  against  the 
Apaches.^^ 

n  expectation  of  a  vigorous  campaign  in  Nueva  Vizcaya, 
Governor  Sastre  formed  a  cordon  of  troops  on  the  Sonora 
frontier,  to  oppose  the  Apaches  when  they  should  be  driven 


/    Goi 


M  Bucarely  to  Arriaga,  Aug.  27,  1772,  against    the    Apaches,    C-2230.     This 

C-2007.  letter  is  substantially  to  the  same  effect 

« C-2175.     Bucarely    wrote    again,  as  C-2175. 
April  26,   1773,  about  measures  taken 


1771]  STATE    OF   AFFAIRS  135 

from  Chihuahua.  He  waited  some  time,  but  the  Apaches 
did  not  come,  for,  as  he  wrote  to  Bucarely,  January  14, 
1773,  the  Spanish  forces  in  Nueva  Vizcaya  had  not  played 
their  part.  Indeed,  Oconor  had  not  even  written  to  him, 
he  complained.  His  men  were  getting  sick,  and  his  horses 
useless  on  account  of  the  excessive  cold,  so  that  he  expected 
to  have  to  retire  soon.^^  A  week  later  Sastre  wrote  to 
Bucarely  that  it  was  not  advisable  to  invade  Apacheria, 
as  events  were  proving  that  the  jpresidial  troops  were  inj 
adequate  to  defend  their  own  territories.  In  proof  of  this 
he  cited  two  attacks  recently  made  at  the  presidios  them- 
selves. One  of  these  was  at  Tijb^  on  October  17,  1772,  at 
midday,  when  more  than  a  hundred  horses  were  taken  by 
the  Apaches.  The  other  was  at  Terrenate,  where  they  got  264 
horses.  These  disasters  were  ascribed  by  Sastre  to  a  failure 
to  place  patrols  to  watch  the  avenues  of  the  enemy's  approach 
despite  his  orders  to  do  so ;  otherwise,  the  Apaches  would 
have  found  the  troops  under  arms,  and  no  disaster  would 
have  followed.  At  Horcasitas,  Altar,  and  Fronteras,  his 
orders  had  been  obeyed,  and  there  had  been  no  trouble.^^ 
These  two  letters  caused  Bucarely  to  admonish  Oconor, 
April  21, 1773,  telling  him  that  the  Apaches  must  be  checked, 
or  the  ruin  of  the  frontier  provinces  might  result.  The 
work"  was~  difficult,  but  difficulties  must  be  overcome. 
The  Indians  did  not  seek  opposition,  but  rather  took  advan- 
tage of  carelessness  and  weakness,  on  which  account,  resist- 
ance to  them  must  be  prepared  everywhere.  New  Mexico 
alone  of  the  frontier  provinces  did  not  suffer  from  Apache 
attacks,^*  but  Nueva  Vizcaya  was  being  desolated  by  some 
three  hundred  Apaches,  and  the  troops  seemed  unable  to 
prevent  it.  In  Sonora  the  situation  was  even  worse,  not 
only  due  to  the  Apaches,  but  also  because  of  the  danger 
that  the  Seris  and  other  recently  subjected  tribes  might 

**  C-2137.  "  By   this   remark  Bucarely   meant 

"  C-2140.     Juan  Bautista  de  Anza  that  Apache  wars  were  less  serious  in 

commanded  at  Tubac,  and  Jos6  Anto-  New  Mexico  than  elsewhere.     In  letters 

nio   de  Vildosola  at  Terrenate.     There  of  nearly  the  same  date,  January  27, 

seems  to  have  been  bad  feeling  between  and  April  26,  1773,  Bucarely  refers  to 

Sastre    and    Anza,    as    is   instanced    in  Apache  depredations  in  New  Mexico, 

several  of  the  documents  of  this  period.  C-2149,  2231. 


I 


136       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VI 

rise  again.  Affairs  were  much  the  same  in  Coahuila. 
Bucarely  asked  Oconor  if  he  had  enough  troops  to  chastise 
the  enemy  and  at  the  same  time  make  the  changes  of  presi- 
dio sites  required  in  order  to  form  the  frontier  Hne,  and  he 
ordered  him  to  open  correspondence  with  the  various  pro- 
vincial governors,  and  to  inform  them  whenever  he  planned 
to  make  a  campaign,  so  that  there  might  be  a  combined 
movement.  Meanwhile,  he  was  to  send  to  Bucarely  diaries 
of  his  own  operations,  and  letters  about  everything  that 
came  to  his  notice,  so  that  Bucarely  could  have  ample 
data  on  which  to  base  his  measures.^^  Reviewing  these 
matters  in  his  letter  to  Arriaga  of  April  26,  1773,  Bucarely 
summed  up  the  situation  as  follows  :  If  we  do  not  promptly 
and  simultaneously  check  the  Indians  in  all  of  the  provinces, 
and  establish  the  line  of  frontier  presidios,  we  may  have 
success  in  some  provinces  where  we  have  plenty  of  troops, 
but  cannot  avoid  damage  in  others,  for  the  Apaches  flee 
from  opposition,  and  attack  where  resistance  is  weakest. 
Because  of  the  vast  extent  of  our  territory  it  is  exceedingly 
difficult  to  cover  all  ways  of  ingress  and  egress,  wherefore 
we  must  await  the  completion  of  the  line  of  presidios,  and 
then  wa^e  luiceasing  campaigns.  For  the  present,  it  is 
too  much  to  expect  the  soldiers  to  do,  for  they  have  the 
additional  burden  of  building  the  new  presidios ;  so,  addi- 
tional troops  will  be  sent.  Oconor's  task  as  comandante 
inspector  is  a  hard  one,  since  he  has  to  cover  the  whole  area 
in  person  or  by  his  orders,  and  owing  to  the  tremendous  dis- 
tances, he  cannot  be  sure  at  the  time  of  giving  his  commands 
that  his  measures  will  prove  beneficial.^^ 

Several  references  have  been  made  to  the  proposed  forma- 
tion of  a  line  of  frontier  presidios  as  a  means  of  combating 
the  Apaches.  This  traces  directly  to  the  inspection  by  the 
'M^rqu'^s  de  Rubi,  1766-68,  to  which  reference  has  already 
been  made.  On  April  25,  1770,  Arriaga  ordered  Croix  to 
take  such  measures  as  were  fitting  to  protect  the  interior 
provinces  in  accord  with  the  plan  and  other  documents  of 
Rubi,  and  with  the  requirements  for  bringing  about  peace 

26  C-2219.  26  C-2233. 


1771]  STATE    OF  AFFAIRS  137 

with  the  Indians.^^  Croix  thereupon  drew  up  a  detailed 
instruction  for  the  forming  of  a  Hne  of  presidios  from  Sonora 
to  Texas,  those  of  the  Cahfornias  not  being  considered  as 
part  of  the  plan.  The  instruction  is  dated  July  18,  1771, 
and  was  intended  to  go  into  effect  on  January  1,  1772.^^ 
That  date,  however,  was  much  too  early,  for  the  instruction 
had  called  for  the  suppression  of  six  existing  presidios,  and 
for  a  change  of  site  of  many  that  were  to  be  retained.  A 
junta  was  held,  April  2,  1772,  in  which  it  was  decided  that 
sites  should  be  explored  for  new  locations  of  presidios,  and 
the  needs  of  the  frontier  in  relation  to  Apache  warfare  deter- 
mined,^^ Bucarely  giving  appropriate  orders  to  carry  out 
the  junta^s  decision.^^  Before  anything  of  importance  had 
been  accomplished  the  matter  was  taken  up  in  Madrid,  with 
the  result  that  a  formal  reglamento  was  drawn  up,  signed  by 
the  king  September  10,  1772,  for  the  line  of  presidios  about 
to  be  formed  on  the  frontier  of  New  Spain.  Among  the 
more  noteworthy  terms  of  the  reglamento  were  the  following  : 
There  was  to  be  a  line  of  fifteen  presidios  from  Altar  in 
Sonora  to  Espiritu  Santo  in  Texas,  these  being,  as  nearly  as 
possible,  forty  leagues  apart,  but  with  due  regard  to  habit- 
ableness  of  site  and  the  necessities  of  defence.  There  were 
to  be  other  presidios  not  part  of  the  line,  as  Santa  Fe  in 
New  Mexico,  San  Antonio  de  Bejar  in  Texas,  Buenavista 
and  Horcasitas  in  Sonora  (although  it  was  planned  to  sup- 
press the  two  last  named,  as  soon  as  the  Indians  should  be 
sufficiently  reduced  to  a  peaceful  mode  of  life),  and  also 
various  garrisons  or  '^flying  squadrons,''  while  the  Cahfor- 
nias were  to  continue  on  a  separate  footing,  the  viceroy  being 
ordered  "to  sustain  and  aid  them  by  every  means  possible." 
The  line  was  to  be  established  by  an  official  to  be  called 
the  comandante  inspector  (or  in  this  document,  inspector 
comandante)  of  the  military  rank  of  colonel  at  the  least, 
directly  under  the  orders  of  the  viceroy,  but  if  a  comandancia 

^  C-1468.  only  the  decision  of  the  junta,  but  also 

**  C-1759.     The    gist   of    this  docu-  some  of  the  documents  upon  which  it 

ment  appears  in  an  estado,   or   chart,  was  based. 

made  by  Jose  de  Gorrdez,  July  23,  1771,,  »  Referred  to  in  Bucarely  to  Arriaga, 

C-1760.  Apr.  24,  1772,  C-1941. 
*  C-1850,  a  testimonio  including  not 


w 


138       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VI 

general  of  the  frontier  provinces  should  be  erected,  he  was 
to  be  under  the  comandante  general.  He  was  not  to  be 
governor  of  a  province  or  captain  of  a  presidio,  but  was  to 
rule  over  all,  changing  his  residence  according  to  the  needs 
of  the  service,  and  seeing  to  it  that  the  terms  of  the 
reglamento  were  enforced.  He  was  to  review  the  presidios 
each  year,  but  might  do  this  through  two  ayudantes  in- 
spectores,  who  were  to  have  the  rank  at  least  of  captain. 
He  was  not  only  to  erect  the  new  line  of  presidios,  but  also 
to  have  the  determination  and  direction  of  military  cam- 
paigns. He  might  grant  a  truce  or  even  negotiate  the 
preliminaries  of  peace,  although  in  the  latter  event  peace 
would  not  be  binding  and  permanent  without  sanction  of 
the  viceroy.  His  salary  was  to  be  8000  pesos  a  year,  and 
that  of  each  ayudante  inspector  3000  pesos.^^ 

Hugo  Oconor  became  the  first  comandante  inspector,  being 
appointed  the  day  of  the  decree,^^  and  going  forth  to  take  up 
his  duties  on  December  4,  1772.^^  Bucarely  set  to  work  to 
prepare  an  instruction  supplementary  to  the  reglamento. 
On  February  24,  1773,  he  wrote  to  Arriaga  that  he  had  com- 
pleted it,  and  hoped  to  put  the  reglamento  into  effect  by 
July  1,  1773.  This  would  not  be  possible  in  all  places, 
because  of  the  vast  extent  of  the  frontier  provinces,  and  of 
certain  measures  that  had  to  precede  the  placing  of  the  presi- 
dios. Oconor  must  first  dislodge  the  Taraumares  from  the 
Bols6n  de  Mapimi  (where  a  situation  existed  parallel  to 
that  of  the  Seris  and  the  Cerro  Prieto  of  Sonora  in  former 
years).  Vast  regions  had  to  be  explored,  presidial  sites 
chosen,  and  all  of  the  presidios  inspected.  Bucarely  was 
facilitating  matters  by  arranging  that  the  work  to  be  accom- 
plished in  New  Mexico,  eastern  Texas,  Nuevo  Leon,  and 
Nayarit  be  done,  not  by  Oconor,  but  by  others.^* 

The  instruction  to  Oconor  is  dated  March  1,  1773.  For 
the  purpose  of  showing  frontier  conditions  it  is  quite  as 
important  as  the  reglamento  itself.     It  begins  with  a  pre- 

« C-1843.     Also    in    ArriUaga,   Re-       22,  1777,  C-3606. 
copilacidn  for  1834,  139-89.  ^  C-2077. 

32  Stated   in   Oconor  to   Croix,  July  »*  C-2180. 


1771]  STATE    OF  AFFAIRS  139 

amble  giving  a  history  of  the  conquest  of  New  Spain,  in 
particular  of  the  frontier  provinces,  and  praises  the  Mar- 
ques de  Rubi  and  viceroys  Casa-Fuerte  (1722-34)  and 
Croix  (1766-71)  for  correcting  abuses  there,  propagating 
the  faith,  and  taking  other  action  redounding  to  the  glory 
of  Spain.  Then  follow  the  instructions  in  seventy-six 
paragraphs.  These  supplement  the  reglamento  by  empha- 
sizing certain  phases  of  the  work,  and  by  giving  directions  as 
to  the  way  in  which  it  was  to  be  carried  out.  Oconor's 
principal  duty  was  to  estabUsh  the  line  of  presidios,  but  he 
was  also  to  give  special  heed  to  campaigns  against  the 
Apaches  and  to  reviewing  presidios.  Attention  was  directed 
also  to  paragraphs  in  the  reglamento  tending  to  the  suppres- 
sion of  graft  by  presidial  captains,  who  were  prohibited 
from  having  a  hand  in  the  sale  of  goods  to  their  troops.  In 
arranging  the  line  of  presidios  Oconor  was  to  begin  in  the 
east  and  proceed  westward.  Nueva  Vizcaya  and  Coahuila 
having  been  strengthened,  it  was  quite  likely  that  the 
Apaches  would  attack  Sonora,  wherefore  Oconor  was  to 
take  with  him  enough  troops  to  be  able  to  chastise  them. 
Until  the  four  Sonora  presidios  provided  for  in  the  regla- 
mento could  be  placed  at  their  new  sites,  the  "flying  com- 
pany'' of  Sonora  was  to  be  retained  in  service.  The  presi- 
dios of  Horcasitas  and  Buenavista  were  also  necessary  until 
the  Seris,  Tiburones,  Pimas,  and  Sibubapas  should  become 
definitely  settled  in  missions.  The  value  of  Rubfs  work 
was  such  that  Oconor  was  to  have  Rubles  report  with  him 
wherever  he  went,  that  document  being  described  as  esen- 
cialisimo.  Former  presidio  sites,  left  vacant  by  the  removal 
of  the  presidios  to  the  new  line,  were  to  be  occupied  by  Span- 
ish and  Opata  settlers.  While  some  soldiers  were  to  be  em- 
ployed in  building  presidios,  others  could  be  used  for  cam- 
paigns, aided  in  this  respect  by  the  flying  squadron  of  Jos^ 
Antonio  de  Vildosola,  the  garrisons  of  Horcasitas  and  Buena- 
vista, and,  if  hostilities  should  have  ceased  there,  by  some 
of  the  troops  from  Nueva  Vizcaya  and  Coahuila.  In  case 
of  insurmountable  difficulties  in  obeying  these  directions, 
Oconor  might  make  provisional  orders,  submitting  them  to 


c?L„ 


140        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VI 

Bucarely,  however,  for  final  decision.  Weekly  reports  of 
occurrences  in  the  frontier  provinces  were  to  be  made  by 
the  comandante  inspector  to  the  viceroy.^^ 

In  forwarding  this,  Bucarely  wrote  a  long  letter  to  Oconor. 
As  to  Sonora  he  reiterated  that  Apaches  fleeing  from  Nueva 
Vizcaya  might  endanger  Pimeria  Alta.  Some  subjected 
Indians  of  Sonora  were  also  showing  signs  of  bad  faith,  and 
it  would  be  necessary  to  watch  them,  although  some  of  the 
settlements,  those  of  the  Seris  in  Pitic,  the  Tiburones  in 
Carrizal,  and  the  Sibubapas  in  Suaqui,  were  proceeding 
happily.  These  three  tribes  were  a  very  important  consider- 
ation. They  occupied  the  best  lands  of  Sonora,  and  their 
continuance  at  peace  would  result  in  benefit  to  the  province, 
and  a  saving  to  the  public  treasury,  as  for  example  by  the 
suppression  of  the  presidios  of  Horcasitas  and  Buenavista. 
Oconor  was  charged  to  devote  himself  with  zeal  to  main- 
taining peace  in  Sonora.^^  At  the  same  time  Bucarely  took 
measures  in  support  of  the  reglamento,  giving  appropriate 
instructions  to  the  governors  of  Nueva  Vizcaya,  Sonora, 
Coahuila,  Texas,  and  New  Mexico,  ordering  the  extinction 
of  the  presidios  of  Nuevo  Leon  and  Nayarit,  and  providing 
ioT  the  payment  of  expenses  by  the  cajas  reales  of  Durango, 
Alamos,  Potosi,  and  Guadalajara.  These  measures  were 
referred  to  in  Bucarely's  letter  to  Arriaga  of  March  27^ 
1773.37 

Bucarely ^s  letter  of  February  24  (already  cited) ^^  and  the 
above  of  March  27,  1773,  were  forwarded  by  Arriaga  to  the 
Conde  de  O'Reilly  for  his  opinion,  respectively  on  May  24  ^^ 
and  June  23,  1773.^^  O'Reilly  was  then  the  leading  military 
authority  in  Spain,  and  also  a  very  great  personal  friend 
of  Bucarely.  He  reported  favorably  in  both  cases,  holding 
that  Bucarely's  measures  were  very  well  taken,*^  whereupon 
Arriaga  apprised  Bucarely  of  his  own  approval,  in  replies 
of  August  6  ^2  and  August  20,  1773.^^ 


36  C-2186. 

39  C-2270. 

3«  C-2185. 

^0  C-2296. 

87  C-2199, 

enclosing    C-2185,   2186, 

«  C-2324  and  C-2352. 

)5,  2196. 

«  C-2346. 

38  C-2180. 

«  C-2356. 

1771]  STATE    OF   AFFAIRS  141 

Bucarely's  instruction  had  referred  to  the  prohibitjion_  ^  ^^^ 
placed  upon  presidio  captains  from  selling  goods  to  their,,,  i 
soldiers.  This  touched  upon  an  evil  that  was  ever  present 
in  Spanish  colonies,  —  graft.  There  is  plenty  of  evidence 
that  it  was  general  along  the  frontier.  To  this  must  be  i 
ascribed,  in  some  measure,  the  failure  to  stamp  out  Indian  ' 
wars,  and,  as  a  corollary,  the  failure  to  establish  an  effective  , 
route  to  the  Californias.  Graft  of  presidial  captains  in 
the  sale  of  goods  to  soldiers  was  referred  to  in  one  of  the 
Labaquera  memorials,  as  already  noted. ^^  A  royal  decree 
of  May  12,  1760,  ordered  a  junta  to  be  called  in  Mexico 
to  regulate  the  prices  of  goods  at  the  presidios.  The  order 
seems  not  to  have  been  fulfilled ;  so,  on  June  23,  1764, 
Arriaga  ordered  Cruillas  to  call  the  junta,  which  was  to 
arrange  that  prices  should  be  the  same  as  those  current 
among  merchants  of  the  provincial  capitals  nearest  the 
presidios.^^  On  March  17  of  the  next  year  Cruillas  wrote 
that  he  had  called  the  first  junta,^^  which  drew  a  sharp  re- 
proof from  Arriaga,  August  1,  1765,  for  the  viceroy's  delay 
in  a  matter  that  had  been  recommended  to  him  as  so  im- 
portant.*^ Cruillas  replied,  October  23,  1765,  defending 
himself,*^  but  no  evidence  has  appeared  to  show  that  the 
abuses  at  the  presidios  were  remedied.  They  were  one  of 
the  matters  to  engage  the  attention  of  the  Marques  de  Rubi 
in  course  of  his  inspection.  In  a  letter  of  February  21, 
1767,  he  forwarded  to  Arriaga  a  file  of  papers  treating  of  the 
irregular  conduct  of  some  presidio  captains,  who  tyrannized 
over  their  troops  in  the  matter  of  prices  and  goods  furnished 
them.'*^  Arriaga  replied,  July  24,  1767,  that  steps  were 
being  taken  to  check  that  evil.^°  We  have  seen  that  Croix 
and  Galvez  stated  that  the  Sonora  presidios  served  princi- 
pally to  enrich  captains  and  their  backers. ^^  In  his  in- 
struction to  Bucarely  of  September  1,  1771,  Croix  said  that 
the  officers  of  presidios  had  for  a  long  time  occupied  the 

«  Supra  p.  66.  *»  C-705. 

«  C-555.  w  C-845. 

«  C-582.  "  Croix  and  Gdlvez,  Plan,  Jan.  23-24, 

*^  C-591.  1768,  A.G.I.,  103-3-23. 

«  C-598. 


142        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VI 

position  of  merchants,  paying  their  troops  in  goods  and  mer- 
chandise, and  making  a  great  profit  for  themselves. ^^  In  the 
reglamento  of  September  10,  1772,  the  whole  matter  is  taken 
up  in  detail.  Of  the  fourteen  titles  preceding  the  instruction 
for  placing  the  line  of  presidios,  eleven  deal  with  the  correc- 
tion of  abuses  in  the  management  of  presidios.  The  first 
paragraph  of  title  one  may  be  translated  as  follows:  "In 
order  that  the  presidial  troops  may  not  in  future  suffer 
such  damage  as  heretofore,  receiving  salary  in  effects  charged 
at  excessive  prices,  when  my  royal  treasury  was  paying 
them  in  specie :  I  prohibit  this  practice  from  the  first  day 
of  next  year,  with  an  express  declaration  that  those  who 
now  are  and  in  future  shall  be  governors  and  captains  of 
interior  presidios  are  not  to  take  any  part  whatever  in  the 
purchase  of  the  provisions  and  supplies  of  their  garrisons, 
under  penalty  of  deprivation  from  office,  and  of  remaining 
incapacitated  from  obtaining  other  employment  in  my 
service ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  shall  take  care  very 
particularly  that  the  quality  of  these  effects  be  good  and 
their  prices  equitable. '^  Paying  the  troops,  as  well  as  the 
gathering  of  rations,  horses,  clothing,  trappings,  and  other 
effects  needed  by  the  soldiers  and  their  families  was  to  be 
in  charge  of  an  hahilitado  (paymaster),  who  was  to  be  a 
non-commissioned  officer,  ^wing  his  appointment  as 
hahilitado  to  an  election  in  which  the  soldiers  themselves 
had  some  voice,  one  vote  in  five,  or  in  some  cases  one  in  six. 
His  principal  duties  may  be  summed  up  by  saying  that  he 
was  to  procure  the  necessary  goods  and  to  sell  them  as 
cheaply  as  possible,  for  which  he  received  two  per  cent  to 
cover  expenses. ^^  Bucarely's  remarks  on  this  matter  to 
Oconor  in  his  instruction  of  March  1,  1773,  have  already 
been  alluded  to.  Abuses  continued,  however.  Habilitados 
began  to  delegate  their  powers  to  private  individuals,  and 
to  buy  goods  from  a  single  shop,  rather  than  from  those 
which   gave   the   best   prices.     These   practices  were  pro- 

M  Croix,  Correspondance,  291.  lacidn  for  1834,  139-89,  especially  140- 

wC-1843.     In    Arrillaga,    Recopi-  71. 


1771]  STATE    OF   AFFAIRS  143 

hibited  in  1777.^^  Another  practice  growing  out  of  the 
reglamento  of  1772  was  that  the  captains  and  their  sergeants 
or  other  subaltern  hahilitados,  combined  to  make  an  unfair 
profit  out  of  sales  to  the  presidial  troops.  That  seems  to 
have  been  a  prime  factor  in  the  revolt  of  the  garrison  of 
Terrenate  against  its  captain  in  1774.  On  that  occasion 
the  habilitado  had  gone  bankrupt,  and  the  enraged  soldiery- 
beat  him  nearly  to  death.  Captain  Vildosola  was  for  a 
time  suspended  from  command,  and  the  case  dragged  itself 
out  to  the  year  1782.^^  Not  only  the  spirit  of  the  reglamento 
but  also  the  letter  of  the  law  was  disregarded  in  some  in- 
stances. Bucarely's  letter  of  October  27,  1775,  said  that 
Captain  Tovar  of  Terrenate  was  keeping  a  public  shop,  and 
was  also  addicted  to  drunkenness,  whereupon  Bucarely 
ordered  his  removal,  on  Oconor's  recommendation,^^  and 
Gdlvez  approved,^^  but  Tovar  was  killed  in  an  Indian  fight 
before  the  order  could  take  effect.  This  state  of  affairs 
tended  to  the  continuance  of  Indian  wars,  for  disorder  was, 
in  the  interest  of  dishonest  captains  and  their  backers, 
preventing  competition  with  them  by  stock-raisers  who 
lacked  the  advantage  of  presidial  troops  to  protect  their 
animals. 

As  New  Mexico  figures  in  this  work,  both  as  an  objective 
of  a  route  from  Sonora  by  way  of  the  Colorado-Gila  junc- 
tion, and  as  a  starting  point  for  a  route  to  Alta  California, 
brief  notice  may  here  be  given  of  the  state  of  affairs  there. 
Pedro  Fermin  de  Mendinueta  was  governor  at  this  time. 
''In  1771  he  announced  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  with  the 
Comanches  on  the  3d  of  February ;  and  the  viceroy,  replying 
with  thanks,  called  for  a  report  on  the  condition  and  needs 
of  the  province,  which  was  furnished  in  March,  1772. 
Mendinueta  declared  that  the  force  of  80  soldiers  at  Santa 
Fe  was  not  sufficient  to  protect  so  broad  a  territory,  raided 
by  savage  foes  from  every  side.  True,  there  were  about 
250  men  capable  of  bearing  arms  among  the  settlers,  be- 
sides the  pueblo  Indians ;    but  these  were  poorly  supplied 

"  C-3558,  3613,  3705.  on  the  same  case. 

"C-2676,    2489,    4330,   4541.     Be-  »« C-3019. 

sides  these,  there  are  numerous  others  "  C-3167. 


144       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VI 

with  weapons,  and  could  not  leave  their  homes  unprotected 
to  engage  in  distant  campaigns.     The  governor's  proposed 
/ .  remedy  was  a  new  presidio  at  Taos,  and  an  enforced  law 

^  .  requiring  the  Spaniards  to  live  in  compact  pueblos  like  the 
Indians/'  ^^  No  very  important  change  occurred  as  a  result 
of  the  reglamento  of  1772.  The  province  was  hardly  devel- 
oped to  such  a  point  that  it  could  take  up  projects  of  further 
conquest.  Aside  from  its  scant  white  population  it  had  too 
many  Indian  enemies  to  contend  against.  The  Apaches 
were  not  so  troublesome  there  as  in  Nueva  Viz  cay  a,  but 
they  made  attacks  from  time  to  time.  The  most  persistent 
was  the  Comanches.  The  peace  of  1771  with  them  was 
little  more  than  a  temporary  lull  in  warfare,  for  in  1773  we 
find  Bucarely  writing  to  Arriaga,  January  27,  that  fresh 
irruptions  of  the  Apaches  and  Comanches  had  occurred  in 
New  Mexico,^®  and  again,  on  April  26,  of  instructions  that 
he  had  given  to  Mendinueta  to  check  the  depredations  of 
those  tribes.^^ 

Thus  we  may  conclude  that  the  situation  in  the  frontier 
provinces,  while  bad,  was  hopeful.  Sonora  and  New 
Mexico  were  in  an  uncertain  state,  and  the  latter  had  too 
scant  a  population  to  achieve  much  in  the  way  of  conquest 
toward  the  Calif ornias.  The  seriousness  of  the  Nueva 
Vizcaya  situation  had  a  definite  effect  upon  measures 
affecting  Sonora.  Still,  as  compared  to  the  warfare  prior 
to  the  suppression  of  the  Seris,  a  distinct  advance  had  been 
achieved,  and  the  new  reglamento,  it  was  confidently  be- 
lieved, would  solve  the  whole  problem.  The  moment  was 
a  fairly  favorable  one,  therefore,  for  attempting  to  discover 
a  land  route  to  the  Californias,  of  which  those  regions  were 
greatly  in  need.^^ 

"  Bancroft,  Ariz.  &  New  Mex.,  259.  Crisostomo    de    Barroeta    drew    up    a 

*'  C-2149.  plan,    in   which   it   was   provided   that 

*  C-2231.  this   sum    should    be   charged    against 

"  Naturally  the  question  of  expense  the   following    cajas   reales:     Durango, 

was  an  important  one  in  the  plans  for  194,671  pesos,  2  tomines ;   San  Luis  Po- 

the  line  of  frontier  presidios.     By  the  tosi,  148,051  pesos,  2  tomines;  Guada- 

reglamento    of    1772    it    resulted    that  lajara, 34,900 pesos;  Alamos, 9,995 pesos. 

387,617   pesos,   4    tomines   were   neces-  Barroeta  to   Bucarely,   Apr.   27,    1773, 

sary   for    the   annual    expense   of    the  C-2244. 

presidios.     At    Bucarely's   order   Juan  t 


-\. 


CHAPTER  VII 

GARCES  AND  ANZA,    1769-1773 

Some  indication  has  been  given  of  the  need  for  an  over- 
land route  to  Alta  California,  and  the  situation  in  the 
frontier  provinces  has  been  reviewed  in  order  to  discover 
why  an  expedition  was  not  authorized  sooner.  This  chapter 
will  treat  directly  of  Anza's  petition  to  make  such  an  expedi- 
tion, without  considering  outside  factors,  up  to  the  official 
authorization  of  September,  1773.  Although  Bucarely's 
interest  in  the  Californias  appears  clearly  from  what  has 
been  said  already,  and  from  the  content  of  this  chapter, 
the  immensity  of  his  work  for  the  new  settlements  will 
appear  in  greater  measure  in  later  chapters.  Much  that 
he  did  was  contemporaneous  with  the  course  of  Anza's 
petition,  but  discussion  is  postponed,  because  the  subject- 
matter  overlaps  into  a  period  beyond  September,  1773. 

The  immediate  causes  of  the  Anza  expedition  of  1774 
and  of  the  selection  of  the  route  are  closely  associated  with 
the  name  of  Father  Francisco  Garces,  a  Franciscan  of  the 
College  of  Quer^taro.  His  explorations  of  1770  and  1771 
indicated  that  routes  existed  to  both  Alta  California  and 
New  Mexico,  and  that  the  natives  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado 
were  friendly  and  desirous  of  conversion.  Juan  Bautista 
de  Anza  was  a  meritorious  officer  of  Sonora.  For  a  number 
of  years  he  had  been  interested  in  seeking  an  overland 
route  to  Alta  California,  just  as  his  father  had  before  him. 
In  1769  he  asked  permission  of  Gdlvez  to  make  the  attempt, 
but  was  not  permitted  to  do  so.  On  May  2,  1772,  he  again 
proposed  such  an  expedition,  but  owing  to  fears  that  the 
war  in  Sonora  might  again  break  out,  and  that  an  expedition 
such  as  Anza  proposed  might  stir  up  the  Indians  of  the 
L  145 


146       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

country  traversed,  the  junta  was  not  willing  to  recommend 
it  until  further  reports  should  be  obtained.  While  these 
were  being  awaited  Father  Serra  arrived  in  Mexico.  His 
reports  showed  clearly  that  Alta  California  was  in  need  of 
an  overland  route.  More  reports  having  been  received  a 
junta  was  again  called.  Bucarely,  meanwhile,  had  received 
notices  of  foreign  aggressions  in  the  Pacific,  and  these 
influenced  the  decision  in  favor  of  the  expedition.  On 
September  9,  1773,  a  junta  recommended  that  Anza  be 
licensed  to  make  the  exploration  that  he  had  proposed,  and 
on  the  13th  Bucarely  so  decreed.  The  long-planned  ad- 
vance by  way  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado  rivers  was  to  come, 
at  last. 


The  Franciscans  were  eager  to  make  a  good  showing  in 
Pimeria  Alta,  to  which  they  had  succeeded  in  1768,  follow- 
ing the  expulsion  of  the  Jesuits.  Therefore,  there  came  a 
renewal  of  northward  explorations  and  of  projects  for 
converting  the  Indians  of  the  Gila,  and  even  those  as  far 
away  as  Moqui.  Preeminent  among  the  Queretaranos  of 
Pimeria  Alta  was  a  man  whose  achievements  should  be 
written  large  in  the  history  of  exploration,  Father  Francisco 
Carets.  Although  his  principal  object  in  his  journeys  of 
exploration  was  the  saving  of  souls,  for  in  him  apostolic 
zeal  burned  with  an  ardor  comparable  with  that  of  his 
great  predecessors  in  the  Franciscan  order,  his  results  were 
of  vast  importance  from  the  standpoint  of  exploration  and 
of  plans  for  frontier  advance.  Carets  took  up  his  ministry  at 
San  Javier  del  Bac  in  June,  1768.  In  August,  he  started  on 
the  first  of  his  tours  of  exploration  going  through  Papagueria 
to  the  Gila.  In  1769  he  seems  to  have  made  an  unimpor- 
tant tour  as  chaplain.  In  1770  he  went  forth  again,  between 
October  19  and  November  2,  covering  from  Bac  to  and  along 
the  Gila,  and  the  return  to  Bac.  On  this  journey  he  travelled 
among  the  Pimas  Gileiios  and  Opas,  both  of  whom  gave 
him  a  friendly  reception.  He  reported  that  the  Pimas 
Gilenos  were  particularly  worthy,  and  were  clamorous  for 
the  missionaries  that  Garces  had  promised,  when  he  visited 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  147 

.them  in  1768.  They  were  far  from  being  a  savage  people, 
had  good  fields  of  wheat  and  maize,  and  knew  of  God.  The 
Opas  were  a  much  ruder,  if  equally  kindly  people.  This 
exploration  added  fresh  evidence  of  the  accessibility  of  Alta 
California  from  Sonora,  for  the  Pimas  were  much  excited 
over  accounts  of  people  seen  in  the  west,  the  previous  year  ; 
these  they  described  in  such  a  way  that  Garces  realized 
that  they  were  referring  to  the  soldiers  of  the  1769  expedi- 
tions to  Alta  California.  The  accessibility  of  Moqui  was 
attested  by  the  presence  of  blankets  of  Moqui  make,  the 
Indians  also  stating  that  they  had  obtained  them  in  trade 
with  other  Indians,  who  had  bought  them  from  the  Moquis. 
In  concluding  his  diary  of  this  journey  Garces  urged  the  con- 
version and  conquest  of  the  Pimas  Gileiios.  They  were 
neighbors  of  the  Apaches,  and  only  four  or  five  days  from 
New  Mexico ;  they  ruled  Papagueria,  and  were  a  valiant 
people.  Conversions  there  he  deemed  to  be  a  hundred 
times  more  important  than  in  the  west,^  because  commerce 
with  New  Mexico  might  be  obtained  through  that  region,  ' 
and  the  Apaches  might  be  checked  from  extension  west-  jj 
ward.^ 

A  much  more  important  journey  was  made  by  Garces     'JPl 
from  August  to  October,  1771,  and  the  information  that  he      ^ 
gained  had  a  great  influence  on  the  opinion  of  the  junta  | 
which    eventually    recommended    Anza^s    first    expedition. 
This  journey,  too,  more  than  any  other,  helped  to  deter-  ^ 
mine  the  route  of  the  subsequent  expedition.     The  details 

1  In    summarizing    this    diary    the  was  the  one  actually  used  by  the  junta 

junta  understood  this  to  mean  west  of  in  coming  to   its  conclusions.     Garc6s 

New    Mexico,    i.e.   asegurando    que  las  said  that  he  had  sent  his  original  diaries 

conguistois  y  fundaciones  que  se  hagan  of  this  and  other  entradas  to  the  presi- 

por  aquellas  partes  serdn  mds  apreciables  dent  of  the  College  of  Quer^taro,  but 

que  las  que  se  extablezcan  p^.    el  Poniente  believed  that  they  could  not  be  under- 

del  Nuevo  Mexico.     Resolution  of  the  stood  because  of  his  bad  handwriting. 

junta,  Sept.  9,  1773,  in  C-2113.  Garc6s   to    Bucarely,     Mar.     8,    1773, 

2Garc6s,    Diary   [Nov.   2,    1770],   in  Tubac,    in    C-2113.     A   letter   of    Bu- 

C-2113.     This  diary  was   not  in  fact  carely  of  April  26,   1773,  says  of  this 

written  until  on  or  shortly  before  March  diary  that  it  was  very  difficult  to  under- 

8,    1773,   when   Garces  forwarded   this  stand,  and  he  doubted  whether  it  would 

and  his  1771  diary,  in  response  to  orders  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  junta  in  its  at- 

from   Bucarely.     The   opinions,    there-  tempt  to  decide  whether  Anza  should 

fore,  may  be  based  upon  his  later  ex-  be  authorized  to  open  an  overland  com- 

perience,  as  well  as  upon  the  journey  munication  from  Sonora  to  Monterey, 

of    1770.     Yet    this    later    account    is  C-2234.    Garc6s' letters  made  up  in  large 

preferable  to   the  original,   because  it  measure  for  the  confusion  of  his  diary. 


148       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

of  the  diary  as  to  Garc6s'  route  might  well  have  been  very- 
confusing  to  the  junta,  due  to  the  fact  that  Garces  mistook 
the  Colorado  for  the  Gila.  In  reality  he  went  through 
Papagueria  to  the  Gila,  reaching  it  just  above  its  junction 
with  the  Colorado  whither  he  was  desirous  of  going;  he 
went  on  past  the  junction  of  the  rivers,  without  realizing 
that  he  had  done  so,  and  then  travelled  west  and  south 
along  the  Colorado  thinking  that  he  was  on  the  Gila  and 
would  in  that  way  reach  the  junction ;  he  crossed  the  Col- 
orado, believing  that  he  was  crossing  the  Gila,  and  came 
upon  a  vast  lagoon,  which  he  took  to  be  the  Colorado ;  he 
returned  to  the  Colorado  and  ascended  almost  to  the 
junction  again,  without  realizing  how  near  he  was  to  the 
place  that  he  sought ;  thence  he  returned  through  Papa- 
gueria. During  his  wanderings  he  visited  and  named 
many  of  the  villages  west  of  the  Colorado  and  reached  the 
\  very  canyon  by  which  Anza^s  expedition  was  to  make  its 
way  through  the  mountains.  He  had  also  journeyed  west 
.  of  the  Gila  Mountains  in  Papagueria,  being  the  first  known 
j  \  explorer  to  take  that  route,  along  which  he  later  guided 
[  1  Anza.^ 

The  parts  of  Carets'  diary  that  weighed  most  with  the 
junta  *  were  those  dealing  with  the  conditions  that  he  found. 
In  Papagueria  there  was  but  little  water,  which  had  caused 
the  Indians  to  refrain  from  asking  for  missionaries,  although 
they  desired  them.  In  succeeding  days,  Garces  had  passed 
through  lands  almost  devoid  of  water,  and  occasionally 
through  others  where  there  was  too  much ;  at  one  time, 
when  in  fact  along  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Colorado,  he 
had  travelled  for  several  days  through  swamps.  West 
of  the  Colorado,  or  of  the  Gila  as  he  thought,  he  found  great 
scarcity  of  water;  he  was  at  that  time  in  the  Colorado 
Desert.  Despite  these  bad  conditions,  the  Indians  had 
good  crops  of  maize  and  wheat,  squash  and  melons.     The 

'  Herbert  E.  Bolton,  The   early  ex-  shows  in  detail  Garc63'  exact  route  in 

plorcUions    of    Father    Garces     on    the  his  journey  of  1771. 

Pacific  slope,  in   The  Pacific  Ocean  in  *  Resolution  of  the  junta,   Sept.   9, 

history.     I  had  reached  the  conclusion  1773,    gives    a    summary    of    Garcia' 

independently    that     Garces     mistook  diaries.     In  C-2113. 
the  Colorado  for  the  Gila,  but  Bolton 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  149 

natives  were  of  powerful  physique,  and  were  most  kind 
to  Garc6s,  listening  eagerly  to  his  promises  of  missionaries. 
The  various  tribes  were  hostile  to  each  other,  being  always 
at  war,  despite  which  fact  their  numbers  were  very  great. 

Garc^s  also  got  much  information  tending  to  prove  the 
existence  of  routes  to  Alta  California  and  New  Mexico. 
The  junta  made  no  note  of  the  facts  mentioned  by  Garc6s  in 
its  summary  of  the  diaries,  but  as  it  had  already  commented 
upon  them  in  connection  with  other  documents,  they  may 
be  chronicled  here.  While  at  San  Jacome  ^  Garces  was  told 
there  were  men  to  the  west  garbed  like  himself,  and  others 
up  and  down  the  river.  Shells  which  the  Indians  wore 
in  their  ears  had  been  procured  seven  days  to  the  west, 
where  two  of  their  number  had  been  and  had  seen  mission- 
aries. The  missionaries  of  New  Mexico  were  seven  days 
to  the  east,  the  Indians  said,  but  only  four  days  from  San 
Pedro,  near  the  junction.  They  spoke  of  other  white  men, 
who  wore  a  different  kind  of  clothing  from  that  of  the 
friars,  which  agreed  with  a  story,  of  which  Garces  had  heard, 
told  to  the  Pimas  Gilenos  by  a  slave  who  had  escaped  from 
the  Apaches.  Garc6s  met  Indians  who  had  seen  a  compass 
such  as  he  carried,  —  proof  that  they  had  seen  other  white 
men.  He  also  saw  many  of  the  painted  shawls  of  Moqui, 
and  garments  of  black  wool  and  horsehair,  a  significant 
fact,  because  these  Indians  had  no  cattle  or  horses  them- 
selves to  furnish  the  raw  material  for  these  articles  of  wear- 
ing apparel.  They  told  Garces  that  they  got  them  from  the 
Opas,  who  lived  on  the  route  to  Moqui.® 

Bucarely  had  already  begun  to  consider  establishing 
communication  between  Sonora  and  Monterey,  before  Anza 
presented  his  petition.  An  expediente  giving  an  account  of 
Garces'  journey  '  had  been  sent  to  him  by  Pedro  Corbaldn, 
and  Bucarely  forwarded  it  to  Arriaga,  March  25,  1772.^ 
The  Corbalan  expediente  included  a  letter  from  Father 
Esteban  de  Zalazar  to  Fathers  Perfecto  and  Mariano  de 
Buena   raising   conjectures  whether   Monterey  might   not 

^  An  Indian  village  west  of  the  Colo-  *  Garc6s,  Diary,  Aug.  8  to  Oct.  27, 

rado  and  below  its  junction  with  the       1771,  C-1 765.     Also  in  C-2113. 
Gila,  named  San  Jacome  by  Garc6s.  '  C-1806.  « C-1931. 


150        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  VII 

be  reached  by  way  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila.  In  a  letter  to 
Governor  Sastre,  March  18,  1772,  Bucarely  asked  Sastre 
to  give  his  views  on  the  matter.^ 

Juan  Bautista  de  Anza,  like  his  father  and  grandfather 
before  him,  had  followed  a  military  career  in  the  frontier 
provinces.  With  regard  to  his  early  life  little  has  yet  ap- 
peared beyond  the  fragmentary  references  in  Bancroft. ^^ 
Taking  these  with  a  report  by  the  Marques  de  Rubi,  Feb- 
ruary 21,  1767,"  Anza's  petition  of  1770  that  he  be  confirmed 
as  captain  of  cavalry,^^  and  several  other  documents  not  used 
by  Bancroft,  a  fairly  complete  summary  may  be  obtained. 
His  grandfather  had  served  thirty  years  at  Janos  as  lieu- 
tenant and  captain,  and  his  father  twenty  years  in  the  same 
capacities  at  Fronteras,  acting  also  as  temporary  governor 
of  the  province  at  one  time.  In  the  latter  capacity  he  had 
merited  and  won  general  approval,  especially  by  breaking 
up  an  Indian  conspiracy  in  1737.  In  that  year  one  Arisivi, 
an  Indian,  claimed  to  be  a  herald  of  Montezuma,  saying 
that  the  latter  had  come  back  to  life  to  restore  the  Mexican 
Empire.  Anza^s  father  hanged  Arisivi  and  several  of  his 
followers,  which  ended  the  revolt.  His  connection  with  the 
bolas  de  plata  incident  and  his  death  at  the  hands  of  the 
Apaches  have  already  been  referred  to.  The  Anza  who  now 
enters  the  account  was  born  at  Fronteras  in  1735,  and  entered 
the  service  in  1753,  taking  part  thenceforth,  as  he  put  it  in 
1770,  in  continuous  warfare  against  the  Apaches,  Seris, 
Pimas,  and  Sibubapas.  For  the  first  two  years  he  was  a 
volunteer  at  Fronteras,  serving  at  his  own  expense.  On 
July  1,  1755,  he  became  a  lieutenant  at  that  presidio.  He 
is  mentioned  as  taking  part  in  a  campaign  under  Captain 
Gabriel  de  Vildosola  against  the  Apaches  in  1758.  On 
February  19,  1760,  he  was  promoted  to  the  captaincy  of 
the  presidio  of  Tubac,  but,  owing  tQ  the  death  of  Viceroy 
Amarillas,    the    appointment    had    never   been    confirmed. 

9  Cited  in  Sastre  to  Bucarely,  Oct.  details  that  it  leads  one  to  believe  that 

19,  1772,  C-2037.     Also  in  C-2113.  it  was  a  case  of  mistaken  identity. 

i**  An  account  of  Anza's  life  appeared  ^^  Exttracto  de   la  rebistta  de  inspec- 

in  the  San  Mateo  Leader  of  December  2,  cidn,  Tubac,  in  C-706. 
1909,  but  it  is  so  inaccurate  as  to  proved  ^^  C-1421. 


,.x^. 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  151 

Bancroft  refers  to  a  campaign  by  Anza  in  1760  against  the 
Seris,  and  to  another  of  1766  against  the  Apaches.  One  of 
Anza's  principal  achievements  was  the  subjecting  of  the 
Papagos,  a  tribe  of  over  three  thousand  Indians,  on  which 
occasion  he  killed  their  chief  with  his  own  hand.  He  had 
made  many  campaigns  in  southern  Sonora,  against  the 
Seris  and  others  of  the  Cerro  Prieto,  and  according  to  Rubi, 
was  the  one  who  contributed  most  to  reducing  the  Suaquis. 
In  the  military  operations  of  Elizondo,  Anza  was  a  conspic- 
uous figure.  A  letter  of  his  to  Fray  Juan  Sarove,  a  Carme-  ^-^s,e 
lite  of  Zelaya,  May  18,  1769,  tells  of  an  attack  by  him  on 
the  Cerro  Prieto  a  few  days  before. ^^  A  detail  of  the  troops 
of  the  Sonora  campaign,  made  by  Elizondo,  October  16, 
1769,  shows  that  there  were  four  divisions,  Anza  serving  in 
that  commanded  by  Captain  Diego  Peyran.  Of  the  255 
men  under  Peyran,  Anza  commanded  55.^*  That  same 
month  he  was  one  of  three  commanders  engaged  in  an  attack 
on  the  Cerro  Prieto.  He  is  also  mentioned  in  the  monthly 
reports  of  events  sent  by  Elizondo  to  the  viceroy. ^^  In  his 
petition  of  1770  Anza  says  that  he  had  twice  been  wounded, 
that  he  had  been  in  fourteen  general  engagements  and  many 
lesser  ones,  that  his  troops  had  killed  115  persons,  captured 
109,  and  taken  over  2500  cattle. 

Bishop  Tamaron,  who  was  at  Tubac  in  1763,  states  that 
Anza  was  a  married  man,  his  wife  being  the  sister  of  one 
Jose  Manuel  Diaz  del  Carpio,  chaplain  of  the  post.^^  Of 
his  character  and  abilities  the  writer  has  seen  many  docu- 
ments giving  praise  of  the  highest  kind.  Even  Father  Font 
(with  Anza  on  his  second  expedition  to  Alta  California), 
who  entertained  a  deep  dislike  for  Anza,  never  hinted  that 
he  was  other  than  an  able,  courageous  officer.  Governor. 
Sastre  seems  to  have  made  several  veiled  thrusts  at  Anza. 
This  is  all  that  the  writer  has  found  in  derogation  of  Anza, 
prior  to  the  Yuma  disaster  of  1781,  while  on  the  other  hand, 
there  are  numerous  documents  in  which  he  is  given  the 
warmest  praise,  even  by  Teodoro  de  Croix,  who,  after  1871 

13  Santa  Cruz  de  Quer6taro,  K,  No.  »  For  example,  in  C-1250. 

11,  Leg.  14.  i«  A.P.C.H.,  Tamar6n,  Visita,  113. 

"  C-1384. 


152       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

was  most  bitter  against  him.  One  such  document  especially- 
worthy  of  note  is  the  already  mentioned  report  by  the  Mar- 
ques de  Rubi.  After  recounting  Anza's  services  Kubi  says 
that  '^by  reason  of  his  activity,  valor,  zeal,  intelligence,  and 
notable  unselfishness  he  is  an  all-round  good  officer  (un 
Completto  ofizial),  worthy  of  being  distinguished  by  His 
Majesty  in  remuneration  for  his  services,  and  as  a  stimulus 
to  others/'  More  directly  to  the  point  were  Rubi's  re- 
marks in  praise  of  Anza  as  a  result  of  the  former's  inspection 
of  Tubac.  Not  only  Anza's  accounts,  but  also  the  declara- 
tions of  his  soldiers,  showed  that  he  had  never  done  any- 
thing prejudicial  to  his  troops,  but,  on  the  contrary,  had 
always  treated  them  liberally;  he  had  actually  reduced 
prices  for  them,  displaying  a  generosity  which,  according  to 
Rubi,  was  very  rare  in  the  frontier  provinces.  Because  of 
Anza's  just  administration  many  people  had  come  to  live 
at  Tubac,  to  the  great  advantage  of  all  that  section,  a  fact 
which  might  in  future  permit  of  transferring  the  presidio 
to  a  more  advanced  point,  affording  greater  opportunity 
for  discoveries  and  for  reducing  the  Apaches. 

Anza's  petition  of  1770  for  the  full  rank  of  captain  was 
recommended  by  his  immediate  chiefs,  Juan  de  Pineda  and 
Domingo  Elizondo,  as  also  by  Viceroy  Croix. -^^  The  matter 
was  referred  to  General  Alejandro  O'Reilly,  who  replied, 
that  as  the  command  of  a  presidio  was  a  very  lucrative 
one,  it  ought  not  to  be  given  too  freely,  but  only  as  an  ex- 
ceptional reward.  He  therefore  recommended  telling  Anza 
that  his  petition  would  be  borne  in  mind,  and  would  be 
granted,  if  he  continued  to  merit  the  viceroy's  approval. ^^ 
O'Reilly's  recommendation  was  adopted  verbatim  by  Arriaga, 
who  wrote  to  Croix  to  that  effect,  October  2,  1770.-^^  So  for 
the  time  being  Anza's  petition  was  denied. 

Anza  seems  to  have  been  interested  for  many  years  prior 
to  his  proposal  of  1772  in  projects  for  an  advance  by  way 

"  Croix  to   Arriaga,   Apr.   29,    1770,  of  presidio  captains  was  a  quasi-recog- 

C-1473.  nized  institution.     He  could  not  have 

^8  O'Reilly    to    Arriaga,     Sept.    27,  been   referring   to    a   captain's   salary, 

1770,  C-1549.     O'Reilly's  remark  would  which  was  small, 
seem  to  indicate  that  graft  on  the  part  "  C-1553. 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  153 

of  the  Gila  and  Colorado  rivers.  He  and  another  officer 
planned  to  make  an  expedition  to  the  Colorado  River  in 
1756,  and  Governor  Mendoza  was  to  follow  with  a  large 
force,  but  soldiers  who  had  accompanied  the  Jesuits  on 
previous  expeditions  gave  such  accounts  of  the  difficulties 
to  be  encountered  that  the  idea  was  given  up.^^  Carets 
alludes  to  Anza's  having  made  such  an  offer  in  the  time  of 
the  Jesuits,  saying  that  it  was  due  to  the  visitador  of  that  order 
that  the  project  was  without  effect. ^^  Anza  also  proposed 
an  expedition  to  Gdlvez  in  1769,  similar  to  the  one  which 
he  suggested  to  Bucarely  in  1772.  This  has  hitherto  rested 
upon  the  following  direct  evidence :  Palou,  after  mention- 
ing the  earlier  proposal  of  Anza's  father,  says:  "The  said 
captain,  Don  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza,  was  in  accord  with  the 
desire  of  his  deceased  father  and  just  as  if  the  latter  might 
have  bequeathed  the  idea  in  a  clause  of  his  will,  he  [Anza 
of  Tubac]  made  an  offer  to  the  very  illustrious  visitador 
general  to  make  an  expedition  at  his  own  cost  from  the  region 
of  the  last  presidios  and  frontiers  of  Sonora  to  the  great 
sea,  with  a  view  to  meeting  with  the  expedition  going  in 
search  of  the  said  ports  [San  Diego  and  Monterey].  He  did 
not  succeed  in  his  designs  because  the  visitador  did  not 
deem  the  said  expedition  necessary  at  that  time."  ^^  Addi- 
tional evidence  may  now  be  given.  Both  Anza  and  Gdlvez 
were  in  the  Cerro  Prieto  district  in  the  fall  of  1769,  and  Anza 
speaks  of  meeting  Gdlvez  at  that  time,  and  of  telling  him, 
as  well  as  Elizondo  and  the  governor,  that  he  had  news  from 
the  Pimas  Gileiios  proving  a  route  to  Alta  California  by 
way  of  Sonora.  The  Pimas  had  heard  from  Indians  west 
of  them  of  the  1769  expeditions  to  Alta  California.^'  A 
Gdlvez  report  to  Arriaga  of  March  8,  1774,  spoke  favorably 
of  Anza's  proposal  to  Bucarely.  He  and  the  Marques 
de  Croix  had  favored  such  a  plan  after  Galvez's  return  from 

20  Stated  in  Anza  to  Bucarely,  Mar.  8,  1773,  in  C-2113.     This  may  possibly 

7,  1773,  in  C-2113.  be  a  confused  reference  to  Anza's  pro- 

*i  The    Spanish    is :     atendo  tambiSn  posal  of  1769. 
dho    capitdn     (segun    me    dixo)     havia  ^  Palou,  Notidas,  III,  154-55. 

procurado  hazer  este  gran  servicio  en  tpo  23  Anza  to   Bucarely,  May   2,  1772, 

de  los  Pes.     Jesuitas  por  cuio  visitador  in  C-1872. 
no  tuvo  efecto.    Garc6s  to  Bucarely,  Mar. 


154       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

Sonora,  he  said,  but  they  had  departed  from  New  Spain 
before  being  able  to  put  it  into  execution.^^  A  number  of 
reasons  can  be  imagined  why  Gdlvez  did  not  authorize  an 
expedition  at  that  time,  even  granting  that  Anza  offered 
to  do  so  at  his  own  expense.  Every  available  man  was 
needed  against  the  Seris,  and  Anza's  withdrawal  would 
have  taken  away  a  number  of  troops.  Moreover,  expedi- 
tions at  the  leader's  expense  in  fact  involved  much  govern- 
mental expenditure,  as  in  the  case  of  Anza's  expedition  of 
1774,  which  was  made  on  those  terms.  Furthermore,  Gal- 
vez's  illness  might  have  interrupted  the  project.  Finally, 
Galvez  might  have  wished  to  await  the  result  of  the  other 
expeditions  to  Alta  California,  to  see  whether  the  land  could 
be  held,  before  authorizing  a  new  one.  Gdlvez's  own  words 
would  imply  that  he  did  not  refuse  his  consent,  but  post- 
poned it. 

Anza  was  well  acquainted  with  Garc6s'  achievements, 
the  latter's  mission  of  Bac  being  only  a  few  miles  north  of 
Tubac.  During  Garces'  1771  tour  Anza  wrote  him  a  letter, 
and  it  reached  him  in  the  midst  of  his  wanderings  west  of 
the  Colorado,^^  —  evidence  of  the  friendly  disposition  of  the 
Indians.  At  length,  on  May  2,  1772,  Anza  wrote  to  Bucarely 
asking  permission  to  attempt  the  discovery  of  a  route  from 
Sonora  to  Monterey.  Anza's  letter  was  mainly  an  argu- 
ment that  such  a  route  could  be  opened  with  less  difficulty 
and  at  less  cost  than  had  been  supposed.  He  had  learned 
from  the  Pimas  in  1769,  independently  of  Garces,  of  their 
having  heard  from  Indians  west  of  them  of  the  1769  ex- 
peditions to  Alta  California,  and  Garces'  diaries  had  con- 
firmed this  news.  Garces  had  referred  to  the  docility  of 
the  Yumas  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  junc- 
tion, and  also  to  the  peaceful  character  of  the  Pimas  Gileiios. 
The  Yumas  had  asked  to  see  Garces'  compass  and  glass 
instrument  for  making  a  fire,  and  also  to  see  other  instru- 
ments which  he  did  not  have,  which  proved  that  there 
must  be  a  route  to  Alta  California  or  to  New  Mexico ; 
nobody  from  Sonora  had  visited  them,  and  none  of  the 

M  C-2566.  »  Garc63,  Diary,  in  C-2113. 


1769]  GARCfiS   AND   ANZA  155 

Yumas  had  come  there,  because  their  enemies  barred  the 
way.  Garces  saw  a  blue  ridge,  which  he  thought  might 
be  the  one  seen  by  the  soldiers  who  went  to  Monterey  in 
1769,  and  he  and  Anza  were  convinced  that  the  distance 
to  Monterey  was  less  than  people  had  believed.  Conclud- 
ing, Anza  asked  permission  to  attempt  an  expedition  to 
Monterey,  taking  with  him  Garces  and  twenty  or  twenty-five 
soldiers  of  his  presidio,  which  number  would  be  sufiicient, 
he  thought,  for  the  undertaking.^^  The  fiscal,  Areche, 
seems  to  have  understood  this  last  statement  as  an  offer 
by  Anza  to  pay  the  expenses  of  the  expedition,  except  for 
the  use  of  the  soldiers, ^^  and  that  interpretation  was  ac- 
cepted by  Anza.^^ 

By  a  decree  of  August  26,  1772,  Bucarely  referred  Anza!s 
petition  to  the  engineer  Miguel  Costanso  for  an  opinion, 
the  latter  having  accompanied  the  expedition  of  1769  to 
Monterey,^^  and  Costanso  returned  a  very  important  report, 
September  5,  1772.  He  estimated  the  distance  between 
Tubac  and  Monterey  as  180  leagues  in  a  straight  Hne.  The 
Pimas  might  have  heard  of  the  1769  expeditions,  he  said, 
as  the  Indians  certainly  did  communicate  with  each  other. 
He  himself  had  seen  implements  at  the  Santa  Barbara 
Channel,  such  as  knives,  pieces  of  sword,  and  other  things, 
which  had  come  from  Spanish  soldiers  in  New  Mexico,  not 
brought  directly,  but  passed  from  hand  to  hand,  as  the 
Indians  were  too  hostile  to  one  another  to  stray  far  from 
their  native  land.  A  pass  would  have  to  be  found  through 
mountain  ridges  between  the  Colorado  River  and  the  Pacific 
Ocean ;  the  mountains  were  certainly  extensive  and  rough, 
but  if  the  Indians  crossed  them,  Spaniards  could.  Pioneers' 
tools,  such  as  levers,  spades,  and  pickaxes  should  be  carried, 
however,  and  two  soldiers  should  be  brought  from  San 
Diego  to  serve  as  guides,  once  the  expedition  should  ap- 
proach the  Pacific.  The  utility  of  such  a  route  was  un-  \^ 
questionable.     Lands  in  the  north  of  Baja  California  were    [ , 

2«InC-1872.  inC-2113.    It  is  possible  that  Anza  may 

27  Areche  to  Bucarely,  Oct.  12,  1772,  have  said  this  in  another  letter,  although 
in  C-1872.  Areche  did  not  refer  to  any  other. 

28  Anza  to  Bucarely,  Mar.  7,   1773,  »  i^  C-1872. 


156       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

too  poor  to  give  even  the  slightest  aid  in  products  to  San 
Diego  and  Monterey,  and  from  Loreto,  farther  south,  it 
was  three  hundred  leagues  to  San  Diego,  by  a  hard  road, 
which  rendered  help  difficult.  It  was  a  long,  arduous  voyage 
from  San  Bias,  and  the  boats  were  too  small  to  permit  of 
transporting  families.  Thus,  Spaniards  in  San  Diego  and 
Monterey  must  remain  unmarried.  On  the  other  hand, 
Sonora  produced  every  kind  of  grain  and  fruit,  and  the 
distance  was  not  excessive,  wherefore  provisions  and  families 
might  be  sent  from  Sonora,  giving  the  new  settlements  greater 
soHdarity  than  they  then  had.^° 

The  Anza  letter  and  Costanso's  report  were  referred  to 
the  fiscal,  Areche,  who  reported,  October  12,  1772,  rec- 
ommending that  the  expedition  be  authorized,  since  Anza 
was  to  undergo  the  expense.  Carets  should  go,  too,  and 
the  tools  suggested  by  Costanso  should  be  taken.  Anza 
was  entitled  to  praise  for  suggesting  the  expedition,  for  it 
would  be  a  great  advantage  to  have  a  better  route  than  the 
slow,  arduous  ones  by  way  of  San  Bias  or  Loreto.  It  would 
help  the  missions  and  presidios  of  Alta  California,  and  those 
of  Sonora  as  well,  by  giving  the  latter  a  market  for  its 
products.  If  Alta  California  were  as  fertile  as  claimed,  it 
could  become  populous,  if  families  were  sent  to  develop  it. 
This  would  reduce  the  burden  on  the  royal  treasury  in  main- 
taining the  new  establishments,  a  very  great  one  with  no 
better  routes  than  the  two  maintained  at  the  time.  The 
only  objection  to  the  project  was  the  withdrawal  of  troops 
from  Tubac,  they  being  needed  against  the  Apaches,  but 
this  could  be  overcome  by  transferring  the  twenty-three 
soldiers  at  Altar,  supplying  their  places  until  Anza's  return 
by  use  of  militia.  Anza  should  be  instructed  to  treat  the 
Indians  with  kindness,  for  the  better  security  of  the  route, 
if  discovered.  He  should  be  assured  that  in  the  event  of 
success  the  king  would  be  asked  to  give  him  a  suitable 
reward.^^ 

A  junta  was  called  for  October  17.  In  addition  to  the 
Anza,  Costans6,  and  Areche  documents  Bucarely  ordered 

30  In  C-1872.  M  In  C-1872. 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  157 

those  of  Anza's  father,  Rebolledo,  and  the  king,  of  1737- 
38,  on  the  same  subject,  to  be  submitted  to  the  junta?^ 
The  junta  decided,  October  17,  1772,  that  more  information 
was  necessary.  The  following  were  its  resolutions  :  Garc^s' 
opinion  should  be  asked,  and  a  copy  of  his  1771  diary  should 
be  sent  for;  the  expediente  should  be  sent  to  Governor 
Sastre,  and  his  opinion  asked,  whether  Anza^s  undertaking 
would  disturb  the  peace  of  that  government ;  Anza  should 
be  thanked  for  the  zeal  which  his  proposal  indicated ;  and 
a  copy  of  the  papers  should  be  sent  to  the  king.^^  Bucarely 
concurred  in  the  decision,  and  wrote  presently  for  the  re- 
ports requested,  writing  at  length  also  to  Arriaga,  October 
27,  1772,  reciting  the  course  of  Anza's  petition  and  for- 
warding a  testimonio  on  the  matter.^* 

Before  Sastre  had  time  to  receive  the  papers  sent  to  him 
at  the  junta^s  order,  he  had  replied  to  Bucarely^s  letter  of 
March  18,  in  a  communication  dated  October  19,  1772, 
making  suggestions  based  upon  the  reports  of  Garc6s' 
explorations  of  1768,  1770,  and  1771.  He  advised  establish- 
ing three  missions  in  Papagueria,  the  desolate  region  between 
Sonora  and  the  Colorado.  There  were  no  religious  there, 
although  the  Papago  Indians  were  Christians,  due  to  their 
habit  of  bringing  children  to  the  missions  for  baptism. 
There  was  plenty  of  pasture  in  Papagueria,  but  the  land  was 
almost  useless  for  crops  or  for  cattle,  because  of  the  scarcity 
of  water.  Three  missions  would  be  practicable,  however, 
and  would  serve  a  good  end,  as  that  land  was  a  refuge  for 
vagabonds  and  bad  Indians,  under  no  legal  or  spiritual  re- 
straint whatever.  Sastre  supported  Garc6s'  proposal  for 
five  missions  among  the  Pimas  Gilenos,  for  the  land  was 
rich,  the  Indians  wanted  missionaries,  and  they  were  enemies 
of  the  Apaches.  He  also  called  attention  to  Garces'  good 
reception  among  the  rude  Opatas.  Referring  to  Garces' 
1771  journey,  he  noted  the  friendliness  of  the  Indians, 
and    the    supposed    proximity    of    New    Mexico.     Carets 

« Bucarely,    Decree,    Oct.    13,  1772,  » in  C-1872.     The  same  documents 

in  C-1872.     The  documents  of   1737-  of  C-1872  appear  with  later  proceedings 

38    have    already    been    considered    in  on  Anza's  petition  to  form  C-2113. 
chap.  II.  M  C-2045. 


158       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

thought  New  Mexico  to  be  only  ten  or  twelve  leagues  from 
Pimeria  Alta,  whereas  it  was  a  journey  of  forty  days  by 
the  route  then  in  use.^^  Furthermore,  New  Mexico  and 
Monterey  were  not  more  than  a  month^s  journey  apart,  in 
Garc6s'  opinion.  Garc6s  had  already  applied  to  his  presi- 
dent, Father  Juan  Crisostomo  Gil  de  Bernabe,  in  August, 
1772,  for  permission  to  seek  a  route  to  Monterey  from 
Pimeria  Alta.  Such  an  attempt,  said  Sastre,  would  result 
in  great  advantage,  if  successful.^*  Father  Zalazar,  com- 
menting upon  Garc^s'  explorations,  had  intimated  that  the 
Indians  would  not  let  Garces  go  through  their  lands,  but 
Sastre  believed  that  he  would  be  successful,  and  should  be 
permitted  to  try  his  project.  If  the  eight  new  missions 
were  founded,  they  should  have  two  missionaries  each.  All 
of  his  proposals  might  be  accepted,  said  Sastre,  without 
endangering  the  peace  of  Sonora.^^ 

Bucarely  acknowledged  Sastre's  report,  January  13, 
1773,^^  and  sent  a  copy  of  it  to  Arriaga,  two  weeks  later. 
In  the  letter  to  Arriaga,  he  told  why  he  had  called  the 
junta.  Garces'  explorations,  he  said,  "promise  the  rich 
fruit  of  a  very  abundant  multitude  of  souls,  disposed  to  be 
included  in  the  body  of  our  holy  religion.  This  .  .  .  and 
the  fact -that  the  discovery  of  a  way  of  communication  by 
land  with  the  port  of  Monterey  may  be  accomplished,  obliged 
metohold  ay^nto  .  .  .  to  decide  upon  the  petition  presented 
from  the  presidio  of  Tubac.''  He  did  not  at  that  time  favor 
establishing  the  missions  proposed  by  Sastre.^^ 

Anza's  petition  was  at  this  stage  when  Junipero  Serra 
arrived  in  Mexico,  in  February,  1773.  Richman,  by  em- 
phasis at  least,  would  make  it  appear  that  Serra  played  the 
principal  part  in  causing  the  expedition  to  be  authorized. 
Serra's  glory  as  a  missionary  is  sufficiently  great,  without 
the  need  of  foisting  upon  him  every  other  meritorious  action 
in  the  early  history  of  Alta  California.     It  is  the  popular 

36  By  way  of  El  Paso.  quest,    therefore,  may  have   been  with 

3«  Sastre  makes  no  mention  of  Anza's  a  view  to  accompanying  Anza. 
proposal   of   which   he   may   not   have  ^7  C-2037.  ^  In  C-2113. 

known,   but  it  is  almost  certain  that  ^  C-2152.     Acknowledged    by    Ar- 

Garc6s    knew   of   it.     The   latter's   re-  riaga,  May  12,  1773,  C-2254. 


1769]  GARCfiS   AND   ANZA  159 

belief  that  Serra  conquered  and  held  the  province,  since  his 
name  is  the  only  one  that  is  generally  known.  Nevertheless, 
as  regards  the  Anza  expedition,  there  is  hardly  a  doubt  that 
it  would  have  been  authorized,  without  Serra's  presence  in 
Mexico.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  conditions  warranted  it, 
the  fiscal  and  junta  both  advised  it,  the  former's  advice 
being  given  before  Serra  arrived  in  Mexico.  Nor  were  the 
memorials  of  Serra  presented  to  the  junta  which  considered 
Anza's  proposal,  its  resolution  being  based  on  other  docu- 
ments, although  members  of  the  junta  as  individuals  knew 
of  the  Serra  documents,  as  they  had  served  in  a  junta  that 
considered  them.  Serra's  primary  concern  in  Mexico  was 
to  settle  the  relations  between  the  religious  and  the  military 
in  Alta  California,  not  the  question  of  a  Sonora  route,  and 
the  matter  of  a  route  from  Sonora  seems  to  have  been  dis- 
cussed by  him  only  after  his  opinion  had  been  asked  by 
Bucarely.'*^  That  he  advised  the  expedition,  is  no  reason 
for  assigning  him  the  credit  for  its  authorization  any  more 
than  to  the  many  others  who  did  the  same.  Yet,  although 
the  Serra  documents  were  not  before  the  junta,  although 
Serra  did  not  dwell  at  length  on  the  matter  of  overland 
routes,  and  although  he  seemed  to  prefer  an  expedition  from 
New  Mexico,  rather  than  one  from  Sonora,  his  memorials 
must  have  had  a  very  great  influence,  because  they  so  clearly 
portrayed  Alta  California's  local  needs,  which  naturally 
called  for  an  overland  route  as  one  of  the  remedies.  After 
Garces  and  Anza,  perhaps  comes  Serra  in  the  list  of  those 
entitled  to  credit,  although  it  will  not  do  to  underrate  the 
advice  of  Costanso  and  Areche,  nor  even  that  of  Sastre. 
Most  entitled  of  all,  however  (and  it  is  believed  that  this 
will  appear  in  the  course  of  this  work),  was  the  viceroy."*^ 

*°  Palou,  Vida,  185.  to  Alta  California  by  way  of  the  present 

*^  Richman  states  that  Serra's  memo-  Arizona  and  New  Mexico  ?  "     The  docu- 

rials  suggested  that  "supply  routes  be  ments  considered  by  the  junta  prior  to 

explored,  first,  from  Sonora,  and  then  Serra's    arrival    in    Mexico    are    then 

from  New  Mexico,"  but  does  not  in-  briefly  reviewed,  when  Richman  says : 

timate  that  Bucarely  had   first  asked  "It  was  with  the  Anza  project  at  this 

his  opinion  on  those  points.     Coming  stage     that     (February-March,     1773) 

to    a   consideration   of   the   immediate  Bucarely   was   waited   upon   by   Serra. 

preliminaries  of  the  expedition,  he  says  :  Garc6s'  diary  of  the  entrada  of  1771  was 

"but  what  of  Serra's  representation  in  examined,   and  on  September   17,   the 

favor  of  explorations  for  supply  routes  captain   of   Tubac   was   authorized   to 


160       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

Serra  did  not  relate  his  remarks  directly  to  Anza's  pro- 
posed expedition,  except  for  one  paragraph  in  his  March 
13  memorial,  in  which  he  said  that  it  was  well  worth  under- 
taking. There  should  also  be  a  westward  expedition  from 
Santa  Fe,  he  said,  opening  communication  between  Alta 
California  and  New  Mexico.  The  discovery  of  a  route 
from  New  Mexico  would  be  especially  conducive  to  spiritual 
conquest.*^ 

The  March  13  memorial  made  several  references  to  voy- 
ages from  San  Bias  to  Alta  California.  Shortly  afterward, 
it  was  proposed  by  the  Tribunal  de  Cuentas  of  Mexico  to 
dispense  with  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  in  order  to  cut 
down  expense,  and  to  depend  upon  mule  trains  to  convey 
supplies  to  Alta  California.*^  This  called  forth  a  protest 
from  Serra,  April  22,  1773,  an  important  document  as  evi- 
dence of  the  insufficiency  of  the  peninsula  as  a  supply  route 
to  Alta  California.  Says  Serra,  "First,  to  carry  the  said 
provisions  by  land  is  not  only  difficult  but  also  practically 
impossible ;  second,  supposing  that  by  applying  our  ener- 
gies it  might  be  done  in  all  security,  it  would  necessitate 

make  a  military  reconnoissance  to  the  el  penaamtp  de  Anza  comhocd  V.E.  d 
establishments  of  Monterey."  In  a  Junta  de  Grra  y  Haz<i<^  etc.  In  other 
note  Richman  adds:  "The  influence  words  Serra's  report  was  only  one  of 
of  Serra  in  securing  a  determination  of  several,  and  may  have  been  specially 
the  matter  is  mentioned  by  Palou  mentioned  because  the  only  one  not 
(Notidas,  vol.  Ill,  p.  155).  Direct  included  in  the  expediente.  Again, 
evidence  of  it  is  furnished  by  Arriaga  Richman:  "by  the  success  of  Anza 
in  a  dispatch  to  the  Viceroy,  dated  (a  success  due  in  part  to  the  presence 
March  9,  1774,  which  refers  to  a  letter  of  Serra  in  Mexico,  in  the  spring  of 
from  Bucarely  of  date  Sept.  26,  1773,  1773)  the  work  of  Portold  was  made 
wherein  the  latter  had  said  that  Havi-  sure  of  completion."  As  a  climax  to 
endo  oydo  al  Presidente  de  las  Misiones  his  chapter  entitled  "San  Francisco 
de  San  Diego  y  Monterey,  Fr.  Junipero  founded"  with  second  title  "Sonora  to 
Serra,  que  apoyd  el  pensamiento  de  Anza,  the  Sea,"  Mr.  Richman  has  "the  ven- 
convocd  V.E.  d  Junta  de  Guerra,  etc."  erable  Junipero  Serra"  gazing  at  San 
The  quotation  from  Palou  is  accurate,  Francisco  Bay,  the  implication  being 
but  something  further  may  be  said  of  impossible  to  escape,  that  he  was  the 
the  direct  evidence.  The  statement  one  primarily  responsible  for  bringing 
(which  is  from  a  summary  of  Bucarely's  to  pass  all  those  events  which  had  pro- 
letter,  not  the  letter  itself)  is  only  part  duced  the  Anza  expeditions  and  the 
of  the  whole,  the  whole  reading  as  fol-  settlement  of  San  Francisco.  Rich- 
lows  :  consiguiente  d  los  anterior^  man  has  erred,  not  by  directly  incorrect 
avisos  sobre  la  proporsidn  q«  hizo  el  statements,  but  by  literary  over-em- 
Cap^  del  Presidio  de  Tubac  .  .  .  Da  phasis  of  Serra's  share. 
V.E.  con  testimonio  en  carta  de  veinte  y  ^  In  C-2103,  Palou,  Noticias,  III, 
aeis    de     Sep^?     llegados     los    informes  41-42. 

pedidos,  y  haviendo  oydo  V.E.  al  Presi-  *^  Referred  to  in  Galvez  to  Arriaga, 

dente  de   las  Missions     de  S^  Diego  y  Mar.  8,  1774,  C-2566. 
Monterrey  Fr.  Junipero  Senrra  g?  apoyd 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  161 

much  more  expense  than  at  present ;  third,  by  this  project 
we  would  certainly  lose  the  best  thing  of  all,  the  very  com- 
mendable disposition  to  accept  the  faith  which  the  natives 
in  all  that  land  have."  In  proof  of  the  first  point,  he  said 
that  both  Californias  were  in  dire  straits  for  mules.  Many 
had  been  taken  from  the  missions  of  Baja  California,  when 
Galvez  sent  the  expeditions  to  Monterey,  the  plan  being 
to  replace  them  by  shipments  from  Sonora,  but,  owing  to 
the  difficulty  of  shipment  or  to  some  other  reason,  not  even 
one  had  been  replaced.  Although  the  deficiency  had  been 
supplied  to  some  extent  by  breeding,  that  method  had 
never  proved  sufficient  to  stock  the  peninsula,  because  of 
the  land's  sterihty ;  in  the  past,  it  had  been  necessary  to 
depend  on  mules  sent  from  the  opposite  coast.  There 
was  also  a  great  scarcity  of  mules  at  Monterey.  Figuring 
on  the  basis  of  supplies  recently  sent  to  California,  it  would 
take  fifteen  hundred  mules  to  carry  them,  and  would  re- 
quire not  less  than  a  hundred  muleteers.  How  was  it 
possible  to  get  that  number  of  mules  across  the  Gulf  to 
Loreto,  he  asked,  when  not  even  a  few  could  be  transported 
in  the  space  of  three  years  ?  And  if  they  could  be  obtained, 
what  would  there  be  for  them  to  eat  in  Baja  California? 
For  his  part,  said  Serra,  he  never  expected  to  see  the 
successful  establishment  of  a  supply  route  up  the  peninsula. 
The  rest  of  the  memorial  may  be  briefly  noted,  Serra  ad- 
vancing strong  arguments  in  support  of  his  second  conten- 
tion, and  saying  as  to  the  third,  that  the  passing  of  these 
mule  trains  in  charge  of  men  of  questionable  morality  would 
have  a  bad  effect  upon  the  Indians  along  the  route,  and 
would  operate  against  conversions.^^  This  must  have 
weighed  heavily  with  the  venerable  Father-President,  but 
it  does  not  seem  that  his  arguments  on  the  first  two  points 
were  on  that  account  an  overstatement.  At  any  rate, 
whether  due  to  Serra  or  not,  the  San  Bias  establishment 
was  retained. 

At  length,  the  reports  requested  by  the  junta  of  October 
17,    1772,   began  to   find  their  way  to   Mexico.     Sastre's 

**  A.P.C.H.,  Prov.  St.  Papers,  1,91-103. 


162       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VII 

reply,  January  21,  1773,  was  noticeably  different  in  tone  from 
his  previous  letter.  Anza  ought  not  to  take  any  troops 
with  him,  he  said,  but  should  be  accompanied  by  Garc6s 
alone,  thus  avoiding  the  danger  of  arousing  the  suspicions 
j  of  the  Indians  at  the  sight  of  troops,  which  positively  would 
j  be  the  result  if  they  were  with  him.  Referring  to  his  Octo- 
ber 19  letter  he  repeated  his  comment  on  Garc^s^  achieve- 
ment of  1771.  If  New  Mexico  were  so  near  Pimeria  Alta 
and  only  a  month's  journey  from  Monterey,  all  that  was 
necessary  was  for  Garc6s  to  explore  the  route  from  New 
Mexico  to  Monterey.  Anza  might  be  permitted  to  make 
an  expedition  also,  provided  he  went  alone.*^ 

Anza  was  in  the  field  on  the  Apache  frontier  when 
Bucarely's  letter  of  October  28,  1772,  written  in  accordance 
with  the  resolution  of  the  junta j  came  to  him.  He  wrote 
from  there,  January  22,  1773,  that  he  must  get  permission 
from  Sastre  to  go  to  his  presidio,  before  he  could  answer 
Bucarely's  questions,  because  his  papers  were  there.  Mean- 
while, he  was  quite  certain  that  the  Indians  eh  route  to 
Monterey  would  welcome  an  expedition  such  as  he  had 
proposed.  In  his  opinion,  too,  it  would  not  cause  trouble 
among  the  Indians  already  subjected,  nor  among  those 
between  the  Spanish  settlements  and  the  Colorado  whom  it 
was  planned  to  reduce ;  rather,  it  would  give  them  pleasure.*^ 
At  length,  March  7,  1773,  Anza  wrote  to  Bucarely  from  his 
presidio  of  Tubac.  First  he  discussed  Jesuit  visits  to  the 
Gila  and  Colorado,  and  the  comparatively  slight  results 
arising  from  them.  Yet,  one  poor  religious  [Garces]  had 
made  this  journey  alone  in  a  very  few  days,  taking  only  as 
much  as  one  horse  could  carry,  and  living  among  the  Indians. 
This  proved  that  they  were  incapable  of  doing  harm,  if 
treated  with  the  kindness  that  was  the  due  of  their  simplic- 
ity. The  late  Antonio  de  Olguin,  lieutenant  of  Terrenate, 
who  went  on  the  last  Jesuit  visit  to  the  two  rivers,  had  told 
Anza  that  it  was  due  to  ill-treatment  that  the  Indians  had 
attempted  to  steal  the  horses  of  that  expedition,  and  yet, 
at  every  Indian  village  the  natives  had  asked  for  ministers. 

«InC-2113.  «InC-2113. 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  163 

According  to  Olguin  and  the  soldiers,  the  Jesuits  made 
explorations  in  a  faulty  manner,  from  which  it  resulted 
that  no  exploration  was  made  of  the  lands  on  the  other  side 

of  the  Colorado.     Anza  said  that  he  did  not  believe  anything  

that  the  Jesuits  had  written  or  said,  because  their  state- 
ments were  contradicted  by  those  who  accompanied  them.'*^ 
Garc6s,  however,  was  a  man  of  integrity,  and  his  reports 
were  the  most  fundamental  on  the  subject. 

Knowing  little  about  the  lands  occupied  by  the  Domini- 
cans on  the  other  side  of  the  Colorado,  Anza  could  not  say 
whether   they   would   be   prejudiced   by   the   founding   of 
missions  at  that  river  from  the  Sonora  side.     However, 
even  if  the  Quiquimas  and  Yumas,  the  only  tribes  there 
that  were  definitely  known,  should  prove  to  be  in  Domini- 
can territory,  it  seemed  to  him  that  that  order  would  suffer 
no  harm  by  the  establishment  of  missions  on  the  east  bank 
of  the  river ;  rather,  it  would  help  the  Dominicans,  because 
it  would  be  easier  to  carry  provisions  and  other  necessaries 
to  them  by  that  route  than  by  sea.     As  matters  were,  they 
must  have  their  needs  suppHed  at  particular  seasons,  or  wait    ^^^,  .^ttv:^"^ 
a  long  time.     This  route  would  establish  the  commerce  of    ^-v^Ji^ 
the  peninsula  upon  a  better  basis,  as  well  as  that  of  San^^^  ^^^"^ 
Diego  and  Monterey.  ^-^><<^ 

Some  persons  said,  continued  Anza,  that  he  had  proposed 
this  expedition  in  order  to  disturb  the  peace  of  the  provinces.^® 
On  the  contrary,  it  would  help  them,  as  it  might  result  in 
an  extension  of  their  trade  to  New  Mexico,  and  there  would 
also  be  trajfic  with  Indians,  although  of  less  account.  Great 
good,  temporal  as  well  as  spiritual,  would  come  to  the 
Indians  by  the  establishment  of  missions,  because  they 
would  have  to  live  at  peace,  instead  of  destroying  one  an- 
other like  wild  beasts,  as  under  existing  conditions.  The 
Indians  along  Anza's  proposed  route  were  lacking  in  arms 
and  in  courage,  and  were  not  apt  to  cause  trouble  any  more 

*'  This   was   only   shortly  after   the  been  used  in  the  deliberations  leading 

expulsion  of  the  Jesuits,   when  every-  to  the  Anza  expeditions, 
thing  that  they  had  done  was  repre-  <*  This  probably  referred  to   Sastre, 

sented     in     an     unfriendly     light.     It  who    had    opposed    Anza's   project   on 

seems    strange,    however,    that    not    a  that  ground.     The  "provinces"  means 

single    Jesuit    document    should    have  Sinaloa  and  Sonora. 


t 


164      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  VII 

than  the  P^pagos  and  Pimas  Gilenos  had  done,  when 
their  territories  were  traversed.  The  last  named  were 
better  armed  and  more  warlike  than  the  others,  but  they 
allowed  Spaniards  to  live  among  them  and  render  them 
[religious?]  service  at  any  time.  Because  of  this  docility 
of  the  Indians,  missions  and  presidios  were  not  yet  necessary 
among  them.  Since  the  suppression  of  the  Pimas  [Bajos] 
and  Seris,  the  presidio  of  Altar  had  had  little  to  do,  and 
could  for  a  time  supply  all  needs.  Tubac  was  just  then 
busily  engaged  with  the  Apaches,  who  might  hinder  an 
advance  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  but  the  campaign  then 
being  waged  against  them  would  lead  to  their  suppression, 
it  was  hoped.  Once  the  Apaches  were  conquered,  the  troops 
of  Altar  and  Tubac  could  be  used  for  more  advanced  estab- 
lishments, and  the  soldiers  of  Horcasitas  and  Buenavista 
might  in  Hke  manner  be  employed,  as  the  original  reason 
for  founding  those  presidios,  to  check  the  Seris  and  their 
allies,  was  no  longer  operative. 

Anza^s  concluding  paragraphs  bring  out  the  difficulties  that 
he  had  to  face  in  the  way  of  jealous  rivals,  of  whom,  doubt- 
less, the  most  prominent  was  Sastre.  His  remarks,  however, 
were  couched  in  the  usual  diplomatic  style  that  distinguished 
him  in  all  his  writings.  He  mentioned  no  names,  but  was 
probably  aware  that  Sastre  had  belittled  his  plan.  The 
data  furnished  by  Garces  and  himself  would  be  enough, 
he  said,  to  enable  Bucarely  to  make  a  decision.  He  him- 
self had  no  other  concern  in  the  undertaking  than  a  desire 
to  serve  Their  Majesties,  for  whom  he  -^ould  meet  death, 
if  necessary.  Difficulties  might  be  expected  through  the 
efforts  of  rivals,  who  always  opposed  such  undertakings 
when  they  did  not  propose  them.  If  Bucarely  should 
decide  to  authorize  the  expedition,  Anza  asked  three 
favors :  that  he  might  be  directly  under  Bucarely's  orders, 
"the  better  to  be  understood,^'  by  which  he  probably  meant 
that  he  did  not  want  to  be  under  Sastre ;  that  the  governor 
be  ordered  to  furnish  such  assistance  as  Anza  should  need, 
for  all  of  which,  with  the  exception  of  the  troops,  Anza 
would  gladly  pay  out  of  his  own  pocket ;    and  that  he 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  165 

might  go  to  Mexico  upon  his  return,  to  deHver  his  report 

in  person.^^  _  /. 

At   about   the   same  time,   March   8,   Garces   wrote   to 
Bucarely   enclosing  his   diaries,   which  have  already  been 
treated  elsewhere.     A  copy  of  the  1771  diary  was  sent  to 
Arriaga  by  Bucarely  with  his  letter  of  April  26,  1773.^°     In  ^  ^V^^ 
his  letter  Garces  recited  a  number  of  reasons  why  Anza's  ^ 

undertaking  was  worthy  of  approval.     Inasmuch  as  Garces 
could  not  get  his  own  projects  carried  out,^^  he  was  support-  \ 
ing  Anza^s,  which  seemed  to  be  more  favorably  viewed.^   n^^^Aj 
Anza  was  the  right  type  of  man,  for  his  "zeal  in  the  service  i7:_<i. 

of  both  Majesties  is  well  proved  .  .  .  the  said  captain  is 
exceedingly   affable,   patient,   liberal,   well-beloved  by  the 
Indians,  punctilious  in  matters  of  the  service,   and  with 
no  improper  habits  of  life."     Again,  Anza  had  "a  sufficient 
fund  of  discretion  to  resolve  any  unforeseen  incident  .  .  . 
and  the  manners  to  meet  European  people  or  those  of  other 
quality."     For  Garces  to  go  alone  would  be  difficult,  if     \"^ 
not  impossible.     The  Indians  that  Garces  saw  were  exceed-      ;i:-^^ 
ingly  docile,  and  he  had  heard  that  they  were  poorly  armed  ;      • 
moreover,  Anza  proposed  to  go  with  a  considerable  force, 
which  would  obviate  any  possible  danger.     The  news  that 
came  in  1769  to  these  Indians  about  white  people  to  the 
west  of  them,  accounts  of  which  Garces  also  received  in 
his  1770  and  1771  journeys,  indicated  that  a  route  existed. 

The  expedition  would  not  prejudice  the  Dominicans, 
but  on  the  contrary  would  help  them.  Their  conversions 
must  begin  with  the  Indians  nearest  the  mouth  of  the  Col- 
orado, the  Quiquimas,  who  were  terrible  enemies  of  the 
coast  Pimas  as  also  of  the  Yumas  and  their  allies,  through 
whose  territories  Anza  proposed  to  go.  The  Yumas  and 
other  tribes  would  be  charged  by  Anza  not  to  fight  against 
the  Quiquimas,  and  peace  would  certainly  prevail  if  a  mis- 
sion each  were  to  be  placed  among  the  coast  Pimas  and 
the  Yumas.  The  Dominicans  would  then  require  less  of  a 
mission  guard,  as  the  Quiquimas  could  have  no  other  enemies 

*»  In  C-2113.  "  For  the  conquest  and   conversion 

w  C-2234.  of  the  Pimas  Gilenos. 


166      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

than  the  tribes  named.  The  abihty  to  control  the  Indians 
on  both  sides  of  the  Colorado  would  be  advantageous  to 
both  sections,  making  rebellion  less  likely  in  each  place,  and 
aiding  in  the  work  of  conversions.  Every  step  in  aid  of 
conversions  ought  to  be  taken,  lest  neighboring  tribes  be 
lost,  or  the  Pimas  of  the  coast  revolt  again.  The  Pimas 
would  never  have  risen  in  the  past,  had  they  not  been  sup- 
ported by  their  numerous  relatives.     If  ministers  had  been 

:  placed  in  Pimeria  and  along  the  two  rivers  sixty  years  be- 
fore, at  an  annual  expense  of  ten  or  twelve  thousand  pesos, 

\  \  the  king  would  not  then  have  to  maintain  two  hundred  sol- 

"  '  diers,  and  the  conquest  would  have  advanced  much  farther. 
The  march  to  San  Diego  would  not  be  too  difficult,  if  the 
bad  stretch  between  Sonoita  and  the  Yuma  country  were 
avoided,  but,  for  the  journey  to  Monterey,  Garc^s  would 
advise  going  farther  up  the  Colorado,  and  searching  for  a 
pass  through  the  mountains.  After  giving  further  evidence 
to  prove  the  existence  of  a  route,  in  particular  the  presence 

:  among  the  Indians  whom  Garc6s  had  visited  of  articles 
which  must  have  come  from  the  Pacific  shore  of  the  Cal- 
ifornias  and  not  from  the  Gulf,  Garces  went  on  to  say  that 
he  did  not  regard  Monterey  as  very  far  distant,  and  that 
the  tribes  along  the  way  would  probably  be  friendly  to 
one  another,  which  would  enable  Anza,  by  means  of  gifts 
to  obtain  interpreters  to  accompany  the  expedition.  To- 
bacco was  recommended  as  a  gift  particularly  pleasing  to 
Indians.  With  that  and  a  preHminary  notice  of  the  coming 
of  the  expedition,  by  sending  Garces  ahead,  no  fear  of  the 
Indians  needed  to  be  entertained.  It  was  only  necessary 
to  tell  them  that  the  king  was  sending  an  expedition  to 
visit  them,  because  they  were  good  people,  and  that  would 
win  their  affection.  If  there  were  the  least  likelihood  of 
danger,  Garces  would  not  favor  this  proposal.  He  himself 
had  gone  without  escort  in  his  journeys,  nor  would  he  have 
consented  to  go  with  a  very  few  soldiers  or  with  a  commander 
in  whom  he  had  no  confidence,  but  the  present  case  was 
different,  —  all  the  more  so  in  that  Anza  had  made  the  offer 
of  his  own  free  will. 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  167 

To  maintain  the  route  to  be  discovered  by  Anza-  would 
not  cost  much,  as  there  were  already  three  presidios  suited 
to  the  purpose,  —  Horcasitas,  Buenavista,  and  Altar.  If 
the  expedition  were  authorized,  orders  for  it  should  be  sent 
sealed  and  without  appeal,  for  in  lands  so  remote  from  the 
capital  as  Sonora  it  was  possible  for  interested  persons  to 
prevent  useful  undertakings.  Finally,  he  recommended 
the  surrender  of  the  missions  of  Pimeria  Baja  by  the  Fran- 
ciscans, who  should  proceed  to  the  new  fields.  The  mis- 
sions given  up  by  them  should  not  be  secularized,  but  should 
be  left  to  other  orders,  the  Indians  continuing  free  from 
taxation.  ^^ 

On  June  14,  1773,  Bucarely  referred  to  Areche  the  Anza 
and  Garc^s  letters,  the  latter 's  diaries,  and  the  previous  file 
of  papers  on  Anza's  petition. ^^  Areche  replied,  August  14, 
1773,  that  he  had  nothing  to  add  to  his  previous  report,  but 
suggested  that  these  documents,  including  Sastre^s  letter 
of  January  21  be  cited  before  the  same  junta,  that  it  might 
resolve  whether  the  expedition  should  be  authorized  or 
not.^*  TTioT  to  the  junta^s  decision  Bucarely  got  word  that 
the  English  and  Russians  were  pushing  to  the  northwest 
coasts  of  North  America,  and  it  will  be  shown  in  a  later 
chapter  that  Bucarely's  opinion  was  influenced  by  the  news. 
It  is  possible,  however,  that  Anza's  expedition  would  have 
been  authorized  anyway.  The  junta,  at  least,  made  no 
mention  of  foreign  danger,  and  if  convinced  of  the  practica- 
bility of  the  route,  the  docility  of  the  Indians,  and  the  se- 
curity of  Sonora,  perhaps  also  of  the  sound  basis  of  the  Alta 
California  establishments,  seemed  certain  to  recommend  the 
expedition. ^^  It  is  possible,  too,  that  Bucarely  might  have 
favored  Anza's  proposals  on  the  long-standing  ground  of 
foreign  danger  without  the  spur  of  contemporary  reports. 

M  In  C-2113.  letter    to    Arriaga    of    November    26, 

"  In  C-2113.  1773.     In  it  he  asked  permission,  for 

"In  C-2113,  the  sake  of  secrecy,  to  dispense  with 

"  It  is   possible    that    the   members  consent  of  the  junta  for  expenditures 

of  the  junta  did  not  know  of  the  sup-  by  him  to  check  foreign  encroachments. 

posed    foreign    activities    at    the    time.  C-2430.     The   failure   to   mention   the 

Some  evidence  of   this,   although  over  particular  emergency  in  the  documents 

two  months  later  than  the  authoriza-  before  the  junta  is  an  indication  to  the 

tion   of   the   expedition,    is   Bucarely's  same  effect. 


168       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

By  a  decree  of  September  1,  1773,  Bucarely  added  to 
the  expediente  considered  previously  by  the  junta  and  re- 
cently by  Areche  several  documents  already  discussed  in  this 
chapter  and  one  other/^  the  last  named  being  a  letter  from 
Arriaga  to  Bucarely,  May  12,  1773,  acknowledging 
Bucarely^s  of  January  27,  and  giving  approval  for  what  had 
been  done  thus  far.^^  On  September  9,  1773,  the  junta 
met  for  the  second  time  to  consider  Anza^s  petition.^^  After 
summarizing,  quoting,  or  making  brief  reference  to  the 
documents  before  it,  the  junta  made  its  resolution  in  the 
following  terms : 

^^  Having  read  the  documents  named,  and  having  con- 
sidered the  whole  matter  referred  to,  it  was  resolved  by 
unanimous  agreement :  That  it  was  a  useful  and  proper 
thing  to  discover  a  route  by  way  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado 
rivers  to  the  new  establishments  of  San  Diego  and  Mon- 
terey, according  to  the  terms  that  Captain  Don  Juan  Bau- 
tista  de  Anza  proposes ;  That  for  that  purpose  he  may 
take  twenty  volunteer  soldiers  of  his  own  choice,  who  will 
make  use  of  their  arms  only  in  the  unavoidable  event  of 
having  to  defend  themselves,  comporting  themselves  to- 
ward all  Indians  along  the  route  with  the  greatest  kindli- 
ness and  moderation,  so  that  they  may  be  well  disposed 
to  the  Spanish,  and  to  this  matter  the  said  Captain  Anza 
will  give  every  careful  attention,  on  account  of  its  great 
importance  in  the  service  of  God  and  the  king;  That 
to  replace  the  soldiers  that  have  to  accompany  him,  an 
equal  number  may  be  recruited  to  serve  for  the  time  that 

'« In   C-2113.     The    documents    re-  Mangino ;    and    Juan    de    Arce.     Val- 

f erred  to  were :     Sastre's  letter  of  Oct.  cdrcel,  Malo,  Areche,  and  Barroeta  be- 

19,  1772;  Bucarely's  to  Sastre,  Jan.  13,  longed  to  the  viceroy's  council.     Val- 

1773 ;  and  Bucarely's  to  Arriaga,  Jan.  cdrcel,   Barroeta,  Abad,    Vald6s,   Guti- 

27,  1773.  6rrez,    Mangino,     and     Arce,     besides 

'7  C-2254.     Also  in  C-2113.  Bucarely,   held   offices   connected  with 

w  The  following   men   took   part   in  financial  administration.     With  the  ex- 

this     meeting :      Bucarely ;     Domingo  ception  of  Malo,  all  of  these  had  been 

Valcdrcel,   member  of   the   Council   of  present    at   the  junta   of    October    17, 

the  Indies,  decano  of  the  Audiencia  of  1772.     Two  others  at  that  junta  were 

Mexico,   auditor,   etc. ;  Felix  V.    Malo,  not  present  at  this :      Jos6  del    Toro, 

second    subdecano    of    the    Audiencia  of  Bucarely's  coxmcil,  subdecano  of  the 

Jos6   de   Areche,  fiscal;    Juan   de   Ba-  Audiencia,  and  holding  administrative 

rroeta ;    Santiago  Abad ;    Pedro  Toral,  offices    connected   with  taxation ;    and 

who   signed   with   his   mother's   name,  Fernando  Mesia,  the  treasurer. 
Valdes ;      Juan    Gutierrez ;      Fernando 


1769]  GARCfiS  AND   ANZA  169 

it  takes  for  this  expedition,  and  for  that,  compensation 
will  be  made  by  the  royal  treasury ;  That  he  shall  be  accom- 
panied by  the  Reverend  Father  Francisco  Garc6s,  whose 
advice,  on  account  of  his  wide  experience,  shall  be  taken, 
for  the  success  of  the  expedition,  in  the  contingencies  that 
may  occur,  and  the  said  Reverend  Father  Garces  may  be 
accompanied  by  another  religious  agreeable  to  him  and  of 
good  conduct ;  That  the  said  captain  make  no  establish- 
ment, directing  his  route  to  the  latitude  of  Monterey,  and 
from  there  give  an  account  to  His  Excellency  the  Viceroy 
in  minute  detail  of  all  that  shall  have  occurred  in  the  journey, 
so  that  the  latter  may  form  a  judgment  and  give  the  orders 
that  are  fitting;  That  once  the  discovery  is  accomplished, 
the  said  captain  may  come  to  this  Court  to  inform  His 
Excellency  of  what  he  shall  deem  fitting,  as  he  [Anza]  pro- 
poses ;  That  orders  on  the  subject  be  sent  directly  to  the 
said  captain,  and  that  the  latter  may  give  an  account 
directly  to  His  Excellency  of  what  happens ;  That,  to  render 
the  assistance  which  he  needs  and  asks  for,  suitable  orders 
may  be  given  to  the  comandante  inspector  and  to  the  governor 
of  the  province.  His  Excellency  making  such  arrangements 
as  he  may  deem  proper  for  the  happy  outcome  of  this  explora- 
tion, from  which  so  many  advantages  may  result,  if  it  is 
successful,  for  the  greater  protection  of  the  new  establish- 
ments of  San  Diego  and  Monterey ;  That  transcripts  of 
the  proceedings  may  be  drawn  up,  of  everyiihing  that  may 
be  necessary,  [one]  for  the  record  in  the  Real  Tribunal  de 
Cuentas  of  this  special,  although  small  expense,  [another]  to 
go  to  the  captain,  and  [another]  to  give  an  account  to  His 
Majesty/'  ^^ 

Four  days  later  Bucarely  decreed  that  the  resolution  of 
the  junta  be  executed, ^^  and  on  September  26,  1773,  he 
wrote  to  Arriaga  that  he  had  granted  Anza's  petition,  en- 
closing a  testimonio  of  what  had  occurred. ^^  No  further 
official  action  was  necessary,  although  in  theory  the  royal 
approval  ought  to  be  obtained.  On  March  9,  1774,  Arriaga 
wrote  to  Bucarely,  reciting  the  latter's  instructions  to  Anza, 

«•  In  C-2113.  «>  In  C-2113.  «  C-2388. 


170      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 

and  adding:  ^^The  king  being  informed  of  what  has  been 
referred  to  .  .  .  has  been  pleased  to  approve  everything 
done  in  this  matter/'  ^^  On  that  day  Anza  was  nearly  across 
the  Colorado  Desert ;  by  the  time  of  its  receipt  in  Mexico 
he  must  have  been  near  Tubac  on  the  return  march.^^ 


«  C-2567. 

«3  The  facts  recited  in  the  last  para- 
graph serve  as  a  reminder  of  the  in- 
adequacy of  our  knowledge  of  Spanish 
colonial  institutions,  which,  indeed,  is 
apparent  to  anybody  making  a  study 
of  the  field  or  a  portion  of  it,  whether 
he  deal  with  a  narrative  or  an  institu- 
tional subject.  In  the  present  instance 
the  questions  suggest  themselves.  Who 
was  primarily  responsible  for  the 
authorization  of  the  Anza  expedition, 
and  What  proportionate  share  in  it  did 
various  oflficials  or  governmental  agen- 
cies have?  It  is  believed  that  enough 
documents  will  be  cited  in  later  chap- 
ters to  leave  no  reasonable  doubt  as 
to  the  answer  to  the  first  question. 
But  if  the  present  work  were  to  stop 
here,  one  could  not  answer  that  ques- 
tion with  certainty,  and  in  any  event 
one  could  not  answer  the  second  query 
without  a  wider  knowledge  of  Spanish 
colonial  institutions  than  we  now  have. 
The  trouble  is  that  institutional  studies 
have  employed  inadequate  materials. 
The  laws  of  the  Indies  have  been  the 
basis,  supplemented  by  such  other 
source  material  as  exists  in  print.  Only 
a  small  percentage  of  this  material  is 
helpful  to  show  the  actual  workings 
of  colonial  administration.  The  Spanish 
have  always  been  adept  at  making  laws 
which  they  straightway  proceed  to 
disregard  or  use  only  when  they  fit 
the  case  in  hand.  Materials  in  print 
are  an  infinitesimal  fraction  and  by  no 
means  a  good  selection  of  those  which 
exist  in  manuscript.  Better  institu- 
tional studies  might  be  written,  if  in- 
vestigators would  use  the  oflficial 
materials  to  be  found  in  the  Archivo 
de  Indias,  tracing  an  institution,  for 
example,  through  a  given  period, 
illustrating  it  by  a  definite  piece  of 
narrative.  In  that  way  we  may  learn 
eventually  just  what  were  the  func- 
tions of  the  greater  governing  agencies, 
and  of  the  lesser  ones  as  well. 

The  present  study  is  not  an  institu- 
tional one,  but  some  remarks  may  be 
ventm-ed  in  order  to  call  attention  to 
governmental  procedure  in  a  given 
instance.  The  method  of  transacting 
official  business  may  be  gathered  from 


noting  the  course  of  documents  referred 
to  in  this  and  succeeding  chapters. 
For  example,  Anza's  petition  went  to 
the  viceroy,  the  fiscal,  Costansd,  Sastre, 
the  junta,  Arriaga,  and  the  Council  of 
the  Indies.  The  expediente,  or  file  of 
papers,  for  this  one  matter  alone  was 
so  long  that  it  could  not  be  read  care- 
fully in  a  single  day.  Nor  is  there 
anything  exceptional  in  its  length. 
Many  other  matters  might  come  up 
the  same  day  of  equal  voluminousness. 
Spanish  officialdom  encouraged  long, 
fiill  reports,  often  complaining  because 
some  document,  which  the  reader  may 
think  verbose  enough,  was  not  suffi- 
ciently detailed  in  information.  The 
number  of  reports  that  might  be  called 
for  in  a  case  involving  the  widest  range 
of  official  connection  is  amazing.  For 
example,  Lacy's  reports  of  Russian 
aggressions  passed  through  the  hands 
of  Grimaldi,  Arriaga,  and  Bucarely 
before  action  was  taken,  and  would 
normally  iiave  gone  to  Areche  and  the 
junta,  but  for  Bucarely's  request  for 
permission  to  dispense  with  the  consent 
of  the  latter.  Before  action  was  com- 
pleted a  series  of  letters,  reports, 
instructions,  and  diaries  would  be 
written  by  captains  of  ships,  governors 
of  provinces,  commissaries,  religious, 
and  others  that  would  fill  volumes. 
All  of  these  would  go  into  the  expediente 
and  might  come  up  again  in  toto  upon 
some  similar  occasion.  The  size  of  the 
expediente  would  be  swollen  to  double 
or  treble  its  proportions,  because  of 
the  practice  of  making  what  almost 
amounted  to  a  copy  of  the  letter  being 
answered  and  inserting  that  in  the 
reply,  that  being  required  by  law.  If 
copies  sent  to  different  persons  could 
be  brought  together,  the  papers  would 
again  be  multiplied  in  volume.  It 
becomes  clear  why  the  government 
had  to  rely  on  its  bureaucracy.  No 
one  man  could  possibly  read  all  the 
documents  on  a  given  matter  without 
neglecting  everything  else.  It  was 
the  usual  rule  for  the  viceroy  to  accept 
the  decision  of  the  fiscal  or  of  the  junta. 
Even  then,  execution  depended  very 
largely  upon  minor  officials,  especially 
in  distant  provinces,  where  the  wishes 


1769] 


GARCfiS  AND   ANZA 


171 


of  the  viceroy  were  often  disregarded, 
under  color  of  some  plausible  excuse. 

By  law  the  greatest  authority  rested 
with  the  king,  aided  by  agencies  around 
him,  such  as  the  ministro  general,  Con- 
sejo  de  Indias,  Casa  de  Contratacidn, 
and  Contaduria  General.  A  second 
stage  of  authority  was  that  of  the 
viceroy,  having  many  aids,  but  also 
many  checks,  as  by  the  audiencia,  the 
junta,  and  others.  Third  came  the 
vast  horde  of  provincial  and  local 
officials,  of  which  the  central  figure, 
though  handicapped  in  turn,  was  the 
governor  of  a  province.  Such  was  the 
law,  and  such  perhaps  the  practice  as 
regards  veto  power  or  negation  of 
action,  but  as  regards  positive  acts  the 
deciding  factor  in  a  given  case  might 
be,  and  usually  was,  perhaps,  some 
official  in  the  third  grade  of  authority. 
The  intent  of  the  law  would  be  carried 
out  if  men  in  the  second  and  first  ranks 
displayed  exceptional  industry  and 
ability,  and  then  only,  as  a  rule,  in 
matters  of  wide  scope  in  the  case  of 
the  vice-regal  government,  and  of  very 
wide  scope  in  the  case  of  the  royal 
government. 

A  capable  viceroy  was  in  a  pecul- 
iarly good  position  to  do  effective  work, 
being  near  enough  to  the  thing  to  be 
done  by  the  lower  grade  of  officials, 
far  enough  away  from  the  group  above 
him,  and  able  to  dominate  those  around 
him.  The  Anza  petition  is  a  good  test 
case.  It  was  opposed  unavailingly 
by  Governor  Sastre  of  Sonora.  Arriaga 
might  have  interposed  his  veto,  but 
could  not  have  caused  the  expedition ; 
for  many  years  he  had  backed  the  prin- 
ciple of  such  an  overland  advance,  but 
no  expedition  had  been  made,  although 
Arriaga  was  an  exceptionally  able 
ministro  general.  Of  the  group  around 
Bucarely  the  Audiencia  of  Mexico  con- 
tributed nothing  as  such,  although  the 
junta  was  in  part  composed  of  its  mem- 
bers. They  might  also  be  members 
of  the  viceroy's  council ;  three  members 
of  the  audiencia  taking  part  in  the  junta 
of  September  9,  1773,  were  also  in  the 
council ;  another  member  of  that  junta 
was  in  the  council,  but  not  in  the  au- 
diencia. (Supra  n.  58.)  It  is  also 
well  to  remember  that  the  fiscal  of  the 
audiencia  had  in  fact  become  a  servant 
of  the  viceroy.  (Cf.  chap.  II,  n.  70.) 
Credit  for  granting  the  petition  lies 
either  with  the  junta  or  with  Bucarely 
for  no  other  governmental  agency, 
other  than  those  mentioned  and  dis- 
posed of,  intervened. 

The  Junta  de  Guerra  y  Real  Hacienda 
of  the  viceroyalty  was  a  very  important 


institution  in  the  period  covered  by 
this  work,  one  upon  which  little  or  no 
information  can  be  obtained  in  clear 
form  in  printed  works.  Its  consent 
was  necessary  for  the  expenditure  of 
royal  funds,  and  it  was  often  called  to 
deliberate  whether  a  given  project 
should  be  ordered  or  not.  But  it  was 
not  an  insuperable  legal  obstacle  to  a 
viceroy.  On  November  26,  1773,  Bu- 
carely wrote  to  Arriaga  asking  for  per- 
mission to  dispense  with  the  junta's 
consent  to  expenditures  undergone  with 
a  view  to  checking  Russian  aggressions, 
alleging  the  desirability  of  secrecy  as 
the  reason  for  his  request.  (C-2430.) 
He  was  permitted  to  expend  money 
on  his  own  responsibility.  (Revilla 
Gigedo,  Informe,  par.  47,  April  12, 
1793,  Mexico.  C-5613.)  The  regla- 
mento  of  1786  was  put  into  effect  with- 
out the  previous  assent  of  a  junta. 
(Revilla  Gigedo,  par.  61.)  A  royal 
order  of  April  14,  1789,  empowered 
Viceroy  Flores  to  make  expenditures 
with  regard  to  the  occupation  of  Nootka 
and  the  exploration  of  the  Russian 
establishments  in  the  northwest  with- 
out the  necessity  of  asking  permission 
of  a  junta.  .  (Revilla  Gigedo,  par. 
92-93.)  Thus,  viceroys  dispensed 
with  the  junta's  authority  either  with 
or  without  royal  consent.  More  im- 
portant than  the  viceroys'  legal  rights, 
however,  was  the  actual  authority  that 
they  were  able  to  exercise  as  a  result 
of  their  relations  with  individuals  of 
the  junta.  Members  of  the  junta  were, 
as  a  rule,  men  holding  administrative 
positions  under  the  viceroy,  often  be- 
ing, as  already  noted,  members  of  his 
council.  Moreover,  membership  in  the 
junta  was  not  always  the  same,  men 
skilled  in  the  subject  discussed  often 
being  called,  presumably  by  the  viceroy. 
The  number  at  a  junta  varied.  At 
the  Anza  junta  of  1772  there  were 
eleven  present,  there  were  ten  in  1773, 
and  twelve  in  1774.  There  seems  to 
have  been  a  difference,  however,  be- 
tween a  junta  de  guerra  y  real  hacienda, 
such  as  those  called  with  relation  to 
Anza's  projects,  and  such  a  junta  as 
that  which  on  January  21,  1768,  author- 
ized Gdlvez  to  proceed  to  the  frontier 
provinces  to  carry  out  reforms.  In 
the  former  case  most  of  the  members 
had  offices  having  to  do  with  financial 
administration ;  in  the  latter,  there 
might  be  few  or  none.  Those  at  the 
above-mentioned  1768  iunta  were : 
Viceroy  Croix ;  Archbishop  Lorenzana ; 
Gdlvez  himself ;  Toro  and  Santaella  of 
the  audiencia;  Cornide,  a^esor  general 
of  the  viceroyalty;  Panes,   a  military 


172       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VII 


officer;  and  Vasante,  superintendent 
of  the  customs  house  of  Mexico  City. 
The  junta  de  guerra  y  real  hacienda 
which  met  in  May,  1773,  to  consider 
Serra's  petition  had  practically  the 
same  membership  as  the  Anza  junta 
of  September  9,  1773.  Especially  note- 
worthy in  this  connection  is  the  case 
of  Fernando  Mesia  who  was  present 
at  the  junta  of  1772  concerning  Anza's 
request,  absent  in  1773,  as  also  from  the 
Serra  junta  of  that  year,  and  present 
again  in  1774.  {Infra,  chap.  XII,  n. 
70.)  Anza's  second*  expedition  was 
ordered  by  Bucarely  on  November  28, 
1774,  without  consulting  the  junta, 
which  was  called,  howevdt,  on  Decem- 
ber 16,  when  it  recommended  certain 


details,  treating  the  expedition  itself 
as  one  already  decided  upon.  (In 
C-2496.)  The  day  before,  Bucarely 
had  already  written  to  Rivera  that  the 
expedition  was  coming.  (A.P.C.H., 
Prov.  St.  Pap.,  Ben.  Misc.,  II,  20-25.) 
In  fine,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that 
a  viceroy  could  dominate  the  junta  if 
he  so  desired.  Finally,  Bucarely  took 
a  keen  interest  in  Anza's  project. 
This  may  be  deduced,  not  only  from 
his  official  correspondence,  but  also 
from  private  letters  written  by  him  to 
General  O'Reilly.  (A.G.I.,  legajo,  88- 
5-17.)  Therefore,  it  would  seem  that 
Bucarely  is  entitled  to  the  chief  credit 
for  authorizing  the  first  Anza  expedi- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

APPROACHES   OF   THE    RUSSIANS   AND   THE   ENGLISH   TO 
SPANISH   POSSESSIONS   OF  THE   PACIFIC  NORTHWEST 

Danger  of_eafiEQ2jdime».ts  by^  foreign  powers  has  been 
giv^SETprominent  notice  in  preceding  chapters  as  a  principal 
cause  for  frontier  advance  in  New  S^ain  jn  the  eighteSath 
century.  Keiween  1773  and  1776  this  factor  was  to  be  more 
than  usually  operative,  or  certainly  more  than  usually  a 
cause  of  action,  tinder  the  guiding  hand  of  the  great  vice- 
roy, Bucarely.  It  affected  every  other  phase  of  actwity 
related  to  northwestward  advance,  and  in  many  cases, 
certainly  as  regards  the  Spanish  voyages  of  discovery,  it 
was  the  direct  cause  of  what  occurred.  It  seems  worth 
while  at  this  point,  therefore,  to  treat  of  this  factor  by  it- 
self. It  may  be  viewed  in  three  ways,  considering:  first, 
approaches  through  the  centuries  of  nations  who  most 
threatened  New  Spain  between  1773  and  1776,  giving  an 
idea  of  the  actual  danger^  second^  the  foreign  policy  of 
Spain  between  1763  and  1779,  in  an  attempt  to  acquire  a 
view  in  proper  perspective  of  Spain's  attitude  concerning 
the  problems  of  colonial  defence,  in  particular  her  attitude 
concerning  the  defence  of  the  indefinitely  extending  CaH- 
fornias ;  third,  a  detailed  account  of  what  Spain Jhoiight 
5vnrl  r|jd  l^^twppTi  1773  ^.and  1776  to^meet  foreign  aggressions^ 
in  the  "far  aorthwest;  without  rfference  to  Spain's  other 
concerns  in  that  period.  To  this  factor  of  foreign  danger 
three  chapters  will  now  be  devoted,  one  for  each  of  the  three 
viewpoints  indicated. 

To  appreciate  the  significance  of  any  period  in  the  history 
of  our  Pacific  coast,  it  is  well  to  review  the  age-long  ap- 
proaches to  this  coast  of  the  nations  of  the  earth.     The 

173 


174     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  VIII 

full  meaning  of  the  past  or  of  contemporary  events  was  not 
fully  understood  at  any  given  time,  but  in  telling  what  oc- 
curred at  a  particular  moment,  some  attempt  should  be 
made  to  indicate  it.  We  find  that  it  is  not  true  that  the 
course  of  empire  lies  ever  toward  the  west;  rather,  this 
"old  conception  of  a  westward  line  of  advance  gives  place 
to  another  view  —  that  of  civilization  spreading  east  and 
west  from  some  original  seat  in  eastern  Asia,  traversing  the 
world  in  opposite  directions,  and  drawing  at  length  to  a 
new  focus  on  this  opposite  side  of  the  globe/'  ^  Spain, 
England,  France,  and  finally  the  United  States  of  America 
made  approaches  by  land  from  the  Atlantic  coast.  Russia 
came  by  land,  sea,  and  land  again,  east  and  south.  Sailors 
from  all  of  these  countries,  and  the  Portuguese  and  Dutch 
as  well,  made  voyages  at  one  time  or  another,  whether 
around  Africa  and  Asia  or  around  South  America,  to  the 
western  coasts  of  the  Americas  prior  to  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  Some  say  that  Chinese  had  visited 
these  coasts  as  early  as  the  fifth  century,^  and  the  Japanese 
government  was  certainly  investigating  possibilities  of 
commerce  with  New  Spain  in  the  opening  years  of  the 
seventeenth  century,  going  so  far  as  to  send  a  commission 
to  that  kingdom.^ 

The  Seven  Years'  War  marks  the  beginning  of  a  more 
determined  advance  upon  the  part  of  European  powers. 
That  war  was  fought  in  America  and  Asia  as  well  as  in 
Europe,  being  largely  the  result  of  colonial  rivalries.  Peace 
had  hardly  been  made  in  1763  when  Europe  set  forth  to 
seek  new  colonies,  going  naturally  to  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
where  the  possibilities  seemed  greatest.  France  and  Eng- 
land sent  out  voyages  to  the  south  Pacific.  In  the  far 
northwest  of  North  America,  however,  Russia  and  England 
were  the  ones  that  threatened  Spanish  supremacy.  There- 
fore, we  may  devote  this  chapter  to  their  approaches  to 

1  Teggart,     The    approaches    to    the  ^  Zelia  Nuttall,  The  earliest  hiatoriffd 

Pacific  coast.  relations    between    Mexico    and    Japan, 

*  The    principal    exposition    of    this  in    University    of    California,    Publica- 

view  is  Edward  P.  Vining,  An  inglorious  tions,   American    Archceology  and  Eth- 

Columbtts,  New  York,  1885.  nology,  v.  4,  no.  1  (Berkeley,  1906). 


1650]         APPROACHES   OF   RUSSIANS  AND   ENGLISH  175 

the  Pacific  coast,  remembering,  however,  that  Spain  had 
felt  misgiving  at  the  approach  of  other  peoples  in  other 
days,  if  not  in  the  time  of  principal  interest  here,  in  order 
that  we  may  estimate  the  greatness  of  the  problem  with 
which  she  had  to  contend. 


The  Russian  approach  was  largely  in  the  hands  of  Cos- 
sacks, the  underlying  causes  being  their  yearning  for  new 
homes  where  they  might  enjoy  personal  freedom  and  the 
commercial  stimulus  of  the  fur  trade."*  The  first  step  was 
taken  in  the  reign  of  Ivan  IV  (1533-84),  when  the  outlaw, 
Yermak  Timofeief,  led  a  band  of  Cossacks  across  the  Ural 
Mountains  in  1578,  and  conquered  a  Tartar  kingdom  on 
the  Ob  River.  Thenceforth,  the  Cossacks  made  rapid 
strides  across  the  continent.  Ten  men  could  conquer  a 
kingdom,  whether  due  to  the  superiority  of  their  weapons  or 
to  other  causes  does  not  matter  here.  Tobolsk,  Tomsk, 
Yenesseisk,  Irkutsk,  Yakutsk,  and  finally  Okhotsk  on  the 
Pacific  successively  became  centres  of  their  endeavors  and 
supply  stations  for  the  next  point  to  the  east.  In  fifty 
years  they  had  reached  Yakutsk,  over  half  way,  and  eleven 
more  years  sufiiced  to  reach  Okhotsk,  where  an  establish- 
ment was  made  in  1639.  From  Yakutsk  they  went  south- 
ward up  the  Lena  River  to  Lake  Baikal,  where  silver  mines 
were  found,  but  here  their  rush  was  checked,  the  Manchu 
Tartars  being  too  powerful  for  them.  In  1646  they  reached 
the  land  of  the  Chukchis  in  the  extreme  northeastern  part 
of  Asia,  and  were  rewarded  by  rich  finds  of  mammoth  ivory. 
The  Chukchis,  however,  were  not  pleasant  neighbors,  and 
were  able  to  maintain  their  independence  of  Russia  to  the 
close  of  the  eighteenth  century.  In  1648-50  one  Simeon 
Deshnef  is  said  to  have  sailed  along  the  northern  coast  of 
Asia  and  south  through  Bering  Strait,  but  if  the  voyage  was 
actually  made,  it  had  no  great  effect,  and  its  geographical 

*  Bancroft,    Alaska,    14-15.       Ban-  ress  to  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 

croft  has  as  much  as  is  required  here  century  is   Golder,   Russian  expansion 

for  the  principal  events  of  the  Russian  on  the  Pacific.     The    spelling  of  Rus- 

advance,  but  the  best  and  most  recent  sian    names    in    this    and    succeeding 

account  in  English  of  the  Russian  prog-  chapters  follows  Bancroft. 


176     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VIII 

import  remained  unknown.^  By  1706  Kamchatka,  the 
last  Siberian  land  to  be  taken,  had  been  overrun. 

Arrived  at  the  Pacific  the  conquerors  wondered  what  lay- 
beyond.  There  were  evidences  of  a  great  land  not  far  to 
the  east;  strange  trees  drifted  ashore;  the  swell  of  the 
ocean  was  not  great ;  and  the  Chukchis  told  stories  of  a  rich 
eastern  continent,  —  and  well  may  it  have  seemed  rich  to 
them,  when  the  comparatively  agreeable  west  coast  of 
Alaska  is  contrasted  with  the  bleak  and  stormy  Siberian 
shore.  The  Russian  government  became  interested  in  the 
"American  Siberia '^  as  early  as  1710,  and  attempts  were 
made  to  reach  it  by  way  of  the  Arctic  Ocean  along  the  north 
coast  of  Siberia,  and  surveys  were  made  of  the  Kurile 
Islands.  This,  it  may  be  noted,  was  during  the  reign  of 
Peter  the  Great  (1682-1725).  Peter  also  planned  expedi- 
tions which  were  to  proceed  from  Kamchatka  to  see  whether 
America  and  Asia  joined,  and  to  make  discoveries  along 
Pacific  shores  from  Japan  to  the  American  continent.  It 
fell  to  the  lot  of  Vitus  Bering,  a  Dane,  to  execute  the  major 
part  of  his  commands,  and  to  the  reigns  of  his  successors  to 
see  them  carried  out. 

The  expeditionaries  had  first  to  make  the  overland  jour- 
ney across  Siberia,  which  they  started  to  do  in  1725.  Ar- 
rived at  the  Pacific,  Bering  left  Okhotsk  in  1727,  and  in  the 
following  year  sailed  through  Bering  Strait.  He  then  re- 
turned to  St.  Petersburg,  where  he  recommended  further 
voyages  to  discover  trade  routes  to  America  and  Japan, 
and  to  explore  the  northern  coast  of  Siberia.  Plans  were 
made  on  a  large  scale,  and  the  expeditions  were  authorized 
in  1734,  but  it  was  six  years  before  they  got  under  way. 
Bering  commanded  one  ship,  and  Alexei  Chirikof  the  other, 
but  the  two  at  length  became  separated.  On  July  15,  1741, 
Chirikof  discovered  the  American  coast  just  above  55°. 
He  then  sailed  northwest  and  west,  passed  the  Aleutian 
Islands,  and  after  much  suffering  reached  Kamchatka  in 
October,  1741.  Chirikof  made  another  voyage  in  1742, 
but    did    not    reach    America.     Bering,    meanwhile,    had 

6  Golder,  67-95,  doubts  the  authenticity  of  the  Deshuef  voyage. 


1783]         APPROACHES   OF   RUSSIANS   AND   ENGLISH  177 

sighted  the  American  mainland  above  58°  on  July  16, 
1741.  The  return  voyage  was  one  of  terrible  hardship. 
The  voyagers  were  obliged  to  winter  on  Bering  Island, 
where  their  commander  died,  and  the  survivors  did  not  get 
back  to  Kamchatka  until  August,  1742.  Incidentally, 
they  brought  back  some  furs  of  the  sea  otter^  and  this  it 
was  which  proved  the  impulse  for  a  fresh  series  of  Russian 
voyages. 

Between  1743  and  1767  a  number  of  voyages  by  private 
individuals'  were  made  as  far  as  the  Aleutian  Islands  in 
search  of  furs.  The  year  176JL,niarks  the  beginning  of  a 
new  period  of  imperial  interest,  when  plans  were  made 
which  resulted  in  the  Krenitzin  and  Levashef  expedition. 
Secret  instructions  were  given,  but  the  object  seems  to  have 
been  to  verify  the  reports  already  received  from  the  fur- 
traders,  and  to  obtain  as  much  further  information  as  pos- 
sible. The^JEJx£iiitzin-Levashef  voyage  took  place  during 
the  yea(£_1766-69/)  The  expeditionaries  encountered  great 
hardships  and  g^ot  no  farther  than  the  Aleutian  Islands,  not 
reaching  the  mainland.  Levashef  at  length  got  back  to 
St.  Petersburg  in  1771.  Special  notice  should  be  taken  of 
this  voyage  as  the  principal  one  under  imperial  direction 
in  the  period  of  most  interest  here.  We  have  seen  that 
the  Spanish  ambassador  to  Russia  in  1764  reported  that  the 
Russians  were  engaged  in  projects  affecting  the  northwest 
coasts  of  North  America,  and  his  letters  were  revived, 
nearly  a  decade  later,  and  notice  of  them  sent  to  Bucarely. 
This  expedition  may  also  have  been  the  foundation  of  the 
exaggerated  reports  from  St.  Petersburg  of  the  Conde  de 
Lacy,  which  will  be  dealt  with  in  a  later  chapter.  In  the 
same  period  came  the  books  by  Mtiller  and  others  to  which 
reference  has  already  been  made.  Private  expeditions 
continued,  however,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say  how  much 
they  entered  into  the  rumors  heard  by  the  Spanish  am- 
bassadors. These  voyages,  too,  seem  to  have  reached  no 
farther  than  the  Aleutian  Islands.  Not  until  1783  did  the 
Russians  make  a  direct  attempt  to  extend  their  fur  trading 
operations  to  the  Alaskan  mainland,  for  the  sea  otter  was 


X 


X 


178      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VIII 

disappearing  from  the  Aleutian  Islands.  In  that  year  an 
expedition  was  made  under  Potap  Zaikof,  but  was  a  failure. 
In  the  same  year  Grigor  Shelikof  organized  a  company  to 
make  a  fur  trading  settlement,  and  this  was  made  in  1784_ 
on  the  Island  of  Kadiak,  the  first  Russian  settlement  in 
North  America.  This  occurred  several  years  later  than 
cohc'erns  us  at  present,  but  it  is  a  proof  of  the  actual  danger 
to  Spain  several  years  bef or^  """^ 

"English  approaches  to  the  Pacific  coast  were  along  a 
number  of  lines,  but  may  be  reduced  roughly  to  two  :  from 
the  Atlantic  coast  westward,  in  most  part  overland,  but 
in  some  degree  by  sea,  as  represented  by  the  attempts  to 
find  a  northwest  passage;  the  direct  approach  by  sea  in 
the  Pacific  itself,  around  South  America,  eastward  from 
southern  Asia,  and  even  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panamd. 
The  former  was  the  earlier  and  more  formidable  movement, 
but  the  latter  was  first  to  arrive  and  the  one  which  in 
fact  gave  more  trouble  to  Spain  down  to  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  We  may  therefore  take  up  the  latter 
series  of  approaches  first.® 

English  entry  of  the  Pacific  by  way  of  the  Isthmus  of 
Panamd  passed  through  two  principal  phases.  The  first 
came  in  the  latter  half  of  the  sixteenth  century  during  the 
reign  of  Elizabeth,  when  English  sailors  plundered  Spanish 
towns  and  ships,  although  their  countries  were  nominally 
at  peace.  Drake  and  Hawkins  are  the  typical  names.  The 
second  phase  came  in  the  seventeenth  century,  when  the 
men  engaged  tended  to  evolve  from  a  shadowy  British 
allegiance  into  unqualified  pirates.  Sir  Henry  Morgan  is 
the  outstanding  figure  of  this  period.  Just  at  the  close  of 
the  century,  also,  came  the  unsuccessful  attempt  to  found  a 
Scotch  colony  at  Darien.  This  marks  the  end  of  English 
activity  along  this  line  of  approach  to  the  Pacific. 

Another  line  of  advance  to  which  little  space  need  be 

*  This   portion   of   the    chapter   has  by    Bancroft's   works.     Mr   Leebrick's 

been   based   in  large  measure  upon   a  manuscript    was    the    winner    of    the 

paper    by    Karl    C.    Leebrick    entitled  James    Bryce    Historical    Essay    prize 

English  voyages  to  the  Pacific  coast  dur-  at  the  University  of  California  in  1912. 
tng  the  eighteenth  century,  supplemented 


1588]        APPROACHES   OF   RUSSIANS  AND   ENGLISH  179 

given,  because  it  did  not  in  fact  get  near  the  Americas,  is 
the  British  advance  around  Africa  to  southern  Asia.  This 
may  be  said  to  have  begun  with  the  chartering  of  the  Brit- 
ish East  India  Company  in  1600,  the  EngHsh  government 
granting  to  that  company  rights  of  trade  from  the  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  to  the  Straits  of  Magellan.  A  voyage  to  the 
East  Indies  was  made  in  the  very  next  year,  and  in  little 
more  than  a  decade  the  company  had  already  established  a 
post  in  India.  As  early  as  1637  English  ships  had  ap- 
peared on  the  coast  of  China  and  for  the  next  century  and 
a  half  they  carried  on  an  intermittent  trade  with  China. 
Spain  had  little  to  fear  from  England  in  this  period  from  the 
direction  of  the  East  Indies,  because  of  the  English  con- 
flicts in  India  with  the  Portuguese,  Dutch,  and  French, 
especially  with  the  last  named.  Once  t2ie__EngHsh  over- 
came their  opposition,  however,  they  loomed  up  as  a  danggji 
to  the  Spanish  colonies.  The  capt-iirp  of  "Maniia  in  1762 
by  fliiJKngjlTgh  fi:?^peditiop  from  India  was  a  significant  in- 
dication  of  the  reality  of  this  danger.  We  have  seen  that 
the  Croix-Galvez  plan  of  January,  1768,  referred  to  the 
possibility  of  English  and  Dutch  voyages  from  the  East 
Indies  to  the  Californias.  Not  until  the  last  fifteen  years 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  however,  was  this  fear  realized, 
when  numerous  English  ships  made  the  voyage  from  China 
to  Nootka  and  the  coasts  of  the  far  northwest. 

The  pioneer  of  English  voyagers  around  South  America 
to  the  Pacific  coast  was  Francis  Drake.  After  plundering 
the^^pa^ish  coasts  he  made  a  brief  stay  in  Alta  California 
m(l579jjSind  then  sailed  across  the  Pacific,  eventually  get- 
ting"back  to  England.  His  voyage  showed  how^.weak -W-as 
the  Spanish  control  of  the  T^acific,  and  it  was  never  for- 
go^en  by  the  Spaniards,  who  likewise  realized  how  much 
they  had  to  fear  from  the  presence  of  an  enemy's  ship.  A 
fresh  lesson  was  not  long  in  coming.  In  1587-88  Thomas 
Cavendish  repeated  Drake's  voyage,  capturing  a  rich 
Manila_ga;lleon  near  Cape  San  Lucas  in  1588.  The  seve^n- 
teenth  century  was  the  age  of  buccaneers,  whether  virtual 
or  real,  and  some  of  them  seem  to  have  rounded  South 


180      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  VIII 

America.  One  expedition,  with  a  semblance  of  govern- 
mental authority,  left  Virginia  in  1683,  turned  South  Amer- 
ica, and  joining  with  buccaneers  who  had  crossed  the  Isthmus 
of  Panamd  engaged  in  operations  against  the  Spaniards, 
1684-86.  Cook,  Eaton,  Davis,  Harris,  Swan,  Wafer, 
Cowley,  Townley,  Dampier,  and  the  Frenchman  Grogniet 
were  among  the  leaders  of  this  enterprise.  Swan  and 
Townley  got  as  far  north  as  Mazatldn. 

The  first  four  decades  of  the  eighteenth  century  were 
marked  by  English  voyages  in  which  commercial  objects 
were  most  largely  to  the  fore,  the  promoters  getting  clear- 
ance papers  from  the  government.  Once  in  the  Pacific, 
these  voyagers  acted  much  as  had  their  predecessors,  the 
buccaneers,  plundering  the  Spaniards.  The  voyages  were 
different  in  that  the  government  required  records  to  be  kept, 
many  of  which  were  published,  and  in  the  general  endeavor 
to  advance  knowledge  of  the  Pacific  coasts,  men  of  science 
often  accompanying  the  expeditions.  The  first  of  this 
series  of  voyages  was  headed  by  Dampier,  who  left  England 
in  1699  with  a  fleet  of  five  ships.  The  expedition  subse- 
quently split  up  into  four  separate  voyages,  owing  to  the 
inability  of  different  ofl&cers  and  men  to  agree  with  Dam- 
pier. Dampier  got  as  far  north  as  the  coast  of  New  Spain 
in  1704-5  before  pursuing  his  voyage  around  the  world. 
Clipperton  and  Funnel  got  back  to  England  by  a  similar 
voyage.  The  expedition  had  been  a  financial  failure,  but 
some  Bristol  merchants  were  persuaded  to  make  another 
venture.  The  new  expedition  set  sail  in  1708  under  the 
command  of  Woodes  Rogers.  Three  years  later  it  got  back 
to  England  with  an  immense  profit,  largely  the  result  of 
having  captured  the  Manila  galleon  off  Cape  San  Lucas  in 
1709.  After  this  encounter  Woodes  Rogers  took  the  usual 
route  around  the  world.  Many  companies  now  sprang  up, 
but  they  were  unable  to  equal  the  success  of  Woodes  Rogers. 
The  Shelvocke-Clipperton  voyages  which  were  along  the 
coast  of  New  Spain  in  1721  are  the  most  noteworthy.  The 
voyages,  even  when  unprofitable  to  British  merchants, 
cost  the  Spaniards  enormous  losses,  both  in  property  taken 


17^91         APPROACHES  OF  RUSSIANS  AND   ENGLISH  181 

or  destroyed  by  the  English,  and  in  prer.flytift^^T]^  TYig>Q«^- 
l^res.  They  also  vastly  jmvrpfl.sp.d  Plngh'sh  knnwIpHgp  nf 
the  Pacific,  and  Jj^_§haJt:es-  Spain's  sense  of  danger  may 
well  have  been  enhanced  by  the  vast  literature  about  Eng- 
lish voyages,  and  the  popular  interest  in  them  in  England. 

A  new  era  begins  with  the  outbreak  ^_warbets^.eaJEd&g- 
land  and  Spain  in  17^^  The'~departure  is  marked  by  the 
fitting  out  of  an  expedition  at  government  expense,  a  formal 
naval  enterprise,  under  the  command  of  George  Anson.^ 
Anson  took  the  customary  route  around  the  world,  in  the 
years  1740-44,.in  the  course  of  which  he  cruised  the  western 
shores  of  New  Spain.  Failing  to  encounter  the  Manila 
galleon  he  crossed  to  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  took  one 
there.  Although  he  did  not  make  a  profit,  and  lost  most 
of  his  men,  he  had  caused  an  immense  expense  and  great 
loss  to  Spain.  Furthermore,  among  the  papers  taken  in  the 
captured  galleon  were  those  which  revealed  the  Spanish 
secrets  of  the  Pacific.  There  were  sailing  directions  for  the 
South  American  coast  and  the  trans-Pacific  routes,  with 
charts  showing  islands,  shoals,  landmarks,  harbors,  and  the 
like.     The  Pacific  was  no  longer  a  closed  sea. 

After  the  Seven  Years'  War  a  new  type  of  voyage  begins. 
The  semi-piratical  voyages  of  the  past  were  no  longer  in 
accord  with  public  morals,  nor  was  there  the  excuse  of  war. 
Voyages  for  scientific  objects  and  discovery  began  there- 
fore to  be  sent  out,  with  instructions  not  to  interfere  with 
the  ships  or  territory  of  European  peoples  with  whom 
England  was  at  peace.  The  impetus  came  from  France, 
who  having  lost  her  colonies  by  the  peace  of  1763,  was 
eager  to  replace  them  by  new  discoveries.  The  English 
quickly  followed  the  French  lead  by  the  voyages  of  Biron, 
1764-66,  and  WaUis  and  Carteret,  1766-69.  These  voy- 
ages went  around  the  world  by  way  of  South  America  and 
the  south  Pacific,  and  made  no  discoveries  requiring  notice. 

Then  came  the  most  important  voyages  of  all,  and  es- 
pecially interesting  here,  as  they  fall  within  the  period  of 
principal  interest  in  this  work,  the  three  voyages  of  Cap- 
tain James  Cook.     The  first  voyage  occupied  the  years 


182      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  VIII 

1768-71,J  One  object  was  to  observe  the  transit  of  Venus, 
the  Island  of  Tahiti  being  selected  as  the  place  at  which  to 
do  it.  Cook  followed  the  path  of  Biron,  Wallis,  and  Car- 
teret. After  the  observation  had  been  taken  at  Tahiti, 
Cook  proceeded  westward  and  made  extensive  explorations 
in  New  Zealand  and  Australia.  Upon  his  return  to  Eng- 
land he  was  commissioned  to  go  again  to  the  south  Pacific 
to  determine  whether  a  great  southern  continent  existed 
there,  about  which  speculation  had  been  rif^lor  two  cen- 
turies. The  expedition  took  place  in  1772-75,  aiid  the  myth 
of  the  southern  continent  was  exploded.  Perhaps  a  more 
important  fact  here  is  that  in  all  his  voyage  he  lost  but  four 
men,  and  only  one  by  sickness.  This  was  the  result  of 
special  preparations  by  Cook.  Before  his  time  it  was 
usually  the  case  that  from  forty  to  seventy-five  per  cent  of 
the  crew  were  lost.  Cook's  methods  were  published,  and 
were  followed  by  later  voyagers.  It  meant  that  the  terror 
of  the  seas  had  been  banished,  and  in  a  very  great  degree 
made  Spain's  retention,  of  powerin.tihe  Pacific  aomufik^ik^ 
less  secure.  ^^,„ 

Cook's  third  voyage  left  England  in  the  year  1776,^nd, 
as  will  be  pointed  out  in  a  later  chapter,  caused  the  Span- 
ish government  no  little  anxiety.  One  of  its  objects  was  to 
attack  another  long-standing  myth,  that  of  a  practical 
water  passage  through  or  around  North  America.  Cook 
was  commissioned  to'  approach  this  problem  from  the 
Pacific  side.  He  was  also  to  get  information  of  the  coast, 
and  was  secretly  instructed  to  take  possession  for  England 
of  all  lands  not  hitherto  discovered  or  visited  by  Europeans. 
En  route  he  discovered  the  Hawaiian  Islands  in  1778,  a 
group  destined  to  occupy  an  important  place  in  later  voy- 
ages of  the  eighteenth  century.  He  reached  the  North 
American  coast  in  about  44°,  and  proceeded  northward. 
Some  furs  were  picked  up  from  the  natives  for  mere  trifles, 
and  were  later  disposed  of  in  China  at  such  good  prices  as 
to  open  the  eyes  of  merchants  to  the  possibilities  of  the  fur 
trade.  The  result  was  a  swarm  of  European  vessels^  par- 
ticularly English  ships,  on  the  northwest  coasts  in  the  last 


1776]         APPROACHES   OF   RUSSIANS  AND   ENGLISH  183 

fifteen  years  of  the  century.  To  return  to  Cook,  he  con- 
tinued  ^TtTiward,  and  passed  through  Bering  Strait,  but 
was  obUged  by  the  ice  to  turn  back.  While  wintering  in 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  in  1779  he  was  killed  in  an  affray  with 
the  natives.  The  expedition  proceeded  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Clerke.  Clerke  also  passed  through 
Bering  Strait,  but  was  forced  back  by  the  ice,  as  Cook  had 
been,  and,  soon  afterward,  he  made  his  way  around  the 
world  to  England. 

To  sum  up,  it  is  clear  that  EngUsh  exploration  in  the 
Pacific  was  gathering  momentum!  Each  new  discove^ 
and  each  advance  in  thFscience  ^Thavigation  or  other  form 
of  knowledge  brought  the  Spanish  empire  of  the  Pacific 
just  so  much  nearer  a  fall.  To  this  must  be  added  not  only 
the  activities  of  the  Russians,  but  also  the  voyages  oi  the 
French,  Dutch,  and  Portuguese.^  Furthermore,  there  were 
foes  attacking  from  the  Atlantic  side,  stripping  Spain  bit  by 
bit  of  her  colonies,  and  expanding  into  the  unoccupied  lands 
that  brought  them  nearer  to  the  Pacific  coast.  A  little 
reflection  on  these  factors  will  enable  one  to  appreciate  the 
problem  which  Spain  had  to  face. 

One  other  factor  remains  to  be  considered,  that  of  the 
English  advance  across  the  North  American  continent. 
^Tli^westwaH^pfogfess  of  what  wasTcTEecome  the  United 
States  had  reached  the  Mississippi  by  1776,  but  the  Ameri- 
can movement  did  not  represent  a  threatening  element  as 
regards  Spain's  possessions  in  the  Pacific  until  after  the 
purchase  of  Louisiana  in  1803.  ._IIntil  then  the  political, and 
geographical  barriers  were  too  great  for  the  United  States 
to  be  a  danger.  The  Spanish  government  did  contemplate 
the  possibility  of  Americans  crossing  the  Mississippi  and 

^  The  great  volume  and  importance  with  additional  matter,   in  the  James 

of   French   voyages   in   the   eighteenth  Bryce  Historical  Essay  of   Mr.   Tracy 

century  is  shown  in  Erick  W.  Dahlgren,  B.    Kittredge,    French    voyages    to    the 

Les   relacions   comerciales   et   maritimes  Pacific  cost   during   the   eighteenth   cen- 

entre  la  France  et  les  cdtes  d' Ocean  Pad-  tury,  winner  of   the   prize  in    1913    at 

fique    (Paris,     1909),    and     the     same  the  University  of  California.     Unfortu- 

author's    Voyages    frangais  de   la  Mer  nately  no  Dahlgren  has  yet   appeared 

du  Sud  avant  Bougainville  in  Nouvelles  for  Dutch  or  Portuguese  voyages,  nor 

Archives    des    Missions    Scientifiques,  have  they  yet  been  made  the  subject 

V.    14,   422-568   (Paris,    1907).     These  of  a  Bryce  Essay  contest, 
works    were    extensively    used,    along 


184     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  VIII 

encroaching  on  New  Spain,  but  not  on  the  Pacific  northwest. 
The  course  of  events  in  Canada,  however,  and  particularly 
the  activities  of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company,  were  factors 
which  threatened  the  far-flung  coast  of  the  Californias, 
and  were  so  regarded  by  Spain.^  One  must  think  back  to 
the  voyages  of  the  Cabots,  followed  by  a  procession  of 
English  mariners  seeking  a  northwest  passage,  —  Frobisher, 
Davis,  Hudson,  Baffin,  James,  and  others,  —  if  he  is  to  get 
this  subject  in  proper  focus.  France,  however,  was  first  to 
get  a  foothold  in  Canada,  and  soon  afterward  her  colonists 
began  to  realize  profits  in  the  fur  trade.  Two  Frenchmen, 
Groseilliers  and  Radisson,  paved  the  way  for  England's 
sharing  in  this  trade.  Dissatisfied  with  the  rewards  ac- 
corded them  by  the  French,  they  temporarily  entered  the 
service  of  some  Englishmen  who  were  interested  in  exploit- 
ing the  fur  trade  of  Hudson  Bay,  and  in  1668  they  started 
English  fur  trading  operations  in  that  region.  The  venture 
was  a  success,  and  led  to  the  chartering  of  the  Hudson's 
Bay  Company  in  1670.  The  company  was  granted  a  monop- 
oly and  the  proprietorship,  with  civil  and  criminal  juris- 
diction, of  all  Hudson  Bay  lands  not  actually  possessed  by 
a  Christian  prince.  Down  to  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  the 
company  was  in  almost  continual  war  with  the  French, 
who  did  not  recognize  its  right  to  the  territory.  The  treaty 
of  1713,  however,  gave  to  England  all  lands  embraced  by 
the  waters  emptying  into  Hudson  Bay  and  Strait.  The 
region  acquired  was  not  definitely  known,  but,  at  all  events, 
the  attacks  of  the  French  now  ceased. 

The  trade  in  furs  was  a  very  profitable  one.  Perhaps  for 
this  reason  the  company  decided  to  let  well  enough  alone, 
and  adopted  a  policy  of  secrecy  and  restriction.  All  but 
servants  of  the  company  were  kept  away  from  the  terri- 
tory, and  the  founding  of  settlements  and  even  the  making 
of  discoveries  were  discouraged.  The  discovery  of  a  strait 
communicating  with  the  Pacific  had  been  one  of  their  char- 

*  The   brief    account   given    here   is  work  on  the  North  West  Company  is 

based  on  Bryce,    Willson,    Laut,    and  in  course  of  preparation,  gave  me  valu- 

Burpee.     Mr.     Gordon     C.     Davidson  able   aid  in  revising  this  part  of  the^ 

of  the  University  of  California,  whose  chapter. 


1749]        APPROACHES   OF   RUSSIANS  AND   ENGLISH  185 

ter  objects ;  yet  they  were  charged  with  opposing  a  search 
for  it,  until  forced  to  make  the  attempt.  Likewise,  agri- 
culture and  mining  were  not  encouraged.  As  a  result,  after 
a  century  of  existence  the  company  had  in  1770  but  seven 
posts,  all  close  to  Hudson  Bay,  with  a  total  population  of 
about  two  hundred  men,  all  company  servants.  This 
exclusive  policy  had  not  passed  without  criticism.  The 
most  notable  critic  was  a  certain  Arthur  Dobbs,  who 
devoted  a  large  part  of  his  lite  to  attacking  the  company 
because  of  its  failure  to  find  a  northwest  passage.  As  a 
result,  several  expeditions  were  made  under  the  auspices 
respectively  of  the  company  in  self  defence  against  Dobbs' 
charges,  of  the  government,  and  of  a  private  concern,  the 
last-named  being  financed  by  popular  subscription.  This 
activity  took  place  for  the  most  part  between  1737  and  1747. 
Parliament  manifested  interest  by  offering  £20,000  as  a  re- 
ward to  the  discoverer  of  the  passage,  but  the  passage  was 
not  found.  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  the  last  of  these  ex- 
peditions one  of  the  boats  was  named  California,  and  the 
forming  of  a  settlement  in  the  Californias  was  contem- 
plated, if  the  strait  should  be  found,  to  serve  as  the  base 
for  a  vast  Pacific  trade.  Failing  to  find  a  passage,  Dobbs 
now  sought  a  charter  for  a  new  corporation,  charging  the 
Hudson's  Bay  Company  with  failure  to  extend  their  settle- 
ments to  the  interior.  The  case  came  up  in  1749,  and 
Dobbs'  petition  was  denied.  The  matter  is  of  no  small 
importance.  A  new  company  would  undoubtedly  have 
stimulated  exploration,  and  might  have  resulted  in  much 
earlier  penetration  by  a  British  enterprise  to  the  Pacific 
coast,  with  consequences  that  stir  the  imagination.  From 
another  standpoint  the  Dobbs  controversy  is  important. 
It  attained  considerable  publicity,  a  number  of  books  being 
written  in  the  course  of  it.  These  came  to  the  notice  of 
Spain,  and  were  a  cause  of  forebodings  on  her  part. 

Twenty  years  later  the  company  at  last  awakened  to  the 
desirability  of  interior  exploration.  The  great  name  is  that 
of  Samuel  Hearne.  Hearne's  first  journey  came  in  the  year 
1769.     He  was  sent  out  by  the  company  to  obtain  infor- 


186      THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  VIII 

mation  of  the  interior ;  in  particular,  he  was  to  reach  a  cer- 
tain river  said  to  abound  in  copper  ore  and  fur-bearing  ani- 
mals. This  journey  was  a  failure,  and  in  another  of  1770 
he  again  failed  to  reach  the  river  of  copper.  In  December 
of  the  same  year,  he  started  a  third  time,  and  on  this  occasion 
was  successful,  reaching  the  river  since  called  the  Copper- 
mine in  July,  1771,  and  descending  it  to  its  mouth  in  the 
Arctic  Ocean.  NotuntilJune,  1772,  did  he  get  back  to  the 
company's  posts  on  Hudson  Bay.  The  Hearne  explora- 
tions were  followed  by  a  new  policy  on  the  part  of  the 
company,  which  began  thenceforth  to  push  its  trading  op- 
erations inland.  Not  much  progress  had  been  made,  how- 
ever, by  the  close  of  the  year  1776,  which  marks  the  end  of 
the  period  of  principal  interest  dealt  with  here.  That  the 
Spanish  government  may  well  have  been  alarmed,  however, 
is  proved  by  the  remarkable  westward  progress  of  the  com- 
pany and  its  rivals  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

An  important  rival  had  sprung  up  in  the  Scottish  mer- 
chants of  Montreal,  themselves  the  successors  of  the  French 
since  the  Seven  Years'  War.  Before  that  war  had  ended 
the  Scottish  merchants  were  pushing  into  the  region  of  the 
Great  Lakes,  and  not  long  afterward  penetrated  as  far  as 
the  Saskatchewan  River.  Gradually  these  men  drew  to- 
gether, and  in  the  winter  of  1783-84  the  North  West  Com- 
pany was  formed,  an  organization  which  was  to  accomplish 
vast  results  in  the  way  of  exploration.  These  companies 
were  yet  another  powerful  force  in  motion  against  the 
tottering  Spanish  Empire. 

These,  then,  were  some  of  the  actual  dangers  to  Spain's 
Pacific  possessions.  The  Portuguese,  Dutch,  and  French, 
however  dangerous  they  may  have  been  prior  to  1763,  were 
not  a  factor  in  the  north  Pacific  between  that  date  and 
1776.  They  therefore  have  virtually  been  left  out  of  this 
account.  The  Russians  were  a  real  danger,  but  the  English, 
among  whom  should  be  included  the  American  colonists, 
were  in  fact  the  most  threatening  force.  It  is  now  time  to 
see  how  Spain  viewed  the  situation. 


CHAPTER  IX 

DIPLOMACY   OF  THE   REIGN   OF   CHARLES    III    (1759-1788) 
FROM  WAR  TO   WAR  WITH  ENGLAND,    1763-1779 

Having  gained  an  idea  of  th^  actual  danger  that  threat- 
ened Spain  in  the  Pacific  northwest,  we  may  next  attempt 
to  acquire  perspective  by  tracing  the  leading  phases  of 
Spanish  diplomacy  in  the  reign  of  Charles  III,  before  taking 
up  the  more  specialized  topic  of  Spain's  activities  against 
foreign  aggressions  in  or  near  the  Calif ornias.  The  object 
is  to  show  what  Spanish  ministers  thought  concerning  Eng- 
land and  Russia,  and  not  so  much  what  those  countries  did 
or  did  not  do  to  merit  Spain's  opinion.  This  chapter,  like 
the  preceding,  is  intended  as  background  material  for  the 
seven  chapters  following  this.  Events  from  1763  to  1773, 
therefore,  appear  in  less  detail,  although  considerable  space 
is  given  to  the  Falkland  incident.  The  stress  falls  between 
1773  and  1776,  and  the  story  is  carried  to  1779.^ 

It  will  be  found  that  Spain's  foreign  policy  in  this  period 
was  primarily  directed  toward  meeting  the  possibility  of 
war  with  England.  Russia,  though  a  dangerous  opponent 
in  the  Pacific,  gave  Spain  hardly  any  concern  in  Europe. 
Troubles  there  were  with  Portugal  and  Morocco,  but  that 
which  made  them  cogent  factors,  especially  in  the  case  of 
Portugal,  was  the  relation  which  England  bore  to  the 
situation.  To  oppose  England  tlie  Family  Compact  be- 
tween the  crowns  of  France  and  6pain  was  brought  into 
T^emg,  and  it  continued  to  be  the  basis  of  Spain's  foreign 
pt^ilicy  throughout  the  period.  Spain  seems  to  have  been 
faithful  to  the  intent  of  this  treaty,  but  France  was  in- 

1  Danvila    has    been    my    principal  with   additional  information   based   on 

source,    with    valuable    supplementary  English    documentary    materials.     Oc- 

material  from  Doniol.    Rousseau  proved  casional    references    to    other    writers 

useful     as     a     convenient,     although  have  also  been  made, 
often    scant,    summary    of  these  two, 

187 


188       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

clined  to  be  lukewarm  when  the  compact  did  not  serve 
her  purposes,  and  enthusiastic  when  it  did,  using  it  also 
as  a  plea  for  specially  favorable  commercial  treatment  of 
France  by  Spain.  At  the  time  of  the  Falkland  affair  in 
1770-71,  and  several  times  between  1773  and  the  close  of 
1776,  Spain  was  ready  and  even  eager  to  fight  England,  but 
France  repeatedly  declined.  Late  in  1775,  however,  a 
change  in  the  Spanish  attitude  began  to  be  perceptible, 
which  became  marked  after  1776.  This  was  due  primarily, 
it  would  seem,  to  the  American  Revolution,  which  en- 
gendered a  belief  that  Spain's  participation  in  the  war  would 
be  fatal,  whatever  the  event;  victory,  which  would  also 
result  in  the  independence  of  England's  colonies,  meant 
the  presence  of  a  dangerous  neighbor  in  America,  and  the 
eventual  loss,  perhaps,  of  Spain's  colonial  empire;  defeat 
meant  the  same  danger  at  the  hands  of  England.  In  all  of 
this  period  one  Spanish  statesman  was  consistently  for 
war,  Aranda,  who  from  1773  on  was  ambassador  to  France. 
Grimaldi,  minister  of  state,  was  favorable,  but  cautious, 
desiring  to  make  sure  that  the  time  was  ripe.  Floridablanca, 
who  succeeded  him  in  1777,  believed  in  preparation  for  war, 
but  in  maintenance  of  peace,  if  possible.  Charles  III  was 
successively  of  the  opinion  of  his  two  ministers  of  state,  al- 
though perhaps  somewhat  more  inclined  to  peace  than  either. 
The^an^er  point  marked  by  the  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence of  the  period,  in  case  of  war  with  England,  was  not 
the  Pacific  coast,  but  especially  the  West  Indies  ^and  the 
near-by  coasts  of  the  mainland.  Down  to  the  close  of  the 
Falkland  affair,  whatever  anxiety  there  was  for  Pacific 
ports  concerned  South  America.  After  1773  affairs  in  the 
Pacific  do  not  seem  to  have  been  important  enough  to  oc- 
cupy a  prominent  place  in  diplomatic  correspondence. 
That  they  should  have  done  so,  it  is  easy  now  to  see,  but 
that  Spanish  statesmen  failed  to  note  the  inevitable  danger 
resulting  from  the  age-long  approaches  of  European  nations 
to  the  Pacific  is  not  hard  to  understand  in  view  of  their 
more  immediate  concern  for  the  West  Indies. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY   OF   THE    REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III       189 

There  are  many  reasons  why  Spain  should  have  regarded 
England  as  her  principal  European  opponent  during  the 
-TCign  of  Charles  III  (1759-88).  Charles  himself  is  said  to 
have  harbored  a  feehng  of  resentment  against  that  country, 
dating  from  the  time  when  he  was  king  of  Naples,^  although 
it  is  doubtful  whether  he  allowed  this  feeling  to  dictate  his 
political  action.  In  any  event  there  were  reasons  of  state 
for  an  anti-England  policy,  irrespective  of  any  personal 
spite  that  Charles  may  have -felt.  These  have  already 
been  reviewed  in  an  earlier  chapter.^  They  come  to  this, 
that  England  was  endeavoring  to  break  down  the  monopoly -^-  1 1 
qiaintained  by  Spain  in  her  colonial  trade,  and  that  througha-^^" 
out  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  England  was 
markedly  imperialistic,  especially  so  after  the  advent  to 
power  of  William  Pitt.  Enghshmen  smuggled  goods  into 
various  parts  of  Spanish  America,  and  the  English  govern- 
ment added  colonies  to  the  British  Empire  at  the  expense  of 
both  France  and  Spain.  Spain  lost  Florida  in  1763,  and 
might  look  back  to  a  loss  in  earlier  years  of  Gibraltar  and 
Minorca,  Jamaica  and  the  Atlantic  coast  strip  of  North 
America,  the  southern  part  of  which,  at  least,  Spain  had 
regarded  as  rightfully  Spanish.  It  seemed  perfectly  clear 
that  England  would  pick  up  more  colonies  when  an  op- 
portunity should  present  itself.  Incidents  of  temporary 
import  were  continually  occurring  to  accentuate  the  hos- 
tility engendered  by  these  disputes  of  a  permanent  kind, 
often  closely  related  to  the  latter. 

The  basjjg  of  the  foreign  policy  of  this  period  was  the^^ 
J^amily  Com^  the  crowns  of  France  and 

Spain,  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  directed  pri^ 
marily  against  England.  The  first  trial  of  arms  had  re- 
sulted in  failure,   England  achieving  a  great  triumph  in 

2  Addison,     26-27,     refers    Charles'  the  city  unless  the  Neapolitan  troops 

hatred    of    England    to    the    following  should  return,  and  Charles  was  obliged 

incident.     During  the  War  of  the  Aus-  to  withdraw  them.     According  to  Ad- 

trian  Succession,  Charles  got  together  dison  he  was  not  of  the  type  to  forget 

an  army  of  12,000  Neapolitans  to  fight  or  forgive  such  humiliation.     Charles' 

on  the  side  of  Spain  against  Austria.  hatred  of  the  English  is  noted  by  other 

After  his  little  army  had  departed  for  writers  as  well,  e.g.  Danvila,   IV,   ilO, 

the   field,    an    English    fleet    appeared  157. 
off  Naples  and  threatened  to  bombard  '  In  chap.  III. 


190       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

the  Seven  Years'  War.  Neither  of  the  Bourbon  monar- 
chies regarded  the  peace  of  1763  as  conclusive,  however, 
but  rather  looked  upon  it  as  a  truce  until  such  time  as  their 
land  and  sea  forces  should  be  ready  again."*-  This  idea  was 
largely  at  the  bottom  of  Charles'  policy  of  economic  re- 
generation, as  already  pointed  out,  in  order  that  revenues, 
and  hence  the  sinews  of  war,  might  be  produced.  This 
it  was  that  lay  back  of  the  visita  of  Jose  de  Gdlvez  in  New 
Spain. 

Spain  was  particularly  alarmed  by  the  strength  of  Eng- 
land's position  in  the  West  Indies,  the  possession  of  Jamaica 
and  Florida  by  England  being  looked  upon  as  endangering 
not  only  Spain's  hold  of  other  islands  of  the  West  Indies, 
but  even  the  security  of  New  Spain  and  other  mainland 
colonies.^  Pretexts  for  trouble  were  not  lacking.  Eng- 
lishmen had  obtained  a  right  to  cut  wood  in  Honduras, 
but  did  not  observe  the  restrictions  placed  upon  them. 
Spain  refused  to  pay  the  ransom  that  had  been  exacted  by 
the  English  at  the  capture  of  Manila  in  1762.®  ThaSac- 
ramgjiito^Mdfsputes  went  on.  French  settlers  in  Louisiana 
resisted  the  transfer  to  Spain,  and  it  was  believed  that  the 
English  had  instigated  them  to  do  it.  Not  only  in  Spain 
but  also  in  America  steps  were  taken  with  a  view  to  the 
possibility  of  war.  In  1764  Cruillas,  viceroy  of  New  Spain, 
complained  that  he  had  no  troops  with  which  to  resist  an 
invasion  except  one  regiment  at  Vera  Cruz  and  a  few  scat- 
tered companies  of  regular  troops  and  militia  elsewhere. 
He  recommended  that  capable  officials  be  sent  from  Spain 
and  that  recruiting  be  authorized.^  Tanucci,  who  had  been 
Charles'  principal  adviser  in  Naples,  and  who  continued  to 
have  an  interest  in  his  welfare  after  Charles  became  king  of 
Spain,  displayed  deep  interest  in  Spanish-American  affairs 
in  this  period.  Reforms  in  the  Americas,  he  wrote,  in 
December,  1764,  were  the  most  important  question  that  the 
king  had  to  confront.  He  repeated  this  opinion  in  several 
letters  of  the  year  1765,  saying  that  Spain  ought  to  reor- 

*  DanvHa,  IV,  104 ;  Addison.  51-52.  «  Rousseau,  II,  55-59,  66,  81. 

6  Danvila,  IV,  82-86 ;  Ferrer  del  Rio,  ^  Zamacois,  V,  596. 

I.  460-51. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN    OF   CHARLES   III       191 

ganize  its  navy  and  fortify  its  ports  in  the  Americas,  for  the 
EngHsh  fanaticism  for  conquest  was  increasing.  His  let- 
ter of  August  16,  1766,  to  Squillace  speaks,  however,  of 
the  greater  need  for  reorganizing  the  fleet.  Although  the 
fortification  and  garrisons  of  America  were  too  weak  to  with- 
stand a  siege,  they  could  nevertheless  keep  up  a  defensive 
war  without  great  danger  of  being  lost.^  Nor  was  the 
Spanish  government  unmindful  of  danger  in  the  Americas, 
despite  its  preoccupation  over  the  internal  affairs  of  Spain.* 
The  principal  diplomatic  interest  down  to  1771  concerns 
the  events  leading  to  the  expulsion  of  the  English  from  the 
Falkland  Islands  in  1770,  and  the  subsequent  warlike  prep- 
arations of  England  and  Spain.  Peace  was  hardly  estab- 
lished in  1763  when  two  English  warships  were  prepared  for  a 
secret  mission  under  Biron  as  commander.  News  of  it  was 
published  in  Holland  in  May,  1764,  whence  the  Spaniards 
learned  of  it.  Biron  left  England  in  July,  1764,  and  touched 
at  one  of  the  Falkland  Islands  in  January,  1765,  at  a  place 
called  by  him  Port  Egmont.  He  applied  the  name  Falklands 
to  the  group,  and  took  possession  for  England.  He  did  not 
form  a  settlement,  but  went  on  around  the  world,  reaching 
England  again  in  1766.  His  act  cannot  be  said  to  have  given 
England  title  to  the  Falklands,  for  the  islands  had  been  dis- 
covered as  early  as  the  sixteenth  century  by  Spanish  navi- 
gators and  had  been  visited  by  Spaniards  as  recently  as 
1763.^^  A  French  expedition  under  Bougainville  had  pre- 
ceded the  English  in  the  Falklands,  and  had  formed  a  settle- 
ment on  one  of  the  islands  in  1764.  The  expedition  seems 
to  have  been  despatched  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
Spanish  court,  which  first  got  news  of  it  from  America,  the 
French  ships  having  put  in  at  Montevideo.  The  news  was 
not  well  received  in  Spain,  and  inquiry  was  made  of  the 
French  court  concerning  the  objects  of  the  expedition.  A 
reply  was  made  that  the  ships  had  gone  in  search  of  a  de- 
serted island,  to  facilitate  passage  of  Cape  Horn  by  French 
navigators.     An   accident  had  forced  them  to  put  in   at 

«Danvila,  IV,  92,  111.  say  that  the  islands  were  discovered 

9  Ibid.,  IV,  111.  in  1686  by  the  English  captain  Cowley, 

10  Altamira,  IV,  58.     Other  accounts       e.g.  Rousseau,  II,  59. 


w 


192       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

Montevideo;  but  they  had  no  intention  of  trading  with 
Spanish  America.  They  had  found  an  island  to  their  pur- 
pose, one  of  the  Maluinas  or  Falkland  group. ^^ 

That  the  Falklands  were  regarded  as  strategically  im- 
portant by  Spain  appears  from  a  confidential  letter  of  Gri- 
maldi  to  an  intimate  friend,  August  6,  1764.  Spain  ought 
to  prevent  the  French  establishment,  he  said,  as  it  might 
later  prove  an  obstacle  to  the  passage  of  Cape  Horn.  A 
Spanish  settlement  should  be  made  at  the  Bay  of  San  Ju- 
lian on  the  mainland  [opposite  the  Falklands],  for  the 
Falklands  and  San  Julian  were  the  keys  to  Spain's  kingdoms 
in  that  part  of  the  world.  If  they  were  occupied,  and  if 
the  viceroy  of  Peru  would  take  action  to  cover  the  prin- 
cipal points  of  his  kingdom  and  to  fortify  two  or  three 
essential  ones,  those  kingdoms  would  be  unconquerable  by 
forces  coming  from  Europe,  and  illicit  trade  could  not  be 
carried  on.  The  French  were  soon  asked  to  withdraw,  lest 
the  English  be  tempted  to  follow  their  example  and  settle 
there.  Choiseul  agreed,  provided  Spain  herself  wished  to 
make  a  settlement. -^^ 

In  April,  1762^  "the  islands  were  fojmally  delivered  to 
Spain  iDyTfeer rench.  Sometime  before,  an  English  expe- 
dition had  reached  Port  Egmont  and  had  made  a  settle- 
ment. In  December,  1766,  the  English  governor  had  visited 
the  French  colony  and  protested  against  it,  claiming  that  the 
islands  belonged  to  England,  and  the  dispute  was  renewed 
by  the  Spanish  and  English  governors  after  the  transfer  by 
France  to  Spain.  Each  ordered  the  other  to  withdraw,  the 
Englishman  setting  a  time  limit  of  six  months. ^^  The  af- 
fair was  reported  to  the  Spanish  government,  which  sent 
an  order  to  the  captain  general  of  Buenos  Aires,  February 
23,  1768,  to  expel  the  English  by  force.  At  least  one  Span- 
ish minister  was  for  war,  the  fiery  Aragonese,  Count  Aranda, 

"  Danvila,    IV,   93-94.     Some   such  would    be    greatly    diminished,     fresh 

place  was  believed  to  be  necessary  to  vegetables  all  gone,  and  the  crew  in  sad 

allow  of  a  break  in  the  voyage.     Boats  straits  from  scurvy, 

were  so   poorly  constructed   then  and  ^^  Danvila,  IV,  94-96. 

so  slow  that  they  usually  had  to  stop  "  Altamira,   IV,   58 ;    Rousseau,   II, 

for    repairs    after    making    so    long    a  60-61;     Danvila,    111-12.     These    ac- 

voyage  as  from  Europe  to  Cape  Horn.  counts  all  vary  somewhat  in  details. 
Moreover,  food  supplies  by  that  time 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III       193 

president  of  the  Council  of  Castile.  The  English  govern- 
ment was  informed  of  Spain^s  proposed  action  in  the  Falk- 
lands,  and  France  was  sounded  to  see  whether  she  would 
live  up  to  the  Family  Compact.-^^  It  was  not  until  De- 
cember, 1769,  that  the  Spanish  were  able  to  find  Port  Eg-,^,^ 
mont.  A  fleet  was  sent  from  Buenos  Aires,  and  the  port  \ 
surrendered  on  June  10,  1770.^^   ^ 

'Ihe  news  reached  Europe  at  a  time  when  the  English 
government  was  irritated  against  Spain  on  other  grounds. 
By  a  decree  of  June  24,  1770,  Charles  III  had  prohibited 
the  importation  and  consumption  of  English  muslins,  thereby 
causing  serious  lost  to  Enghsh  shippers.^  This  and  the 
FalMan^^cident  were  enough  to  cause  Parliament  to  vote 
funds"  in  preparation  for  war.  AranH^a^eade3"*the  war 
paHjMiinL  Spain,  but  Lord  North  and  Grimaldi,  respectively 
chief  ministers  of  England  and  Spain,  were  at  first  less 
inclined  to  fight,  but  as  the  year  1770  drew  to  a  close,  Gri- 
maldi had  changed  his  mind.  The  English  were  making 
excessive  demands  for  satisfaction,  as  well  as  for  the  resti- 
tution of  Port  Egmont.  Furthermore,  it  was  believed  that 
the  leading  French  minister,  Choiseul,  stood  ready  to  bring 
France  in  on  Spain's  side,  although  according  to  Rousseau 
that  conclusion  was  unwarranted.  So,  expeditions  were 
prepared,  fleets  united,  and  the  respective  ambassadors 
withdrew.  War  seemed  inevitable,  when  an  unforeseen 
event  occurred,  changing  the  whole  aspect  of  affairs.  This 
was  the  fall  of  Choiseul,  who  was  succeeded  in  power  by 
D'Aiguillon  of  the  party  of  peace.  It  was  on  this  occasion 
that  Louis  XV  calmly  disregarded  the  Family  Compact, 
saying,  "My  minister  wanted  war,  but  I  do  not."  Spain, 
therefore,  had  to  yield  as  gracefully  as  possible,  and  on 
January  22,  1771,  the  Spanish  ambassador  signed  a  decla- 
ration at  London  disapproving  the  removal  of  the  English 
colonists  and  promising  to  restore  Port  Egmont,  without 
prejudice,  however,  to  Spain's  claim  of  sovereignty.^^ 

These  events  occurred  during  the  time  that  the  Marques 

"  Danvila,  IV,  112-17.  w  Ferrer  del  Rio,  III,  67. 

«  Ibid.,  IV,  96-97,  103.  "  Becker,  37-39  ;  Rousseau,  II,  55-81. 


194       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

de  Croix  was  viceroy  of  New  Spain.  His  views  are  worth 
noting.  Writing  to  his  brother,  April  28,  1771,  Croix  said 
that  he  did  not  yet  know  whether  war  had  been  declared, 
but  he  was  putting  the  kingdom  in  a  state  of  defence.  He 
did  not  think  that  New  Spain  was  in  any  great  danger; 
any  English  attack  on  the  Spanish  colonies  would  be  di- 
rected against  Porto  Rico  or  Campeche,  he  thought. ^^  His 
instruction  to  Bucarely,  September  1,  1771,  noted  Vera 
Cruz  as  the  most  important  port  of  New  Spain,  and  the 
key  to  the  kingdom.^^  Acapulco  would  be  open  to  attack, 
but  such  an  event  was  unlikely  because  of  the  length  of  the 
voyage  necessary  to  reach  there.  The  Manila  galleon 
would  be  able  to  defend  the  port,  and,  moreover,  the  country 
was  mountainous  and  thinly  populated,  not  an  inviting 
point  to  occupy  .^^ 

A  new  factor  was  now  to  appear  to  affect  the  diplomatic 
relations  of  Spain  and  England^  the  latter's  jg^uarrel  with^^ 
her  American  colonies.  Tieorge  Bancroft  intimates  that 
as  early  as  1769  Spain  favored  England  rather  than  the  col- 
onies, because  of  the  danger  that  a  near-by  independent 
republic  would  represent,  and  his  view  has  been  followed 
by  other  writers,  or  else  nothing  has  been  said  by  them  at 
all.^^  The  first  intimation  of  Spanish  hostility  to  England 
comes  when  Spain  began  in  1776  to  contribute  funds  to  the 
Americans.  In  fact,  Spain^s  preparations  for  war  were 
going  on  for  a  half  decade  preceding  that  year,  although 
in  the  earlier  years  without  reference  to  England's  co- 
lonial troubles. 

Spain  might  justly  have  abandoned  the  Family  Compact 
after  the  Falkland  incident,  but  her  hatred  and  fear  of 
England  were  too  great,  although  for  a  time,  the  compact 
suffered  partial  eclipse.  Not  only  the  Falkland  affair,  but 
also  the  fall  of  Choiseul,  its  proponent  in  France,  weakened 
it.  Charles  III  saw  that  in  future  he  could  count  only 
upon  his  own  forces,  but  he  continued  to  increase  and  equip 

18  Croix,  Correspondance,  224.  text,  but  the  impression  given  is  that 

19  Ibid.,  286.  20  ji^id.,  287.        the  Spanish  fear  of  America  was  ex- 
21  Bancroft's  remarks  are  on  a  page        pressed  as  early  as   1769.      Bancroft, 

headed  1769.     No  date  appears  in  the        III,  337. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III       195 

them.  Toward  the  close  of  the  year  1772,  we  find  him  mak- 
ing inquiries  as  to  the  state  of  the  EngHsh  mihtary  and 
naval  forces. ^^  Furthermore,  an  apparent  return  to  the 
Family  Compact  is  noticeable  by  1773.  Late  in  that  year 
we  find  the  warlike  Aranda  become  Spanish  ambassador  to 
France,  and  his  influence  at  once  began  to  make  itself  felt. 
In  November,  1773,  Aranda  conferred  with  D'Aiguillon 
about  the  European  situation,  and  reported  the  result  to 
Grimaldi.  Reference  to  the  partition  of  Poland  had  been 
made,  but  this  was  of  only  passing  interest  to  Aranda.  But 
as  regards  England  he  told  D'Aiguillon  that  that  country 
was  making  exceptional  naval  preparations  with  a  view  to 
imposing  its  law  upon  all  opponents,  and  he  urged  that 
France  prepare  for  war,  as  Spain  was  doing.  D'Aiguillon 
refused  to  see  anything  alarming  in  the  situation,  but 
later  made  plans  in  case  war  should  break  out,  as  for 
example  to  burn  the  Portsmouth  navy  yard.  The  French 
army  and  navy  were  in  a  fair  state  of  readiness,  so  far  as 
Aranda  was  able  to  learn.  He  recommended  that  the 
Bourbon  kings  garrison  the  principal  points  of  the  East  and 
West  Indies,  in  which  case  it  would  matter  little  if  the 
English  should  occupy  indefensible  points,  as  the  latter 
could  not  hold  them  without  being  much  weakened.  Be- 
sides, the  English  had  to  reckon  on  the  need  of  protect- 
ing the  British  Isles,  and  would  not  send  many  men  far 
away.  D'Aiguillon  was  interested  in  the  course  of  the 
Russo-Turkish  War,  and  hoped  it  might  continue  long 
enough  for  Sweden  to  reorganize  her  forces.  He  suggested 
Sweden  as  a  good  base  from  which  to  attack  the  north  of 
the  British  Isles,  and  also  noted  the  value  of  Sweden  as  a 
check  against  Russia.  Aranda  reported  this  much,  without 
noteworthy  comment.  Aranda's  conversations  with  D'Ai- 
guillon  were  warmly  approved  by  Charles  III.  Grimaldi's 
letter  to  Aranda  of  December  27,  1773,  stated  that  Spain 
was  continuing  her  naval  preparations  with  the  greatest 
ardor,  and  hoped  to  get  the  fleet  in  such  shape  that  it  could 
go  to  sea  quickly ;    it  would  be  important  in  a  war  with 

22  Danvila,  IV,  377-78. 


196       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

England  to  strike  at  once,  for  the  English  type  of  govern- 
ment did  not  permit  of  uniting  its  fleet  with  such  rapidity 
as  Spain  could  employ.^^ 

Warlike  negotiations  seem  to  have  given  way  to  other 
matters  in  the  first  half  of  the  year  1774.  Louis  XV  thought 
of  marrying  again,  and  the  possibility  of  his  choosing  a 
Spanish  princess  for  a  time  held  the  stage.  Later,  he  gave 
up  the  idea,  and  talk  of  it  had  hardly  come  to  an  end  when 
Louis  was  taken  sick  and,  on  May  10,  he  died.  Matters 
were  then  halted  until  a  new  government  could  get  under 
way.  There  was  a  change  of  ministry  and  a  period  of  un- 
certainty as  to  its  attitude.  Vergennes  succeeded  D'Aiguil- 
lon  as  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  but  as  he  was  at  the  time 
ambassador  to  Sweden,  it  was  not  until  July  that  he  was 
ready  to  take  up  his  duties  at  the  French  court.  Indications 
in  the  meantime,  however,  were  that  France  would  stand  by 
the  Family  Compact,  or  so  at  least  the  king  and  his  min- 
isters said.  This  possibility  gave  England  no  small  concern, 
according  to  the  Spanish  ambassador  in  London.  Choiseul 
returned  to  the  French  court,  and  that,  too,  was  regarded 
as  a  favorable  symptom  by  Spain. ^^  In  this  period  occurred 
an  incident  which  might  have  precipitated  a  war  if  both 
Spain  and  England  had  not  been  uncertain  as  to  France's 
attitude.  An  English  ship  took  possession  of  Viegues  or 
Crab  Island,  only  two  leagues  from  Porto  Rico,  despite  the 
protest  of  the  Spanish  governor  of  Porto  Rico.  The  issue 
remained  in  doubt  for  a  time,  but,  on  June  18,  Grimaldi  was 
able  to  inform  Aranda  that  the  English  force  had  aban- 
doned the  island. ^^ 

Vergennes  was  at  his  post  by  July,  1774.  His  early  cor- 
respondence, both  with  the  king  and  with  French  ambas- 
sadors at  other  courts,  shows  that  he  was  an  enthusiastic 
and  ardent  supporter  of  the  Family  Compact,  although 
we  shall  see  that  this  enthusiasm  was  tempered  in  mo- 
ments of  crisis  by  a  clear  view  of  what  most  favored  France, 
and  at  all  times  by  a  desire  to  see  France  profit  commer- 

23  Danvila,  IV,  386-90.  25  Coxe,   V,   7-8 ;  Danvila,  IV,  393, 

2*  Ibid.,  IV,  390-401.  399. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY   OF   THE   REIGN   OF   CHARLES  III       197 

cially.  In  his  instructions  of  July  22,  1774,  to  Baron  de 
Breteuil,  ambassador  to  Vienna,  Vergennes  outlined  the 
status  of  French  foreign  policy  upon  the  accession  of  Louis 
XVI  to  the  throne.  Of  France's  engagements  the  most 
important  was  that  of  the  Family  Compact  with  Spain,  he 
said.  It  was  necessary,  not  only  in  case  the  situation  in 
England's  American  colonies  should  offer  a  chance  to  at- 
tack England,  but  also  for  a  more  immediate  object  upon 
which  the  rest  depended,  that  of  giving  France  an  oppor- 
tunity to  build  up  her  army  and  navy  again.  The  com- 
pact rested  on  the  strongest  ties  of  blood,  amity,  and  po- 
litical interest,  and  fulfilled  admirably  the  double  purpose 
of  opposing  superior  forces  to  the  English  navy,  and  of 
tempering  England's  penchant  for  attacking  France,  be- 
cause of  her  unwillingness  to  break  with  Spain.  Spain,  how- 
ever, was  not  equally  desirous  of  avoiding  a  break,  because 
of  England's  profits,  licit  and  illicit,  in  Spanish  trade,  and 
because  Spain  had  in  every  way  to  dread  the  superiority  of 
the  British  forces  in  North  America.  Thus,  the  common 
enemy,  England,  was  the  most  dangerous  and  most  powerful 
opponent  of  the  two  crowns.  There  were  other  objects  of 
the  pact,  but  Spain  was  not  expected  to  enter  into  these 
any  more  than  she  might  desire;  it  is  noteworthy  that 
these  other  objects  included  relations  with  Sweden,  Poland, 
and  Turkey,  as  against  Russia.  In  fine,  the  E]amily  Com- 
pact should  be  considered  as  the  basis  of  Jjou\slC7mtfT^ 
eign  policy.^^  To  Ossun,  the  French  ambassador  at  Ma- 
drid, Vergennes  wrote,  the  same  day,  that  he  was  ready 
upon  all  occasions  to  give  the  most  unequivocal  proofs  of 
his  desire  to  maintain  it.^^  Much  to  the  same  effect  were 
his  words  to  tKe  kmgT^December  8,  1774,  on  which  date  he 
presented  a  memorial  on  the  political  situation  of  France 
with  relation  to  the  different  powers.  England,  he  said, 
was  dangerous,  because  more  jealous  of  the  prosperity  of 
her  neighbors  than  solicitous  for  developing  her  own,  and 
because  the  British  ministry,  despite  friendly  assurances, 
was  ready  to  unite  party  sentiment  in  England  by  stirring 

26  Doniol,  I,  22-26  ^  Ibid.,  I,  13-14. 


198       THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

up  a  war  against  France.  The  Family  Compact  was  the 
surest  means  of  holding  England  in  check.^^ 
'^'  Aranfia  was  favorably  impressed  by  the  situation  at  the 
French  court.  He  wrote  a  long  letter  to  Grimaldi,  August 
5,  1774,  in  which  he  discussed  the  king  and  queen  and  the 
leading  ministers.  Maurepas,  then  seventy- three  years 
old,  had  reentered  the  Council  of  State,  and  was  the  king's 
principal  adviser.  He  was  a  warm  partisan  of  the  agree- 
ment with  Spain.  Vergennes  was  a  man  of  no  party,  think- 
ing only  of  the  interests  of  the  service.  Turgot  had  become 
secretary  of  the  navy,  but  would  have  a  hard  task  as  his 
predecessor,  M.  de  Boines,  had  left  that  department  in 
confusion. ^^  In  another  letter,  the  same  day,  Aranda  re- 
ferred to  the  surprise  caused  by  the  unexpected  peace  con- 
cluded between  Russia  and  Turkey,  resulting  in  advantages 
to  the  former.  There  was  some  fear  lest  Russia  might  re- 
new its  pretensions  to  Finland  against  Sweden. ^°  It  is 
worthy  of  remark  that  the  Russo-Turkish  War  had  endured 
from  October  6,  1768,  to  July  21,  1774 ;  also,  that  the  fear 
of  Russia  in  North  America  does  not  seem  to  have  filled 
large  enough  place  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence  to  have 
caught  the  attention  of  Danvila,  Rousseau,  or  others  who 
have  devoted  their  works  to  the  diplomacy  of  Spain  in  this 
period.  That  such  a  fear  existed  will  be  shown  in  the  next 
chapter,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  comparatively  unimpor- 
tant. 

The  British  ministry  reached  the  same  conclusion  as 
Aranda  with  regard  to  the  adherence  of  France  and  Spain 
to  the  Family  Compact,  and  consequently  planned  to 
occupy  Spain  with  other  affairs,  so  as  to  separate  her  from 
France,  or  at  least  to  turn  her  from  following  a  common 
policy.^^  Two  matters  were  at  hand  of  which  they  might 
avail  themselves,  the  disputes  of  Spain  with  the  sultan  of 
Morocco,  and  her  quarrels  with  Portugal  over  boundaries 
in  South  America. 

By  a  treaty  of  the  year  1767,  satisfactory  relations  be- 

28  Doniol,  I,  19.  30  Ibid.,  IV,  404. 

»  Danvila,  IV,  401-^.  «  Doniol,  I,  26. 


1763]      DIPLOMACY   OF  THE   REIGN   OF  CHARLES   III       199 


i 


i 


tween  Spain  and  Morocco  had  been  established,  including 
the  recognition  of  Spain's  right  to  her  establishments  on  the 
North  African  coast.  Late  in  1774,  however,  the  sultan 
announced  that  he  could  no  longer  tolerate  Christian  posts 
in  his  empire,  and  he  commenced  the  siege  of  Melilla,  a 
Spanish  town  there.  The  ensuing  military  operations  need 
not  be  followed,  except  to  note  a  battle  before  Algiers  in 
July,  1775.  On  this  occasion  General  O'Reilly,  reformer  of 
the  Spanish  army  and  a  man  of  tremendous  reputation, 
suffered  a  crushing  defeat  with  a  loss  of  nearly  three  thou- 
sand men  in  killed  and  wounded.^^  When  the  news  came  to 
Spain  there  was  a  great  outcry  against  O'Reilly,  as  also 
against  Grimaldi,  who  already  had  many  opponents  of  the 
nationalist  element,  Grimaldi  being  an  Italian.  What  is 
more  to  the  point  here  is  that  England  was  beheved  to 
have  inspired  the  sultan  of  Morocco  to  attack  Spain.  This 
is  the  opinion  of  Ferndn-Nuiiez,  himself  a  participator  in 
the  O'Reilly  expedition.^^  O  •  ^^^-"^ 

There  was  a  much  stronger  case  against  England  on  the  l:^ . 
charge  of  inciting  her""ally,  Portugal,  against  Spain  over 
{^xmth_^American  affairs .  Certainly  England^  "supported 
Portugal's  exaggerated  claims. ^^  Boundaries  between  the 
Portuguese  and  Spanish  colonies  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  had 
never  been  settled  satisfactorily,  resulting  in  perennial 
disputes  in  that  region,  especially  concerning  the  province 
of  Sacramento.  One  of  the  principal  causes  of  trouble  at 
this  time  was  the  policy  of  the  Portuguese  minister  of 
state,  Pombal,  who  was  desirous  of  making  conquests 
in  South  America,  and  who  was  willing  to  go  to  any  length 
in  bad  faith  to  achieve  his  end,  relying  upon  the  support  of 
England,  in  case  Spain  should  declare  war.  The  course  of 
events  may  first  be  traced,  after  which,  a  discussion  of  their 
place  in  Spanish  diplomacy  may  be  resumed. 

Pombal  secretly  sent  orders  to  Portuguese  officials  in  the 

^  Rousseau,  II,  84-89.  speaks  as  if  Spain  were  the  aggressor, 

33  Ferndn-Niinez,  I,  246-47.  instigated    by    the   French   court,    but 

"  Ibid.,  I,  279  ;  Ferrer  del  Rio,  III,  admits   that   the   Portuguese   minister, 

138-39;  Doniol,  I,  26.     Another  view-  Pombal,    "was    eager    to    extend    the 

point  appears  in  Coxe,  V,  8-9.     Coxe  domains  of  Portugal  in  the  new  world." 


200       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

Sacramento  region  to  seize  desirable  Spanish  territories. 
When  news  of  the  seizures  came  to  Europe  he  would  pre- 
tend that  it  was  false,  or  that  nothing  more  than  inconse- 
quential affrays  between  Spanish  and  Portuguese  soldiers 
had  occurred.  He  promised  to  order  his  troops  to  desist 
from  such  actions,  and  asked  Charles  III  to  do  the  same. 
The  latter  did  so,  but  Pombal,  on  the  contrary,  continued 
to  order  hostilities  and  to  send  reenforcements,  hoping  to 
secure  posts  from  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  dislodge  the 
Portuguese  by  the  time  that  his  duplicity  could  no  longer 
be  concealed.  Not  only  did  he  deceive  Charles  III  for 
awhile,  but  he  misled  the  English  ministers  as  well,  pretend- 
ing that  Portugal  was  a  victim  of  Spanish  ambition. 

A  change  in  the  situation  came  as  a  result  of  the  American 
Revolution.  By  the  close  of  the  year  1775  England  was 
so  busily  engaged  with  her  colonies  that  she  was  far  from 
desiring  war  in  Europe,  and  restrained  Portugal.  The 
British  Cabinet  announced  that  it  would  take  no  part  in 
the  Spanish-Portuguese  quarrel,  provided  Spain  should  make 
no  attempts  against  Brazil  or  Portugal  itself.  Pombal 
now  made  peaceful  overtures  to  Charles  III,  hoping  to  de- 
lay Spain's  sending  of  troops  to  South  America,  as  had 
been  proposed,  but  the  proofs  of  Pombal's  perfidy  were  so 
clear,  that  he  was  no  longer  believed.  An  expedition  set 
sail  from  Cddiz  in  November,  1776,  the  fleet  being  under 
the  Marques  de  Casa  Tilly,  and  the  troops  commanded  by 
Pedro  Ceballos.  En  route  to  Buenos  Aires  the  Portuguese 
island  of  Santa  Catherina,  off  the  coast  of  Brazil,  was 
captured.  Then  followed  the  seizure  of  the  Portuguese 
fleet,  and  the  reconquest  of  Sacramento. 

Meanwhile,  fortune  played  into  Spain's  hands  in  another 
respect.  On  February  23,  1777,  Jose  I  of  Portugal  died. 
His  wife,  Maria  Victoria,  who  became  regent,  was  a  sister 
of  Charles  III  and  an  opponent  of  Pombal,  whose  fall  from 
power  occurred  immediately.  In  October  of  that  year  a 
treaty  was  signed  between  Spain  and  Portugal,  entirely 
favorable  to  the  former.  The  much-disputed  Sacramento 
colony  and  the  other  lands  occupied  or  claimed  by  Portugal 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III       201 

were  recognized  as  belonging  to  Spain,  while  Santa  Cathe- 
rina  and  other  parts  of  Brazil  recently  conquered  by 
Ceballos  were  restored  to  Portugal.^^ 

Ossun  had  reported  to  Vergennes,  July  7,  1774,  that  war 
between  Spain  and  Portugal  was  a  possibility,  due  to  the 
latter's  aggressions  in  South  America.^^  The  situation  was 
far  from  pleasing  to  Vergennes,  who  feared  that  Spain  might 
desire  to  conquer  Portugal,  and  thus  bring  on,  not  only  war 
with  England,  but  a  general  "European  war,  lest  Spain's 
conquest  result  in  too  great  Bourbon  strength,  upsetting 
the  balance  of  power.  Naturally,  he  was  eager  to  learn  the 
attitude  of  England,  and  asked  Garnier,  his  ambassador  in 
Lisbon,  to  learn  what  he  could  on  that  point.  Vergennes 
believed  that  England  would  not  openly  come  to  Portugal's 
aid,  but  that  she  would  do  so  surreptitiously.^^  At  the 
same  time  he  was  not  neglecting  to  use  the  Family  Compact 
for  France's  commercial  advantage.  Writing  to  Ossun, 
September  13,  1774,  he  charged  him  to  say  that  France  was 
eager  to  reorganize  her  finances  and  her  navy,  as  Charles  III 
had  suggested,  but  commercial  prosperity  was  a  necessary 
prerequisite,  and  that  depended  upon  finding  a  market 
outside  her  own  borders.  Spain  might,  therefore,  grant 
certain  commercial  favors  to  France,  and  at  least  put  her 
on  an  equal  basis  with  England,  mentioning  the  case  of 
prepared  leathers  on  which  the  duty  was  twice  as  high 
against  French  goods  as  against  those  from  England. ^^ 

England's  attitude  toward  Spain  in  the  affair  with  Por- 
tugal was  not  long  in  doubt.  Lord  Stormont,  British  am- 
bassador to  France,  told  Vei'gennes  that  Spain  was  getting 
ready  to  attack  Portugal,  not  only  in  America,  but  also  in 
Portugal  itself,  and  that  England  could  not  look  upon  such 
preparations  with  indifference.  Writing  of  this  to  Gri- 
maldi,  September  30,  1774,  Aranda  said  that  he  was  answer- 
ing other  foreign  ministers  at  Paris  with  regard  to  the 
alleged   plans  of  Spain,   saying  truthfully  that    he    knew 

^  This    account   of  the  Sacramento  '*  Doniol,  I,  27. 

dispute  was  taken  from  Rousseau,  II,  ^  Ibid.,  I,  28. 

100-9.  ^  Ibid.,  I,  36-37. 


202       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

nothing  of  them.^^  Whereas  Stormont^s  manner  with  Ver- 
gennes  had  been  brusque,  in  order  to  intimidate  France, 
Lord  Grantham  at  Madrid  had  made  similar  inquiries  with 
poHteness,  in  order  to  keep  Spain  from  coming  too  strongly 
to  France^s  support.  Vergennes  was  not  easily  frightened, 
however.  Stormont  had  demanded  that  France  should 
check  the  hostile  designs  of  Charles  III,  whereupon  Ver- 
gennes replied  that  he  could  not  intervene,  not  having 
heard  from  the  two  countries  of  their  differences,  and  that 
he  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  intentions  of  the 
Catholic  King  were  less  sincerely  pacific  than  those  of  Eng- 
land.^^  Similarly,  Grimaldi  expressed  surprise  at  Grant- 
ham's representation,  saying  that  it  was  not  Spain  but  Por- 
tugal which  was  making  warlike  preparations.  Writing  of 
this  to  Aranda,  October  15,  1774,  Grimaldi  remarked  that 
England  had  said  nothing  while  Portugal  was  sending  troops, 
ships,  and  munitions  to  South  America,  but  when  there 
seemed  a  likelihood  that  Spain  might  do  so,  she  affected 
astonishment,  and  was  even  bold  enough  to  assert  that 
Spain  was  forming  an  army  on  the  Portuguese  frontier. 
One  might  believe  that  England  was  in  an  agreement  with 
Portugal  to  draw  Spain  into  a  war,  if  it  were  not  that  the 
British  ministry  sincerely  desired  and  even  needed  peace. 
So,  very,  likely,  Pombal  was  deceiving  the  English  minis- 
ters."*^ Ossun's  report  to  Vergennes,  October  6,  1774,  was 
in  substantial  agreement  with  this.  He  believed  that 
Grimaldi  and  Charles  III  desired  peace,  but  that  they 
would  fight  in  a  just  cause.  If  Spain  should  attempt  to 
retake  the  posts  in  South  America  which  the  Portuguese 
had  seized,  it  might  lead  to  war."*^  Vergennes'  reply  shows 
that  France  might  have  abandoned  the  Family  Compact 
again  in  case  of  a  rupture.  Vergennes  believed  that  Por- 
tugal was  the  aggressor,  and  that  Pombal  was  endeavoring 
to  draw  the  English  into  it.  He  said  that  there  was  a  pos- 
sibility of  an  English  fleet's  being  sent  to  Brazil,  which  was 
as  important  to  England  as  if  it  were  her  own,  and  as  the 

»  Danvila,  IV,  404-5.  «  Danvila,  IV,  405-6. 

«  Doniol,  I,  29.  «  Doniol,  I,  29-30. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III       203 

British  navy  had  a  taste  for  plunder,  such  an  event  might 
cause  war.  He  had  told  Stormont  that  peace  might  be 
maintained  if  England  would  cause  Portugal  to  stop  sending 
war  material  and  troops.  If  England  desired  peace,  he  con- 
tinued to  Ossun,  France  had  no  choice  but  to  agree. 
Louis  XVI  was  devoted  to  the  Family  Compact,  but  the 
finances  were  in  disorder.  They  must  be  restored,  and  the 
navy  put  in  shape,  things  which  would  take  France  sev- 
eral years,  and  until  then  France  could  give  no  effective 
aid  to  Spain.  This  much  was  told  to  Ossun  in  confidence, 
and  he  was  not  to  let  it  be  known  to  the  Spanish  ministry.*^ 
Meanwhile,  Vergennes  renewed  his  plea  for  commercial 
advantages  with  Spain,  or  at  least  that  France  be  allowed 
j^rivileges  equally  with  England,  the  common  enemy  of  the 
two  crowns.^^  To  Aranda,  however,  the  impression  was 
given  that  France  stood  back  of  Spain,  both  in  the  affair 
with  Morocco  and  in  that  with  Portugal.*^  And  so  she 
did, — in  sympathy. 

As  the  year  1774  drew  to  a  close,  England's  dispute  with 
her  American  colonies  began  to  loom  on  the  diplomatic 
horizon,  although  its  importance  was  not  yet  grasped. 
In  England  it  was  looked  upon  as  a  Whig  device  against  the 
Tories,  and  opinion  at  the  French  court  naturally  followed 
that  of  London,  its  advent  being  welcomed  on  the  ground 
that  England  would  be  kept  busy  enough  to  prevent  her 
attacking  France.  At  least  one  British  minister,  however. 
Lord  Rochford,  saw  early  in  1774  that  the  matter  was 
serious.  The  Boston  rioters  were  descendants  of  Crom- 
well's Puritans,  he  said,  implying  by  that,  that  they  would 
fight.  His  remarks  were  duly  quoted  to  the  French  court 
in  Guines'  report  of  June  13, 1774.'*^  Spain  was  preoccupied 
with  the  Portuguese  difficulty,  especially  because  of  Eng- 
land's favorable  attitude  toward  Portugal.  Grimaldi  wrote 
to  Aranda,  December  5,  1774,  asking  him  to  sound  the 
French  ministry  to  see  if  France  would  stand  by  the  Family 
Compact  in  case  of  war ;   the  matter  was  urgent,  as  news 

"  Ibid.,  I,  31-35.  «  Danvila,  IV,  406-7. 

**  Ibid.,  I,  38.  «  Doniol,  I,  38-40. 


204       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

had  come  from  Buenos  Aires  that  the  Portuguese  were  plan- 
ning an  assault  on  the  port  of  Santa  Tecla.  Aranda's 
reply,  December  19,  1774,  advised  against  open  prepara- 
tion for  war,  but  suggested  that  the  Spaniards  in  America 
should  be  induced  to  resist  the  Portuguese.  Then,  if  it 
came  to  war,  the  French  would  not  "have  the  face''  (no 
tendrdn  cara)  to  withhold  their  aid."*^  About  at  this  time 
Pombal  seemed  to  have  relented,  being  advised,  no  doubt, 
of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  England's  sustaining  Portu- 
gal. Vergennes,  who  wished  to  retain  the  Family  Com- 
pact for  an  occasion  when  it  might  redound  to  France's 
advantage,  wrote  to  Ossun,  January  3,  1775,  praising  him 
for  not  having  told  Charles  III  of  France's  need  for  peace, 
and  adding  that  the  king  of  Spain  must  not  be  allowed  to 
believe  that  France  would  not  have  come  to  his  aid  in  case 
war  had  broken  out.*^ 

By  December,  1774,  it  became  clear  that  England's  Ameri- 
can troubles  were  something  more  than  passing  riots* 
Garnier,  who  had  become  chargS  d'affaires  in  London,  wrote 
Vergennes,  December  19,  1774,  that  it  was  the  most  im- 
portant event  since  the  English  Revolution.  He  sug- 
gested that  France  help  the  Americans  in  secret,  as  America 
might  withdraw  her  commerce  from  England  and  offer  it 
to  other  nations,  in  the  event  of  a  quarrel  with  England.  On 
January  27,  1775,  he  announced  that  England  was  pre- 
paring to  send  General  Gage  with  9000  men  to  put  down 
the  colonists,  and  sounded  a  warning  that  she  might  seize 
the  Antilles  in  the  flush  of  success,  or  as  a  recompense  for 
defeat,  if  the  colonists  should  be  victorious.  Her  seemingly 
pacific  intentions  should  not  allow  the  French  court  to  be 
caught  unprepared.  Vergennes  was  much  impressed  by 
Garnier's  warning.  Writing  to  Ossun,  February  7,  1775, 
he  urged  him  to  rouse  the  Spanish  court  to  the  importance 
of  England's  despatch  of  troops  to  America.  Although  they 
might  be  intended  solely  for  use  against  the  colonials,  un- 
foreseen events,  such  as  a  change  of  ministry  in  England, 
might  bring  about  a  new  destination  for  them  dangerous  to 

«  Danvila,  IV,  408.  «  Doniol,  I,  35. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III       205 

the  establishments  of  France  and  Spain  in  that  part  of  the 
world.  France  was  taking,  precautions  against  unforeseen 
attack,  and  hoped  that  Spain  would  do  so,  too.  Writing 
again,  February  14,  he  stated  that  England's  difficulties 
would  prevent  her  from  assisting  Portugal,  but  the  danger 
of  war  with  England  was  even  greater,  because  of  the 
magnitude  of  her  efforts,  and  it  behooved  France  and  Spain 
to  fortify  themselves,  lest  the  recoil  fall  upon  their  colonies 
when  least  expected.  "I  am  not  calm,  I  assure  you,  sir,^' 
he  said,  ^^in  seeing  the  English  carry  such  great  land  and  sea 
forces  to  America. '^  Ossun's  letter  of  February  20,  1775, 
said  that  Charles  III  and  Grimaldi  agreed  with  Vergennes, 
and  had  told  him  that  Spain  was  doing  everything  possible 
to  put  the  Americas  in  a  state  of  defence.  Spain  now  had 
a  navy  of  forty-four  vessels,  and  artillery  and  munitions 
were  being  prepared  for  ten  or  eleven  thousand  men  who 
were  to  be  ready  to  embark  without  delay.  Havana,  Porto 
Rico,  and  the  kingdom  of  New  Spain  had  been  fortified ; 
there  was  a  colonial  militia  with  Spanish  officers  in  those 
places  and  in  Cumand,  Caracas,  and  Buenos  Aires,  and 
there  were  Spanish  regulars  in  all  of  the  places  named, 
except  Cumand  and  Caracas,  and  also  in  Cartagena, 
Panama,  and  Portobello."*^ 

Meanwhile,  Escarano  in  London  had  been  impressed, 
much  as  Garnier  had  been,  by  the  danger  to  Spain's  colonies 
resulting  from  the  presence  of  English  troops  in  America. 
There  were  11,736  British  soldiers  there,  he  wrote  to  Gri- 
maldi, March  6,  1775,  and  it  would  be  easy  to  attack  Spain's 
possessions,  both  because  they  were  near,  and  because 
England  had  so  many  transports  at  hand.  He  was  of  the 
opinion  that  England  could  not  defeat  America  with  ita^ 
"three  million  souls  guided  by  the  enthusiasm  of  liberty, 
and  accustomed  to  live  in  a  kind  of  independence,"  a  people 
"who  had  given  so  many  proofs  of  valor."  If  the  opposi- 
tion should  overthrow  the  Tory  ministry,  it  would  mean 
war  with  Spain,  as  that  would  bring  Chatham  (Pitt),  Rich- 
mond,  and  Shelburne  into  power.     Even  with  a  well-in- 

« Ibid.,  I,  40-46. 


206       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

tentioned  ministry,  it  was  not  certain  that  England  would 
not  seek  a  pretext  for  a  rupture,  and  employ  her  forces 
without  warning  against  some  of  the  less  well  fortified  Span- 
ish colonies.  She  could  avail  herself  of  Spain's  quarrel 
with  Portugal  for  a  pretext.  Escarano  suggested  that  it 
might  be  well  to  intimate  to  England,  that  she  must  with- 
draw her  troops  and  ships  from  the  Americas,  when  her 
quarrel  with  the  colonies  should  be  adjusted.  Lord  North 
wanted  peace,  but  his  position  in  power  was  very  precari- 
ous.^°  In  referring  to  Chatham,  Escarano  was  mentioning 
the  bugbear  which  disturbed  the  peace  of  mind  of  both' 
France  and  Spain,  especially  of  the  former.  The  great 
English  imperialist  was  ever  ready  for  war,  and  was  re- 
garded at  the  French  court  as  especially  hostile  to  France. 

Danvila  holds  that  France  and  Spain  were  by  this  time 
resolved  to  fight  England.  It  was  only  necessary  to  in- 
crease their  forces,  and  to  seek  an  opportune  occasion.^^ 
Aranda  and  the  French  ministry  were  making  plans  of  cam- 
paign as  early  as  March,  1775.^^  Writing  to  Grimaldi, 
March  30,  1775,  Aranda  advised  that  Spain  take  an  atti- 
tude of  open  hostility  to  England.  He  had  just  seen  Mau- 
repas,  Vergennes,  and  Sartine,  and  they  had  informed  him 
that  the  French  fleet  was  in  better  shape  than  people  thought. 
Aranda  told  them  that  he  believed  that  France  and  Spain 
together  could  destroy  England,  and  reminded  them  of  the 
insecurity  of  treaties  with  England,  because  of  her  system 
of  changing  ministries,  involving  also  the  possibility  of  a 
change  in  policy.  If  the  French  and  Spanish  navies  were 
ready,  it  would  be  better  to  break  with  England,  he  had 
said.  By  putting  the  essential  points  in  the  Americas  in 
a  state  of  defence  beforehand,  it  would  matter  little  if  the 
English  should  make  attacks  elsewhere.  The  French  min- 
isters had  shown  themselves  agreeable  to  his  proposals. 
Even  the  peace-loving  Charles  III  and  Grimaldi  seemed 
ready  to  fight.  The  latter  wrote  to  Aranda,  April  25, 
1775,    applauding   his    warlike    proposals,    but    suggesting 

M  Danvila,  IV,  378-80.  « Ibid.,  IV,  447-48. 

"  Ibid.,  IV,  412. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN    OF   CHARLES   III       207 

that  it  would  be  well  to  ask  England  for  an  explanation 
with  respect  to  her  considerable  forces  in  America,  and  to 
request  that  she  disarm,  as  soon  as  peace  should  be  made 
with  her  colonies.  He  enclosed  a  letter  to  Escarano  to  that 
effect,  but  it  was  not  to  be  forwarded  to  him,  unless  the 
French  court  should  approve.  This  would  have  meant  war, 
perhaps,  but  Vergennes  did  not  approve  of  presenting  such 
a  request.  What  is  more  surprising,  Aranda  agreed  with 
him,  although  only  because  ha  favored  another  pretext  for 
a  rupture.  ^^  While  this  correspondence  was  being  carried 
on,  Spain's  naval  preparations  were  going  on  apace,  the 
maritime  expedition  against  the  Barbary  Coast  peoples 
serving  as  an  excuse.^*  Grimaldi  told  Ossun,  wrote  the 
latter  to  Vergennes,  April  24,  1775,  that  the  British  am- 
bassador had  taken  good  care  not  to  evince  the  least  anxi- 
ety in  that  regard,  and  if  he  had  done  so,  that  he,  Grimaldi, 
bearing  in  mind  England's  colonial  troubles,  would  have 
been  disposed  to  tell  him  that  Spain  was  not  obliged  to  ren- 
der an  account  of  her  conduct  to  England.  Grimaldi  was 
much  impressed  by  the  danger  from  England  in  America, 
and  felt  that  the  Bourbon  crowns  should  spare  no  effort  to 
maintain  and  improve  their  navies.  Spain  had  made  con- 
siderable progress,  although  much  remained  to  be  done,  and 
she  regretted  that  France  was  still  behindhand,  despite  the 
application  and  good-will  of  her  king  and  ministers.^^  That 
Grimaldi's  fears  of  an  attack  on  the  French  and  Spanish 
colonies  had  some  basis  is  confirmed  by  a  remark  of  Lord 
Kochford  of  the  British  Foreign  Office.  Two  campaigns 
would  suffice  to  restore  order  in  America,  he  said,  and  the 
spirits  of  both  the  English  and  the  Americans  could  be 
appeased  by  an  attack  on  the  hereditary  enemy,  France.^® 
This  remark  seems  to  have  been  made  in  July,  1775. 
Aranda  sensed  such  a  possibihty,  and  said  that  England, 
knowing  the  real  hostility  of  France  and  Spain,  was  already 
thinking  of  declaring  war  upon  the  House  of  Bourbon." 
At  about  this  time,  the  Spanish  authorities  began  to  be 

w  Ibid.,  IV,  409-11.  w  Rousseau,  II,  111-12. 

M  Doniol,  I,  47 ;  Danvila,  IV,  409.  "  Aranda  to  Grimaldi,  Aug,  7,  1775, 

"  Doniol,  I,  47.  in  Danvila,  IV,  416. 


208       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

impressed  by  an  idea  which  may  well  have  been  a  cause 
of  their  delay  in  declaring  war.  The  idea  seems  to  have 
been  expressed  first  in  Aranda^s  letter  of  July  24,  1775,  to 
Grimaldi.  An  attempt  was  being  made,  he  said,  to  get 
the  English  ministry  to  concede  as  much  as  possible  to  the 
colonists.  An  independent  America  would  be  a  menace, 
as  her  population  was  increasing  and,  consequently,  she 
needed  lands,  and  would  be  more  apt  to  seek  them  in  a 
region  with  a  temperate  climate  like  New  Spain  than  by 
going  north.  So  the  Americans  might  eventually  dominate 
North  America,  or  might  help  Spain^s  colonies  to  become 
"Independent  too.  There  would  also  be  danger  if  England 
should  defeat  the  Americans,  because  the  latter  would 
probably  join  in  England's  wars  as  in  the  past.  He  urged 
a  more  firm  control  by  Spain  over  Cuba,  San  Domingo, 
and  Porto  Rico,  not  alone  because  of  their  richness,  but 
also  because  they  were  the  key  to  the  continent,  and  easier 
than  other  places  to  defend.  Louisiana  he  regarded  as 
exposed  in  any  event,  both  because  of  America's  expanding 
population  and  because  it  was  the  nearest  of  the  temperate 
lands.  Grimaldi  replied,  August  7,  1775,  that  the  king 
realized  the  truth  of  Aranda's  remarks,  and  the  wisdom  of 
his  suggestions.  Spain  had  too  scant  a  population  to  settle 
all  of  the  colonies,  and  the  latter  were  too  extensive  to  be 
defended  equally  well  at  all  places.  Grimaldi  thought  it 
might  be  desirable  to  invite  French  settlers  to  San  Do- 
1  mingo  and  Porto  Rico.  As  for  Louisiana,  the  king  thought 
\  it  best  to  leave  it  alone.  The  English  would  be  able  to 
I  raise  great  armies  against  that  section,  and  if  Spain  should 
I  develop  it,  it  might  serve  only  as  an  inducement  for  the 
English  to  come  and  attack  it.^^ 

At  this  time  also  the  Portuguese  question  again  raised 
its  head,  on  account  of  the  continued  Portuguese  aggres- 
sions in  South  America.  As  we  have  seen,  Charles  III  was 
at  length  aroused  to  order  an  expeditionary  force  sent 
from  Spain.  Aranda  was  asked  by  Grimaldi  in  another 
letter  of  August  7  to  request  France  to  intervene  at  Lisbon 

w  Danvila,  IV,  414-17. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY   OF   THE   REIGN    OF   CHARLES   III       209 

to  bring  about  an  amicable  end  of  the  dispute  by  causing 
Portugal  to  withdraw  her  troops,  and  Aranda's  reply,  Au- 
gust 20,  stated  that  France  was  willing  to  do  as  requested. 
Aranda  and  Vergennes  proposed  that  the  same  plan  be 
followed  in  England  to  get  that  country  to  check  Portugal, 
but  principally  to  discover  by  her  answer  the  real  intent  of 
the  ministry,  for  it  was  clear  that  England  and  Portugal 
were  working  in  agreement.  Meanwhile,  said  Aranda, 
let  troops  be  sent  to  South  America,  and  others  stationed 
on  the  Portuguese  frontier;  England  could  not  land  an 
army,  as  she  was  having  all  she  could  do  to  find  troops 
enough  for  her  war  with  the  colonies.  Not  long  afterward 
the  Portuguese  question  seemed  to  be  approaching  a  favor- 
able stage.  The  Portuguese  ambassador  had  shown  a 
disposition  to  settle  the  matter  amicably,  wrote  Grimaldi, 
September  15,  1775 ;  so,  French  intervention  would  be 
unnecessary.^^ 

From  the  beginning  of  the  year  1776  Vergennes  was  fully, 
decided  on  war  with  England..^^  Aranda,  naturally,  was  as 
warlike  as  ever,  and  suggested  an  invasion  of  Ireland,  and 
establishing  an  independent  country  there.  This  plan  met 
with  Vergennes'  approval,  but  was  less  warmly  received  in 
Spain,  on  the  ground  that  it  might  result  in  England's  vast 
forces  in  America  falling  suddenly  upon  the  Bourbon  col- 
onies. Aranda  recognized  that  England  would  probably 
attack  Spain  whether  successful  or  defeated  in  the  war  with 
her  colonies,  either  to  satisfy  her  ambition,  or  to  recover 
from  her  losses.  Louisiana  and  San  Domingo  were  most 
in  danger,  he  said.  Havana  and  Porto  Rico  could  be  de- 
fended. The  best  thing  to  do  would  be  to  make  military 
preparations  at  once,  despite  what  England  might  say.®^ 
Vergennes  tried  to  frighten  Charles  III  with  these  dangers, 
but  the  latter's  reply  asking  ten  or  twelve  thousand  French 
troops  to  defend  French  San  Domingo  found  Vergennes  less 
impressed  by  the  American  danger.  He  declined  to  send 
the  men,  as  it  would  amount  to  a  declaration  of  war,  which 

«•  Ihid.,  IV,  417-21.  «  Danvila,  IV,  447-53. 

»  Rousseau,  II,  113. 


210       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

was  inopportune.  What  better  can  we  ask,  he  said,  than 
what  England  is  doing  against  herself?  She  was  generous 
enough  to  spare  the  Bourbon  courts  the  pains  and  expense 
of  destroying  her.^^ 

In  June,  1776,  Spain  took  a  fresh  step  in  the  virtual  war 
against  England,  making  a  beginning  of  contributions  jt.Q 
the  Americans.  France  had  begun  this  practice  shortly 
before.  The  reason  for  their  doing  so,  despite  the  fear  of 
an  independent  America,  may  be  found  in  a  letter  of  Aranda 
to  Grimaldi  of  June  7.  It  was  necessary  to  make  such  con- 
tributions so  that  the  English  and  Americans  might  weaken 
each  other,  destroying  the  former,  and  putting  the  latter 
in  a  state  where  they  would  listen  to  reason,  that  is,  as 
dictated  by  the  Bourbons,  at  the  beginning  of  their  inde- 
pendence.^^ In  September  Vergennes  presented  a  memorial 
to  Aranda  which  was  warlike  enough  in  sound.  The  prin- 
cipal point  seemed  to  be  that  war  against  England  ought 
soon  to  be  declared,  before  England  should  make  an  at- 
tack on  France  and  Spain.  Spain's  attitude  is  expressed 
in  Grimaldi's  letter  of  October  8,  1776,  to  Aranda.  The 
war  was  inevitable,  and  England  herself  would  declare  it 
as  soon  as  she  found  a  favorable  occasion.  It  would  there- 
fore be  an  indubitable  advantage  to  begin  several  months 
before  England  planned  to  do  so,  especially  if  she  were  still 
occupied  with  her  colonies.  If  she  were  about  to  make  peace 
with  them,  the  danger  to  the  French  and  Spanish  colonies 
would  be  great,  especially  to  the  latter.  Spain  was  ready, 
however,  to  adopt  the  policy  that  France  thought  best, 
although,  to  be  sure,  it  was  uncertain  whether  the  present 
was  the  most  fitting  time  to  begin  the  war.  If  undertaken, 
Spain  hoped,  among  other  things,  to  conquer  all  or  part  of 
Portugal.  This  frank  statement  found  Vergennes  less 
enthusiastic.  Aranda's  letter  of  November  9,  1776,  called 
attention  to  the  difference  between  Vergennes'  words  of 
September  and  those  of  November.  Moreover,  France  was 
unwilling  to  have  Spain  conquer  Portugal,  as  the  other 
European  powers  would  object.     Charles  III  seems  not  to 

62  Rousseau,  II,  114-15.  ^  Danvila,  IV,  454-59. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY   OF   THE    REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III       211 

have  been  so  disappointed  as  Aranda,  saying  that  the  de- 
cision for  war  ought  to  be  one  of  free  choice,  and  he  himself 
believed  that  the  right  moment  had  not  yet  come.  Aranda 
presented  a  paper  to  Vergennes  and  Maurepas  in  December, 
however,  urging  them  to  declare  war.  There  was  nothing 
to  fear  from  Austria,  Prussia,  or  Russia.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  were  the  oft-mentioned  dangers  to  the  colonies  of 
France,  and  especially  of  an  English  attack  on  San  Do- 
mingo. Aranda  was  not  successful  in  making  France  take  a 
determined  stand,  but  continued  his  efforts  throughout 
the  year  1777.^^  Still,  as  Danvila  says,  Spain  and  France 
were  virtually  at  war  with  England  from  1776  on.  They 
were  aiding  the  Americans  with  supplies  and  funds,  were 
making  plans  for  hostilities,  and  were  carrying  on  their 
military  and  naval  preparations.^^  . 

The  diplomatic  situation,  as  far  as  it  affected  Spain,  has  t ' 
now  been  given  in  some  detail  to  the  close  of  the  year  1776.  j  1 
For  the  purposes  of  this  work  an  equal  amount  of  detail 
is  not  necessary  after  that  year,  because  it  marked  the  end  j 
of  the  tremendous  activities  in  New  Spain  in  northwest-  I  \ 
ward  exploration.     A  brief  review  down  to  the  outbreak  of )  j 
war  with  England  in  1779  should  therefore  suffice.     After 
war  was  declared,  naturally  it  was  the  principal  interest  of 
Spain  to  1783,  when  peace  was  concluded,  a  date  beyond 
which  the  principal  limits  of  this  volume  do  not  pass. 

Early  in  the  year  1777  Grimaldi  was  succeeded  by  Flo- 
ridablanca,  whose  policy  appears  in  a  memorial  by  him 
dated  March,  1777.  The  most  immediate  advantages  that 
Spain  could  get  from  a  war  with  England,  he  said,  would 
be  to  expel  her  from  Florida,  and  to  destroy  the  British  es- 
tablishments in  Honduras.  France  might  regain  Canada, 
and  the  right  to  fish  in  Newfoundland,  as  well  as  a  profitable 
trade  with  the  insurgent  colonies.  But  neither  country 
ought  to  think  of  war  until  there  were  considerable  forces 
of  troops  and  ships  in  their  islands  of  the  West  Indies,  and 
Spain  ought  immediately  to  send  as  many  naval  vessels  as 
possible  to  Havana.     If  the  rebellious  colonies  should  es-  \\ 

M  Ibid.,  IV,  463-73.  «  Ibid.,  IV,  445. 


i  1 


212       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 


d 


tablish  their  independence,  Spain  ought  to  contrive  to  keep 
them  divided  in  interests,  so  that  there  might  not  grow  up 
a  formidable  power  near  Spanish  America.^^  Clearly  there 
was  no  enthusiasm  in  Spanish  governmental  circles  on  be- 
half of  the  Americans.  This  appears  also  from  the  cold 
reception  accorded  Arthur  Lee,  the  American  representa- 
tive, who  about  this  time  appeared  in  Spain.^^ 

The  surrender  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga  caused  an  en- 
tire change  in  the  course  of  diplomatic  procedure.  The 
British  government  began  to  make  offers  with  a  view  to 
conciliating  the  colonists.  The  French  ministry  acted 
quickly  to  prevent  a  reconciliation ;  for  reconciliation  would 
mean  a  loss  of  the  commercial  favors  which  France  hoped 
to  obtain,  and  might  also  mean  a  war  of  England  and  the 
colonies  against  France.  Therefore,  on  December  16,  1777, 
France  declared  herself  ready  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  com- 
merce and  alliance  with  the  American  revolutionaries, 
specifically  stating  that  her  willingness  was  due  partially  to 
a  desire  to  diminish  the  power  of  England  by  separating 
her  from  her  colonies.  On  February  6,  1778,  a  treaty  was 
signed.  ^^ 

All  of  this  was  done  without  any  official  notification  to 
Spain.  Aranda  had  soon  learned  of  it  unofficially,  although 
he  did  not  find  out  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  and  he  sent 
word  to  Spain.  Charles  III  immediately  called  for  the 
opinions  of  his  leading  ministers.  France  should  be  asked 
to  explain  the  nature  of  her  pact,  said  Floridablanca,  in 
his  memorial  of  January  22,  1778.  The  first  thing  for 
Spain  to  do,  however,  was  to  assure  the  safety  of  the  fleet 
coming  from  Vera  Cruz,  and  that  of  the  naval  vessels  and 
troops  returning  from  Buenos  Aires,  while  more  troops 
should  be  sent  to  Havana  and  Porto  Rico.  War  ought  to 
be  avoided  if  possible,  in  view  of  the  inconstancy  of  Spain's 
allies.  England  seemed  disposed  to  be  on  good  terms 
with  Spain,  and  even  with  France,  were  it  not  that  the 
latter's  imprudent  actions  and  insatiable  desire  to  get  the 


^  Danvila,  IV,  494-96. 
67  Rousseau,  II,  118-19. 


«  Danvila,  IV,  502^. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY    OF   THE    REIGN    OF   CHARLES   III       213 

world's  commerce  for  herself  had  caused  England  to  be 
suspicious.     In  fine,  he  recommended   continued  prepara- 
tion, as  if  the  war  were  inevitable,  but  that  it  be  avoided 
as  long  as  possible,  as  it  could  not  be  favorable  to  Spain 
under    existing    circumstances.     This    opinion    of   Florida- 
blanca's   not    only   manifests   his   displeasure,   which   was        j 
shared  by  Charles  III  and  others,  at  France's  proceeding      1/ 
to  such  important  measures  without  consulting  her  ally,  but     Ji 
also  shows  that  Spain  was  beginning  to  comprehend  the 
selfish  use  that  France  was  making  of  the  Family  Com-      \\ 
pact ;    France  was  striking  for  herseK,  not  for  France  and       \  \ 
Spain.     Not  until  March  4,  1778,  did  Vergennes  give  Aranda 
a  copy  of  the  treaties  made  with  the  Americans,  and  not 
until  March  19  did  the  French  government  give  an  official 
notification  to  that  of  Spain.     From  this  time  forth  Spain  \\ 
felt   at  liberty  to  pursue  her  own  policy  irrespective  of    '  \ 
France.     The  Spanish  ambassador  in  London  was  advised 
that  Spain's  attitude  toward  England  would  depend  upon 
the  latter ;   Spain  neither  wished  war  nor  feared  it.^®    Flo- 
ridablanca  had  several  stormy  interviews  with  Montmorin,       i 
who  had  succeeded  Ossun  as  French  ambassador  to  Madrid,  i   ;' 
He  accused  France  of  compromising  Spain  when  the  fleet  I  / 
from  Vera  Cruz  and  the  squadron  from  Buenos  Aires  were  | 
at  the  mercy  of  the  English,  alluded  to  France's  unwilling-  ' 
ness  to  make  war  in  October,  1776,  when  Spain  was  ready,   .  j 
and  gave  his  opinion  that  the  present,  far  from  being  the  '  i 
best  moment  for  the  Bourbons  to  make  war,  was  for  Spain 
the  most  fatal.     He  recognized  that  Aranda  was  of  the 
French  opinion,  but  decidedly  he  himself  was  not.   When, 
in  April,  Montmorin  asked  that  D'Estaing's  fleet  be  per- 
mitted to  touch  at  Cddiz,  Floridablanca  replied  that  he 
thought  it  extraordinary  that  France  should   ask  aid   of 
Spain,  after  having  acted  contrary  to  Spain's  advice.     Did 
he  take  the  Catholic  King  for  a  viceroy  of  the   king   of 
France?  7^ 

Charles  III  now  began  to  attempt  the  part  of  mediator. 
He  hoped  to  get  Gibraltar  and  Minorca  as  the  price  for 

•  Ibid.,  IV,  504-18.  'o  Rousseau,  II,  119-23. 


214       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  IX 

bringing  about  peace.  In  May,  Escarano  suggested  to  one 
of  the  English  ministry  that  Gibraltar  would  be  a  fair 
equivalent  for  Spain's  services,  but  was  told  that  the  price 
was  high,  and  that  in  any  event  affairs  had  probably  gone 
beyond  the  point  where  mediation  would  serve;  England 
wanted  no  more  from  Spain  than  that  she  remain  neutral. 
This  was  the  reply  of  Lord  Weymouth,  who  rather 
brusquely  thanked  Charles  III  for  the  magnanimity  of 
Ms  offer.  Such  an  answer  was  not  calculated  to  be  pleas- 
ing to  the  Spanish  ear,  as  Floridablanca  very  plainly 
intimated  to  Lord  Grantham.  England  had  had  a  chance 
for  peace,  he  said,  and  declined  it ;  the  chance  would  not 
return.  To  add  to  Spain's  displeasure  England's  conduct 
on  the  sea  gave  cause  for  complaint,  and  even  the  coasts 
of  the  Iberian  Peninsula  were  plundered  by  some  English- 
men. Nevertheless,  Charles  still  hoped  to  fill  the  r61e  of 
arbitrator,  and  all  the  more  so  when  news  came  of  French 
naval  successes  against  the  English.  British  replies,  how- 
ever, were  at  no  time  more  courteous  than  Weymouth's 
answer  to  Escarano  had  been.  Charles  got  Louis  XVI  to 
submit  terms  upon  which  he  would  make  peace.  The  lat- 
ter required  an  acknowledgment  of  American  independence, 
the  recall  of  England's  land  and  naval  forces,  and  other  con- 
ditions of  less  note.  Weymouth  haughtily  rejected  them. 
On  November  14,  1778,  Grantham  delivered  a  note  saying 
that  England  could  have  no  understanding  with  France 
until  that  country  withdrew  her  support  from  the  Ameri- 
cans. At  the  same  time,  a  proposal  by  Spain  for  a  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  year  truce  between  England  and  her  colonies 
was  rejected.  However,  Charles  III  still  endeavored  to 
mediate.  He  offered  Weymouth  an  indefinite  armistice, 
to  be  guaranteed  by  a  general  disarmament.  He  had  not 
consulted  Louis  XVI  before  making  this  offer,  but  Ver- 
gennes  did  not  disavow  his  act.  Again,  however,  the 
Spanish  king's  proposals  were  arrogantly  rejected.^^  To 
make  matters  worse  England  had  delayed  ker  reply  from 
January  to  March,  1779,  and  English  ships  had  continued 

w  Rousseau,  II,  123-35. 


1763]     DIPLOMACY   OF  THE   REIGN   OF   CHARLES   III      215 

to  attack  those  of  Spain.  Charles  III  renewed  his  offer  of 
a  suspension  of  hostihties,  this  time  in  the  form  of  an  ulti- 
matum, April  3,  1779.  England  again  delay ed,  and  in  the 
meantime  planned  attacks  on  Nicaragua  and  the  Philip- 
pines. On  May  28  the  ultimatum  was  rejected.  The 
Spanish  ambassador  left  London,  and  on  June  23  war  was 
officially  declared.^^  I  t  V^j  ^ 

72  Altamira,  IV,  66-67. 


CHAPTER  X 

ACTIVITIES    OF   SPAIN   AGAINST   FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS   IN 
THE   PACIFIC  NORTHWEST,    1773-1775 

Spain  was  more  and  more  threatened  by  the  activities 
of  other  European  nations  in  the  Pacific  northwest,  but, 
although  she  was  not  fully  awake  to  the  danger,  if  we  may 
judge  by  the  history  of  her  diplomacy  in  the  reign  of  Charles 
III,  nevertheless  she  did  not  disregard  it.  On  the  con- 
trary, she  played  no  small  part  in  the  discoveries,  explora- 
tions, and  conquests  of  the  period,  urged  on,  as  usual,  by 
the  necessity  of  defending  what  she  already  possessed,  and 
enjoying  leadership  of  an  exceptional  character  in  accom- 
plishing these  tasks.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  her  policy 
of  defence  had  led  to  plans  for  fortifying  her  American 
possessions,  especially  those  in  the  West  Indies  and  those 
bordering  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea. 
The  Argentine  coast,  the  Falkland  Islands,  and  the  coasts 
of  the  viceroy alty  of  Peru  had  also  commanded  attention. 
Thus  far,  Spanish  efforts  may  be  regarded  as  part  of  a 
conscious,  general  policy.  A  Spanish  writer  has  implied, 
although  he  does  not  specifically  state,  that  the  northwest- 
ward expeditions,  both  by  land  and  sea,  were  part  of  the 
same  plan,^  but  the  conjecture  does  not  accord  with  the 
facts.  The  Pacific  shores  of  New  Spain  were  on  an  indepen- 
dent footing.  An  European  war  would  involve  the  other 
lands  named,  more  particularly  the  West  Indies,  but  was  not 
regarded  as  greatly  endangering  Pacific  North  America.  Of 
this  the  correspondence  of  Viceroy  Croix,  already  quoted,  is 
evidence.  In  this  chapter  it  will  appear  that  action  was 
taken  by  Spain  on  the  basis  of  foreign  encroachments  in 

1  Fernandez  Duro,  VII,  153,  160-61. 
216 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  217 

the  Pacific,  as  she  understood  them,  irrespective  of  the  state 
of  European  poHtics.  Yet,  there  is  a  larger  unity  embracing 
all  of  Spain's  colonies,  even  if  there  were  no  general  plan, 
namely,  the  search  of  European  nations  for  colonies^^and 
the  counter-attempts  of  Spain  in  self-defence. 

England  and  Russia  gave  Spain  concern  in  the  Pacific  ^ 
northwest  between  1773  and  1776,  the  former  much  less'^ 
than  the  case  merited.     Even  in  the  case  of  Russia,  despite 
the  great  number  of  documer^ts  about  her  encroachments, 
Spain  was  not  much  afraid.     To  a  certain  extent  this  period   / 
is  one  of  particular  emergency  as  regards  the  Russians,  but,  ^ 
in  the  main,  Spanish  activities  may  be  ascribed  to  permanent 
reasons  for  combating  foreign  danger,  with  the  added  fact 
of  a  capable  man  to  direct  the  work.     To  the  supposed*\ 
danger  of  Russian  encroachment  were  due  the  P6rez  voyage  j 
of   1774,   and  the  Heceta   and  Bodega   voyages  of   1775.  r 
These  were  only  the  most  direct  manifestations  proceeding  I 
from  the  same  cause.     Among  other  steps  taken,  related  in  ar 
measure  at  least  to  the  Russian  peril,  were  the  Crame  ex- 
ploration  of  the   Coatzacoalcos   River  in  the  Isthmus  of 
Tehuantepec,   the  An z a   and   Rivera   expeditions   to   Alt^u 
California,  and  tlie^founding  of  San  Francisco,  the  general 
endeavor  to  develop  Alta  California  and  keep  it  well  supplied, 
and  even  the  formation  of  a  reglamento,  or  mode  of  govern- 
ment,    for   the    Californias.     Only   the    Crame    expedition 
will  be  taken  up  conclusively  in  this  chapter,  but  some  of 
the  other  events  will  be  alluded  to  because  of  their  relation 
to  the  plans  against  the  Russians. 

In  this  chapter,  then,  there  appears  not  only  a  discussion 
of  foreign  approaches  to  Spain's  Pacific  colonies  viewed  from 
a  third  and  concluding  standpoint,  but  also  a  resumption  of 
details  concerning  governmental  attention  to  this  region. 
In  the  latter  sense  it  stands  forth  as  the  first  to  be  treated  of 
a  group  of  activities  from  1773  on,  and  is  so  placed  because 
it  is  the  key  to  the  other  events, — the  impulse  to  action 
arising  from  foreign  danger.  The  other  events  have  to 
do  with  the  government's  interest  in  local  problems  of 
the  Californias,  and  its  attention  to  questions  bearing  upon 


218        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

the  opening  and  use  of  an  overland  route  to  Alta  California. 
These  have  been  reserved  for  later  chapters,  although  con- 
temporary with  the  events  related  here.  Because  of  their 
close  historical  connection,  it  will  be  well  to  note  in  advance 
some  of  the  most  significant  dates,  before  proceeding  to 
the  matter  of  this  chapter. 

On  July  23,  1773,  a  provisional  or  temporary  reglamento 
for  the  Calif ornias,  to  which  Bucarely  had  devoted  much 
time  for  several  months,  received  official  sanction  by  his 
decree.  On  August  17,  instructions  were  issued  to  Fernando 
Rivera^  Moncada,  who  was  to  lead  some  soldier-settlers 
to  Alta  California  up  the  peninsula,  and  succeed  Pages  in 
command  of  the  new  establishments.  On  September  13, 
tEe  first  Anza  expedition  was  authorized,  as  we  have  seen. 
In  January,  1774,  Anza^s  expedition  left  Tubac,  Sonora, 
and  discovered  a  route  to  Alta  California,  returning  to 
Tubac  in  May.  Rivera  left  Loreto,  Baja  Cahfornia,  in 
March,  1774,  and  got  to  Monterey  in  May.  A  second 
Anza  expedition  was  authorized  in  November,  1774.  With 
this  were  to  go  settlers  and  domestic  animals,  both  greatly 
needed  in  Alta  California.     Anza  left  Tubac  in  October, 

1775,  conducted  the  settlers  and  animals  to  Alta  California, 
and  was  back  in  Sonora  by  June,   1776.     In  September, 

1776,  a  settlement  was  made  at  San  Francisco  by  some  of 
the  colonists  who  had  accompanied  Anza.  Late  in  the  same 
year  Carets  proved  the  existence  of  a  route  from  Alta 
California  to  New  Mexico. 

A  turning  point  in  Bucarely^s  activities  in  behalf  of  the 
Califomias  seems  to  have  come  at  about  the  time  when 
progress  began  to  be  made  toward  forming  a  provisional 
reglamento,  in  May,  1773.  Up  to  that  time  he  had  been 
acquiring  information,  while  attending  as  best  he  could 
to  the  needs  of  the  province,  although  with  slight  expecta- 
tion of  a  successful  issue  of  the  Alta  California  establish- 
ments. To  be  sure,  he  continued  to  call  for  reports,  and  on 
May  27  wrote  that  he  was  as  much  in  the  dark  as  ever, 
but,  from  this  time  forth,  his  measures  began  to  be  effectual. 
There  was  no  more  talk  of   abandoning   Alta   California, 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  219 

although   that    contingency  was    with    difficulty    avoided. 
Between  1773  and  1776^6  brought _.±hja.^ta 

establishments  out  o!  tTie^realm  of  uncertainty,  and  placed 
them  on_an  enduring  basis. 


Some  indications  of  Spain's  fear^ JEn^Hsh^^gress^^^^  in 
the  northwest  prior  to  1773  have  already  been  given,  notably 
the  Croix-Galvez  plan  of  January,  1768,  but  in  the  period 
embraces  by  this  chapter  very  little  evidence  on  the  point 
has  come  to  light,  as  compared  with  the  bulk  of  material 
concerning  the  Russians.  Yet  Bucarely's  original  con- 
sideration of  the  problem  of  foreign  danger  seems  to  have 
sprung  from  news  of  an  English  project.  In  a  letter  of 
June  26,  1776,  he  reviews  his  acts  undertaken  with  a  view 
to  circumventing  foreign  encroachments,  and  says  that  his 
first  measures  were  due  to  the  king's  apprehension,  early  in 
1773,  over  reports  that  an  Englishman  named  Bings  was 
undertaking  a  voyage  to  the  North  Pole,  with  a  view  to 
reaching  the  Californias,  if  possible.  This  was  responsible 
for  instructions  given  by  him  at  that  time  with  the  aim  of 
safeguarding  the^  Californias  against  the  entry  of  foreign 
sMpsTJ  TTiS  Instructions  referred  to  were  those  given  to 
Hiy§j;:a,  August  17,  1773,  as  follows:  "The  admission  of 
foreign  boats  into  the  American  ports  of  the  king's  dominions 
is  absolutely  prohibited  by  the  laws  of  the  Indies,  and  it 
is  commanded  in  many  royal  decrees  and  orders  that  this 
prohibition  be  observed ;  and  there  are  also  repeated  de- 
crees that  commerce  is  not  to  be  permitted,  even  in  Spanish 
ships,  on  the  coasts  comprised  in  this  viceroyalty,  exceptm 
the  ship  from  the  Philippines,  which  comes  to  Acapulco, 
and  the  boats  in  the  ship-yard  of  San  Bias  for  the  support 
of  old  and  new  California."  All  other  ships  Rivera  was  to 
detain  if  his  forces  should  permit,  making  prisoners  of  the 
expeditionaries,  and  giving  an  account  to  the  government 
in  Mexico.  Then  followed  instructions  for  guarding  against 
surprise,  when  the  Philippine  and  San  Bias  boats  entered 
Alta  California  ports,  lest  an  enemy's  ships  might  be  mis- 

2  A.G.P.,  Cor.  Vir.,  series  I,  v.  12,  No.  2296. 


220         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

taken  for  them.  In  the  same  document  it  is  stated  that 
the  settlers  should  have  arms  to  aid  in  defending  the  Cali- 
fornias  if  necessary,  and  Rivera  was  to  make  a  complete  in- 
ventory of  the  artillery,  munitions,  and  arms  in  the  province. 
The  exploration  and  occupation  of  the  port  of  San  Franciaca 
were  also  recommended^  "  THe^^^  M  historian,  Rivera, 

says  that  the  instructions -to  his  namesake  were  also  related^ 
to  reports  of  Russian  aggressions;^  which  was  probably  the 
case,  since  Bucarely  had  known  of  them  for  some  time  be- 
fore the  date  of  his  instruction  to  Rivera,  and  they  were 
considered  to  be  at  least  as  pressing  as  the  report  about 
Bings.  Rivera  goes  on  to  say  that  Bucarely  was  ordered 
to  exercise  great  vigilance  over  Pacific  coast  ports,  especially 
over  Monterey,  taking  the  action  which  the  viceroy  in  fact 
embodied  in  his  already  mentioned  instructions.  He  was 
to  assert  that  this  was  done  in  accordance  with  provisions 
to  that  effect  in  the  laws  of  the  Indies,  and  not  to  mani- 
fest that  it  was  done  by  express  royal  order. ^ 

The  danger  of  English  interference  in  the  northwest  seems 
not  to  have  been  taken  very  seriously.  Writing  to  Arriaga, 
September  28,  1774,  Bucarely  characterized  the  fears  on 
that  account  as  absurd.^  Other  references  to  the  same  effect 
appear  in  the  correspondence  about  the  Russians.  True, 
this  view  of  the  matter  underestimated  the  danger,  —  this 
was  the  period  of  Hearne's  explorations  for  the  Hudson's 
Bay  Company,  of  activity  by  the  Scottish  merchants  of 
Montreal,  and  of  voyages  by  Cook  to  the  south  Pacific,  — 
but  nevertheless,  it  represented  the  Spanish  attitude. 

Apprehension^  about  the  Russians  at  this  time  was  due 
to  the  reports  of  the  Conde  de  Lacy,  Spanish  ambassador  to 
Russia,  who,  late  in  the  year  1772,  scented  danger  from 
the  Russians.  Writing  to  Grimaldi,  on  October  22,  1772, 
of  Russian  explorations  toward  North  America  from  Kam- 

»  C-2350.     Other  aspects  of  the  in-  that  Bings  was  undertaking  (emprendla) 

struction  to   Rivera  are   considered  in  it,  and  Rivera  that  he  was  arranging 

chap.  XI,  and  to  some  extent  in  chap.  (arreglaba)    it.     The  only   fact   of  im- 

XIV.  portance  here,  however,  is  that  Spain 

*  Rivera,  I,  428.  felt  some  apprehension. 

'  I   have  found   no  reference  to   an  «  C-2732. 

actual    Bings    voyage.     Bucarely    said 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  221 

chatka  as  a  base/  he  also  enclosed  an  order  of  the  Russian 
government  of  September  5,  1770,  calculated  to  inspire  mis- 
giving in  Spain.  The  order  stated  that  the  Russian  govern- 
ment had  received  notices  that  a  foreign  power  [unnamed] 
was  planning  an  attack  on  the  port  of  St.  Peter  and  St. 
Paul,  Kamchatka,  with  a  view  to  threatening  Russia's 
hold  on  that  country.  The  order  called  for  precautions 
by  the  officials  there,  the  gathering  of  powder  and  flour, 
and  the  use  of  an  army  of  15^000  men.  If  English  ships 
should  appear,  however,  they  were  to  be  received  with 
honors  and  friendship,  and  be  given  such  assistance  as  they 
might  need.^  As  regards  the  15,000  men  there  was  an  ele- 
ment of  absurdity  in  this  document  which  makes  one  doubt 
its  authenticity.  Nor  can  it  have  frightened  Grimaldi,  for 
he  does  not  appear  to  have  forwarded  a  copy  to  Arriaga. 
On  February  7,  1773,  Lacy  wrote  again.  He  had  learned, 
he  said,  that  a  Russian  naval  officer,  Chirikof ,  had  continued 
to  make  explorations  in  Kamchatka  and  North  America 
between  1769  and  1771,  and  Chirikof  and  his  secretary  had 
visited  St.  Petersburg  early  in  1772.  They  were  sworn 
to  secrecy  by  the  government,  and  the  former  had  been 
sent  back  to  make  another  voyage.  Several  Russians  had 
said  that  very  important  discoveries  had  been  made,  but 
there  had  been  so  much  secrecy  that  Lacy  could  learn 
nothing  certain,  beyond  the  fact  of  Chirikof's  voyage.^ 
A  copy  of  this  letter  was  sent  to  Arriaga,  who  was  instructed 
to  ask  Bucarely  to  take  fitting  measures.^°  Arriaga  acknowl- 
edged receipt  of  this  letter  on  April  11,^^  and  on  the  same 
day  wrote  to  Bucarely,  forwarding  a  copy  of  Lacy's  letter, 
and  ordering  Bucarely  to  find  out  whether  the  Russians 
were  in  fact  advancing  their  explorations.^^ 

Bucarely  replied  on  July  27,  showing  no  great  anxiety, 
but  stating  that  he  had  already  taken  action.  He  referred 
to  a  map  printed  at  St.  Petersburg  in  1758  indicating  that 
two  ships  under  Bering  had  explored  the  North  American 
coast  between  55°  and  60°,  but  he  was  inclined  to  doubt 

^  C-2038.  w  Grimaldi  to  Arriaga.  Apr.  6,  1773. 

8  C-1543.  C-2209. 

» C-2162.  "  C-2210.  "  C-2211. 


222        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

whether  the  land  discovered  was  really  part  of  North 
America.  Lacy's  letter  showed,  however,  that  the  Russians 
had  designs  upon  America,  although  their  difficulties  would 
be  great,  because  of  the  scant  population  and  the  scarcity 
of  supplies  in  Kamchatka,  and  because  of  the  distance  from 
St.  Petersburg.  Precautionary  measures  must  be  taken 
however,  as  the  Russians  might  overcome  the  difficulties.^^ 
Referring  to  the  Spanish  situation  in  the  Pacific,  Bucarely 
said  that  the  region  between  Cape  San  Lucas  and  Monterey 
had  been  occupied.  There  were  no  foreign  establishments 
in  that  stretch,  and  no  boats  had  been  seen  in  recent  years 
other  than  the  Manila  galleon  and  the  ships  that  went  to 
Alta  California.  San  Diego  and  Monterey  were  the  only 
ports,  and  were  the  only  places  with  force  enough  to  hold 
in  check  the  innumerable  Indians  of  Alta  California.  For 
reasons  of  economy  the  Alta  California  establishments  had 
not  been  increased.  The  Department  of  San  Bias  was  not 
capable  of  accomplishing  much;  skilled  officers  and  pilots, 
supplies,  and  other  things  were  needed  before  anything  of 
much  consequence  could  be  done.  Russian ^estabhshments 
in  No^}]  AnripriVa.  or  those  of  any  foreign  country  should  be 
prevented^  not  that  Spain  did  not  have  enough  territory, 
for  It  had  more  than  it  could  settle  in  centuries,  but  be- 
cause any  neighbors  other  than  the  Indians  might  prove 
dangerous.  Although  it  would  be  hard  for  the  Russians 
to  establish  themselves,  it  was  a  possibility,  and  if  it  were 
done  would  be  to  the  disadvantage  of  Spain.  For  Spain 
to  prevent  their  establishment  would  be  easier  than  it  would 
be  for  the  Russians  to  undertake  it,  but  it  would  cost  Spain 
a  great  deal.  Spain  had  the  advantage  of  known  ports 
and  fertile  lands,  where  settlements  might  be  made,  from 
which  voyages  could  be  undertaken.  The  best  time  to  sail 
from  San  Bias  was  from  the  last  of  November  to  the  end  of 
January,  and  probably  the  same  held  true,  north  of  Monterey. 
As  Juan  P6rez  had  signified  a  desire  to  make  an  expedition 
to  the_far  nbff h,"'BircareTy  "HaH  given  him  secret  instructions 
to  draw  up  plans,   and  was  now  awaiting  them.     These 

^8  For  the  map,  cf .  infra  n.  34. 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  223 

operations  would  be  expensive,  and  would  cost  less  if  con- 
ducted from  Manila.-^* 

Despite  the  calm  with  which  the  viceroy    viewed_the 
situation  and  his  underesBmanon"'^^  measures 

against  the  possibility  of  foreign  aggressions  were  the  key- 
note of  his  action  from  this  time  forth.  In  that  same  month 
a  provisional  reglamento  for  the  Californias  had  been  made. 
This  will  be  taken  up  later  in  its  local  aspects,  when  it  will 
appear  that  no  goint  was  made  of  a  specific  foreign  danger. 
Yet,  Bucarely  wrote  to  his  friend.  General  O'Reilly,  July 
28,  1773,  that  in  forming  the  reglamento  he  had  proceeded 
principally  with  a  view  to  avoiding  the  ideas  of  the  Rus- 
sians.^^  Bucarely 's  lack  of  anxiety,  however,  is  still  further 
manifested  in  a  letter  to  Arriaga  one  month  later.  Nothing 
further  could  be  done  about  Perez's  voyage,  he  said,  as 
that  official  had  left  for  Monterey  on  his  customary  annual 
voyage  with  provisions,  before  Bucarely's  letter  to  him  had 
reached  San  Bias.  He  would  therefore  await  Perez's 
return.^®  An  accident  to  P6rez's  ship  occurred,  however, 
obliging  him  to  put  back  to  shore,  and  thus  Bucarely  was 
able  to  report,  September  26,  1773,  that  P6rez  had  received 
his  orders  concerning  the  northwestern  explorations  sooner 
than  he  had  expected.-^^ 

In  his  letter  of  July  27  Bucarely  had  requested  that  some 
naval  officers  be  sent  from  Spain  for  use  in  Pacific  coast  ex- 
plorations, and  a  royal  order  of  August  24,  1773,  informed 
him  that  six  were  being  sent.  Now  that  he  was  to  have 
their  assistance,  Bucarely  should  be  able  to  accomplish 
his  purposes  against  the  Russians,  wrote  Arriaga  to  the 
viceroy  in  a  letter  of  December  23,  1773.^^  The  order  of 
August  24  had  directed  Bucarely  to  make  settlements  in 
ports  south  of  San  Diego,  and  to  explore  the  whole  coast  and 
the  neighboring  islands  in  search  of  Russians,  who  were 
to  be  dislodged  if  found.  Replying,  November  26,  1773, 
Bucarely  said  that  he  had  already  taken  steps  for  the  de- 
^  PO'rture  of  P6rez,  and  not  only  that,  but  the  Anza  expedi- 

"  C-2337.  "  C-2365. 

"  C-2342.  "  C-2397.  "  C-2456. 


224        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

tion,  the  new  reglamento  for  the  Calif ornias  and  San  Bias, 
and  certain  orders  given  to  Agustin  Crame  all  bore  on  the 
question  of  .checking  the  Russians.  Crame  had  been  ordered 
to  explore  the  Rio  Coatzacoalcos,  and  report  secretly  to 
Bucarely.  That  river,  being  navigable  up  to  Tehuantepec, 
had  been  used  formerly  for  the  transportation  of  artillery, 
and  Bucarely  wished  to  know  whether  it  would  still  be 
easier  and  less  expensive  to  send  artillery  to  the  Pacific 
by  that  route.  Otherwise,  the  expense  would  be  unendur- 
able, or  there  would  be  the  long  delays  incident  to  recourse 
to  Manila.  Perez  had  been  ordered  to  explore  and  take 
possession  of  only  such  lands  as  were  not  occupied  by  a 
foreign  power,  as  he  carried  no  force  with  which  to  dislodge 
an  enemy.  All  of  these  matters  must  cost  considerable 
sums  that  were  not  provided  for  by  a  fund,  and  would 
normally  have  to  be  granted  by  a  junta  de  real  hacienda,  said 
Bucarely,  but  as  these  projects  ought  to  be  kept  secret, 
he  asked  for  authority  to  raise  money  by  his  own  decree,^^ 
and  his  request  was  acceded  to  by  the  royal  govern- 
ment.2o 

From  March  to  May,  1773,  Lacy  in  St.  Petersburg  was 
writing  letters  to  Grimaldi  about  the  Russian  aggressions 
in  North  America.  The  dates  of  these  letters,  and  those 
of  Grimaldi^s  and  Arriaga^s  letters  in  handling  them  are 
worthy  of  note,  as  they  show  a  marked  lack  of  anxiety  on 
the  part  of  those  highest  in  authority,  who  often  delayed 
action  on  Lacy's  excited  warnings.  The  Lacy  letters  re- 
ferred to  were  dated  March  19,  April  23,  May  7  (two), 
and  May  11,  1773.  The  April  23  letter  was  a  long  one, 
possibly  the  most  startling  of  all,  but  was  neglected  by  the 
Spanish  government  for  a  year.  It  will  be  taken  up  in  its 
place  from  the  standpoint  of  action  on  it.  The  other  four 
were  acted  on  at  the  same  time,  although  one  of  Lacy^s 
May  7  letters  may  not  have  been  forwarded  to  Bucarely. 
It  had  enclosed  a  map  (in  Russian)  of  Russian  discoveries 
in  Kamchatka,  and  a  list  of  merchandise  showing  the  kind 
of  trade  that  the  Russians  were  carrying  on  in  that  part 

MC-2430.  aJRevilla  Gigedo,  I nforme,  par.   47.     C-5613 


v^ 


I 

i 

U 
i 

In 

o 

!^  I 


i 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  225 

of  the  world.^^  Grimaldi  forwarded  this  letter  and  its 
enclosures  to  Arriaga,  June  13,  1773,^^  and  the  latter  sent 
them  next  day  to  Jorge  Juan  ^^  for  an  opinion.^^  Juan's 
reply  does  not  appear,  but  the  map  at  least  was  forwarded 
to  Bucarely  with  Arriaga's  letter  of  September  25,  1773,  to 
be  noticed  presently. ^^ 

In  his  March  19  letter  I^acy  claimed  to  have  made  an 
important  discovery.  He  had  received  a  detailed  report  of 
the  Russian  expeditions  between-  Kamchatka  and  America 
obtained  by  one  who  had  handled  and  read  the  papers, 
which  were  sealed  and  deposited  in  the  Russian  archives. 
The  report  said  that  Bering  and  Chirikof  in  their  voyages 
of  1741-42  had  reached  land  at  60°,  but  they  could  not  tell 
whether  it  was  the  continent  or  an  island.  In  1764,  two 
ships  went  from  Archangel  under  Estehacowy  and  Panowba- 
few,^^  and  one  from  Kamchatka  under  Krenitzin.  They 
joined,  and  explored  the  land  from  a  little  above  40°  up 
to  75°,  and  reported  it  as  part  of  the  mainland.  Between 
235°  longitude  and  Kamchatka  the  sea  was  full  of  islands, 
the  inhabitants  of  which  traded  with  the  people  of  Kam- 
chatka, wore  the  same  kind  of  dress,  and  had  the  same 
manners  and  customs.  They  said  that  the  land  either 
joined  Asia,  or  was  not  more  than  two  hours  away,  as  had 
been  stated  by  Professor  Steller  who  accompanied  Bering. 
They  believed  the  land  to  be  the  Calif ornias,  which  in  that 
case  extended  to  75°.  It  was  a  region  of  high  mountains, 
with  an  agreeable,  moist  climate ;  it  contained  trees  adapted 
for  use  as  masts,  for  example,  cedar ;  it  had  an  abundance 
of  copper,  and  signs  of  other  metals ;  and  it  abounded  in 
fur-bearing  animals  of  the  best  quality  of  skins.  In  1765- 
66  the  empress  authorized  a  company  of  Kamchatka  busi- 
ness men  to  form  an  establishment,  which  they  did  on  the 
mainland  at  64°.  There  were  twenty-four  men  in  the  com- 
pany, employing  two  hundred  Cossacks  in  hunting,  making 

"  C-2250.  UUoa  of  the  Notidas  secretas  concerning 

22  C-2289.  affairs  in  the  viceroyalty  of  Peru. 

23  Juan  was  the  celebrated  Spanish  «<  C-2290. 
mathematician,   naval  officer,   and   ac-  "  For  the  map,  C-2126. 
ademician,     who,     however,     is     more  '*  I    am    unable    to    identify  these 
famous    to-day    as    joint  author  with  names. 

Q 


226         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

discoveries,  guarding  the  establishment,  and  procuring  the 
payment  of  tribute  to  Russia,  and  there  were  forty  sailors 
and  two  ship-builders  there.  Members  of  the  company 
were  allowed  to  wear  a  gold  medal  with  the  bust  of  the 
empress,  who  had  given  to  the  company  the  privilege  of 
trading  in  anything  that  it  might  see  fit  in  that  region.  So 
far,  they  had  traded  mainly  in  furs,  but  also  in  walrus- 
teeth,  whalebone,  whale  oil,  and  certain  kinds  of  fish,  and 
they  planned  to  build  up  commerce  with  China  and  Japan. 

They  imported  from  Russia  such  goods  as  cloth,  canvas, 
shoes,  leather,  wrought  copper,  and  tobacco.  Gold  and 
silver  they  expected  to  find,  and  they  had  already  found 
pearls,  but  pearl  fishing  had  been  discontinued,  because 
of  a  certain  disease  of  the  fingers  which  it  caused  to  those 
employed  in  it ;  a  less  harmful  method  of  pearl  fishing  was 
being  sought.  Learned  men  of  the  Russian  Academy  were 
being  sent  out  to  discover  mines.^^ 

Writing  May  7  Lacy  said  that  Russia  had  formed  a  proj- 
ect of  forcing  the  Great  Wall  and  invading  China  with 
25,000  men.  They  were  also  planning  a  naval  expedition 
from  Kamchatka  against  Japan  under  command  of  an 
Englishman,  General  Lloyd,  although  it  would  doubtless 
be  postponed  until  the  conclusion  of  the  war  with  Turkey. 
He  mentioned  this  as  evidence  of  Russia's  vast  oriental  proj- 
ects.^^  In  his  May  11  letter  he  wrote  that  the  empress  had 
told  Professor  Haller  of  the  Russian  Academy  about  the 
discoveries  in  America,  and  that  he  had  made  a  report  to 
her,  suggesting  that  part  of  the  Russian  fleet  be  sent  around 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  to  Kamchatka,  where  it  could  refit 
and  then  go  to  America  and  make  conquests.  Haller  said 
that  Russia  had  more  right  to  America  than  any  other  power, 
because  the  inhabitants  of  America  came  originally  from 
Siberia,  and  had  continued  to  trade  with  it ;  also,  because 
the  Dutch  had  made  themselves  masters  of  the  Moluccas. ^^ 
Lacy  was  sure  that  this  report  had  been  made,  absurd  as  it 
might   appear,    and   therefore   thought   it   best   to   inform 

^  C-2197.  Moluccas  had  to  do  with  it,  unless  on 

28  C-2249.  the  modern  doctrine  of  "compensation." 

29  It    is    difficiilt    to    see  what    the 


1773]  FOREIGN  AGGRESSIONS  227 

Grimaldi,  for  nothing  was  deemed  impossible  by  the  Rus- 
sians, however  difficult  or  dangerous  it  might  be.^^ 

Grimaldi  sent  these  three  letters  of  Lacy  to  Arriaga  on 
June  20,  1773.  He  had  delayed  after  receiving  Lacy's 
March  19  letter  in  expectation  of  a  more  detailed  report 
which  Lacy  had  intimated  that  he  was  about  to  send,  but 
which  had  not  come.^^  A  few  days  later  Grimaldi  again 
wrote  to  Arriaga,  sending  him  two  letters  of  the  Vizconde 
de  la  Herreria  of  the  year  1764,  when  the  latter  was  in  St. 
Petersburg.^^  The  letters  contained  notices  about  the  Cali- 
fornias  and  information  about  Russian  expeditions.^^  With 
them  was  a  map  of  the  year  1758,  in  French,  made  by  the 
Imperial  Academy  of  Sciences  of  St.  Petersburg,  showing  the 
Russian  discoveries  in  North  America. ^^  Arriaga  was  some- 
what slow  to  act.  Not  until  September  25  did  he  write  to 
Bucarely,  when  he  forwarded  the  documents  which  have 
just  been  discussed,  and  gave  instructions  for  Bucarely 
to  do  what  he  should  think  proper  to  find  out  whether  the 
Russians  were  advancing.^^  From  another  letter  of  Arriaga 
to  Bucarely,  January  24^  1774,  we  get  a  clear  expression  of  the 
ministro  generaVs  views  with  regard  to  the  Russian  periL. 
"As  for  the  Russian  discoveries,''  he  said,  "they  are  still 
to  me  a  very  remote  object  of  attention,  and  the  present 
time  seems  much  too  early  for  them  to  be  a  cause  for  alarm. 
But  as  the  preparations  against  them  serve  many  other 
purposes,  especially  in  that  they  conduce  to  the  advance- 
ment of  missionary  work,  and  to  the  extension  of  the  gospel, 
the  more  land  we  gain  by  discoveries,  I  am  very  well  satis- 
fied with  all  that  has  been  done,  for  in  this  manner,  by  sea 
and  land,  we  may  proceed  with  our  conquests  to  one  place 
after  another.''  ^^ 

Meanwhile,  Bucarely  had  been  making  preparations  for 
the  Perez  expedition,  his  activity  in  this  regard  being  in 

3"  C-2252.  not  seen) ,  and  appeared  also  in  English 

31  C-2295.  in  the  English  translation  from  that  work 

32  Grimaldi    to  Arriaga,    June     28,        of   1761,   and   in  French  in   a    French 
1773.     C-2306.  translation  of  1766. 

33  0-545,561.  35C-2380. 

3<  C-442,     The   map   was  pubHshed  36  A.G.I.,  146-4-2. 

in   Miiller's  Sammlung   (which  I   have 


228        THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

striking  contrast  to  the  delays  of  the  administration  in 
Spain.  On  July  18,  1773,  Bucarely  had  ordered  P6rez  to 
draw  up  a  plan  for  northward  exploration,  and  Perez's 
accidental  return  from  his  proposed  Monterey  voyage  had 
enabled  him  to  receive  this  order  earlier  than  otherwise 
would  have  been  the  case,  so  that  the  plans  were  taken  up 
at  once.  On  September  1,  Perez  completed  his  plan,  which 
the  viceroy  approved  in  his  order  of  September  29,  making 
one  change,  —  that  Perez  must  go  north  to  60°  rather  than 
to  45°  or  50°,  as  that  officer  had  suggested.  There  is  no 
evidence  to  show  that  the  junta  was  consulted. 

Lcial  instruction  was  not  issued  until  December 


1773)  It  begins  by  declaring  that  the  king  had  imposed 
ipon  the  viceroy  of  extending  his  dominions,  as  well  as 
of  preserving  them,  in  order  to  bring  the  Indians  into  vassal- 
age, and  to  spread  the  gospel  among  them.  Therefore,  the 
viceroy  was  ordering  Juan  Perez  to  make  explorations  north 
of  Monterey,  in  the  frigate  Santiago,  otherwise  Nueva 
Galicia,  which  was  to  carry  provisions  for  a  year.  Perez 
was  also  to  take  provisions  to  Monterey,  but  to  stay  there 
no  longer  than  necessary  to  unload  them,  when  he  should 
again  put  to  sea.  He  should  reach  at  least  60°  before  start- 
ing back  to  Monterey,  making  a  most  minute  examination 
of  the  coast  upon  his  return,  and  landing,  where  possible 
without  risk.  He  was  to  make  no  settlements,  but  might 
leave  distinguishing  marks  at  good  sites,  taking  formal 
possession  of  them.  If  a  foreign  establishment  should  be 
discovered,  he  was  to  land  north  of  it,  and  take  possession, 
leaving  evidences  of  his  act.  He  must  not  communicate 
with  such  foreign  establishment,  but  should  view  it  from 
afar,  getting  in  that  way  all  the  information  that  he  could. 
He  was  to  avoid  ships  that  he  might  meet,  or,  if  compelled 
to  communicate  with  them,  was  to  conceal  his  real  objects. 
Indians  were  to  be  treated  well,  and  their  customs  noted, 
especially  in  matters  of  government ;  likewise  he  was  to 
note  the  productivity  of  the  lands  in  minerals  and  agricul- 
tural products,  and  get  data  as  to  the  animals,  plants,  and 
trees.     He  was  to  find  out  Whether  the  Indians  had  ever 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  229 

seen  boats  before  or  any  foreigners,  and  if  they  had,  was 
to  inquire  about  their  visit  there.  He  might  put  into 
Monterey,  if  a  storm  or  other  accident  should  make  it 
necessary,  or  if  urgently  in  need  of  provisions,  of  which  an 
extra  supply  had  been  ordered  sent  from  San  Bias.  In 
entering  Monterey  or  San  Diego  he  was  to  hoist  a  certain 
signal,  of  which  Rivera  had  been  advised,  so  that  he  might 
know  that  Perez's  was  not  a  foreign  ship.  On  no  account 
was  he  to  start  hostilities  with  the  Indians,  remembering 
that  his  principal  object  was  to  explore  the  coast  in  search 
of  foreign  establishments,  and  to  acquire  information  that 
might  lead  to  a  more  thorough  examination.  Russian 
maps  of  1758  and  1773  were  being  given  to  him,  as  possibly 
of  some  use,  and,  finally,  he  was  assured  that  he  would  be 
rewarded  according  to  his  deeds.^^ 

In  answering  Arriaga^s  letter  of  September  25,  Bucarely 
wrote,  December  27,  1773,  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  document 
just  mentioned,  and  saying  that  the  preparations  for  the 
voyage  were  already  so  far  advanced  that  there  had  hardly 
been  time  to  make  a  copy  of  the  Russian  map  of  1773,  and 
he  had  been  obliged  to  send  the  map  and  Perez's  instructions 
by  special  courier.  The  instructions  were  secret,  and  were 
not  to  be  opened  by  Perez  until  after  his  departure  from 
Monterey.  He  was  to  stop  at  Monterey  to  leave  provisions, 
as  the  supply-ship  Principe  was  laid  up  for  repairs  until 
February.  P^rez  himself  had  plenty  of  supplies,  and  a 
crew  of  his  own  choosing,  and  Bucarely  hoped  that  some 
useful  knowledge,  at  least,  might  result  from  the  expedi- 
tion.^^ A  month  later  Bucarely  wrote  that  Perez  and  the 
Santiago  had  probably  sailed  already;  he  had  heard  that 
they  were  only  awaiting  a  favorable  wind  in  order  to  put 
to  sea.  Francisco  Hijosa,  the  commissary  of  San  Bias, 
had  written,  January  5,  1774,  that  the  boat  was  provisioned 
for  a  year,  besides  carrying  supplies  for  Monterey,  and 
Bucarely  had  ordered  the  Principe  promptly  to  San  Diego 
and  Monterey,  so  as  to  provide  for  every  possible  contin- 
gency that   might   cause   Perez    to   need   more   supplies. ^^ 

37  C-2457.  38  C-2464.  39  C-2521. 


230         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

P6rez  had  in  fact  sailed  on  January  24,  as  Bucarely  soon 
learned  from  Hijosa's  letter  of  the  27th  from  San  Bias.  Up 
to  the  Islas  Isabelas,  wrote  Bucarely;  soon  afterward,  the 
voyage  had  gone  very  well,  according  to  the  letters  sent 
back  from  there  by  Perez  and  by  Serra,  who  was  also  on 
board.  Nor  had  the  repairing  and  the  provisioning  of  the 
Principe  for  the  voyage  to  Monterey  been  lost  sight  of  by 
Bucarely,  who  expected  to  hear,  every  instant,  that  the 
boat  had  sailed. *° 
y  p^V  Reference  has  been  made  to  a  proposed  exploration  of  the 
^np  Isthmus'  of  Tehuantepec  by  Agustin  Crame.     This  affair  was 

^  undertaken  without  delay.     Crame  was  at  first  unsuccess- 

ful in  his  quest,  informing  Bucarely  on  December  28, 1773, 
that  he  had  not  found  a  route  across  the  isthmus  suitable 
for  the  transportation  gf  artillery.  Only  a  few  days  later, 
however,  January  2,  1774,  he  wrote  enthusiastically  of  his 
complete  success.  He  had  wandered  in  the  hills,  as  if  his 
plan  were  to  open  a  new  way,  instead  of  exploring  what 
he  had  been  told  was  the  old  one,  when  by  good  luck  he 
hit  upon  a  route  which  not  only  was  suitable  for  transport- 
ing artillery,  but  which  had  formerly  been  used  for  that 
purpose.  The  proof  of  this,  which  he  regarded  as  incontest- 
able, was  that  a  way  had  been  cleared  to  make  a  wide  road, 
something  that  would  not  have  been  done  in  this  part  of 
the  world  for  any  other  reason.  As  a  result  of  this  dis- 
covery it  was  clear  that  an  excellent  route  existed,  especially 
if  use  were  made  of  the  rivers  there ;  it  could  be  done  wholly 
by  land,  but  at  considerable  labor  and  expense,  as  a  stretch 
I  \  of  five  or  six  leagues  would  have  to  be  cleared.  Crame  had 
a  little  more  to  do  in  order  to  complete  his  exploration,  and 
was  making  a  map,  so  that  his  description  of  the  country 
might  be  more  clearly  understood. ^^ 

*^  Bucarely   to     Arriaga,     Feb.     24,  ports  of  that  country,  of  the  possibility 

1774.     C-2551.  of  commercial  development,  and  of  the 

*i  C-2502.     Crame  referred    also    to  advantages  that  would  accrue,  if  trade 

the  possibility  of  an  interoceanic  canal  with   Peru   might   avail   itself  of   such 

across    the    Isthmus    of    Tehuantepec.  a    canal,    thus    permitting    the    entire 

This  could  be  made,  he  said,  by  cutting  commerce  of  both  Americas  to  centre 

a  space  only  eight  or  nine  leagues  long,  upon  one  point.     Crame  had  in  mind, 

and  making  one   tunnel,   thus  joining  no  doubt,  that,  as  things  were,  there 

two  rivers  flowing  into  opposite  seas.  were  two  centres  of  trade,  Vera  Cruz 

This  led  him  to  a  consideration  of  the  and    Porto    Bello,    whereas    the    canal 


C  wm(»  l^t€can((0eme.  y  cutout 


•  n,  .   „    ,  ^  .*  /t. 


The  Crame  Map  of  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  1774. 


1773]  FOREIGN  AGGRESSIONS  231 

Evincing  much  pleasure  over  Cramers  achievement,  Bu- 
carely  forwarded  his  statement  to  Arriaga,  January  27, 
1774,  again  remarking  that  it  formed  part  of  a  plan,  along 
with  the  P6rez  and  Anza  expeditions,  to  oppose  superior 
forces  to  those  which  the  Russians  might  create  in  the 
Pacific.'*^  Writing  again,  March  27,  1774,  Bucarely  noted 
a  new  use  that  might  be  made  of  the  Tehuantepec  route, 
besides  the  one  originally  contemplated.  Cramers  map 
having  been  completed,  he  was  forwarding  it  so  as  to  show 
how  easily  goods  might  be  carried  that  way  both  for  use  in 
Alta  California  and  to  assist  in  the  explorations,  or  for  other 
purposes,  at  less  expense  than  the  existing  method  by 
means  of  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  and  in  less  time  than 
if  reliance  were  placed  on  voyages  from  Manila.  No 
authentic  documents  had  been  found  to  prove  a  former 
communication  from  sea  to  sea  at  Tehuantepec,  but  there 
were  cannon  at  Vera  Cruz  which  had  been  cast  in  Manila, 
Crame  had  found  proofs  of  the  use  of  the  Tehuantepec 
route  to  transport  cannon,  and  there  was  a  tradition  to  the 
same  effect  in  that  country.  Furthermore,  Cortes  had 
built  ships  there  for  voyages  to  the  Californias,  and  he 
must  have  made  use  of  the  Crame  route  to  transport  his 
materials.  All  of  these  notices  might  be  of  some  use  in 
resolving  what  to  do  to  check  the  Russians.'*^  Cramers 
map  will  explain  Bucarely's  interest  in  the  Tehuantepec 
route  better  than  anything  else.^^ 

Between  the  departure  of  Perez  for  the  north  and  his 
return,  late  in  1774,  there  was  a  long  gap  when  Bucarely's 
interest  in  the  affairs  of  Alta  California  and  its  retention 
against  foreign  foes  was  more  directly  concerned  with 
matters  affecting  an  overland  route,  and  with  the  de- 
velopment of  the  province,  as  by  his  projected  settlement 
of  San  Frdncisco.  He  seemed  willing  to  await  the  re- 
sult of  Perezes  voyage  before  engaging  further  in  naval 
ventures.  The  authorities  in  Spain,  however,  were  in  a 
measure  roused  to  a  fear  of  both  the  Russians  and  the  Eng- 

would  permit  of  there  being  one  prin-  <*  C-2520. 

cipal  port  as  a  base  for  both  New  Spain  "  C-2597. 

and  Peru.  **  For  the  map,  A.G.I. ,  vitrina. 


232         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

lish  by  the  resurrection  of  Lacy's  April  23  letter  of  the  pre- 
vious year.  This  came  about  as  a  result  of  another  letter 
from  Lacy;,  January  25,  1774,  which  made  references  to  the 
Russian  discoveries  in  Kamchatka.^^  We  may  now  take 
up  the  much  neglected  letter  of  April  23^  1773. 

An  emissary  of  Lacy'sKd  come  upon  a  civilized  native  of 
Kamchatka,  then  in  St.  Petersburg,  and  the  latter  had  made 
the  following  statements :  The  Russians  knew,  as  early  as 
1770,  of  the  Spanish  expeditions  of  1769  to  Alta  California, 
and  they  were  afraid  lest  Spain  might  threaten  Russia's 
possessions.  There  was  some  talk  of  making  an  agreement 
with  the  English,  who  were  also  interested,  to  check  Spain's 
advances,  but  when  a  report  came  that  Spain  had  reached 
only  48°  [sic],  whereas  the  Russian  possessions  were  in  64° 
and  65°,  the  Russians  concluded  that  the  Spaniards  did  not 
know  of  their  settlements,  and  undertook  no  measures 
against  them.  The  Russians  had  expected  English  help, 
because  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  was  extending  its 
possessions  westward  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Russian  settle- 
ments. The  English  company  already  had  settlements  all 
the  way  from  Hudson  and  Baffin  bays  to  the  Pacific,  and 
it  was  carrying  on  an  extensive  trade  with  the  Indians.  Its 
employes  hindered  everybody,  even  other  Englishmen, 
from  entering  its  territories,  and  the  Russians  had  cause 
for  complaint,  because  it  won  over  tribes  which  had  been 
disposed  to  join  with  the  Russians,  and  overcame  Russian 
efforts  at  winning  the  friendship  of  the  natives,  whenever 
they  got  too  near  the  company's  possessions.  The  Russians 
not  only  had  a  settlement  on  the  American  mainland,  but 
also  had  several  very  large  ones  on  different  islands.  The 
islands  were  part  of  a  great  archipelago  extending  south- 
ward to  the  equator,  including  the  islands  of  Japan.  This 
information,  said  Lacy,  confirmed  what  he  had  said  in  his 
letter  of  March  19,  1773.  Clearly^  the  Russians  were 
already  in  the  Californias,  not  far  from  the  Spanish  settle- 
ments.  and  he  believed  that  it  was 'a  "matter  of  the  greatest 
importance  to  checK  them."^  On  this  point  it  might  be  well 

«  C-2514. 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  233 

to  know  that  the  Russians  had  been  obliged  to  abandon 
the  land  of  the  Yakutskis,  because  of  the  hostility  of  that 
people.^^ 

Not  until  April  30,  1774,  did  Grimaldi  take  action  on 
this  letter,  when  he  wrote  to  Arriaga  that  he  was  in  doubt 
whether  he  had  sent  him  a  copy  before.  But,  "  considering 
the  importance  of  these  notices,''  he  felt  that  he  need  not 
apologize  for  sending  a  copy  again,  if  he  had  previously  done 
so.  He  also  enclosed  copies  of  two  maps  sent  by  Lacy, 
one  of  which  had  been  forwarded  before  in  Grimaldi's  letter 
of  June  13,  1773,  and  another,  in  German,  sent  by  Lacy 
with  his  letter  of  January  25,  1774."*^  The  latter  showed  the 
discovery  by  the  Russians  of  a  new  archipelago  in  the 
Pacific.'*^  Arriaga  acknowledged  Grimaldi's  letter  of  June 
1,^^  and,  two  weeks  later,  forwarded  copies  of  Lacy's  letter 
and  a  translation  of  the  German  map  to  Bucarejy,  with 
instructions  that  the  latter  was  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  Rus- 
sian objects.^"  By  another  letter,  June^^SS/ 17747"Arrragar 
informed  Bucarely  that  he  still  thought  the  danger  of  a 
Russian  approach  to  the  Spanish  dominions  in  New  Spain 
very  distant*  He  had  approved  all  of  Bucarely's  measures, 
but  thought  there  would  be  time  enough  in  which  to  check 
the  Russians  if  Spain  should  proceed  in  the  normal  way.  He 
specifically  referred  to  the  Crame  and  P6rez  expeditions, 
however,  as  well  adapted  to  procure  the  results  for  which 
they  had  been  undertaken.^^ 

Bucarely 's  reply  of  September  28,  1774,  is  further  evi- 
dence to  show  in  what  estimation  he  held  the  reports  of 
Russian  and  English  aggressions,  and  shows  also  what  he 
was  doing  to  meet  them.  He  was  inclined  to  treat  Lacy's 
report  as  absurd,  as  far  as  it  dealt  with  the  extension  of  the 
Hudson's  Bay  Company's  possessions  to  proximity  with 

^«C-2221.    More  likely  the  Chukchis  as  the  one  already  forwarded  by  him 

were  meant,  rather  than  the  Yakutskis.  September  25,  1773.     Bucarely's  letter 

"7  0-2615.     Grimaldi    said  that    the  of   September   28,    1774    (C-2732),   re- 
first-mentioned  map  had  been  forwarded  marks  the  failure  to  enclose  the  sup- 
in  Lacy's  letter  of  June  13,  1773.    This  posed  Lacy  map  of  June  13,  1773. 
seems  to  have  been  a  slip  for  his  own  ^  The  map  is  not  in  the  file, 
letter  of  that  date.     It  will  be  noted  "^  C-2636. 
that  Arriaga  did  not 'at  this  time  send             ^  C-2649. 
Bucarely  a  copy  of  the  map  referred             "  A.G.I.,  146-4-2. 
to,  probably  because  it  was  the  same 


234        THE   FOUNDING   OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA^       [Ch.  X 

those  of  Russia.  This  had  the  same  appearances  of  in- 
vention as  the  pretended  voyage  from  Hudson  Bay  to  the 
Pacific  about  which  so  much  had  been  pubhshed.^^  Referring 
to  his  own  letters  about  conditions  in  Alta  CaHfornia,  the 
voyage  of  P6rez,  Anza^s  discovery  of  a  route  from  Sonora 
and  his  return,  and  the  explorations  of  the  Rio  Coatzacoalcos 
to  Tehuantepec  by  Crame,  he  repeated  that  all  of  these 
activities  had  the  same  object.  They  were  being  executed 
at  the  same  time,  and  were  evidence  that  his  sole  intention 
was  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  foreign  danger  to  Spain's 
possessions  of  the  Pacific  coast.  He  was  building  a  new 
boat  at  San  Bias,  and  planning  a  new  expedition  by  way  of 
the  Anza  route  to  occupy  the  port  of  San  Francisco.  First, 
however,  it  was  necessary  to  consult  with  Anza,  and  to 
learn  the  results  of  Perez's  voyage.  He  was  also  suspending 
the  change  in  location  of  the  Sonora  presidios,  until  he  could 
decide  whether  there  should  be  one  at  the  confluence  of  the 
Colorado  and  Gila,  in  which  case  Sonora  would  require  six 
presidios  instead  of  four.^^ 

Meanwhile,  preparations  for  a  second  expedition  by  the 
Anza  route  to  Alta  California  were  going  on,  although  not 
much  was  done  until  after  Anza's  arrival  in  Mexico  early 
in  November.  At  about  the  same  time  Bucarely  got  news 
of  Perez's  return,  the  Santiago  having  reached  San  Bias 
on  November  3.  We  have  seen  that  P6rez  had  sailed  from 
San  Bias  on  January  24,  1774,  bound  for  Monterey.  At  the 
same  time,  Anza  was  making  the  first  of  his  expeditions  to 
Alta  California.  When  Anza  reached  San  Gabriel,  March 
22,  1774,  he  learned  that  Perez  was  at  San  Diego,  and  there- 
fore sent  a  force  there  to  obtain  provisions.  One  of  the  men 
in  that  party  was  a  soldier  named  Juan  Bautista  Valdes,  who, 
a  httle  later,  was  sent  back  over  the  Anza  route  to  Mexico 
with  Anza's  despatches  to  Bucarely.  Upon  Valdes'  arrival  in 
June,  Bucarely  ordered  Melchor  de  Peramas  to  take  a  dep- 

"  This  may  refer  to  a  voyage  from  and  much  was  written,  many  English 

the  Pacific  by  a  transcontinental  strait,  writers  believing  that  the  voyage  had 

supposed  to  have  been  made  in  1640  been    made.     It    is    now    utterly    dis- 

by  an  Admiral  Fonte.     Much  interest  credited, 
was  taken  in  England,  in  the  eighteenth  ^  C-2732. 

century,    in   accounts   of   this   voyage, 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  235 

osition  from  him.  Vald^s  stated  that  he  had  seen  the 
Santiago  at  San  Diego,  and  had  gone  on  board.  All  were 
well.  The  boat  had  been  there  two  weeks,  having  stopped 
at  Serra's  request,  he  said,  in  order  that  supplies  might  be  left 
at  the  southern  missions.  Vald^s  seemed  ignorant  of  the  pur- 
poses of  the  voyage,  stating  that  the  Santiago  had  come  to 
bring  provisions.  New  masts  were  being  cut  for  the  Santi- 
ago, the  old  ones  being  too  high,  although  in  other  respects 
the  frigate  was  a  good  one.  He  had  seen  Serra,  who  was 
well  and  had  started  overland  for  Monterey.^*  Writing  to 
Arriaga,  June  26,  1774,  Bucarely  evinced  displeasure  at 
the  news  of  Perezes  stop  at  San  Diego,  because  his  orders 
were  against  doing  so,  unless  in  great  necessity,  and  it  was 
for  that  reason  that  he  had  caused  the  Valdes  declaration 
to  be  taken.  The  Santiago  seemed  to  have  had  an  easy  voy- 
age, and  to  have  stopped  either  at  Serra's  request  or  because 
of  the  excessive  length  of  the  mast.  Serra  had  been  willing 
to  be  set  down  at  Monterey  when  he  started.  Bucarely 
was  waiting  to  hear  further  as  to  the  cause  for  this  stop.^^ 
By  September  26,  1774,  Bucarely  had  learned  that  P6rez 
had  started  north  from  Monterey,  and  he  so  informed 
Arriaga.^^ 

Perez  had  gone  on  to  Monterey,  reaching  there  May  9, 
and  setting  sail  again  on  June  11.  He  did  not  reach  60° 
as  instructed  to  do,  but  got  to  about  55°  ;■  he  did  not  land 
to  take  possession  for  Spain,  nor  was  he  able  to  make  good 
observations  of  the  coast,  due  to  bad  weather  and  fog; 
furthermore,  he  found  no  foreign  establislwPafiBiiSt-^tim:..p]:^ 
thattheydid  not  exist.  He  turned  south,  July  22,  1774, 
reached  Monterey  on  August  27,  and  left  there  for  San 
Bias  on  October  9.  While  Bucarely  had  not  learned  what 
he  had  wished  to  learn,  he  considered  that  Perez  had  gained 
much  useful  information.  Writing  to  Arriaga,  November 
26,  1774,  he  said  that  Perez  had  reached  55°  49',  where  he 
conversed  and  bartered  with  Indians  who  came  to  the  ship 
in  canoes,  and  the  same  thing  occurred  in  49°.     He  had 

"  Vald^s,  Declaration,  June  14,  1774.  "s  C-2656. 

C-2648.  B6  C-2719. 


236         THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

been  obliged  to  return  because  of  fogs  and  cold,  a  fear  that 
the  fresh  water  might  give  out,  and  his  suspicion  of  an 
unknown  coast,  but  he  had  accomplished  much  more  than 
Bucarely  had  expected  of  a  first  expedition.  The  information 
obtained  would  help  in  future  voyages,  and  was  some  evidence 
that  there  were  no  foreign  establishments  in  the  nineteen 
degrees  that  he  had  covered,  north  of  the  Spanish  settle- 
ments. The  Indians  seemed  to  have  been  the  same  as 
those  mentioned  in  the  accounts  of  the  Russian  expedition 
of  1741.  They  were  docile,  but  more  advanced  than  those 
encountered  hitherto  by  Spaniards ;  for  example,  they  wore 
clothes.  He  would  immediately  follow  up  this  voyage  by 
preparing  others,  and  he  had  already  ordered  the  Santiago 
to  refit  for  another  voyage.  This  time  it  was  not  to  stop 
at  San  Diego  or  Monterey.  Bruno  de  Heceta  was  to  be  in 
command,  with  P^rez  as  pilot  and  second  in  authority,  and 
with  the  same  crew.  Heceta  was  to  bear  similar  instruc- 
tions to  those  given  to  P6rez,  particular  stress  being  laid 
upon  his  reaching  a  higher  latitude,  examining  as  much  of 
the  coast  as  possible  on  his  return,  and  taking  possession  for 
Spain  wherever  he  might  land.  After  unloading  provisions 
at  Monterey,  Lieutenant  Miguel  Manrique,  in  the  Principe^ 
was  to  explore  the  port  of  San  Francisco,  for,  said  Bucarely, 
''I  regard  the  occupation  of  this  port  as  indispensable, 
and  to  facilitate  it  I  intend  that  Anza,  who  is  now  at  this 
capital,  shall  return  to  Sonora  and  make  a  second  entradaJ^  ^^ 
With  this  letter  Bucarely  forwarded  a  copy  of  Perez's 
diary  and  other  documents  emanating  from  those  who  had 
taken  part  in  the  voyage.^^  In  another  letter  of  November 
26,  Bucarely  was  able  to  say  that  he  had  already  appointed 
a  chaplain  for  the  new  voyage,  and  he  was  about  to  call 
a  junta  to  determine  what  fund  should  pay  the  expenses  of 
maritime  expeditions  of  discovery.^^  Replying  to  these 
letters,  February  14,  1775,  Arriaga  gave  his  approval  to 
Bucarely's  plans  for  a  new  voyage.^" 

Bucarely  wrote  yet  another  letter  on  November  26,  1774, 

"  C-2763.  69  C-2765. 

6s  C-2645,  2681,  2757.  «o  C-2848. 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  237 

one  to  General  O'Reilly^  which  merits  particular  attention. 
O^Reilly  and  Bucarely  seem  to  have  been  warm  personal 
friends.  Evidence  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  two  legajos  of 
correspondence  of  the  viceroy,  now  in  the  Archivo  General 
de  Indias  (88-5-17  and  88-5-18).  The  first  of  these  legajos 
is  composed  for  the  most  part  of  the  O'Reilly-Bucarely 
correspondence  between  1769  and  1775,  with  scattering  let- 
ters for  other  years.  During  this  period  each  wrote  to  the 
other  every  month,  and  but  few  of  their  letters  are  missing. 
Bucarely's  letters  are  horradores,  or  drafts,  and  O'Reilly's 
are  signed  with  his  name  and  rubric.  In  each  case  the  body 
of  the  letter  is  in  the  hand  of  a  clerk,  with  corrections  by 
Bucarely  or  O'Reilly,  but  there  are  lengthy  postscripts  in 
their  own  hands  and  in  some  cases  entire  letters.  Al- 
though intimately  personal,  they  dealt  mostly  with  the 
affairs  in  New  Spain,  O'Reilly's  interest  being  explained 
by  the  fact  that  he  himself  wished  to  become  viceroy,  and 
Bucarely  wished  it  no  less.  One  of  the  most  surprising 
disclosures  of  the  correspondence,  in  view  of  Bucarely's  re- 
markable activity  and  efficiency  as  viceroy,  is  the  fact 
that  he  would  have  preferred  to  return  to  Spain  from  Havana 
instead  of  going  to  Mexico,  and  that  he  desired  all  along  to 
retire,  if  his  post  could  be  obtained  for  O'Reilly.  The 
correspondence  is  also  of  interest  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
proportions  given  to  the  various  affairs  of  the  viceroyalty. 
From  this  we  are  able  to  see  that  Bucarely  spoke  the  truth 
when  he  said  that  the  matters  having  to  do  with  checking 
the  Russians  were  occupying  his  principal  attention.  Indeed 
events  on  the  northern  frontier  and  nortJiwest  coast  were 
almost  the  only  affairs  of  the  viceroyalty  that  he  discussed, 
and  especially  the  matters  dealt  with  most  largely  in  this 
volume.  One  oddity  may  be  noticed.  O'Reilly  never 
failed  to  inquire  concerning  his  friend  Hugo  Oconor,  and 
to  urge  that  special  favor  be  shown  to  him.  Thus  Oconor 
and  his  work  get  more  space  than  any  other  single  factor. 
O'Reilly's  defeat  before  Algiers  may  explain  why  he  failed 
to  become  viceroy  of  New  Spain. 

Bucarely 's  letter  to  O'Reilly  of  November  26,  1774,  aside 


238         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

from  its  paragraph  about  Oconor,  is  almost  wholly  devoted 
to  his  own  activities  against  the  Russians.  Here  again  lie 
speaks  of  having  undertaken  the  Anza,  Crame,  and  P^rez 
expeditions  to  counteract  the  Russian  danger.  Perez  had 
reached  the  very  place  where  the  Russians  were  in  1741. 
He  had  discovered  some  new  tribes  of  Indians,  and  had 
ascertained  that  for  four  hundred  leagues  north  of  Monterey 
there  was  no  reason  to  suspect  the  existence  of  f preigA  estab- 
lishments. The  rest  of  the  coast  would  presently  be  ex- 
plored, and  Bucarely  would  lose  no  time  in  making  fresh 
investigations  which  would  make  the  path  of  glory  easy  for 
his  successor.^^ 

Notwithstanding  the  pressure  of  arranging  for  the  second 
Anza  expedition,  Bucarely  did  not  delay  the  preparations 
for  new  voyages  of  discovery.  On  December  27,  1774,  he 
wrote  several  letters  about  the  course  of  maritime  explora- 
tion. In  one  he  advised  Arriaga  that  he  was  sending  some 
articles  which  P^rez  had  obtained  in  trade  with  the  Indians 
of  55°  49',  enclosing  an  inventory  of  these  goods.^^  These 
showed  the  Indians  to  be  far  advanced  from  barbarism; 
for  example,  the  list  included  blankets,  a  fur  cap,  a  woven 
hat,  and  a  purse.  Bucarely  recommended  that  Perez  be 
promoted,  as  an  incentive  to  others.^^  In  another  letter  he 
wrote  of  his  plan  for  the  northward  voyage  of  the  Santiago. 
As  in  the  CBse  of  Perez's  voyage,  extra  supplies  were  to  be 
forwarded  to  Alta  California  to  provide  for  the  possible 
need  of  the  Santiago.  Perez  and  Hijosa  had  suggested  that 
it  would  be  well  for  the  Sonora  to  accompany  the  Santiago, 
and  Bucarely  had  accepted  the  suggestion,  asking  Heceta 
of  the  Santiago  to  name  a  commander  for  the  other  boat 
from  the  naval  officers  sent  from  Spain.  These  officers 
were  now  in  Mexico,  but  they  would  very  soon  be  ready 
to  start  west.  Bucarely  was  also  hurrying  forward  a  supply 
of  arms  and  ammunition,  by  forced  marches.  Not  only 
was  Manrique  to  explore  the  port  of  San  Francisco,  but 
Heceta  had  also  been  ordered  to  do  so  upon  his  return,  by 

«  C-2771.     O'Reilly   was    expected  ««  C-2784  is  the  inventory, 

to  be  his  successor.  es  C-2783. 


1773]  FOREIGN  AGGRESSIONS  239 

which  time  Bucarely  thought  that  it  might  already  be  occu- 
pied by  the  troops  that  Anza  was  to  conduct  there.  Heceta 
carried  the  same  instructions  as  Perez,  except  that  he  was 
not  to  stop  at  Monterey  going  north,  unless  in  case  of 
necessity.  He  was  to  reach  65°,  if  possible,  before  approach- 
ing the  coast,  and  then  explore  as  he  came  south.  He  was 
to  avoid  foreign  settlements,  if  there  were  any,  and  to  take 
formal  possession  elsewhere,  when  possible.  Under  no 
circumstances  was  he  to  make  a  settlement,  but  he  was  to 
get  further  information  about  the  Indians  found  by  Perez, 
in  particular  whether  they  had  any  commerce,  and  whether 
the  goods  they  exchanged  with  Perez  were  of  their  own  make 
or  bought  from  others.  Parties  were  to  be  sent  ashore, 
but  not  inland --nor  in  any  way  exposed  to  the  treachery  of 
the  Indians.  AH  that  was  desired  was  to  accustom  the 
Indians  to  good  treatment  by  the  Spaniards,  and  to  get  in- 
formation from  them.^^  The  same  day  Bucarely  wrote  to 
O'Reilly  telling  of  preparations  for  the  voyages  of  discovery, 
again  remarking  that  the  northern  lands  would  thus  be 
explored  for  the  benefit  of  his  successor,  and  the  Spanish 
court  reassured  concerning  the  explorations  of  the  Russians. ^^ 
Three  months  later,  March  27/1775,  Bucarely  wrote  that 
the  Santia^  and  Sonora  had  sailed  for  the  north  on  March 
16.  With  them  went  the  San  Carlos  with  provisions  for 
"Monterey,  charged  also  with  the  duty  of  exploring  San 
Francisco  Bay.^^  Another  letter  of  the  same  date  advised 
that  Manrique  had  gone  insane,  and  had  had  to  be  put, 
ashore,  wherefore  Ayala  was  succeeding  him  in  command  of 
the  San  Carlos,  his  place  on  the  Sonora  being  taken  by 
Bodega  y  Cuadra.  All  six  naval  officers  sent  from  Spain, 
including  Manrique,  had  thus  far  manifested  the  greatest 
zeal.^^ 

Meanwhile,  Arriaga  seems  to  have  become  unusually 
excited  over  possible  foreign  establishments  on  the  Pacific 
coast.  Writing  to  Bucarely,  December  23,  1774,  he  said 
that  the  king  had  directed  him  to  give  secret  orders  to  the 

«  C-2780.  «« C-2874. 

6s  C-2782.  «  C-2875. 


240        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

viceroy  to  dislodge  any  foreign  enemies  found  on  the  coasts 
of  the  CaHfornias.  Bucarely  was  to  ask  them  to  go,  and  if 
they  refused,  he  was  to  drive  them  away  by  force.^^  In 
reply  Bucarely  wrote,  April  26,  1775,  that  Perezes  voyage 
had  indicated  that  there  were  no  settlements  for  twenty 
degrees  north  of  Monterey,  except  of  Indians  who  appeared 
less  barbarous  than  those  hitherto  met  with,  but  to  make 
more  sure,  he  had  planned  new  expeditions.  Anza  had  been 
directed  to  occupy  San  Francisco,  and  boats  had  been  sent 
northward  with  provisions  for  Alta  California,  and  to  carry 
on  explorations.  He  deemed  it  best  to  await  the  results  of 
these  expeditions,  rather  than  engage  in  new  ones  which 
might  be  profitless  without  the  information  about  to  be 
gained,  as  well  as  expensive.^® 

Perez's  voyage  had  aroused  considerable  interest  in  Spain. 
Upon  receipt  of  Bucarely 's  letter  of  November  26,  1774, 
Arriaga  sent  that  and  Perez's  diary  to  Vicente  Doz,^^ 
June  1,  1775,  asking  his  opinion  relative  to  future  dis- 
coveries, and  how  far  away  he  thought  the  Russians  might 
be.'^^  Doz's  answer  shows  a  remarkable  grasp  of  the  situa- 
tion. He  had  read  of  all  the  Russian  voyages  of  discovery 
to  North  America,  he  said,  especially  the  last  one,  thatjiL 
Alexei  Chirikof  in  1741,  which  reached  land  in  ^^^S^^Ti^' 
latituae  and  iJl8°  longitude,  reckoning  from  Pari^.  Perez 
claimed  to  have  reached  55°  40'  latitude  and  221^°  longi-" 
tude.  The  difference  in  longitude  stated  was  only  forty 
leagues,  and  that  might  be  due  to  an  error  in  reckoning. 
Thus,  they  must  have  reached  land  at  the  same  place. 
Perez's  men  saw  Indians  with  half  of  a  bayonet  and  a  piece 
of  sword ;  doubtless  these  articles  had  belonged  to  some  of 
the  ten  men  sent  ashore  by  Chirikof  who  did  not  return. 
Chirikof,  being  unable  to  land,  had  returned  with  the 
coast  always  in  sight  to  a  gulf  in  51°  12',  which  was  only 
twelve  degrees  of  longitude  from  Kamchatka.  His  and 
P6rez's  diaries   together  proved   therefore  that    the    Cali- 

68  C-2777.  69  C-2893.  to  observe  the  transit  of  Venus  from 

™  Doz  was  a  Spanish  astronomer  who  San  Jos6  del  Cabo.     Humboldt,  Polit- 

accorapanied   the   Frenchman,   Chappe  ical  essay,  I,  liii  and  222. 

d'Auteroche,  to  Baja  California  in  1769  ^^  C-2928. 


1773]  FOREIGN  AGGRESSIONS  241 

fornias  ran  northwest  by  north  up  to  60°  ;  then  west ;  then 
south  six  hundred  leagues  to  the  said  gulf,  where  America 
ended,  one  hundred  fifty  leagues  from  the  Russian  posses- 
sions ;  then  north  and  northeast,  forming  a  channel  with  the 
eastern  coast  of  Asia  of  not  more  than  one  hundred  leagues 
in  width  in  some  places,  according  to  some  of  the  Russian 
voyagers.  As  to  future  discoveries,  it  would  not  be  possible 
to  pass  60°,  unless  a  strait  were  found  separating  the  land  dis- 
covered by  the  Russians  from  the  continent  of  America.  The 
Russians  had  always  been  desirous  of  encroaching  upon  the 
Spanish  domains  in  North  America,  but  they  had  failed 
repeatedly  in  their  attempts  from  Archangel,  nor  had  their 
voyages  from  Kamchatka  been  altogether  successful. 
Bering  perished,  and  so  did  most  of  Chirikof^s  crew  and  the 
astronomer,  De  L'Isle.  These  misfortunes,  the  sterility  of 
Kamchatka,  and  the  slight  civilization  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Kamchatka  would  protect  Spain  for  the  present.  The 
English  were  quite  as  eager  in  seeking  a  northwest  passage, 
as  the  Russians  in  their  designs,  nor  had  they  suffered 
fewer  misfortunes.  Hudson  and  Baffin  had  proved  to 
the  English  the  fruitlessness  of  their  undertaking,  but  a 
way  to  the  Pacific  might  possibly  be  found,  not  by  a  strait, 
but  by  way  of  the  rivers.  The  violent  currents  that  P^rez 
encountered  might  come  from  some  great  river,  and  it 
might  even  be  the  one  which  the  French  reported  as  having 
its  source  near  the  Missouri  River.  De  LTsle  thought  that 
river  might  empty  into  the  Pacific,  and  Mliller  reckoned  its 
mouth  as  in  the  vicinity  of  the  place  where  P6rez  encountered 
the  currents.  It  would  therefore  be  well  to  examine  that 
bay  to  see  whether  there  might  prove  to  be  a  passage.  Al- 
though Perez  explored  between  Cape  Mendocino  and  50°, 
he  had  said  nothing  about  the  two  entrances  said  to  have 
been  found  by  Aguilar  and  Fuca  between  42°  and  48°, 
which  was  some  evidence  that  they  did  not  exist,  but  as 
bad  weather  and  fog  had  prevented  Perez's  seeing  a  great 
part  of  the  coast,  it  would  be  well  to  make  a  second  explora- 
tion   to    uproot  this   preoccupation  of   the  geographers.^^ 

7>  Doz  to  Arriaga,  June  21,  1775.    C-2929. 


242        THE   FOUNDING   OF  SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

On  receiving  this  communication  Arriaga  wrote  to  Bu- 
carely,  June  23,  1775,  approving  all  that  he  had  done  for 
the  second  voyage  of  exploration.^^  A  few  days  later, 
July  8,  he  acknowledged  receipt  of  the  news  of  departure 
of  the  two  boats  for  the  north 7^  On  receiving  Bucarely's 
letter  of  April  26,  Arriaga  seems  to  have  forgotten  the  ap- 
proval recently  given  by  him.  Replying  on  August  26,  he 
asked  why  the  instructions  to  Heceta  were  at  variance  with 
his  order  of  December  23,  1774,  calling  for  the  expulsion  of 
foreigners  from  the  coasts  of  the  Calif ornias.  He  was  ob- 
jecting to  the  paragraphs  requiring  Heceta  to  avoid  com- 
ing in  contact  with  foreign  establishments  or  foreign  ships 
other  than  to  get  information  about  them.^^  Bucarely's 
answer  is  not  at  hand,  but  he  might  have  said  that  the 
order  referred  to  did  not  reach  Mexico  until  after  the  San- 
tiago and  Sonora  had  sailed,  to  say  nothing  of  Arriaga's 
approval  of  June  23.  However,  it  could  not  have  been 
an  issue  of  importance,  because  the  viceroy  was  able  soon 
to  report  the  return  of  the  two  ships  and  that  they  had 
come  upon  no  foreign  establishments. 

Before  that  time,  however,  Bucarely  had  made  a  report, 
August  27,  1775,  as  to  the  cost  of  the  voyages.  The  P^rez 
voyage  had  cost  15,455  pesos y  4  reales,  11  granos,  and  the 
voyage  then  being  made  by  Heceta  and  Bodega  had  called 
for  36,740  pesos,  2  granos,  the  total  for  the  two  being 
52,195  pesos,  5  reales,  1  grano.  San  Bias  had  paid  for  all, 
although  chargeable  only  with  20,000  pesos,  wherefore 
Bucarely  had  ordered  the  additional  sum  returned  to  that 
department.^®  Both  the  expense  and  the  method  of  satisfy- 
ing it  received  the  royal  approval.^^  This  matter  is  worthy 
of  more  than  passing  comment.  Much  has  been  said  of 
the  unwillingness  or  inability  of  the  Spanish  government  to 
expend  money.  Yet  for  these  voyages  and  the  many  other 
projects  of  Bucarely  considerable  sums  jvere  required.  ^^ 
shows  either  a  more  pronounced  fear  than  appears  from  the 

"  C-2930.  78  C-2978. 

">*  C-2951.  "  Arriaga  to  Bucarely,  Dec.  22, 1775. 

75  C-2969.  C-3050. 


1773]  FOREIGN  AGGRESSIONS        ^  243 

documents,  or  else  a  reviyal_jof„energ^^^  ^P^^  ^9£?^ 

from  theTii^ire"     TEe  latter  view  impresses  the  writer  more 
strongly.     Arriaga  had  found  a  maii  w¥o  "^co^^ 
done,  things  too  that  were  worth  doing,  and  he  gave  him 
free  play. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Santiago,  Sonora,  and  San  Carlos 
left  San  Bias  for  the  north  on  March  16,  1775.  The  two 
former  went  in  company  until  July  30,  when  they  parted. 
Heceta_in_the__)San^i^^  about  to  49°,  usually  keeping 

near  the  shore  and  anchoring  often.  In  the  course  of  his 
exploration  he  came  upoii  the„  mouth  of  the  Columbia 
River.  The  sickness  of  many  of  the  crew  compelled  his 
return,  so  that  by  August  29  he  was  already  at  Monterey. 
Bodega  went  nearly  to  58°,  made  a  thorough  survey  from 
the  limit  of  P6rez's  voyage,  and  landed  twice  to  take  posses- 
sion. As  usual  on  such  voyages  many  of  the  crew  were  now 
sick  with  scurvy,  and  besides,  provisions  were  failing.  So 
the  Sonora  was  turned  southward,  and,  exploring  the  coast 
as  best  it  could,  made  for  Monterey  and  reached  there  on 
October  7.  Neither  vessel  had  found  any  Russians.  Ayala 
in  the  San  Carlos  had  in  the  meantime  „made_.  a-,thorougIi 
exgloration  of  San  Francisco  Bay,  and  returned  to  San  Bias 
shortly  before  the  other  two  vessels,  while  Heceta  and  Bodega 
got  there  on  November  20.  The  results  of  these  voyages 
were  set  forth  at  length  by  Bucarely  in  four  letters  of 
November  26,  1775,  to  Arriaga,  all  written  before  he  learned 
of  the  arrival  of  Heceta  and  Bodega  at  San  Bias,  but  based  on 
reports  which  they  had  forwarded  by  Ayala  in  the  San  Carlos, 
In  the  first  he  wrote  generally  of  all  three  voyages,  telling  of 
the  latitude  reached  by  them,  and  of  Ayala's  exploration  of 
San  Francisco  Bay.^^  His  second  letter  dealt  with  the 
voyage  of  Ayala."^^  Among  its  enclosures  was  a  letter  to 
him  from  Ayala,  November  9,  1775,  also  about  San  Francisco 
Bayj  saying  that  it  was  the  best  port  that  he  had.SfifiJX.from 
Cape  Horn  north.^^     The  third  letter  treated  of  Heceta's 

78  C-3032.  7,  1776,  of  the  exploration  of  San,Fran- 

7'  C-3033.  Cisco  Bay,  with  a  description  of  the  bay. 

«» C-3028.   The  other  enclosure  was  a  C-2985. 
report  by  Josfe  de  Cafiizares,  September 


244        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

voyage,^^  and  the  fourth  of  Bodega^s.^^  A  month  later,  on 
December  27,  1775,  Bucarely  informed  Arriaga  of  the  return 
of  Heceta  and  Bodega,  and  recommended  the  commanders 
and  pilots  of  all  the  vessels  engaged  in  the  recent  explora- 
tions.^^ One  of  the  pilots,  whom  Bucarely  had  also  recom- 
mended in  one  of  his  November  26  letters,  was  no  longer 
alive  to  benefit  by  the  royal  favor.  On  the  second  day  out 
from  Monterey,  on  the  voyage  back  to  San  Bias,  there  had 
occurred  the  death  of  Juan  P^rez,  This  news  was  conveyed 
by  the  same  mail  of  December  27.^^  The  promotions  rec- 
ommended were  shortly  afterward  authorized. ^^ 

To  return  to  the  status  of  opinion  in  Spain :  Doz's  able 
and  complacent  view  of  the  situation  in  comparing  the 
P6rez  voyage  with  those  of  the  Russians  may  well  have 
lulled  Arriaga  into  a  feeling  of  security.  Lacy  in  Russia 
was  far  from  that  state  of  mind,  however,  and  now  bombarded 
Grimaldi  with  a  fresh  series  of  letters  about  Russian  activi- 
ties in  the  Pacific.  No  evidence  has  come  to  hand  to  show 
that  his  communications  were  ever  forwarded  to  Bucarely, 
but  they  did  reach  Arriaga.  They  will  therefore  be  re- 
corded here. 

In  a  letter  dated  April  31  [sic],  1775,  Lacy  wrote  Grimaldi 
that  Perez's  voyage  was  causing  some  uneasiness  at  the 
Russian  court.  If  the  Spanish  ships  were  approaching 
Kamchatka,  he  suggested  that  they  get  in  touch  with  the 
Chukchis,  a  people  whom  the  Russians  had  not  been  able 
to  conquer,  whose  hatred  for  the  Russians  was  so  great 
that  they  would  be  likely  to  give  information  to  the  Span- 
iards.^^ In  a  communication  dated  May  1,  1775,  Lacy 
enclosed  a  document  tending  to  confirm  what  he  had  said 
previously  concerning  Russian  commerce  and  discoveries 

81  C-3034.     This  enclosed  a  number  Heceta  and  Bodega  in  taking  possession 

of    documents    forwarded    by    Heceta  for  Spain  of  places  where  they  landed, 

from  Monterey.     C-2816,  2967,  3003-5.  with  maps  of  the  ports  entered.     Most 

8*  C-3035.     An  account   by  Bodega  of  these  documents  enclosed  in  these 

was    enclosed.     Bodega    to    Bucarely,  two  letters  are  to  be  found  in  A.G.I. , 

Oct.  13,  1775.     C-3006.  Estado,  Aud.  Mex.,  legajo  19. 

83  C-3057.     With  this  letter  he  for-  »*  C-3062. 

warded  the  diaries  kept  by  the  com-  ^  Gdlvez  to  Bucarely,  Feb.  28,  1776. 

mander,    pilot,    and    chaplain   of   each  C-3157. 
ship.     Another  letter  of  the  same  date,  »«  C-2900. 

C-3058,  forwarded  the  official  acts  of 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  245 

in  America.  He  had  also  verified  it  through  the  state- 
ments of  merchants  engaged  in  the  commerce  of  which  the 
document  treated,  and  by  the  most  secret  methods.  Being 
'^very  much  persuaded  that  these  discoveries  cannot  do 
less  than  cause  a  notable  revolution,  in  time,  in  the  com- 
merce of  Europe,"  he  would  continue  to  be  vigilant.  The 
Russian  government  had  learned  of  the  Perez  voyage 
through  an  account  in  the  Leyden  Gazette  of  March  21, 
1775.^^  The  enclosed  document  stated  that  the  Russians 
had  discovered  from  the  north  of  California  to  67°.  In 
1 763  a  company  jQif  jtwenty  Russian  merchants  was  f prrned 
for  trade  with  Kamchatka  and  the  islands  already  discovered 
and  those  to  be  discovered.  This  compaixy;-,had.i/WO^attle- 
ments  in  Kamchatka,  and  had  come  upon  many  populous 
islands  in  1764  and  1766  on  the  western  coast  of  America. 
The  company^s  capital  had  increased  from  10,000  rubles 
in  1763  to  60,000  in  1772,^^  and  the  furs  and  other  products 
obtained  by  this  company  in  1773  ^®  were  valued  at  300,000 
rubles.  Between  1768  and  1773  they  sent  seven  frigates 
to  the  west  coast  of  North  America,  one  in  1768,  two  in  1770, 
one  in  1772,  and  three  in  1773 ;  the  boats  of  1772  and  1773 
had  not  yet  returned.  This  company  had  no  fixed  settle- 
ment  in  America,  but  landed  Cossacks  there  to  hunt.  The 
commerce  of  Kamchatka  bore  a  considerable  relation  to  that 
with  America  and  neighboring  islands,  continued  Lacy, 
and  was  therefore  worthy  of  mention.  In  1755  the  Russian 
trade  in  Kamchatka  did  not  exceed  10,000  rubles  and  it 
had  already  increased  300  per  cent.  They  got  cloth  and 
other  manufactured  goods  from  Russia  and  Siberia.  There 
were  more  than  3000  people  in  Kamchatka  and  dependent 
islands  (exclusive  of  the  newly  discovered  ones  on  the  coast 
of  North  America),  who  paid  tribute  to  the  crown  in  furs 
of  a  total  annual  value  of  more  than  20,000  rubles.^^ 

Two  months  later,  June  26,  1775,  Lacy  forwarded  a  map 
of   Russian   discoveries   in   America,   being   a   copy   made 

^  C-2901.  posed  of  that  year  in  Kamchatka,  for 

88  At  present  a  ruble  is  worth  about  the  boats  of  1773  had  not  yet  returned. 
77  cents.  m  For  the  enclosure,  C-2902. 

8°  Lacy   probably  meant   those   dis- 


246         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH  CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  X 

by  Mtiller,  to  whom  Lacy  referred  as  the  head  of  the  archive 
of  foreign  affairs  in  Russia,  and  a  celebrated  geographer 
of  that  empire.  At  the  same  time  he  enclosed  a  document 
relative  to  those  discoveries,  translated  from  the  Russian 
into  French  by  Miiller,  which  gave  information  of  all  the 
islands  of  the  archipelago  in  that  part  of  the  world.^^  Mul- 
ler^s  note  related  to  the  Russian  discoveries  in  the  Pacific 
between  1764  and  1767.  He  commented  upon  the  general 
awakening  of  European  interest  in  the  Pacific  at  that  time, 
this  being  an  important  period  for  French  and  English 
discoveries  farther  south,  while  Russia  was  discovering 
new  lands  and  inhabited  islands  in  the  north.  The  Russian 
'discoveries  began  with  Ivan  IV  (1533-84),  who  conquered 
Siberia,  and  sent  an  expedition  to  explore  its  northern  and 
eastern  frontiers,  which  returned  in  the  next  reign,  having 
found  the  sea  at  both  points.  Mtiller  had  found  documents 
in  the  Siberian  archives  showing  that  in  a  subsequent  ex- 
ploration along  the  Arctic  coasts,  one  man  reached  Kam- 
chatka. He  must  therefore  have  passed  through  Bering 
Strait.^^  Discoveries  stopped  during  the  troublous  times  of 
the  usurpers,  Boris  and  Demetrius,  but  were  resumed  in 
the  reign  of  Peter  I  (1672-1725).  He  sent  one  body  of 
explorers  along  the  northern  coast  of  Siberia,  and  others 
up  the  eastern  coast  of  Kamchatka  to  see  if  they  would  meet, 
and  to  discover  new  lands  and  islands.  It  was  not  until 
1728,  however,  that  Danadisiki  Bay  in  66°  was  reached,®' 
this  being  accomplished  by  Captain  Bering.  Later,  Chiri- 
kof  reached  the  coast  of  America,  and  Spanberg  discovered 
the  Kurile  Islands,  a  great  archipelago  north  of  Japan.  It 
was  reserved  for  Catherine  II  (1762-96)  to  charter  a  com- 
pany of  Russian  merchants  to  engage  in  commerce  with 
the  new  islands  and  discover  others.  There  were  twelve 
in  this  company,  to  each  of  whom  the  empress  had  given 
a  gold  medal,  while  orders  were  given  to  her  officers  in 
Okhotsk  to  assist  them  in  every  way.  Thus  far,  they  had 
discovered   a  number  of  islands,   from  which   came  their 

»i  C-2944.  "  That  is  to  say,  America  and  Asia 

9*  A     reference,    probably,     to     the       were  proved  to  be  separated. 
Deshnef  expedition,  1648-50. 


1773]  FOREIGN   AGGRESSIONS  247 

principal  profits  in  furs.  In  1764  the  company  sent  out 
ships  from  Okhotsk  under  Lieutenant  Lynd,  who  discovered 
a  number  of  islands  between  56°  and  57°,  returning  late  in 
1767.  As  a  result  a  new  map  was  published  in  1768,  which 
appeared  again  in  the  publications  of  the  Academy  of 
Sciences  of  St.  Petersburg  in  1773.  Mtiller  himself  had 
made  an  even  more  striking  map,  showing  all  of  the  voyages 
and  discoveries  since  the  time  of  Bering,  and  the  size,  posi- 
tion, and  in  part  the  names  of  the  islands.  As  regards 
products,  dress,  and  speech,  the  islands  and  their  inhabitants 
between  50°  and  55°  resembled  those  of  the  Kurile  Islands ; 
between  55°  and  60°  the  people  almost  exactly  resembled 
the  natives  of  Kamchatka ;  between  60°  and  70°  they  differed 
a  little  from  the  other  sections.  In  all  of  these  islands  the 
people  were  very  much  like  those  discovered  by  the  English 
and  French  in  the  middle  of  the  Pacific.  Beyond  the 
islands  discovered  were  others  not  yet  occupied  by  the  Rus- 
sian argonauts,  but  a  number  of  ships  sent  out  in  recent  years 
had  not  yet  returned.  The  present  commander  in  Kam- 
chatka, Timafey  Tschemalow  (Chemaloff)  had  1120  men 
under  his  orders,  as  follows :  300  soldiers ;  706  natives  of 
Kamchatka;  and  114  men  in  some  of  the  Kuriles.  A 
certain  major,  of  Polish  origin,  in  the  government  mining 
service  of  Siberia  had  informed  Mtiller  that  the  Russians 
had  no  settlements  on  the  American  coasts,  although  they 
were  sending  some  vessels  there  every  year,  as  well  as  to  the 
new  archipelago  .^^ 

These  letters  of  Lacy  were  forwarded  to  Arriaga  by 
Grimaldi  in  letters  respectively  of  October  4,^^  and  October 
21,  1775.^^  It  is  strange  if  no  copies  were  forwarded  to 
Bucarely ;  if  they  were  not,  it  is  evidence  of  a  lack  of  anxiety 
on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  government ;  if  they  were,  Bu- 
carely seems  not  to  have  become  excited,  or  otherwise,  some 
hint  would  have  appeared  in  his  letters  on  kindred  matters. 

With  the  return  of  Heceta  and  Bodega,  whatever  crisis 
there  was  had  passed.  Other  voyages  were  planned,  as 
will  be  pointed  out,  but  they  were  not  to  be  made  until  the 

.     »*C-2945.  '8C-3002.  »•  C-3014. 


248         THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  X 

situation  had  completely  changed.  In  January^  1776, 
Julidn  de  Arriaga  died,  and  was  succeeded  as  ministro 
general  by  Jos6  de  Gdlvez.  Great  as  the  latter  had  been  as 
visitddor,  he  was  not  to  succeed  equally  well,  in  New  Spain 
at  any  rate,  as  ministro  general.  His  promotion  meant  the 
virtual  removal  of  Bucarely  from  the  direction  of  frontier 
affairs.  Although  this  did  not  take  effect  until  the  end  of 
1776,  that  year  marks  a  transition  to  a  later  period,  as  re- 
gards the  northwest  voyages,  rather  than  the  culmination 
of  Bucarely's  work.  Discussion  of  such  events  for  1776, 
therefore,  belongs  more  appropriately  to  that  part  of  this 
work  which  introduces  the  new  regime. 


CHAPTER  XI 

SPANISH  ATTENTION  TO  LOCAL  PROBLEMS  OF  THE 

CALiFORNiAs;  1773-1775 

BucARELY^s  work  of  a  more  local  character  concerning 
the  Californias  may  be  grouped  under  two  principal  heads : 
the  remission  of  supplies;  and  the  matter  of  forming  a 
reglamento  for  the  Californiag.  As  to  the  first,  it  will  be 
shown  that  Bucarely's  care  and  foresight  narrowly  averted 
a  possible  failure  of  the  Alta  California  establishments. 
As  to  the  second,  a  provisional  reglamento  was  formed, 
which  with  some  modifications  was  to  endure  a  number  of 
years,  although  at  no  time  considered  adequate.  It  was 
sufiicient,  however,  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos.  The  matter 
of  the  reglamento  occupied  considerable  attention  of  the 
Council  of  the  Indies,  being  complicated  by  a  consider- 
ation of  Bucarely's  division  of  the  Californias  between  the 
Franciscans  and  the  Dominicans.  Most  active  in  the 
discussion  was  Jos6  de  Gdlvez,  whose  opinions  were  able  to 
sway  the  Council.  He  opposed  the  division,  and  planned 
a  most  ambitious  programme  of  northwestward  advance, 
the  central  idea  being  the  development  and  consequent 
strengthening  of  the  Californias,  so  that  they  might  serve  as  a 
secure  bulwark  for  New  Spain.  In  most  respects  he  recom- 
mended sustaining  Bucarely^s  action,  and  this  was  the  only 
practical  result  of  his  plans.  The  Californias  remained  di- 
vided, and  Galvez's  plans  seem  not  to  have  been  put  into 
full  effect.  Bucarely's  measures,  however,  were  working 
toward  the  same  end. 


One  of  the  most  important  factors  in  the  preservation  of 
the  j^lta  California  establishments  was  that  of  the  annual^ 

249  '  ^ 


250       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

visit  of  the  supply-ships  from  San  Bias.  An  overland  route 
was  necessary,  for  the  use  of  animals  and  settlers,  and  was 
contemplated  for  the  sending  of  food-supplies  as  well,  but 
as  regards  goods  and  effects  the  San  Bias  boats  were  for 
many  years  practically  the  sole  support  of  the  province. 
In  the  period  treated  here  they  were  also  the  chief  resort 
for  food-supplies.  If  the  overland  route  was  a  vital  neces- 
sity in  order  to  establish  the  province  on  a  permanent  basis, 
so  also  were  these  ships,  without  which  Alta  California  must 
certainly  have  been  abandoned. 

As  already  noted,  Alta  California  was  barely  saved  in 
1770,  and  again  in  1772,  by  the  timely  arrival  of  supplies 
from  San  Bias.  The  same  thing  was  to  occur  for  the  third 
time  in  1774.  Bucarely  informed  Arriaga,  June  26,  1773, 
of  the  departure  of  the  San  Carlos  with  provisions  for  San 
Diego  and  Monterey.  He  planned  to  send  another  ship 
in  November,  although  he  understood  that  the  Californias 
were  already  well  provided  with  supplies.^  A  month  later, 
July  27,  1773,  when  he  had  already  received  some  of  the 
reports  about  the  Californias  that  he  had  asked  for,  he 
wrote  of  new  arrangements  that  he  had  made  for  the  voy- 
ages, the  difficulty  of  navigation  from  the  mainland  to  both 
Alta  and  Baja  California  having  caused  him  to  seek  a 
remedy.  From  reports  made  to  him  he  had  learned  that 
December  or  the  beginning  of  January  was  the  best  season 
for  voyages  to  Monterey,  all  the  year  except  April  to  the 
middle  of  June  for  the  voyage  to  San  Diego,  and  all  the 
year,  but  especially  January,  for  those  to  Loreto.  San 
Bias  was  too  hot  and  damp  a  place  in  which  to  store  maize, 
which  formed  the  principal  part  of  the  supplies  for  the 
Californias,  without  exposing  it  to  risk  of  damage,  where- 
fore as  crops  were  gathered  in  January,  it  would  be  best  to 
put  them  aboard  direct.  The  rest  of  the  cargo  could  be 
gathered  beforehand.  Bucarely  had  given  orders  in  accord 
with  these  conclusions,  making  provision  also  that  boats 
should  leave  San  Bias  in  January,  if  possible,  or  early  in 
February,  at  latest.     This  was  to  be  not  only  for  the  year 

1  C-2304.     Approved  in  C-2405. 


1773]  LOCAL  PROBLEMS   OF   THE   CALIFORNIAS  251 

1774,  but  also  for  ensuing  years.^  For  these  reasons  and 
also  because  of  Bucarely's  belief  that  the  Californias  had 
abundant  supplies,  the  November  ship  was  not  sent.  Writ- 
ing to  Arriaga,  September  26,  1773,  he  said  that  the  San 
Carlos  had  been  unable  to  make  the  voyage  to  Alta  Cali- 
fornia on  account  of  the  storms  that  it  encountered  in  at- 
tempting to  round  Cape  San  Lucas.  Having  lost  its  rud- 
der and  sprung  a  leak,  it  put  in  at  Loreto,  discharged  its 
cargo  there,  and  returned  to  San  Bias  for  repairs.  This 
would  have  caused  him  anxiety  over  the  needs  of  Alta  Cali- 
fornia, had  it  not  been  that  the  pilots  and  the  commissary, 
Campo,  informed  him  that  Governor  Barry  had  offered  to 
supply  the  northern  establishments  by  land  with  as  much 
as  they  needed.  Moreover,  he  had  heard  from  Fages  that 
there  was  already  enough  to  last  for  the  rest  of  the  year 
1773.^  Shortly  afterward,  Bucarely  was  confirmed  in  his 
belief  that  all  was  going  well  by  a  letter  from  Father  Verger 
announcing  progress  in  Alta  California,  saying  that  crops 
were  good,  and  that  many  converts  were  being  obtained,^ 
which  news  Bucarely  in  turn  transmitted  to  Arriaga, 
November  26,  1773.^ 

On  January  27,  1774,  Bucarely  wrote  to  Arriaga  that 
Perez  in  the  Santiago  had  probably  started  already  on 
his  voyage  of  exploration  to  the  northwest.  Francisco 
Hijosa,  who  had  become  the  commissary  at  San  Bias,  had 
written  to  him  on  January  5,  that  the  boat  was  provisioned 
for  a  year,  in  addition  to  supplies  that  it  was  carrying  to 
Monterey.  In  order  to  provide  for  every  possible  contin- 
gency, with  Perez's  needs  particularly  in  mind,  Bucarely 
had  ordered  the  Principe  to  sail  for  San  Diego  and  Mon- 
terey as  soon  as  possible  with  more  provisions,®  and  on 
April  26,  1774,  he  was  able  to  announce  that  it  had  sailed 
on  March  21.  It  had  been  delayed  for  repairs  necessi- 
tated by  the  size  of  cargo  that  it  was  to  carry ;  for,  not  only 
was  it  to  bear  supplies  for  the  missions  and  presidios  of  Alta 
California,  but  also  a  copious  store  for  the  Santiago,  in  case 

2  C-2332.     Approved  in  C-2447.  *  C-2425 

» C-2396.  8  C-2441.  « C-2521 . 


i 


252        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

that  boat  should  be  obHged  to  put  back  from  its  northwest- 
ward voyage,  or  for  its  use  when  it  should  return.  Bu- 
carely  had  ordered  the  repairs  to  be  made  promptly,  so  that 
the  Frinci'pe  might  sail  before  the  season  of  good  weather 
should  pass.  Hijosa's  letter  of  March  24  telling  of  its  de- 
parture reported  it  to  be  laden  with  as  much  provisions  as 
it  could  carry ;  so  Bucarely  felt  sure  that  there  would  be 
enough  to  supply  Alta  California  for  many  months,  and 
to  help  Perez's  expedition,  if  needed.^  In  forwarding  Pa- 
lou's  report  of  December  10,  1773,  on  the  status  of  the  Alta 
California  missions,  Bucarely  wrote  Arriaga,  May  27,  1774, 
that  he  was  much  pleased  with  the  progress  of  conversions, 
and  manifested  a  belief  that  much  more  might  be  expected, 
since  the  natives  were  so  numerous  and  the  lands  so  fertile. 
The  greatest  obstacle  had  been  a  lack  of  provisions  with 
which  to  maintain  the  Indians  at  the  missions  during  the 
period  of  instruction.  This  lack  should  be  remedied  in  a 
measure  by  the  provisions  in  the  Santiago  and  Principe^  as 
also  by  the  crops  of  Alta  California.  The  anxiety  of  the 
missionaries  should  be  relieved  by  the  arrival  of  Serra,  for 
he  had  been  told  that  the  needs  of  the  missions  would  be  sup- 
plied.^ In  another  letter  of  the  same  date,  Bucarely  stated 
that  he  had  ordered  a  new  keel  laid  at  San  Bias,  because  it 
was  too  great  a  risk  to  rely  on  the  frigate  and  two  packet- 
boats  for  the  Alta  Cahfornia  voyages.^  It  may  be  ob- 
served that  the  Palou  memorial  had  not  spoken  of 
the  danger  of  famine,  although  emphasizing  the  need  for 
supplies. 

While  Bucarely  rested  secure  in  the  belief  that  Barry 
would  forward  to  Alta  California  the  provisions  which  the 
San  Carlos  had  left  at  Loreto,  no  such  thing  had  in  fact 
occurred,  for  lack  of  the  means  to  convey  them.  As  a 
result,  the  new  establishments  had  to  endure  the_j£orgt 
famine  of  their  history,  lasting  eight  months,  during  which 
time  milk  had  to  serve  as  the  principal  aliment  of  the  col- 
onies. ^°    At  length,  the  Santiago  reached  San  Diego,  March 

">  C-2608.  9  C-2624. 

8  C-2625.  10  Palou,  Vida,  153. 


1773]  LOCAL  PROBLEMS   OF   THE   CALIFORNIAS  253 

.13,  1774,  and  was  able  to  leave  provisions  enough  to  tide 
over  the  situation  until  the  arrival  of  the  Principe.  Other 
missions  had  to  wait  several  weeks  longer,  until  the  pro- 
visions could  be  distributed  from  San  Diego  and  Monterey, 
to  which  latter  port  P6rez  arrived  on  May  9.  To  make 
clear  just  how  serious  were  the  straits  to  which  the  settle- 
ments had  been  reduced  it  will  be  well  to  quote  some  docu- 
ments of  the  period.  Writing  from  San  Gabriel,  April  10, 
1774,  Anza  told  Bucarely  that  he  had  found  a  shortage  of 
rations  at  that  mission,  although  it  was  accounted  the 
richest  site  in  Alta  California.  Herbs  and  three  tortillas 
apiece  daily  were  all  that  was  to  be  had  in  the  way  of  food 
at  that  time.^^  Anza  was  himself  in  great  need  of  provi- 
sions, but  he  was  able  to  get  little  at  San  Gabriel. -^^  He, 
therefore,  sent  to  San  Diego  for  some,  and  procured  a 
supply,  the  Santiago  being  still  at  that  port.^^  Equally 
bad  were  conditions  as  regards  food  supply  at  the  other 
missions. ^^  Nor  was  the  want  in  Alta  California  solely  a 
matter  of  food.  This  appears,  for  example,  in  the  letters 
of  Father  Lasu^n  of  San  Gabriel  to  Franciscans  at  the 
College  of  San  Fernando.  Lasuen  had  hoped  to  return  there, 
but  was  resigned  to  staying  in  Alta  California,  if  required 
to  do  so.  He  begged  to  be  relieved,  however,  from  the 
great  hardship  that  he  was  suffering  for  lack  of  wearing  'ff 
apparel,  which  had  already  reached  the  point  of  indecency.  ^"^ 
His  clothes  had  been  in  continuous  use  for  more  than  five 
years.  He  had  mended  them,  until  they  no  longer  ad- 
mitted of  it,  and  moreover,  he  no  longer  had  materials  for 
sewing. ^^  In  another  letter  of  the  same  date,  April  23, 
1774,  Lasuen  repeated  the  story  of  his  needs.  Perhaps  it 
was  on  that  account,  he  said,  that  the  Indians  cared  for 
him  so  much,  on  the  principle  that  like  attracts  like,  for  he 
resembled  them  much  in  scantiness  of  wardrobe.^^     Writ- 

"  C-2603.  148 ;     correspondence    and    diaries    of 

1'  Palou,    Noticias,   III,     158,     says  Anza,  Diaz,  and  Garces. 
that  an  animal  was  killed  to  provide  »5  Lasuen  to  the  Father  Superior  of 

Anza  with  meat,  but  that  the  mission  San    Fernando,  Apr.  23,  1774.     M.N., 

could  give  him  nothing  else.  Doc.  Rel.  Mis.  CaL,  v.  II. 

13  Vald6s,  Declaration,  C-2648  ;  Anza,  i«  Lasuen  to  Pangua,  Apr.  23,  1774. 

Diary,  C-2602.  Ibid. 

'» Palou,   Vida,   158;    Noticias,   III, 


i. 


ii 


254        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

ing  a  general  letter  to  his  brethren  of  San  Fernando,  May  2, 
1774,  Lasuen  said  that  Fathers  Garces  and  Diaz  of  the 
Anza  expedition  had  given  him  clothing,  which  would 
cover  his  nudity  for  several  months ;  the  former  gave  him 
a  thin  flannel  undergarment  and  cowl,  and  the  latter  a 
tunic  and  a  pair  of  sandals.^^  Two  letters  from  Rivera 
(successor  of  Fages)  to  Bucarely,  June  16,  1774,  show  a 
ladk.of„nnlitaij'  equipment  and  other  necessaries  at  the  pre- 
sidios. In  one  oT  these  letters  he  wrote  that  the  forces  at 
San  Diego  were  in  need  of  thirty  guns,^^  twenty  small  swords, 
twenty  knives,  two  cases  of  powder,  one  case  of  balls,  one 
case  of  munitions,  and  two  packs  of  tobacco.  Monterey 
required  twenty  small  swords,  twenty  knives,  two  cases  of 
balls,  one  case  of  munitions,  two  cases  of  powder,  and 
thirty  guns.  He  wanted  the  guns  to  be  examined  before 
sent,  to  make  sure  they  were  good.^^  In  the  other  letter  he 
complained  that  the  things  forwarded  from  San  Bias  were 
not  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  province.  Articles  asked  for 
were  not  sent,  leaving  the  men  entirely  lacking  in  some 
things  that  they  needed,  for  which  they  had  no  other  re- 
course, for  example,  in  the  matter  of  clothes.  No  carduroy 
had  been  sent,  although  the  soldiers  liked  to  use  it  because 
of  its  durability;  nor  had  there  been  sent  a  cake  of 
soap  or  a  handful  of  Jbob-aciSi^  There  was  a  great  need  for 
guns  and  smjill_  swpjd^-  Some  soldiers  entirely  lacked 
arms ;  others  had  the  gun,  but  not  the  sword,  or  vice 
versa. ^° 

Rivera's  requests  were  considered  in  connection  with  the 
authorizing  of  a  second  Anza  expedition,  and  Lasu^n's 
were  a  matter  between  him  and  his  college.  The  general 
scarcity,  however,  especially  in  food  supplies,  was  met  by 
the  arrival  of  the  Santiago,  followed  a  little  later  by  the 
Principe.  Thenceforth,  Alta  California. did  not  again  suf- 
fer in  that  respect.^^     Her  relief  had  come  not  only  from 

"  Lasu6n    to  Franciscans    of    San  cavalrymen   employed,    and   it   hardly 

Fernando,  May  2,  1774.    Ibid.  seems    likely    that    "shot-gun"    would 

^8  The  word    escopeta  is    equivalent  be  an  accurate  rendering, 
to-day    to    "shot-gun."     In  the  latter  i"  In  C-2496. 

eighteenth   century   it   seems   to   have  ^  In  C-2496, 

been  used  generally  for  such  guns  as  21  Palou,  Vida,  158-59. 


1773]  LOCAL   PROBLEMS   OF   THE    CALIFORNIAS  255 

Bucarely's  foresight  in  sending  the  well-filled  Santiago  and 
the  Principej  in  the  face  of  favorable  reports  as  to  the 
situation  in  Alta  California,  but  also  because  Bucarely 
never  allowed  of  a  relapse  once  he  got  actual  information 
of  the  state  of  affairs  there. 

As  already  noted,  Bucarely  learned  from  Anza  of  the 
scarcity  of  provisions  in  Alta  California.  Writing  to 
Arriaga,  August  27,  1774,  he  expressed  an  opinion  that  the 
cargoes  of  the  Santiago  and  the  Principe  would  relieve  the 
immediate  need.  He  realized  that  tlie  question  of  sup- 
plies was  one  of  considerable  importance,  as  the  ports  of 
Alta  California  might  serve  to  shelter  and  assist  the  boats 
engaged  in  northward  exploration.  It  would  be  of  great 
advantage  to  the  royal  treasury  if  the  inhabitants  might  be 
given  the  means  of  sustaining  themselves  by  their  own 
industry.  Hijosa  had  been  ordered  repeatedly  to  gather 
provisions  at  San  Bias  for  their  aid,  and  to  this  end  he  was 
then  repairing  two  boats,  which  were  to  sail  within  a  short 
time,  one  after  the  other.^^  A  month  later,  Bucarely  was 
able  to  say  that  Alta  California's  extreme  need  had  been 
successfully  met.  The  provisions  of  the  Santiago  had 
reached  Alta  California  in  time  to  relieve  the  sufferings  of 
the  missions,  but  they  would  not  have  done  so,  had  it  not 
been  for  the  successful  voyage  of  the  Principe,  which  reached 
Monterey  June  8,  three  days  before  the  Santiago  sailed. 
These  provisions  and  the  fertility  of  the  soil  would- thfiJice- 
forth  Jnsure  the  permanence  of  the  cofonies,  and  permit  of 
further  conquesl^s.  "Huch  conquests  would  be  easy,  because 
of  the  docilitv  of  the  Indians,  if  there  were  provisions  enough 
to  furnish  them,  for  in  that  lay  their  attraction  to  vassalage 
and  a  knowledge  of  the  faith.  Rivera  and  Serra  reported 
that  all  were  content.  The  Principe  got  back  to  San  Bias 
on  August  30,  and  Bucarely  had  acquiesced  in  repairs 
proposed  by  Hijosa,  tending  to  protect  provisions  from 
water ;  Bucarely  realized  the  importance  of  sending  sup- 
plies to  Alta  California,  not  only  for  its  own  subsistence, 
but    also   as   stores   for   P^rez,  in  case    of   accident.     He 

«  C-2706. 


256        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

had  therefore  suggested  to  Hijosa  that  he  repair  another 
ship,  and  send  the  two  with  provisions  in  the  coming 
January.^^ 

Bucarely's  plans  matured,  so  that  by  February  1,  1775, 
the  Principe  left  San  Bias  with  provisions  for  San  Diego. 
Due  to  the  severity  of  storms  it  took  seventy  days  to  make 
the  voyage,  whereas  the  return  occupied  but  thirteen.  May 
9  to  22.  Quiros,  the  commander,  reported  that  he  saw  the 
Indians  of  a  whole  village  who  had  come  to  San  Diego  to 
ask  for  baptism,  but  it  was  denied  them  because  there  were 
not  provisions  enough  to  maintain  all.  It  was  believed, 
however,  that  the  crops  would  be  sufficient  for  their  main- 
tenance, despite  the  scant  rainfall  at  San  Diego. ^^  The 
San  Carlos  under  Manrique  had  tried  to  leave  with  the 
Principe,  being  destined  for  Monterey  with  provisions,  but 
it  ran  aground  in  the  port  of  San  Bias  itself.  After  getting 
it  free,  the  officials  of  San  Bias  wished  to  unload,  in  order 
to  see  what  damage  it  had  suffered,  which  would  have  held 
back  the  voyage  until  March,  but  Bucarely  ordered  that 
it  be  reloaded  with  provisions  for  the  families  who  were 
to  go  with  Anza  to  found  a  settlement  at  San  Francisco. 
The  rest  were  to  be  left  for  the  Santiago,  in  case  there  should 
be  room  for  them  in  addition  to  those  to  be  carried  for  its 
own  crew  in  the  new  voyage  of  discovery  that  it  was  about 
to  make.  On  February  24,  1775,  the  date  of  his  letter  to 
Arriaga,  Bucarely  had  not  yet  heard  whether  such  an  ar- 
rangement was  possible.^^  The  San  Carlos  was  in  fact  de- 
layed until  March  16,  1775,  when  it  set  sail,  accompanied 
/by  the  Santiago  and  Sonora,  which  were  to  make  further 
explorations  in  the  far  northwest.  This  time,  the  voyage  of 
the  San  Carlos  was  a  success,  for  it  delivered  the  provisions 
consigned  to  Monterey,  was  employed  in  exploring  San 
Francisco  Bay,  and  at  length  returned  to  San  Blas.^^  Early 
in  1776  Bucarely  again  sent  two  provision  ships  to  Alta 

23  C-2719.  Bancroft,    Cal.,    I,    241,    says  that  the 

"  Bucarely    to    Arriaga,     June     26,  San  Antonio  or  Principe  left  San  Bias 

1775.     C-2935.  on  March  16.     This  is  an  error. 

25C-2857.     This    letter  states    that  2' Bucarely    to    Arriaga,    Nov.     26, 

the  Principe  had  left  on  January  31.  1775.     C-3033. 

In  C-2935  it  is  given  as  February  1. 


1773]  LOCAL  PROBLEMS   OF   THE    CALIFORNIAS  257 

California,  the  San  Carlos  and  the  Principe?'^  In  August  of  /"^V  ^ 
that  year  Galvez,  who  had  succeeded  Arriaga,  instituted 
the  comandancia  general  placing  all  of  the  frontier  prov- 
inces, "including  the  Californias,  under  a  separate  govern- 
ment from  that  of  the  viceroy,  but  he  required  that  the 
viceroy  should  continue  to  handle  the  matter  of  the  supply-  ■ 
ships  from  San  Bias  to  the  Calif ornias,^^  a  fortunate  chance, 
very  likely,  as  the  comandancia  general  was  not  a  glittering 
success  in  other  respects.  Thus,  Bucarely  informed  Gdlvez, 
April  26,  1777,  that  the  Santiago  and  Principe  had  set  sail 
with  an  abundance  of  provisions  and  effects  for  Alta  Cali- 
fornia, as  also  the  San  Carlos  for  Baja  California.^*  Further 
than  this  we  need  not  pursue  this  matter  at  this  point,  al- 
though more  will  be  said  later,^^  nor  has  it  been  thought 
necessary  to  give  in  equal  detail  the  measures  for  supplying 
Baja  California.     It  seems  reasonably  clear  that  l^he  CalLr 

fornias  owed  much  to  Bucarely  for  his  a  tt en  t%|}    %c)   thfi 

supply-ships,  and  that  under  a  less  painstaking  and  watchful 
viceroy  disaster  might  have  come  to  the  new  settlements 
before  they  had  a  fair  chance  to  become  firmly  established. 
As  will  be  pointed  out  hereafter,  the  material  needs  of  Alta 
California  were  a  matter  that  occupied  a  large  share  of  the 
viceroy's  attention,  nothing  in  the  affairs  of  the  province 
being  regarded  by  him  as  of  equal  importance.^^ 

Some  of  the  action  taken  with  a  view  to  forming  a  regla- 
mentOj  notably  two  memorials  by  Serra  and  the  temporary 
arrangement  dividing  the  Californias  between  the  Do- 
minicans and  Franciscans,  has  been  discussed  in  another 
connection. ^^  A  provisional  recflamento  was  drawn  up  by 
Juan  Jose  de  Echeveste,  at  that  time  purchasing  agent  for  ^ — 
the  Califojffiias^n  Mexico  City,  the  document  being  dated 
May  19,Q77jy  This  is  the  document  which  it  became  the 

27  Bucarely   to    Arriaga,     Mar.     27,  184-94),    I    covered    substantially    the 

1776.     C-3185.  same  ground  as  that  given  here. 

«  The  king  (by  G&lvez)  to  Teodoro  "  In  chap,  V.     It  should  be  remem- 

de  Croix,  Aug.  22,  1776.     C-3293.  bered  that  the  Palou  report,  considered 

29  C-3532,  with  one  of  Serra' s  in  chapter  five,  was 

30  In  chap.  XVI.  not  before  the  junta  at  this  time,  but 

31  In    an    article  entitled    The    Alta  was  of  later  date,  when  conditions  in 
California  supply-ships,  1 773-76  (South-  Alta  California  had  improved. 
western     historical     quarterly,     XIX, 

S 


258        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

habit  to  call  the  reglamento  provisional,  being  accompanied 
in  later  usage  by  the  opinion  of  the  junta  and  the  decision  of 
the  viceroy,  modifying  it  in  some  particulars.  It  is  hardly 
what  we  would  expect  a  formal  instrument  of  government 
to  be,  having  numerous  paragraphs  of  a  temporary  char- 
acter, as  well  as  the  style  of  a  recommendation  for  legis- 
lation. It  begins  with  an  estimate  of  the  number  of  men 
and  the  cost  each  year  of  the  Californias  and  San  Bias. 
For  the  two  presidios  and  five  missions  of  Alt  a  California 
Echeveste  figured  an  estabhshment  of  eighty-two  military 
men  and  fourteen  others,  not  including  the  missionaries.^^ 
The  salary  roll  would  amount  to  38,985  pesos  a  year,  but 
would  in  fact  require  an  outlay  of  only  15,594  pesos,  as  all 
but  the  officers  were  to  be  paid  in  clothing  and  effects  at 
an  advance  of  150  per  cent,  to  cover  the  extra  cost  [especially 
of  transportation]  to  the  royal  treasury.  For  Baja  Califor- 
nia there  were  to  be  thirty-seven  men,  all  military  but  one, 
the  commissary,  at  an  annual  cost  of  16,450  pesos.  As  all 
but  the  governor  and  commissary  were  to  be  paid  in  effects 
at  an  advance  of  100  per  cent,  the  actual  sum  required  was 
to  be  10,975  pesos.^^  The  Department  of  San  Bias  was 
considered  under  three  heads :  the  department  proper, 
including  the  clerical,  warehouse,  and  church  officials ; 
the  arsenal  or  ship-yard ;  and  the  fleet.  The  first  named 
should  cost  8691  pesos,  4  tontines,  6  granos,  including  annual 
rations  for  127  men  in  the  Californias ;  ^^  the  second,  12,355 
pesos,  2  tontines,  6  granos,  mostly  for  repairs  to  ships ;  the 
third,  34,037  pesos,  5   tomines.^^     In  addition,  2000  pesos 

^  The   men  required  were   the   fol-  mule-drivers    at    Monterey    were    left 

lowing :    at    Monterey,    a    captain,    a  out,  this  would  account  for  the  entire 

sergeant,    two     corporals,    twenty-two  Spanish    establishment    of     the    Cali- 

Boldiers,  -  two    carpenters,    two    black-  fomias. 

smiths,  four  mule-drivers,  and  a  store-  ^  The  men  required  at  San  Bias 
keeper ;  at  San  Diego,  a  lieutenant,  a  were  the  following :  in  the  department 
sergeant,  two  corporals,  twenty-two  proper,  a  commissary,  an  accountant 
soldiers,  two  carpenters,  two  black-  (contador),  a  paymaster  and  store- 
smiths,  and  a  store-keeper ;  at  the  keeper,  three  scribes,  an  amanuensis, 
five  missions,  five  corporals,  and  twenty-  a  chaplain,  and  a  sacristan ;  at  the 
five  soldiers.  arsenal,     a    master-workman     (mcestro 

34  The  men  required  for  Baja  Cali-  mayor),  a    cooper,  a   rope-maker    (cor- 

fornia   were   the   governor,    a   commis-  chador),    and     a     boatswain;     in     the 

sary,    a   lieutenant,    a   sergeant,    three  fleet:  for   the    frigate,    a    captain    and 

corporals,  and  thirty  soldiers.  pilot,   a  second   pilot,   a  boatswain,    a 

3*  If  the  missionaries  and   the  four  boatswain's   mate,    a   steward,    a    car- 


1773]  LOCAL   PROBLEMS   OF   THE    CALIFORNIAS  259 

would  be  required  for  the  purchasing  agent  in  Mexico  City. 
Thus  the  total  annual  cost  of  the  Californias  and  San  Bias 
would  be  92,476  pesos,  3  tomines.  To  pay  this  there  was 
the  yearly  subsidy,  of  33,000  pesos,  the  product  of  the  salt- 
mines  near  San  Bias  amounting  to  25,000  pesos,  and  10,000 
pesos  from  the  pious  fund.  The  roy^al  treasury  would 
therefore  have  to  make  up  the  balance,  24,476  pesos,  3 
tomines. 

Then  came  the  reglamento  proper  in  seventeen  numbered 
paragraphs,  from  which  the  following  are  the  principal 
points.  Neither  the  royal  treasury  nor  the  pious  fund 
could  give  more  funds  for  Alta  California  at  the  time; 
therefore,  nojurther  missions  could  be  provided  for,  but  all 
persons  who  wished  to  go  there  should  be  allowed  to  do  so 
in  the  boats  from  San  Bias.     Such  settlers  ought  to  be 


gr ant edj» rations  for  five  years  and  a  sailor's  wages  for  two, 
and  they  could  be  used  in  raising  crops,  thus  relieving  the 
public  treasury  of  expense.  Each  mission  should  get  800 
pesos  a  year,  with  double  rations  to  each  missionary,  includ- 
ing those  awaiting  assignment  to  new  missions.  These 
sums  were  in  addition  to  those  applied  from  the  pious  fund, 
but  they  were  to  stop  in  five  years  and  were  eventually  to 
be  repaid,  for  in  five  years  the  mission  crops  should  be 
sufficient  to  maintain  them.  Salaries  were  to  be  discounted 
50  per  cent  in  Baja  California,  and  60  per  cent  in  Alta  Cali- 
fornia, and  minute  accounts  of  the  cost  of  goods  were  to 
be  kept.^^  The  store-keepers  of  Monterey,  San  Diego, 
Loreto,  and  San  Bias  were  to  make  an  annual  statement  of 
the  effects  needed.  San  Bias  was  not  to  raise  any  crops, 
because  it  was  difficult  to  do  so  there ;  the  provisions  both 
for  San  Bias  and  the  Californias  were  to  be  purchased,  and 
at  the  proper  season,  so  that  they  might  not  suffer  such  dam- 
age as  had  resulted  on  previous  occasions.  As  San  Bias 
was  not  suitable  for  beasts  of  burden,  the  animals  there 

penter,    a   calker,    two   cabin-boys,    six  penter,    a   calker,    two   cabin-boys,    six 

steersmen,     twenty-seven  ship's     boys  steersmen,  ten  ship's  boys,  and  sixteen 

(gurumetes),    and    thirty     sailors;     for  sailors. 

each   of    two    packet-boats,    a    captain  '^  Note  that  salaries  were  to  be  paid 

and  pilot,  a  second  pilot,  a  boatswain,  in  goods. 

a  boatswain's  mate,  a  steward,  a  car- 


260        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

and  their  drivers  should  be  sent  to  Baja  Calif ornia;  and  if 
not  needed  there,  to  Alta  California,  while  the  cattle  of 
San  Bias  should  be  sold.  The  salt  industry  should  be 
managed  by  the  commissary  of  San  Bias,  who  should  also 
keep  detailed  accounts  of  all  the  business  of  the  depart- 
ment. Similarly,  accounts  of  all  effects  received  should 
be  kept  at  Monterey,  San  Diego,  and  Loreto.  The  frigate 
Santiago  and  the  packet-boats  San  Carlos  and  Principe 
should  be  used  as  provision-ships,  and  the  packet-boats 
Concepcion  and  Lauretana,  the  sloop  Pilar,  and  the  schooner 
Sonora  should  be  employed  on  various  commissions  be- 
tween San  Bias  and  Baja  California.  The  agent  in  Mexico 
and  the  commissary  of  San  Bias  should  buy  goods  that 
were  not  only  cheap  but  suitable,  and  after  every  remission 
of  goods,  accounts  should  be  sent  to  Mexico. ^^ 

On  Bucarely's  decree.  May  24,  1773,  the  Echeveste  regla- 
mento  was  sent  to  the  fiscal,  Areche,  for  his  opinion,^^  and  he 
suggested,  June  14,  1773,  that  the  administrators  of  the 
pious  fund  be  asked  to  pay  more  than  the  10,000  pesos 
required  of  them.  He  noted  that  Echeveste  had  failed  to 
provide  for  a  surgeon,  and  had  made  no  allowance  for  the 
cost  of  powder;  clothing,  trappings,  and  arms  might  be 
charged  to  the  soldiers,  but  not  powder.  In  other  respects 
he  approved  of  the  reglamento,  for  it  would  end  the  obscure, 
improper  methods  employed  at  San  Bias,  Loreto,  and 
Monterey,  which  had  been  the  cause  of  the  confusion  in 
reports  from  the  Calif ornias.  In  closing  he  recommended 
that  the  reglamento  be  sent  to  Mangino,  director  general 
of  the  pious  fund,  for  his  opinion,  and  that  it  then  be  brought 
before  a  junta  for  resolution.^^  On  June  17,  Bucarely  or- 
dered the  expediente  sent  to  Mangino. ^^  Replying,  June  19, 
Mangino  stated  that  the  pious  fund  was  contributing 
14,879  pesos,  3  tomines,  6  granos  to  the  missions  of  the 
Calif  ornias  .^^     Moreover,    there    were     extraordinary     ex- 

38  In  C-2106.  five   Alta   California   missions,    besides 

39  Ihid.  1779  pesos,  3  tomines,  6  granos,  for 
-w  Ibid.  their  double  rations,  and  9100  pesos 
«  Ibid.  for  the  thirteen  missions  of  Baja  Cali- 
*^  To  wit,  800  pesos  to  each  of  the       fornia. 


1773]  LOCAL   PROBLEMS   OF   THE    CALIFORNIAS  261 

penses;  for  example,  it  had  cost  6139  pesos,  5  tomines,  9 
granos  to  get  the  Dominicans  for  the  peninsula  from  Vera 
Cruz  to  San  Bias.  Consequently,  it  was  difficult  to  esti- 
mate how  much  the  proceeds  of  the  fund  would  exceed 
expenses,  and  therefore,  concluded  Mangino,  no  additional 
contributions  should  be  asked  from  it.'*^  On  receiving 
Mangino's  report,  Bucarely  issued  a  decree,  June  22,  1773, 
calling  for  a  junta}^  Of  other  matters  that  were  to  come 
before  it,  besides  those  discussed  already,  letters  of  January 
27  and  February  14,  ^773,  from  Campo  of  San  Bias  are 
alone  worthy  of  note.  Campo  complained  that  there  were 
not  enough  funds  even  to  pay  the  wages  of  the  men.^^ 

The  decision  of  the  junta  is  dated  July  8,  1773.  Taking 
the  Echeveste  reglamento  as  a  basis  it  made  the  following 
recommendations.  The  beasts  of  burden  at  San  Bias  should 
be  sold  instead  of  being  sent  to  the  Californias,  as  the  need 
of  that  province  for  such  animals  was  not  clearly  known; 
and  it  would  be  best  to  sell  the  boats  Concepcion,  Lauretana, 
Pilar,  and  Sonora  for  account  of  the  royal  treasury.  The 
annual  sum  provided  by  Echeveste  was  approved,  and  in 
addition  the  amount  needed  for  the  pay  of  a  surgeon.  Funds 
needed  in  San  Bias  should  be  sent  six  months  in  advance. 
The  governor  and  the  commissary  of  the  Californias,  both 
residents  of  Loreto,  might  receive  their  pay  at  Mexico,  and 
therefore  without  discount.  For  the  year  1774  only,  the 
pious  fund  was  to  contribute  10,000  pesos  toward  the  ex- 
penses of  the  Department  of  San  Bias.  Particular  attention 
was  devoted  to  the  methods  of  making  accounts,  and  special 
note  was  taken  of  the  need  for  sending  funds  to  San  Bias  to 
cover  expenses  for  the  rest  of  the  year  1773.  As  thus 
amended  the  Echeveste  reglamento  should  go  into  effect  in 
January,  1774.^^  Bucarely 's  decree  of  July  23  amounted 
to  an  agreement  with  the  junta  until  the  king  should  de- 
cide on  a  new  reglamento.  On  July  27,  1773,  Bucarely 
forwarded  to  Arriaga  the  five  great  testimonios  to  which 
references  have  been  made  bearing  on  San  Bias  and  the 

«  la  C-2106.  «  In  C-2109. 

**  Ibid.  "6  75^. 


262       THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

Calif ornias,  to  which  subject  he  said  that  he  had  devoted 
himself  with  the  most  painstaking  care  ever  since  he  be- 
came viceroy.'*^ 

The  Echeveste  reglamento  and  the  junta^s  decision  should 
be  taken  in  connection  with  the  instructions  to  Rivera, 
August  17,  1773,  when  that  officer  was  about  to  depart  for 
Monterey  to  succeed  Fages.  Several  paragraphs  treat  of 
the  precautions  to  be  taken  against  the  entry  of  any  boats 
other  than  those  from  San  Bias  and  the  Manila  galleon, 
and  others  deal  with  the  advancement  of  spiritual  conquest, 
especially  toward  San  Francisco.  These  paragraphs  are 
taken  up  in  more  detail  in  other  chapters,  to  which  their 
subject-matter  is  more  closely  related.'^*  The  others  may  be 
briefly  summarized  here.  The  provisional  reglamento  and 
the  decision  of  the  junta  of  July  8  were  attached.  Rivera 
was  named  comandante  for  Alta  California,  and  enjoined 
Fo  maintain  harmonious  relations  with  the  religious.  He 
was  to  help  them  to  reduce  the  Indians  to  mission  control, 
and  was  to  see  that  the  latter  were  brought  into  villages,  so 
that  they  might  be  civilized.  Then  follow  several  para- 
graphs about  the  selection  of  sites  for  mission  villages,  and 
details  with  regard  to  the  plan  of  such  settlements.  Rivera 
was  to  remember  that  these  towns  might  ultimately  become 
great  cities  [it  is  noteworthy  that  such  a  possibility  was 
contemplated].  Such  matters  as  water  supply,  trees,  the 
laying  out  of  streets  and  squares  (plazas),  the  raising  of 
cattle,  and  the  planting  of  crops,  he  was  reminded,  should 
command  great  attention,  for  much  depended  on  what  was 
done  at  the  beginning.  Lands  might  be  assigned  to  the 
Indians,  but  they  were  to  live  at  the  missions,  and  simi- 
larly in  the  case  of  Spanish  settlers,  who  were  to  live  in  the 
towns  (pueblos) f  no  scattering  of  habitations  being  per- 
mitted. In  due  season  the  missions  might  be  converted 
into  towns.  In  everything  Rivera  was  to  remember  that 
the  object  of  the  Alta  California  establishments  was  to  ad- 
v^pjce  spiritual  conquest,  and,  in  consequence,  to  achieve 
an  extension  of  the  royal  dominions,  wherefore  he  was  to 

«  C-2331 .  «  In  chapter  X  and  XIV. 


1773]  LOCAL  PROBLEMS   OF   THE   CALIFORNIAS  263 

propose  from  time  to  time  such  measures  as  he  deemed  of 
advantage  to  the  colony.  He  was  to  maintain  discipline, 
punishing  infractions  thereof,  or  sending  incorrigibles  to 
San  Bias,  where  they  should  stay  pending  the  viceroy's 
decision.  This  apphed  to  other  employ^  and  to  settlers, 
as  well  as  to  the  soldiers.  IRivera  was  to  report  to  the  gov- 
ernor  of  the  CaHfornias  [then  stationed  at  Loreto],  but  the 
latter  was^not  io  iiaye  VJSW3T.  to  ch&nge  his  pleasures  [thus 
the  virtual  independence  of  A|ta  from  Baja  California  was 
^^1M§-41I  Communications  with  the  peninsula  were  to  be 
kept  open,  and  Rivera  was  not  to  wait  for  boats  in  all  cases 
by  which  to  forward  his  mail.  Great  care  was  to  be  exer- 
cised not  to  molest  the  Indians  along  the  route  up  the 
peninsula,  and  similarly  in  Alta  California,  especially  when 
on  expeditions  of  discovery.  The  right  to  correct  baptized 
Indians  belonged  to  the  missionaries,  as  to  the  father  of  a 
family,  and  such  had  been  the  decision  of  a  junta  of  May 
6,  1773.  The  pilots  were  to  decide  all  matters  affecting  the 
packet-boats,  even  the  date  of  sailing,  but  they  were  not  to 
carry  any  passengers  without  the  permission  of  the  coman- 
dante  which  was  only  to  be  given  in  very  urgent  cases. 
An  instruction  to  Fages  of  July  26,  1773,  was  mentioned 
as  binding  upon  Rivera,^^  as  also  the  new  reglamento.  Rivera 
was  to  keep  a  diary  of  all  that  occurred  in  Alta  California, 
sending  it  periodically  to  Bucarely.  He  was  also  to  make 
inventories  of  the  artillery,  munitions,  arms,  and  other 
implements  there,  stating  their  condition,  and  was  to  keep 
all  records  and  papers  carefully.^^  Bucarely  forwarded  a 
copy  of  the  instruction  to  Arriaga  on  September  26,  1773. 
Serra  and  Rivera  had  already  started  for  the  Californias, 
he  said,  and  other  officials  were  soon  to  follow,  and  with 
them  Francisco  Hijosa  who  was  to  succeed  Campo  Viergol 
at  San  Blas.^^ 

Arriaga  sought  the  advice  of  Galvez  on  these  policies 

*' I  have  not  found  this  instruction,  "  C-2391.     Bucarely  enclosed  a  list, 

but  it  is   probable   that   it   had   some  drawn  up  by  Melchor  de  Peramds,  of 

relation  to  the  reglamento,  which  Bu-  individuals  appointed  to  military  and 

carely  had  decreed  three  days  before.  financial  employments  in  the  Califor- 

»  C-2350.  nias  and  San  Bias.     C-2392. 


X 


264        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

that  had  been  occupying  the  attention  of  Bucarely.  Gdl- 
vez's  memorials  in  reply  form  a  complete  review  of  the 
situation  by  one  who  -understood  the  conditions,  and  was 
keenly  interested  in  them.  They  in  part  touch  on  matter 
that  might  properly  have  appeared  in  other  chapters,  but 
as  they  bear  primarily  on  matters  discussed  here,  and  are 
so  noteworthy  in  themselves,  it  seems  best  to  take  them  up 
in  detail  at  this  point.  The  first  matter  brought  to  his 
attention  was  that  concerning  the  division  of  the  Calif omias 
between  the  Franciscans  and  the  Dominicans.  On  No- 
vember 6,  1772,  Fray  Juan  de  Dios  de  Cordova  wrote  to 
the  king  saying  that  twenty-seven  Dominicans  had  started 
for  the  Califomias.  In  expectation  of  an  abundant  har- 
vest of  souls  and  to  replace  the  missionaries  who  had  died, 
he  now  asked  for  twelve  more.^^  This  petition  was  acted 
on  by  the  Council  of  the  Indies,  February  6,  1773,  and 
denied  ;  ^^  but  the  request  was  repeated,  this  time  for  twenty 
more,  the  initiative  coming  from  New  Spain,  and  being 
announced  by  Bucarely  in  a  letter  of  May  27,  1773.^^  The 
entire  expediente  about  the  division  of  the  Californias 
was  thereupon  sent  to  Gdlvez,  Qatober  19,  1773.^^  Two 
months  later,  on  Dec^niber  J^S^l  ^ 


In  a  preamble  he  gave  an  account  of  the  missions  of  Alta 
and  Baja  California  and  Pimeria  Alta,  telling  of  the  slow, 
expensive  course  by  which  they  had  been  established  in  the 
past,  and  of  the  good  opportunity  now  for  the  rapid  prog- 
ress of  conversions.  He  criticized  the  division  of  the  Cali- 
fornias, which  had  been  made,  he  said,  with  slight  knowledge 
of  conditions  there,  calling  attention  to  the  interruption  of 
communications  between  Alta  California  and  the  peninsula 
which  was  necessarily  entailed. ^^  He  then  proceeded  to 
make  his  recommendations. 

A  moderate  settlement  should  be  made  on  the  largest  of 
the  Tres  Marias  Islands,  the  one  to  the  northwest,  as  had 

»2  C-2056.  M  C-2161.  criticism,  Bucarely  could  not  justly  be 

"  C-2279.  blamed,  because  he  had  been  ordered 

"  In  C-2906.  by  the  king  to  grant  a  field  in  the  Cali- 

w  Whatever  the  merits  of  Gdlvez's  fornias  to  the  Dominicans.     C-1782. 


1773]  LOCAL   PROBLEMS   OF   THE    CALIFORNIAS  265 

been  recommended  in  other  years  by  Aysa"  and  Sdnchez.^* 
The  garrison  of  Loreto  might  be  placed  there,  for  it  was 
of  no  use  where  it  was,  Loreto  being  almost  in  the  centre  of 
Baja  California,  in  a  region  long  since  reduced.  Certain 
of  the  missions  of  Baja  California  ^^  should  be  given  over  to 
the  secular  clergy  under  the  bishop  of  Guadalajara,  to  whose 
jurisdiction  the  Calif ornias  belonged,  and  the  same  pro- 
cedure should  be  taken  successively  with  the  other  penin- 
sula missions,  thus  freeing  the  pious  funds  now  expended  on 
them.  The  Dominicans  should  engage  in  active  work  of 
conversion  ^°  toward  the  north  in  the  direction  of  the  Col- 
orado River,  leaving  the  coast  of  Alta  California  to  the 
Fernandinos.  Gdlvez  called  attention  to  the  royal  decree 
of  August  19,  1606,  requiring  the  A^ny^^galleon  to  stop  at 
Monterey  on  its  annual  voyage  to  Acapulco,^^  and  ^ug^ 
gesled.JlaadLiljmght^ 

cost  than  under  the  existing  system.  In  1769  Galvez  had" 
caused  fifteen  Sonora  missions  to  be  made  curacies,  but 
secular  clergy  had  not  been  placed  in  charge.  This  ought 
to  be  done,  the  priests  being  named  by  the  bishop  of  Du- 
rango,  in  whose  diocese  the  province  lay.  The  viceroy 
should  be  ordered  to  establish  without  delay  five  missions 
on  the  Sonora  frontier  among  the  Nixores,  Opas,  Yumas, 
and  others  who  lived  at  the  junction  of  the  Gila  and  Col- 
orado rivers  and  in  its  vicinity,  and  he  should  put  them  in 
charge  of  the  Queretaranos  under  the  direction  of  Father 
Garces,  who  had  repeatedly  visited  those  lands  and  tribes. 
Orders  should  be  given  to  Bucarely  to  let  Anza  make  his 
proposed  journey  to  open  a  route  from  Sonora  to  the  Cali- 
fornias,^^  and  he  should  also  arrange,  whenever  he  might 
deem  it  opportune,  for  two  parties  of  cavalry  to  set  out  at 
the  same  time,  one  from  New  Mexico  and  the  other  from 
Monterey,  and  approach  each  other  along  the  same  line  of 

"  Aysa  to  the  king,   Jan.  21,   1743.  *°  The  phrase  is  en  conversiones  vivas* 

C-242.  the  implication  being  that  missionary 

^  Sdnchez  to  the  king,  Mar.  2,  1751.  work  in  Baja  California  was  not  of  an 

C-308.  active  or  "live"  nature. 

*|*  Gdlvez  says,  those  missions  com-  «i  C-15,  16. 

prising  the  first  class  in  the  reglamento  ^  Bucarely   had    already  authorized 

de  Hnodos  of  November  30,  1768.    This  it,  over  two  months  before, 
may  refer  to  C-1118. 


266        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

latitude  until  they  should  meet,  exploring  the  intervening 
lands,  and  noting  their  inhabitants,  products,  rivers,  and 
especially  the  course  of  the  Colorado  River.  The  leaders 
of  these  expeditions  should  make  exact  reports  of  their 
journeys,  so  that  fitting  measures  might  be  based  upon  them. 
Since  converting  the  Indians  to  the  faith  was  of  primary 
importance,  the  viceroy  should  be  ordered  to  avail  himself 
of  the  funds  taken  from  the  expelled  Jesuits  to  establish 
missions  amidst  the  numerous  peoples  of  Alt  a  California, 
the  Sonora  frontier,  and  the  other  provinces  of  the  frontier 
of  New  Spain.  The  royal  treasury  should  not  bear  the  cost, 
as  it  was  already  undergoing  heavy  expense  to  maintain  the 
presidios  and  mission  escorts,  to  the  same  end  of  advancing 
and  sustaining  conversions.^^ 

Long  before  the  Council  arrived  at  a  decision  on  Galvez's 
plans,  his  opinions  were  sought  with  regard  to  the  Cali- 
fornias'  reglamento.  Bucarely^s  letter  of  July  27,  1773, 
with  its  enclosures,  was  forwarded  to  Galvez  by  Arriaga  on 
December  22,^^  and  that  of  September  26  on  January  29, 
1774.^^  Galvez  prepared  a  memorial  covering  both  renaia- 
sions,  and  sent  it  to  Arriaga  under  date  of  March  8,  1774.- 
The  memorial  begins  with  a  consideration  of  terra's  rep- 
resentations of  March  13,  1773,  commenting  only  upon  such 
paragraphs  as  were  "worthy  of  some  notice  or  remark." 
Gdlvez  had  not  heard  whether  Bucarely  had  taken  action 
on  the  proposed  Anza  expedition  from  Tubac  to  Monterey, 
or  on  Serra^s  proposal  of  an  expedition  to  Alta  California 
from  New  Mexico.  He  and  Croix  had  favored  such  proj- 
ects, and  he  thought  that  Bucarely  should  be  charged  to 
aid  in  bringing  about  the  opening  of  communications  from 
both  Sonora  and  New  Mexico,  especially  with  the  ports  of 
Monterey  and  San  Francisco,  which  ought  to  be  made 
secure  at  all  costs.  The  removal  of  Fages,  without  hearing 
from  either  Fages  or  Barry,  he  regarded  as  a  mistake,  but 

w  For  the  whole  memorial,  C-2454.  pointed  out,   conversions  were  desired 

Gdlvez's  words  implying  that  conver-  when  they  served  to  promote  mundane 

sions  were  the  principal  object  of  the  ends, 
government    must    not    be    taken    un-  "  C-2455. 

reservedly  as  he  said  them.     As  already  <»  C-2522.  «« C-2566. 


1773]  LOCAL  PROBLEMS   OF  THE   CALIFORNIAS  267 

as  it  had  in  fact  taken  place,  Fages  might  be  promoted  to 
the  command  of  a  frontier  presidio.  RiYera^„cQjald^  not 
compare  with  Fages  in  spirit,  resolution^  and  mihtary 
^Q^j^lj^^^gi-  where!  oreGdlvez  f  elt^  tEaF  tlievery  important 
Alta  California  establishments  might  be  in  grave  danger, 
since  they  had  to  confront  a  vast  native  population,  and 
were  exposed  to  the  repeated  attempts  of  the  Russians  and 
the  subjects  of  other  powers  who  had  upon  various  occa- 
sions made  land  in  those  seas.  Rivera  had  been  captain  at 
Loreto  in  the  time  of  the  Jesuits,  but  the  work  there  was 
not  difficult.  It  would  be  better  to  let  him  return  to  Lo- 
reto, and  to  send  Barry,  an  experienced  and  warHke  vet- 
eran, to  Monterey^  which  was,  the  principal  military  post 
and  the  most  important  (j^PT^trp^  f)f  the  new  conquest.  G4I- 
vez  did  not  favor  certain  of  Serra's  proposals  relative  to  the 
military  escorts  of  missions,  as  for  example  one  that  each 
missionary  be  allowed  to  choose  a  soldier  to  accompany  him, 
free  from  other  obligations  of  the  service.  This  request 
had,  very  properly,  been  denied,  and  to  have  done  other- 
wise would  have  meant  that  the  soldiers  would  degenerate 
from  their  profession.  He  approved  Serra's  recommen- 
dation of  mixed  marriages,  but  only  by  whites  or  mestizos  ®^ 
with  Indians,  not  by  mulattoes ;  neither  the  reglamento 
nor  the  junta  had  dealt  with  that  point.  Of  Serra's  other 
memorials  ^^  Galvez  said  nothing,  except  to  refer  slightingly 
to  the  Tribunal  de  Cuentas  of  Mexico  for  having  proposed  to 
abandon  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  adding  that  Bucarely 
had  caused  Echeveste  to  draw  up  the  reglamento  instead  of 
the  Tribunal  because  of  the  latter's  lack  of  common  sense 
and  its  incapacity  in  practical  affairs.  The  Department 
of  San  Bias  was  indispensable,  he  said.  Gdlvez  now  took 
up  the  provisional  reglamento y  which  he  felt  should  be  ap- 
proved, except  as  to  a  few  particulars.  Monterey  should 
have  thirty-one  soldiers  instead  of  twenty-five  since  it  was 
the  most  important,~The  most  advanced,  and  the  most 
exposed  point  on  the  northern  frontier  of  the  Pacific.     San 

^  A  mestizo  is   one  whose    blood   is       in  the  expedientes,  but  only  two  have 
part  white  and  part  Indian.  been    treated    in    this    work,    those    of 

«  Four   memorials  of   Serra  appear       March  13  and  May  21,  1773. 


268        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

Diego's  twenty-five  could  be  reduced  to  nineteen.  The 
presidio  of  Loreto  was  useless,  and  there  would  be  no  danger 
if  it  were  left  without  a  garrison ;  at  most  seventeen  sol- 
diers and  Captain  Rivera  would  be  enough,  instead  of  the 
thirty-four  allotted.  The  other  seventeen,  with  a  lieuten- 
ant, should  be  placed  at  Cape  San  Lucas,  which  was  the  most 
exposed  point  of  that  region  and  the  key  to  Baja  California. 
There  lay  the  Bay  of  San  Bernab^,  of  good  depth  and  shel- 
tered from  all  winds  except  those  from  the  southeast.  The 
Manila  galleon  came  to  San  Jose  del  Cabo  every  year,  and 
could  have  no  protection  unless  a  presidio  were  erected  at 
that  very  important  site.  The  salt-mines  of  San  Bias,  if 
well  managed,  would  produce  30,000  pesos  a  year,  and  it 
might  be  worth  while  to  offer  the  manager  a  percentage  of 
the  sales.  Gdlvez  was  opposed  to  the  sale  of  the  four  boats, 
which  the  junta  had  recommended.  They  were  neces- 
sary for  carrying  provisions  from  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  to 
the  peninsula.  Moreover,  in  view  of  a  decree  of  January 
17,  1774,  allowing  freedom  of  trade  between  the  Spanish 
kingdoms  of  the  Pacific,  these  smaller  boats  would  be  very 
useful  for  carrying  Chinese  wares  from  Acapulco  to  the  Gulf 
of  California.  Other  matters  in  the  reglamento  and  the  de- 
cision of  the  juntaj  as  well  as  Bucarely's  instruction  to  Ri- 
vera, should  be  approved.  One  paragraph  of  the  latter, 
however,  would  have  to  be  amended  as  a  result  of  the  free 
trade  decree,  so  as  to  permit  other  Spanish  ships  than  those 
from  San  Bias  and  the  galleons  to  receive  help  in  Alta  Cal- 
ifornia, if  they  should  be  driven  there  by  storm.  This  left 
one  other  matter  upon  which  Galvez  wished  to  speak,  the 
division  of  the  Californias  between  the  Dominicans  and  the 
Fernandinos.  He  and  Croix  had  not  wished  to  have  the 
two  orders  in  the  Californias,  but  Bucarely  had  permitted 
the  Fernandinos  to  be  despoiled  of  Baja  California,  which 
cut  them  off  from  the  peninsula  as  a  base  of  suppliesT  By 
this  measure,' fob,"  inimsters  with  whom  the  Indians  had 
already  become  satisfied  were  removed  from  their  posts  and 
supplanted  by  the  Dominicans.  On  this  matter,  certainly, 
the    decision    should    be    reserved.     As    regarded    all    else 


1773]  LOCAL   PROBLEMS   OF   THE    CALIFORNIAS  269 

Bucarelv  should  be  thankeH  fny  hjj^  p!f>fl1,  solicitude,  and 
activity  in  fomenting  and  aiding  the  useful  establishments 
of^the  Calif orniaS;  for  ffbat  provinp.g--was  a.  Yffntfahlff>'^jJ- 
wark  for  New  Spain  on  the  Pacific.  Gdlvez's  recommenda- 
fion  that  the  decision  as  to  the"3ivision  of  the  Calif ornias  be 
reserved  was  adopted.  Arriaga  wrote  Bucarely  to  that 
effect,  March  21,  1775,  saying  that  the  matter  was  pend- 
ing in  the  Council  of  the  Indies.  As  the  provisional  re- 
glamento  had  been  made  without  the  fullest  information,  the 
king  ordered  Bucarely  to  make  a  new  one,  when  he  should 
become  sufficiently  well  informed,  keeping  specially  in  mind 
the  situation  which  would  result  from  Anza's  expedition.^^ 
Because  statements  were  made  that  the  provisional 
reglamento  was  formed  without  a  sufficient  knowledge  of 
conditions,  it  must  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  any  criticism 
of  Bucarely  was  intended.  The  reglamento  was  only  pro- 
visional or  temporary  by  reason  of  that  very  lack  of  infor- 
mation, and  nobody  realized  this  uncertainty  more  than 
Bucarely  himself.  Almost  a  year  before  Arriaga  wrote 
the  letter  just  referred  to,  Bucarely  had  written  to  him, 
May  27,  1774,  that  a  new  reglamento  would  be  necessary. 
The  provisional  one  had  been  formed  without  the  informa- 
tion embodied  in  Palou's  report  of  December  10,  1773,^° 
and  circumstances  had  changed  as  a  result  of  the  plans  for 
northwestward  voyages  to  verify  the  extent  of  Russian 
explorations,  as  also  by  the  discovery  of  an  overland  route 
from  Sonora  to  the  Californias  by  Anza.  In  the  same  letter 
he  said  that  he  had  informed  the  Dominicans  of  the  abun- 
dant harvest  [of  souls]  awaiting  them  along  the  Colorado 
River,  hoping  to  inspire  them  with  zeal  to  go  there,  and  he 
had  ordered  Barry  to  lend  aid  to  both  orders  in  the  Cali- 
fornias.^^ A  year  later,  replying  to  Arriaga^s  letter  of  March 
21,  1775,  Bucarely  wrote  that  he  would  await  the  issue  of 
certain  events  before  forming  a  new  reglamento.  He  re- 
ferred to  the  northwestward  expeditions  by  land  and  sea, 

®  C-2872.     The   second    expedition  facts  calling  for  a  change  of  reglamento. 
of  Anza  is  referred  to.     The  discovery  ^^  The  Palou  report  has  already  been 

of    a    new   route   by   the   first  expedi-  considered  in  chapter  five, 
tion    was,    however,    one   of   the   new  ^^  C-2625. 


270        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

and  to  the  decision  whether  the  Department  of  San  Bias 
should  be  moved  to  another  port,  since  the  one  at  San  Bias 
was  gradually  filling  in.''^ 

It  was  not  until  May  11,  1775,  that  the  Council  of  the 
Indies  reached  a  decision  concerning  the  division  of  the 
Californias^  In  addition  to  Galvez's  opinion  of  December 
18,  1773,  and  other  documents  already  cited,  it  had  mean- 
while^ accumulated  many  more.  On  February  1,  1775,  the 
Council  decided  to  ask  Arriaga  for  Anza's  diary  of  the  1774 
expedition  to  aid  the  Council  in  determining  whether  more 
Dominicans  should  be  sent  to  Baja  California/^  The  re- 
quest was  made  ^^  and  the  diary  forwarded  7^  The  other 
documents  consisted  mainly  of  reports  concerning  the 
peninsula/^  At  length,  the  Council  proceeded  to  make  its 
recommendation  to  the  king.  It  began  by  claiming  that 
Bucarely's  division  of  the  Californias  was  contrary  to  the 
royal  orders,  which  had  called  for  an  establishment  entirely 
separate  from  that  of  the  Fernandinos,  but  had  not  con- 
templated depriving  the  latter  of  Baja  California.  The 
fiscal  of  the  Council  did  not  agree  with  this  interpretation. 
Since  the  Father  Superior  of  San  Fernando  had  agreed  to 
the  division  and  no  complaint  had  come  from  the  Fernandi- 
nosj  the  division  might  be  allowed  to  stand,  although  with- 
out approval,  for  it  would  cause  inconvenience  and  ex- 
pense to  do  otherwise. "^^  The  viceroy  should  be  expressly 
directed,  however,  that  the  Dominicans  were  to  make  their 
establishments  from  San  Fernando  Velicata  eastward  toward 
the  Colorado,  leaving  the  whole  west  coast  to  the  Fernan- 
dinos, so  that  the  two  orders  might  not  disturb  or  embarrass 
one  another.  The  viceroy  must  also  be  careful  that  Alta 
California  should  not  suffer  harm  from  having  been  de- 

"  C-2934.  applicable  to  the  Californias ;  the  regla- 

w  C-2839.  mento  of  sinodos  of  November  30, 1768 ;  a 

''*  San    Martin  Cuato    to    Arriaga,  diary  of  the  expeditions  of  1769-70  to 

Feb.  4,  1775,  C-2840.  Alta  California;  a  map  of  the  Californias^ 

'5  Arriaga    to    San    Martin    Cuato,  an  opinion  of  the  fiscal ;  a  former  opinion 

Feb.  13,  1775,  C-2845.  of  Manuel  Lanz  de  Casafonda. 

^*  In  C-2906  they  are  described  as  f ol-  ""  This,  therefore,  is  an  instance  where 

lows:  Gdlvez's  statement  of  the  number  the   viceroy's   action   prevailed   in   the 

of  Indians  in  Baja  California  missions  face  of  a  contrary  opinion  of  the  Coun- 

when  the  Jesuits  were  expelled  ;  a  state-  cil.     Cf .  chap.  VII,  n.  63. 
ment  of  the  amount  of  the  pious  fund 


1773]  LOCAL  PROBLEMS   OF   THE    CALIFORNIAS  271 

priyed  of  support  from  the  peninsula.  Althougli  it  had 
formerly  denied  them,  the  Council  now  granted  the  Do- 
minican request  for  twenty  missionaries,  this  decision  being 
reached  as  a  result  of  Anza's  discovery  of  a  route  from 
Sonora.  In  order  not  to  deplete  the  pious  fund,  the  Coun- 
cil would  authorize  the  viceroy  to  make  curacies  of  all  the 
Baja  California  missions  ready  for  that  step,  giving  them  in 
charge  of  secular  clergy,  or  in  defect  of  these  to  religious, 
who  should  be  subject  to  ecclesiastical  visitation  and  to  the 
rules  of  the  royal  patronage.  The  same  might  be  done  with 
the  older  missions  of  Sonora.  The  five  missions  along  the 
Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  repeatedly  asked  for  by  Gdlvez 
and  the  fiscal  of  Mexico,  should  be  established,  and  later, 
others  should  be  erected  among  the  friendly  peoples  made 
known  by  Anza  and  the  Queretaranos.  The  latter  should 
have  charge  of  the  new  missions,  and  the  cost  of  estab- 
lishing them  should  be  defrayed  from  Jesuit  funds,  the 
royal  treasury  supplying  whatever  might  be  lacking.  The 
Council  complained  of  the  excessive  allowance  granted  to 
the  Dominicans  from  the  pious  fund.  Thenceforth,  Gdlvez's 
arrangement  of  November  30,  1768,  should  be  followed,  the 
amount  allowed  depending  on  relative  distances  and  scarc- 
ity or  abundance  of  provisions.  For  the  greater  security 
of  the  missions  and  presidios  of  Alta  California  such  cattle 
and  sheep  as  were  needed  should  be  sent,  both  from  the 
peninsula  and  from  Sonora ;  there  was  an  abundance  of 
these  animals  in  Sonora,  and  they  could  be  sent  by  the 
Anza  route.  It  would  also  be  well  to  bpeh  a 'route  from 
New  Mexico  to  Monterey,  taking  note  of  intervening  lands 
and  the  course  of  rivers.  The  viceroy  should  give  fitting 
orders  to  carry  out  these  objects  to  the  governors  of  the 
Calif ornias,  Sonora,  and  New  Mexico.  The  garrison  of 
Loreto  should  soon  be  transferred  to  the  largest  of  the  Tres 
Marias,  and  Bucarely  should  call  a  junta  to  see  about 
settling  those  islands,  so  that  they  might  be  securely  held 
and  serve  to  aid  the  Spanish  ships  obliged  to  put  in  there. 
For  the  greater  comfort  and  security  of  the  Manila  galleons 
and  to  facilitate  the  development  of  Monterey,  the  king 


272        THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XI 

should  enforce  the  decree  of  1606  requiring  the  PhiHppine 
Boats  to  stop,  there.  In  reciting  the  advantages  the  Coun- 
cil quoted  the  decree  of  1606  to  the  effect  that  Monterey 
was  in  37°,  almost  at  the  halfway  point  of  the  voyage,  and 
with  an  excellent  and  capacious  harbor.  It  added  on  its 
own  account  that  the  galleonmight  bring  such  articles  as 
were  needed  to  develop  the  new  establishments/^ 

It  will  be  noted  that  Galvez's  recommendations  had  been 
adopted  by  the  Council,  substantially  as  he  had  made  them. 
If  these  projects  could  have  been  exequted  m^eojLi^^ 
tremendous  advance  would  in  all  probability  have  followed, 
resulting  in  an  increase  of  the  white  population  of  Alta 
California,  and  perhaps  in  the  discovery  of  gold.  What 
the  effect  would  have  been  on  the  history  of  Alta  California 
and  of  the  United  States  is  worthy  of  conjecture.  If  the 
Council's  recommendation  were  embodied  in  a  royal  decree, 
no  evidence  to  that  effect  has  yet  come  to  light,  although 
shortly  afterward,  when  Galvez  became  ministro  general,  he 
gave  orders  which  aimed  to  put  most  of  these  projects  into 
effect.  By  the  institution  of  the  comandancia  general ^ 
however,  lie  prevented  the  successful  achievement  of  the 
results  desired.  Until  that  time  Bucarely  was  at  work  in 
harmony  with  the  ideas  of  Galvez  and  the  Council,  for, 
aside  from  the  ma.tter  of  the  division  of  the  Californias,  he 
was  in  entire  agreement  with  them.  Had  these  projects 
been  left  in  his  hands  they  might  have  been  brought  to  a 
successful  issue,  but  Galvez 's  appointee  as  comandante 
general,  Teodoro  de  Croix,  was  not  the  man  to  carry  them 
out.  Great  interest  over  the  Californias  had  manifested  it- 
self in  Spain  in  this  period,  but  the  government  had  actually 
done  little  more  than  to  confirm  Bucarely's  measures.     He 

Xit  was  who  had  sayed_the  new  establishments,  and  had. 
j)laced  the  whole  province  on  a  sound  basis. 

"  C-2906.     There  are  ten  signatures  la    Zerda.      This    document     amounts 

and  rubrics  attached  to  the  document :  to    a    history    of    Dominican    preten- 

Felipe  de  Arco ;  the  Marques  de  Val-  sions   in    New   Spain,    more  especially 

delirios ;  Marcos  Ximeno  ;  Domingo  de  as   regards  the    Californias,  from   1760 

Trespalacios ;    Jos6  de    Gdlvez ;    Pedro  to   1775.      Numerous    documents     are 

Calder6n      Henriquez ;     Tom^s     Ortiz  quoted    and    summarized    before    the 

de    Landazuri ;    Felipe  Santos  Domin-  part  embodying  the  actual  recommen- 

guez ;  Manuel  Diaz ;    Jo86  Antonio  de  dation  of  the  Council  is  reached. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE    FIRST    ANZA   EXPEDITION,    AND    PREPARATIONS    FOR   A 

SECOND,  1774 

The  story  of  this  chapter  ixi^y  quickly  be  told.  Leav- 
ing Tubac  on  January  S,  Q.77A)  Anza  made  a  successful 
march  to  Alta  California  without  the  loss  of  a  iiian>.  There 
were  thirty-four  in  his  party,  including  Fathers^  Garc6s 
and,JDiaz.  The  route  led  through  Papagueria  to  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  and  across  the  Colo- 
rado Desert.  The  party  was  well  received  by  the  Indians 
en  route,  and  especially  so  by  the  Yumas,  who  were  ex- 
ceedingly desirous  of  missions.  On  March  22  Anza  reached 
San  Gabriel,  having  proved  the  existence  of  a  practicable 
route  from  Sonera,  although  not  so  good  a  one  as  could 
have  been  desired.^  The  entire  expedition  soon  returned  to 
Sonora,  where  Anza  was  prevented  from  going  immediately 
to  Mexico  by  orders  of  a  superior  officer.  By  November, 
however,  he  was  in  Mexico,  and  at  once  got  to  work  with 
Bucarely  to  plan  a  new  expedition.  It  was  agreed  that 
Anza  should  lead  thirty  soldiers  and  their  families  to  Alta 
California  for  a  settlement  at  San  Francisco.  Many  domes- 
tic animals  were  also  to  be  taken,  so  that  the  province  might 
be  placed  on  a  permanent  basis  in  that  regard.  The  de- 
tails of  equipment,  organization,  expense,  and  minor  parts 
of  the  plan  were  settled  by  Bucarely,  Echeveste,  and  Anza, 
and  the  expedition  was  authorized  by  the  first  named,  but 

^  The  correspondence  of  Anza  is  my  of  his  return,  and  may  eventually 
principal  resort  in  this  chapter  for  the  publish  it.  In  that  case  the  additional 
details  of  the  expedition,  as  that  con-  or  varying  details  of  the  other  diaries, 
tains  nearly  all  that  is  needed.  I  have  on  which  I  have  taken  notes,  will  ac- 
made  a  preliminary  translation,  how-  company  the  translation,  A  considera- 
ever,  of  two  Anza  diaries,  the  one  sent  tion  of  the  diaries  of  both  Anza  ex- 
back  from  San  Gabriel  and  the  diary  peditions  is  given  in  an  appendix. 

T  273 


274      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

a  junta  was  called  on  December  16,  1774,  to  confirm  what 
had  in  fact  been  arranged  already. 

So  much  for  the  externals.  The  key  to  these  events,  how- 
ever, lies  in  the  oft-discussed  factor  of  orecautionary  meas- 
ures against  foreign  aggression,  particularly  by  the  Rus- 
sians. The  documents  used  in  this  chapter  make  little 
allusion  to  that  factor,  but  they  must  be  read  in  the  light 
of  others,  already  or  later  to  be  discussed,  which  did  so  when 
dealing  with  the  same  events.  The  events  treated  here 
were  only  part  of  the  larger  plan  which  Bucarely  had  in 
mind,  but  of  which  others  in  New  Spain  were  not  fully  cog- 
nizant. Some  indications  of  this  appear  in  the  Bucarely 
correspondence  of  this  chapter.  For  example,  a  letter  of 
May  27,  1774,  treats  of  the  Anza  expedition,  of  the  possi- 
bilities for  missions  among  the  Yumas,  of  Rivera^s  expedi- 
tion to  Alta  California,  of  the  Alta  California  supply-ships, 
of  Palou's  1773  report  of  conditions  there,  and  of  the  voy- 
ages of  exploration,  for  all  were  part  of  the  same  idea.  Other 
Bucarely  letters  will  yield  something  of  the  same,  if  viewed 
from  this  standpoint.  The  letters  of  other  men  must  be 
construed  more  narrowly.  One  of  the  principal  ideas  of 
the  time  was  the  need  of  Alta  California  for  overland  com- 
munication with~Kew  Spain,  a  matter  well  understood  by 
Alta  Californians,  and  the  principal  import  of  the  Anza 
expedition  to  them  was  that  it  seemed  to  supply  this  want. 
Palou^letier  of  ^pril  22,  1774,  most  clearly  presents  this 
view. 


As  soon  as  he  got  word  that  his  petition  had  been  granted, 
Anza  lost  no  time  in  making  preparations  for  his  expedition. 
On  November  6,  1773,  both  he  and  Carets  wrote  to  the 
viceroy,  the  purport  of  their  letters  being  that  the  expedi- 
tion would  start  on  December  15.  They  planned  to  take 
as  northerly  a  route  as  possible,  feeling  sure  that  in  case  of 
need  they  could  return  to  the  Yuma  country  at  the  junction 
of  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  and  proceed  from  there  to  the 
Pacific  without  difficulty.  This  news  was  communicated 
to  Arriaga  by  Bucarely  on  February  24,  1774,  and  was  the 


1774]  THE   FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  275 

latest  that  he  had  been  able  to  hear,  owing  to  the  great 
distance  of  Sonora  from  Mexico  City,  but  he  felt  certain 
that  the  expedition  had  started.^  Anza  did  not  in  fact 
leave  Tubac,  the  starting  point  of  the  expedition,  until 
January  8,  ITIA^  Meanwhile,  the  existencj^jplj^  rgTateJroDpL 
Sonora  to  Alt  a  California  was  definiteIyi,,jpLEX>ygd.  An 
Indian,  Sebastian  Tarabal,  by  name,  had  escaped  from 
the  San  Gabriel  mission^  and  had  reachedjVltar,  Decem- 
ber 26,  1773.  Four  others  who  escaped  with  him.  Including 
his  wife  and  a  brother,  had  died  of  thirst  while  lost  in  the 
Colorado  Desert.  Tarabal  alone  reached  the  junction  of 
the  Colorado  and  Gila,  and  came  from  there  to  Altar  by 
way  of  Papagueria.^ 

Originally,  Anza  had  intended  to  go  by  way  of  the  Gila 
River  to  the  Colorado  junction,  but  he  changed  his  plan, 
choosing  a  route  by  way  of  Altar  and  Papagueria  to  the 
junction  of  the  rivers.  Tarabal  had  said  that  that  route 
was  a  good  one.  Furthermore,  the  Apaches  had  made  a 
raid  on  January  2,  stealing  one  hundred  thirty  horses,  in- 
cluding many  destined  for  the  expedition.  These  could  not 
be  replaced  in  that  vicinity,  and  he  did  not  wish  to  wait  for 
others  to  be  sent,  as  the  Apaches  might  capture  some  more. 
He  hoped  to  get  more  horses  at  Altar,  having  notified  the 
governor  of  Sonora  of  his  need.  Finally,  he  had  decided  that 
it  was  better  to  ascertain  the  direct  route  from  Pimeria,  as 
that  would  be  the  only  one  by  which  produce  could  be  sent 
to  sustain  the  Californias,  as  it  was  alone  free  from  the 
Apaches.^  Garces  added  that  the  Yuma  chief,  Salvador 
Palma,  who  had  accompanied  Tarabal  to  Altar,  said  that 
the  Papagueria  route  was  a  good  one.^  It  is  probable  that 
the  Apache  incident  was  the  determining  factor  with  Anza. 

2  C-2550.  to  return  with  it.     Afterwards,  he  at- 

3  Noted  in  the  diaries  of  Anza,  tached  himself  to  Garc6s,  and  there- 
Garc6s,  and  Diaz.  Tarabal's  career  after  accompanied  him  in  his  extensive 
of  travel  was  a  decidedly  interesting  travels.  Eldredge,  in  Jour.  Am.  Hist., 
one.  Originally  he  came  from  Baja  II,  257.  Diaries  of  both  Anza  ex- 
Cahfornia,  and  in  1769  accompanied  peditions.  Fages,  memorial  of  Nov.  30, 
Portold.     Later,    he    and    his    family  1775.     C-3042. 

were  brought  to  San  Gabriel  to  live,  *  Anza,  Diary,  C-2503. 

but  he  ran  away,  as  observed  above.  '  Garc6s,    Diary,    A.G.P.,    Historia, 

He  accompanied  Anza's  first  expedition  v.  52. 

to  Alta  California,  and  was  permitted 


276      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XU 

The  expedition  left  Tubac  on  January  8,  1774,  reaching 
Altar  a  few  days  later.  Writing  to  Bucarely  from  there, 
January  18,  1774,  Anza  said  that  Governor  Crespo^  had 
arranged  to  supply  him  with  what  he  needed  at  Caborca,  the 
last  village  through  which  he  would  pass  in  that  district,  at 
which  he  expected  to  arrive  the  following  day.  Despite  the 
difficulty  of  procuring  pack  animals  he  was  carrying  four 
months'  provisions.  They  would  last  longer,  but  for  the 
necessity  of  making  gifts  to  Indians  en  route.  He  was  also 
carrying  a  quantity  of  baubles  for  them.  These  were  rather 
scarce  in  Sonora,  but  for  that  reason  they  would  be  all  the 
more  valued  by  the  Indians.  The  Indians  of  the  Colorado 
River  maintained  communication  and  friendship  with  the 
Spanish  post  of  Altar,  in  consequence  of  which  Anza  planned 
to  send  back  letters  of  his  journey,  on  arrival  at  the  Colo- 
rado.'' With  this  letter  he  enclosed  a  list  showing  the 
number  of  individuals  and  animals  and  the  amount  of  pro- 
visions that  he  was  carrying.  Besides  Anza  himself,  there 
were  the  two  religious,  Garc6s  and  Diaz ;  twenty-one  sol- 
diers, one  of  whom  was  Juan  Valdes,  the  soldier  from  Alta 
California  who  was  accompanying  Anza  in  order  to  serve 
as  guide  when  the  expedition  should  reach  that  province; 
Sebastian  Tarabal,  as  guide  from  the  Yuma  country  to  the 
Pacific ;  a  Pima  interpreter ;  and  eight  other  Indians,  five 
as  muleteers,  two  as  servants  of  Anza,  and  one  a  carpenter. 
In  all  there  were  thirty-four  persons.  There  were  thirty- 
five  loads  containing  provisions,  munitions,  gifts  for  the 
Indians,  pioneers'  tools,  and  other  things,  and  there  were 
sixty-five  head  of  cattle,  and  one  hundred  forty  horses.^ 
Arrived  at  Caborca  Anza  did  not  find  the  expected  number 
of  horses  promised  by  Governor  Crespo,  although  he  had 
included  them  in  his  count,  and  the  few  that  he  did  get 
proved  unfit  to  make  the  expedition.^ 

From  Caborca  Anza  proceeded  through  sterile  Papa- 
gueria  to  the  junction,  and  crossed  both  rivers  successfully. 
He  wrote  from  San  Dionisio  at  the  junction,  February  9, 

« Successor  to  Sastre,  who  had  just  ^  C-2506.  » C-2507. 

died.  9  Anza,  Diary,  C-2503. 


1774]  THE   FIRST  ANZA   EXPEDITION  277 

1774,  telling  how  joyfully  he  had  been  received  by  the  Yumas, 
although  a  portion  of  them  had  originally  planned  to  op- 
pose him.  A  Soyopa  Indian  had  told  him  that  there  was 
a  westward  branch  of  the  Colorado  River,  farther  north, 
and  the  same  Soyopa  also  said  that  the  ridge  to  the  north- 
west was  impassible,  because  of  its  ruggedness  and  because 
of  the  lack  of  water  and  pasture.  The  Yumas  must  be  very 
numerous,  for  Anza  had  seen  about  two  thousand  of  them 
in  the  space  of  a  league  and  U  half,  but  they  were  not  a 
people  to  be  afraid  of,  even  if  they  had  been  less  friendly. 
He  hoped  to  find  more  pasture  during  the  rest  of  the  march 
than  he  had  encountered  in  crossing  Papagueria.  The 
Papagueria  route  was  not  a  bad  one,  but  he  had  had  difficul- 
ties, due  to  his  lack  of  acquaintance  with  it ;  in  seasons  of 
rain  it  would  be  an  easy  route  for  a  party,  however  large 
Except  for  the  soldiers  who  accompanied  the  Jesuits,  no 
Spanish  troops  had  ever  penetrated  so  far  as  he  then  was, 
and  his  next  day^s  journey  would  carry  him  beyond  where 
they  had  gone.^^  Anza^s  letter  reached  Altar  in  safety,  and 
was  forwarded  by  Captain  Bernardo  de  Urrea  of  that 
presidio  to  Governor  Francisco  Crespo,  and  by  the  latter 
to  Bucarely.  Each  of  these  officers  added  a  letter  to  An- 
za's,  having  each  received  one  from  him.  Urrea  wrote,  Feb- 
ruary 22,  1774,  that  a  Yuma  had  brought  Anza's  letters  so 
carefully  that  they  appeared  as  if  just  written.  He  took 
occasion  to  praise  Chief  Palma  of  the  Yumas,  who  had 
shown  remarkable  pro-Spanish  proclivities  on  previous 
occasions,  and  who  had  now  accorded  Anza  a  good  recep- 
tion at  San  Dionisio.^^  Crespo  said  little  more  than  that 
Anza's  march  had  fulfilled  his  own  predictions.-^^ 

Bucarely  forwarded  copies  of  these  three  letters  to 
Arriaga  in  his  communication  of  May  27,  1774,  calling 
attention  to  the  parts  that  had  impressed  him.  He  took 
note  of  the  largejumber  of  Indians,  and  their  friendly  recep- 
tion of  Anza ;  of  Anza's  well-founded  expeciaiion  oi  hndlUg 
3-  pra^icaBle  route  to  Alta  California;    and  of  his  report 

"  C-2533.  12  Crespo  to  Bucarely,  Feb.  25,  1774. 

11 C-2543.  C-2554. 


278      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

of  a  westward  branch  of  the  Colorado,  which  Bucarely  sur- 
mised might  be  the  river  flowing  into  San  Francisco  Bay, 
as  there  were  intervening  mountains  elsewhere.  Bucarely 
had  been  very  greatly  impressed  by  the  success  of  Anza's 
march  to  date,  and  by  the  delivery  of  his  letters  from  the 
rivers,  which  facts  he  considered  not  less  remarkable  than 
the  discovery  of  a  route  to  the  Pacific  would  be.  If  the 
route  were  found,  it  might  in  future  conduce  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  new  establishments  of  Alta  California  at  slight 
cost,  and  might  lead  to  a  reduction  to  the  church  of  vast 
numbers  of  Indians.  Anza  and  Urrea  had  made  presents 
to  Chief  Palma  of  the  Yumas,  of  which  Bucarely  approved, 
and  he  had  ordered  Crespo  to  continue  them  to  Palma  and 
other  Yumas  at  royal  expense,  but  not  to  give  them  arms. 
He  also  referred  to  the  Rivera  expedition,  the  supply- 
ships,  the  voyages  of  exploration,  and  the  Palou  report  of 
December,  1773,  in  this  letter,  showing  that  these  events 
were  connected  in  his  mind  with  the  Anza  expedition.^^ 
In  another  of  the  same  date  he  expressed  a  belief  that  Anza 
and  Rivera  might  meet  in  Alta  California,  in  which  case 
there  would  be  men  enough  to  explore  San  Francisco  and 
establish  one  or  more  missions  there,  something  which 
Rivera  had  been  ordered  to  do.  Bucarely  was  hoping  to 
hear  that  it  had  been  done.^^  Two  days  before,  in  ac- 
knowledging receipt  of  the  Palou  report,  he  had  expressed 
the  same  hope,  and  had  asked  for  detailed  information  of 
everything  tending  toward  such  a  result.^^  At  this  time 
also.  May  27,  1774,  Bucarely  wrote  to  O'Reilly  manifesting 
his  satisfaction  with  the  results  achieved  thus  far  by  Anza.^^ 
Their  importance  appears  from  the  prominent  place  that 
they  occupied  in  the  monthly  extract  of  news  from  the  ^ 
frontier  provinces,  which  contained  detailed  references  to 
the  Anza  expedition.^'^  This  was  forwarded  to  Arriaga 
in  another  Bucarely  letter  of  May  27.^^  These  letters 
show  not  only  the  broad  standpoint  from  which  Bucarely 

"  C-2624.     Spanish    official     corre-  "  In  Palou,  Noticias,  III,  254-57. 

spondence  treated  of  but  one  subject  ^^  C-2634. 

in  each  letter.  "  C-2626.  i^  C-2628.  i8  C-2627. 


1774]  THE   FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  279 

viewed  the  Anza    expedition,  but    also    his    deep   interest 
in  it. 

Meanwhile,  Anza  had  encountered  serious  difficulty  in 
his  first  attempt  to  cross  the  Colorado  Desert.  After 
spending  a  terrible  day  in  the  desert  on  February  15  in 
search  of  San  Jacome,  a  village  which  later  turned  out  to 
have  been  abandoned,  he  had  been  obhged  to  return  to 
Santa  Olaya  near  the  Colorado  River,  because  of  the  lack 
of  water  in  the  desert,  and  the  exhaustion  and  rapid  death 
rate  of  his  animals. ^^  He  wrote  to  Bucarely  on  February 
28  to  forestall  bad  news,  trusting  to  Chief  Palma  to  at- 
tend to  the  delivery  of  his  letter.  He  had  descended  the 
Colorado  River,  in  order  to  go  around  the  sands  in  which 
Tarabal  got  lost,  when  he  crossed  the  desert.  As  a  result  of 
the  failure  of  his  first  attempt,  he  had  decided  to  leave  be- 
hind a  large  part  of  his  provisions  and  most  of  the  animals, 
for  the  beasts  were  too  weak  to  proceed.  He  would  put 
all  in  charge  of  Chief  Palma,  in  whom  he  had  confidence, 
leaving  also  three  soldiers  and  four  muleteers,  a  proceeding 
which  he  regarded  as  safe,  for  the  Yumas  seemed  to  be  even 
better  disposed  to  the  Spaniards  than  the  Pimas  and  P4- 
pagos  of  the  reductions.  Members  of  the  two  latter  tribes 
often  visited  the  Yumas,  and  they  would  see  to  it  that  no 
harm  resulted.  Farther  on,  there  might  not  be  another 
such  favorable  opportunity ;  yet,  sooner  or  later,  he  would 
have  had  to  leave  some  provisions  behind,  he  said.  On 
March  2  he  would  start  with  eleven  packs,  containing 
provisions  for  one  month,  enough  at  least  until  they  should 
reach  San  Gabriel,  according  to  Tarabal,  who  said  that  it 
would  take  only  two  weeks,  or  less,  with  good  animals. 
After  reaching  the  pass,  at  about  a  week^s  journey,  there 
would  be  plenty  of  water,  and  there  was  some  before  there. 
So  Anza  and  his  men  were  expecting  to  complete  their 
undertaking,  and  they  would  do  it  on  foot,  if  necessary. 
He  anticipated  no  trouble  from  peoples  yet  to  be  en- 
countered, as  he  understood  them  to  be  as  lacking  in  arms 

i>  Diaries  of  Anza,  Didz,  and  Garc6s. 


280      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

and  spirit  as  the  Yumas  and  Cojats.^^     It  might  be  two  or 
three  months  before  he  returned.^^ 

Anza  left  Santa  Olaya  on  March  2,  traversed  the  desert 
by  a  circuitous  route,  entered  the  mountains  by  way  of  the 
San  FeHpe  Canyon,^^  and  reached  San  Gabriel  on  March 
22.  His  letter  to  Bucarely  from  there,  April  10,  1774, 
gives  the  essential  facts  of  his  march  after  leaving  Santa 
Olaya,  and  accords  high  praise  to  the  route  discovered,  as 
a  means  of  communication.  His  difl&culties  had  been  due 
primarily  to  the  weakness  of  his  animals  and  his  ignorance 
of  the  coimtry.  Because  of  the  former  the  soldiers  had 
been  obliged  to  march  most  of  the  way  on  foot,  and  because 
of  the  latter  they  had  traveled  more  leagues  than  was 
necessary.  Where  it  had  taken  two  hundred  seventy-nine 
leagues  in  coming,  the  return  could  be  made  in  two  hundred 
leagues.^^  Monterey  should  be  about  three  hundred  leagues 
from  Tubac  or  Altar.  There  were  no  hostile  peoples  en 
route ;  rather  they  were  well  disposed,  and  lacking  in  arms. 
In  five  days^  march  from  the  Colorado  River,  Anza  had 
reached  fertile  lands  with  plenty  of  water,  and  the  lands 
thereafter  were  good.  The  route  from  Sonora  was  a  very 
good  one,  even  suitable  for  wagons.  Likewise,  he  expected 
that  that  would  be  the  case  if  a  more  direct  route  were 
taken  to  Monterey,  as  by  way  of  San  Luis  Obispo,  which 
he  thought  might  prove  to  be  the  best  route  from  Sonora 
to  Monterey.  Lower  Sonora  could  then  furnish  the  neces- 
sary aid  to  Alta  California;  Pimeria  Alta  could  not,  be- 
cause of  the  Apaches.  Due  to  a  lack  of  provisions  and  the 
exhaustion  of  his  animals,  he  had  not  attempted  to  go  di- 
rectly to  Monterey,  as  originally  planned,  but  had  come  first 
to  San  Gabriel,  arriving  there  at  the  height  of  the  great 

*o  Diaz  and  Garc6s  say  Cajuenches  of  Am.  Hist.,  II,  521-23,  was  the  first 
for  Cojats.  Diaz,  Diary,  A.G.P.,  His-  to  pronounce  for  the  route  up  the  San 
toria,  V.  396.  Garc6s,  Diary,  A.G.P.,  Felipe  Canyon.  With  more  evidence 
Historia,  v.  52.  Garc6s  adds  that  the  at  hand  than  was  available  for  Mr. 
name  Cajuenches  extended  as  far  as  Eldredge,  I  have  reached  the  same  con- 
San  Diego.  elusion  that  he  did. 

21  C-2560.  23  Based   on  the  estimates  of   Anza 

2*  Until  recently  it  was  believed  that  himself,  the   return   was   accomplished 

Anza  went  through  the   San  Gorgonio  in   one   hundred    seventy-four  leagues, 

Pass,  the  present  route  of  the  Southern  San  Gabriel   to  Tubac.     Anza,   Diary ^ 

Pacific  Railroad.     Mr.  Eldredge,  Jour.  C-2503. 


1774]  THE   FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  281 

famine.  Being  unable  to  get  animals  and  supplies  enough 
from  there  or  San  Diego,  or  even  from  the  Santiago,  then  at 
San  Diego,  he  had  also  been  obliged  to  abandon  his  project 
of  a  direct  return  from  Monterey.  He  had  only  sixteen 
days'  rations  for  his  troops,  and  had  therefore  directed 
most  of  his  men  to  return  to  the  Colorado  by  way  of  the 
route  discovered,  while  he  himself  would  go  to  Monterey 
before  returning.  He  expected  to  be  at  Tubac  by  the  end 
of  May,  whence  he  would  proceed  to  Mexico  in  June  to  re- 
port there  in  person.^*  With  this  letter  Anza  enclosed  his 
diary  as  completed  to  April  5.  Diaz  also  sent  his  diary, 
with  a  letter  of  April  8,  to  Bucarely.^^ 

Attention  may  be  called  to  Anza's  description  of  the  route 
discovered  as  a  good,_orL^jEJitirely,,.praciij2^a]^ 
mission  of  supplies.  As  regards  that  much  of  his  account, 
af  least,  it  would  seem  that  Anza  was  undijQyen^^ 
even  although  he  had  just  traversed  this  route  without 
losing  a  man.  At  any  rate,  the  enthusiasm  of  Anza's 
letter  had  due  modification  in  the  diaries  of  the  expedition, 
those  of  Anza,  Diaz,  and  Garces  agreeing  substantially 
with  the  facts  and  with  each  other.  As  regards  the  Lo:^ 
dians,  those  encountered  between  the  Yuma  countiy  an^ 
Ban^  Gabriel  ha3"^emed  to  be  of  a  very  low  grade  of  cul- 
ture, and  feeble  in  a  military  way.  They  were  reported  to 
be  numerous,  but  along  the  route  that  Anza  traveled,  their 
numbers  were  not  great.  The  Indians  first  encountered 
after  passing  the  Colorado  Desert,  the  Cajuenches,  were  of 
the  Yuman  family,  and  Anza  records  that  they  spoke  the 
same  language  as  the  Yumas,  although  he  also  states  that 
the  Yumas  were  their  enemies.^^  Next  Anza  came  upon 
Indians  of  what  we  now  call  the  Shoshonean  family.  Diaz 
remarked  that  the  Indians  met  with  in  the  mountains  had 
a  similar  language  to  that  of  the  San  Gabriel  Indians,  bas- 
ing his  opinion  on  his  own  observations  and  on  the  fact 
that  Tarabal,  who  had  a  slight  knowledge  of  the  San  Gabriel 
tongue,  was  able  to  make  himself  understood  by  the  mountain 

24  C-2603.  28  Anza,  Diary,  C-2503. 

26  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  396. 


282      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

Indians.^^  These  family  relationships  might  have  become  a 
matter  of  importance  as  affecting  the  future  use  of  the 
route,  but  in  fact  they  seem  to  have  had  no  marked  effect 
at  the  time.  None  of  these  Indians  were  so  cordial  to  the 
Spaniards  as  the  Yumas  had  been,  but  none  of  them  had 
endeavored  to  impede  the  march.  Finally,  they  were  not 
considered  by  the  expeditionaries  as  a  serious  military 
obstacle  in  any  event,  nor  did  they  prove  to  be  so  in  the  few 
years  during  which  Spaniards  went  back  and  forth  along 
this  route.^^  The  Yumas,  however,  were  a  serious  problem. 
They  were  more  numerous  than  the  mountain  Indians, 
there  being  several  thousand  of  them,  and  they  were  much 
more  advanced  in  type  of  life,  having  good  crops  and  better 
weapons^  although  not  good  enough  to  enable  them  to  re- 
sist Spanish  troops  effectually.  The  remarkable  cordiality 
of  the  Yumas  seems  rather  to  have  deceived  Anza  at  this 
time ;  his  opinion  may  be  summed  up  in  his  remark  that 
there  would  be  no  trouble  between  the  Spaniards  and 
Yumas  as  long  as  Palma  lived,  but  rather  he  and  all  his 
tribe  would  be  well  disposed  and  faithful  to  the  king.^^  A 
warning  note  was  sounded  by  Diaz,  however.  Unless 
some  establishments  were  formed  along  these  rivers,  he  said, 
the  march  through  these  lands  would  not  be  easy,  for  the 
inconstancy  of  the  Indians  was  well  known,  and  the  passage 
of  the  river  was  difficult.  If  the  Indians  should  become  dis- 
contented or  unwilling  to  cooperate  in  the  passage  of  the 
rivers,  or  if  they  should  try  to  hinder  it,  a  large  armed 
force  would  be  required  to  conquer  so  vast  a  number  of 
Indians,  despite  their  low  grade  of  culture.^^  This  was  in 
effect  a  prophecy  of  the  disaster  of  1781.  The  difficulty 
lay  not  alone  in  the  numbers  of  the  Yumas,  but  also  in  the 
necessity  for  their  aid  in  crossing  the  Colorado  River. 

27  Diaz,  Diary,  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  way  of  the  San  Gorgonio  Pass  he 
396,  would  not  have  passed  through  tribes 

28  For  information  about  these  In-  of  the  Yuman  family  on  entering  the 
dians,  see]  Hodge,  Handbook,  under  mountains,  which  is  further  evidence, 
"Cajuenche,"  "Serranos,"  "Shosho-  therefore,  in  support  of  Mr.  Eldredge's 
nean  Family,"  and  "Yuman  Family,"  as  contention  for  the  canyon  of  the  San 
also    the    map    showing   the    linguistic  Felipe. 

families  of  American  Indians.     It  may  ^  Anza,  Diary,  C-2602. 

be  remarked  that  if  Anza  had  gone  by  ^o  Diaz,  Diary,  A.G.I.,  88-1-22. 


1774]  THE   FIRST  ANZA  EXPEDITION  283 

While  Anza  was  hastening  to  Monterey  and  back,  most 
of  the  soldiers,  in  charge  of  Father  Garces,  made  their  way 
to  the  junction  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila.  On  April  27 
Garc^s  wrote  to  Bucarely  from  that  place,  detailing  what 
had  occurred  on  his  march  from  San  Gabriel.  The  return 
had  been  made  between  April  13  and  26.  Garces  expressed 
much  disappointment  that  Anza  was  to  return  by  the  same 
route,  rather  than  seek  a  new  one,  as  Garces  had  desired, 
although  Anza  might  have  been  compelled  to  take  that 
course.  He  also  regretted  that  no  observations  of  latitude 
had  been  taken ;  the  other  religious  had  been  ordered  to 
accompany  him  to  take  observations,  and  not  merely  to  give 
him  counsel,  but  instruments  and  a  knowledge  of  their  use 
were  lacking  in  Sonora.  After  Anza's  departure  for  Mon- 
terey, Garces  had  wanted  the  soldiers  under  him  to  wait 
until  he  or  Diaz  could  go  to  San  Diego  for  an  instrument  and 
instruction  in  its  use,  but  they  would  not  do  so.  Indeed,  he 
was  far  from  content  with  the  achievements  of  the  expedi- 
tion, and  his  curiosity  was  still  in  many  respects  unsatis- 
fied. Yet,  Anza  was  worthy  of  praise  for  having  under- 
gone such  great  expense,  and  for  the  good  conduct  that  he 
had  shown ;  besides,  his  example  might  lead  others  to  pro- 
pose like  undertakings.  Reverting  to  his  original  com- 
plaint, he  said  that  if  he  had  gone  to  Monterey,  he  would 
have  urged  a  direct  return  from  Monterey,  by  a  more 
northerly  route.  However,  the  conquests  in  Alta  Califor- 
nia would  in  time  be  attended  to,  as  well  as  the  estabHsh- 
ment  of  less  costly  settlements  on  the  Colorado  and  Gila. 
The  latter  was  particularly  important,  he  said,  and  it  would 
be  a  matter  for  tears,  if  these  numerous  peoples,  so  well 
adapted  for  spiritual  conquest,  were  lost  sight  of.  With 
this  letter  he  was  forwarding  his  diary  by  the  special  courier 
who  was  also  carrying  the  Anza  and  Diaz  diaries  and  let- 
ters.^^  If  Garces'  letter  seems  to  give  Anza  scant  praise,  the 
concluding  paragraphs  of  his  diary  are  more  liberal,  re- 
ferring specifically  to  Anza's  good  deportment  toward  the 
Indians,  his  kindly  manner  toward  the  soldiers,  and  his 

31  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  52. 


284      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

good  treatment  of  the  Fathers,  to  whom  he  gave  not  only- 
necessaries,  but  also  some  luxuries.  These  good  acts, 
thought  Garc^s,  might  have  moved  God  to  sustain  the 
expedition  in  peace. ^^ 

A  letter  from  Palou  to  the  Father  Superior  at  San  Fer- 
nando, April  22,  1774,  shows  how  important  Anza's  dis- 
covery seemed  to  Alta  Calif ornians.  Anza  had  found  that 
it  was  only  one  hundred  seventy  leagues  from  Tubac  to 
SarrTjfabriel,  said  Palou,  through  a  fertile  land,  inhabited 
by  peaceful  people.  Thus,  in  case  of  necessity,  Alta  CaH- 
fornia  could  receive  help  from  Sonora.  Six  Alta  Cahfornia 
soldiers  were  to  go  as  far  as  the  Colorado  with  Anza  to  ac- 
quaint themselves  with  his  route.  Anza  intended  to  pro- 
pose further  projects  of  conquest  to  Bucarely,  which  Palou 
hoped  that  the  Father  Superior  might  support.  One  of 
these  was  the  establishing  of  a  chain  of  jnissions  from  Sonora 
to  Alta  California  along  the  route  discovered.  Another 
was  for  a  maiLservice_every  two  months,  one  courier  to  go 
from  Alta  California  to  the  Colorado,  receiving  there  the 
mail  brought  from  Altar  by  another.  A  third  project  was 
that  eight  droves  of  mules,  then  idle  in  Sonora  since  the 
Cerro  Prieto  campaign,  should  be  used  for  carrying  grain 
and  provisions  to  Alta  California,  four  of  them  to  go  through 
Sonora  to  the  Colorado,  and  the  other  four  between  there 
and  San  Gabriel.  If  that  were  done,  Alta  California  would 
in  a  few  years  be  able  to  maintain  itself.  A  fourth  Anza 
project  was  to  bring  settlers  from  Sonora  by  the  new  route, 
and  he  was  quite  certain  that  many  would  desire  to  come. 
Finally,  he  meant  to  propose  that  the  Manila  galleon  be 
permitted  to  stop  at  Monterey  or  San  Francisco,  If  the 
king  might  also  permit  it  to  land  some  of  the  goods  that  it 
brought  from  China,  so  that  they  might  be  used  in  trade 
with  Sonora  and  New  Mexico,  that  would  cause  this  fertile 
Alta  California  to  be  settled,  and  would  result  in  the  re- 
duction of  the  natives.  Palou  suggested  that  it  would  be 
a  good  time  to  ask  of  Bucarely  that  the  horses  and  mules 
intrusted  to  the  intendente  of  Sonora  be  sent  to  Alta  Cali- 

32  Garc§s,  Diary,  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  52. 


1774]  THE   FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  285 

fornia;  and  likewise,  every  kind  of  cattle  for  breeding  pur- 
poses. The  missions  might  then  reach  a  permanent  basis, 
for  with  the  good  pasture,  the  abundant  lands  and  waters, 
and  the  good  climate  of  this  country  the  animals  would 
increase  rapidly  and  aid  greatly  in  the  conquest. ^^ 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  arrival  in  Mexico 
in  June,  1774,  of  Anza's  courier,  Valdes,  and  to  the  deposi- 
tion made  by  him  before  Melchor  de  Peramds  on  June  14. 
Such  of  his  answers  as  have  not  already  been  considered 
may  now  be  taken  up.  He  was  one  of  those  sent  by  Anza 
to  San  Diego  for  provisions.  That  port  was  said  to  be  forty 
leagues  from  San  Gabriel,  but  Valdes  believed  that  he  must 
have  gone  sixty,  for  it  took  him  two  days.  He  was  in  San 
Diego  three  days,  and  returned  wdth  laden  animals,  re- 
quiring four  days.^^  The  route  was  a  good  one,  there  being 
many  small  streams  and  three  fordable  rivers  with  tree- 
lined  banks.  The  lands  were  fertile,  for  anything  that  he 
knew  to  the  contrary,  and  there  was  much  game,  bears  and 
birds,  in  that  region.  Monterey  was  usually  reckoned  to 
be  sixty  leagues  from  San  Gabriel,  but  it  was  fully  a  hun- 
dred, as  Valdes  knew,  for  he  had  travelled  that  route  four 
times.  Anza  had  started  for  Monterey  on  April  11,^^  taking 
four  of  his  own  soldiers  and  two  others  from  San  Gabriel  as 
guides.  Diaz  and  two  soldiers  waited  for  him  at  San 
Gabriel  while  the  others,  twelve  soldiers  and  two  mule- 
teers, left  San  Gabriel  on  April  18,^^  and  returned  to  Sonora 
with  Garc^s,  Valdes  being  one  of  this  party.  They  went 
back  by  the  same  route,  except  for  two  short  cuts  by  means 
of  which  they  saved  five  days,  experiencing  no  trouble  with 
the  Indians  on  this  march,  except  that  some  Indians  of  San 
Sebastidn  killed  a  horse  to  get  the  meat.  Palma  received 
them  joyfully,  and  ferried  them  across  the  Colorado  on  a 
raft  that  he  had  built  for  Anza^s  party.  He  had  also  kept 
Anza^s  provisions  and  animals  without  taking  any,  and  the 
cows  had  even  increased  in  number  by  the  birth  of  some 
calves.     The  men  whom  Anza  had  left  there  had  taken 

^  M.N.,  Papeles  de  Lancaster- J  ones,  were  of  little  account.  Anza,  Diary, 
V.  2.  C-2602.  M  April  10,  in  fact. 

**  Anza   stated    that  the    provisions  ^  In  fact,  April  13. 


286      THE   POUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

the  horses  and  returned  to  Altar,  on  hearing  a  rumor  that 
misfortune  had  befallen  Anza^s  party.  Vald^s  and  two  other 
soldiers  had  gone  from  the  rivers  to  Altar,  while  Garces  and 
the  rest  remained  behind,  and  from  Altar  Valdes  had  pro- 
ceeded to  Mexico.^^ 

Bucarely  received  the  news  of  Anza's  success  with  the 
greatest  enthusiasm.  He  exhibits  this  in  a  long  letter  to 
Arriaga  of  June  26,  1774,  announcing  the  discovery,  and 
enclosing  copies  of  Anza^s  San  Gabriel  diary,  his  letters  of 
February  28  and  April  10,  and  the  Vald6s  declaration.  Up 
to  the  Colorado  the  march  had  not  been  difficult,  he  said, 
but  was  so,  afterward,  although  the  mishaps  encountered 
were  only  such  as  were  natural  when  one  was  passing 
through  unknown  lands  without  guides  who  knew  the  way. 
So  his  animals  became  weak,  and  frequently  he  was  unable 
to  find  good  halting  places  with  water  and  pasture.  These 
great  difficulties  were  overcome  by  Anza's  good  judgment, 
and  by  his  own  constancy  and  that  of  his  troops.  But  for 
the  failure  of  his  horses,  he  would  have  reached  San  Gabriel 
with  abundant  provisions  both  for  himself  and  the  settle- 
ments there.  His  leaving  some  animals  and  provisions  with 
Palma  had  involved  some  risk,  but  it  had  worked,  and  this 
appeared  to  Bucarely  especially  noteworthy,  as  also  the 
courageous  spirit  with  which  Anza's  soldiers  had  offered 
repeatedly  to  go  on  foot,  if  necessary.  It  was  not  strange 
that  the  march  was  not  as  direct  as  possible,  since  the  route 
had  never  before  been  traversed  by  Spaniards.  Anza's 
messenger  said  that  five  days  had  been  saved  on  the  return 
journey,  and  it  was  probable  that  more  than  a  third  of  the 
distance  would  be  eliminated  when  the  route  became  better 
known.  At  any  rate,  there  was  no  doubt  but  that  it  was 
better  than  the  one  from  Baja  California.  The  Indians 
along  the  route  were  reported  by  Anza  as  lacking  in  arms 
and  peaceful.  The  Yumas  were  the  most  warlike,  if  any 
might  be  said  to  be  so,  and  they  were  friends  of  the  Span- 
iards. If  they  should  retain  this  feeling,  they  might  facili- 
tate the  erecting  of  missions  and  the  establishing  of  peace 

37  C-2648. 


1774]  THE   FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  287 

in  that  country,  for  the  Yumas  wanted  both,  according  to 
Anza.  Thus,  there  would  be  a  secure  route  from  Sonora  to 
Alta  Cahfornia.  The  sea  route  would  always  be  neces- 
sary, but  the  new  route  would  be  a  more  important  way  for 
assisting  that  land  in  a  contingency,  especially  if  Sonora 
should  prove  able  to  grow  all  kinds  of  produce,  and  if  cul- 
tivation continued  to  increase  in  Sonora  as  it  was  then  doing, 
according  to  the  reports  of  Governor  Crespo.  As  further 
measures  in  connection  with  tjie  new  route  required  careful 
consideration,  he  would  wait  until  Anza  reached  Mexico 
City,  to  which  he  contemplated  coming  upon  his  return. 
Meanwhile,  in  order  to  retain  the  friendship  of  the  Yumas, 
Bucarely  had  ordered  Crespo  to  keep  on  good  terms  with 
Palma,  and  to  cause  others  to  do  so.  Crespo  was  to  tell 
Palma  how  pleased  was  Bucarely  with  his  good  faith,  and 
was  to  give  him  presents,  although  no  arms  or  ammunition. 
Thus  he  might  be  kept  well  disposed  until  such  time  as 
missions  could  be  established  in  his  country,  to  facilitate 
communication  with  the  existing  missions  of  Baja  and  Alta 
California,  and  with  others  to  be  erected  there.  Garces' 
return  to  the  Colorado  was  due,  no  doubt,  to  Anza's  lack  of 
provisions,  for  Anza  had  left  half  of  his  with  Chief  Palma, 
and  there  was  a  scarcity  at  San  Gabriel.  Anza^s  confidence 
in  Palma  had  proved  warranted.  The  latter  had  built  a 
raft,  thus  fulfilling  a  promise  to  Anza,  so  as  to  enable  Anza's 
force  to  cross  the  river.  More  particularly  did  his  good 
faith  show  forth  in  the  return  of  all  the  provisions,  with  an 
increase  in  cattle.  The  peaceful  character  of  the  various 
tribes,  as  appeared  from  Anza^s  accounts,  persuaded  him 
of  the  importance  of  his  discovery,  and  of  the  advantages 
that  might  accrue,  when  communication  should  be  estab- 
lished. Bucarely  suggested  that  Anza  be  made  a  lieu- 
tenant colonel,  and  that  each  soldier  be  given  an  escudo  de 
ventaja  entitling  him  to  extra  pay,^^  not  only  as  a  reward, 
but  also  as  an  incentive  to  others  to  make  explorations  that 
would  bring  the  Spanish  settlements  into  better  communi- 

38  The  soldier  with  an  escudo  de  ventaja  received  an  extra  ducado  per  month. 
Diccionario  universal. 


288      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

cation.^^  Bucarely  evidently  hoped  that  the  Anza  route 
would  become  the  principal  land  route  to  Monterey,  su- 
perseding the  one  from  Loreto,  while  communication  by  sea 
would  continue  to  be  maintained.  Nor  did  Arriaga  fail 
to  be  impressed  by  Anza's  achievements.  He  replied  to 
Bucarely's  letter  of  May  27,  giving  approval  of  what  had 
been  done,  and  making  particular  note  of  the  attentions 
shown  to  Chief  Palma.'*^  He  also  procured  Anza's  pro- 
motion to  lieutenant  colonel,  the  royal  grant  bearing  date 
of  October  4,  1774.^^  He  informed  Bucarely  of  this  in  his 
letter  of  October  8,  stating  also  that  the  escudo  de  ventaja 
requested  by  the  viceroy  had  been  granted  to  those  soldiers 
who  had  so  loyally  accompanied  Anza."*^ 

The  details  of  Anza^s  return  journey  require  but  little 
mention  here.  He  left  Monterey  on  April  22,  going  by  way 
of  San  Gabriel  and  the  route  that  he  had  discovered,  saving 
time  by  cutoffs,  much  as  Garces  had  done.  He  reached  the 
Colorado  River  on  May  10,  left  there  five  days  later,  and 
proceeded  by  way  of  the  Gila  to  Tubac,  arriving  May  26. 
From  there  he  had  intended  to  go  at  once  to  Mexico,  but  was 
prevented  from  so  doing  by  orders  of  the  assistant-inspector, 
Antonio  Bonilla.  Anza  refers  to  Bonilla's  act  and  tells  of 
his  return  march  to  Sonora  in  a  letter  of  June  8  to  Bucarely. 
He  would  have  gone  immediately  to  Mexico,  he  said,  but 
had  been  obliged  to  wait  for  a  review  of  his  presidio  by 
Bonilla.  Shortly  after  the  latter^s  departure  he  sent  Anza 
a  secret  instruction  to  proceed  to  Terrenate.  Anza  went 
there,  and  was  placed  temporarily  in  charge  of  the  presidio 
until  a  new  commander  could  be  brought  from  Janos,  which 
Bonilla  had  promised  to  attend  to  promptly.  Referring  to 
the  events  of  his  stay  in  Alta  California,  he  spoke  of  a  strange 
wreck  that  had  been  found  at  Carmelo.  He  had  bidden 
Fages  to  send  it  to  San  Bias  at  the  first  opportunity,  so  that 
it  might  be  examined  there  to  see  if  it  were  the  lost  San 
Jose,  and  if  not,  as  was  likely,  because  it  was  of  a  type  of 
construction  unknown  to  those  who  had  seen  it,  to  de- 

»  C-2656.  «  C-2737. 

«  Arriaga  to  Bucarely,  Oct.  2,  1774.  «  C-2740. 

C-2735. 


1774]  THE   FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  289 

termine  to  whom  it  had  belonged.  He  remarked  on  the 
scarcity  of  provisions  in  Alta  CaUfornia,  but  said  that  both 
the  troops  and  the  missionaries  were  expecting  early  relief 
through  the  coming  of  boats,  and  the  opening  of  the  Sonora 
route.  All  the  tribes  in  that  country  were  maintaining  ab- 
solute peace.**^ 

Anza's  detention  in  Sonora  is  more  fully  explained  in  a 
letter  by  Bonilla  to  Hugo  Oconor,  July  16,  1774.  Cap- 
tain Jose  de  Vildosola  of  Terrenate  had  been  arrested,  fol- 
lowing a  riot  of  his  troops  due  to  graft  indulged  in  at  their 
expense  by  the  captain  and  habilitado.  In  this  difficulty 
Bonilla  hit  upon  Anza  as  temporary  comjnander,  because 
his  ability  and  agreeable  disposition,  and  his  unusually 
great  knowledge  of  the  character  of  presidial  troops  fitted 
him  to  maintain  order  at  Terrenate,  and  because  he  was 
the  only  officer  then  in  Sonora,  for  Captains  Bernardo  de 
Urrea  and  Gabriel  de  Vildosola  were  habitually  sick,  and  of 
the  subalterns  there  was  scarce  one  capable  enough  to  act 
even  as  habilitado.  Since  Anza  had  the  viceroy's  per- 
mission to  go  to  Mexico  to  report  concerning  his  important 
and  felicitous  discovery,  an  officer  should  be  sent  from 
Nueva  Vizcaya  to  relieve  him,  and  Bonilla  had  taken  it  upon 
himself  to  ask  Governor  Crespo  to  appoint  Lieutenant 
Pedro  de  Tueros.*^  This  makes  it  clear  that  Bonilla's  act 
was  not  due  to  petty  spite,  such  as  Anza  had  to  confront 
on  other  Occasions.  Bucarely,  however,  was  much  dis- 
pleased, although  he  may  not  have  had  full  knowledge  of 
the  motives  that  had  prompted  Bonilla.  Writing  to  Ar- 
riaga,  August  27,  1774,  he  said  that  he  was  persuaded  that 
nothing  in  the  affairs  of  Sonora  was  more  important  than 
what  Anza  had  just  accompHshed,  and  as  he  had  given 
clear  orders  to  Bonilla  to  have  Anza  come  to  Mexico,  there 
ought  to  have  been  no  delay.  Bucarely  had  notified  the 
inspector,  Hugo  Oconor,  how  objectionable  Bonilla's  act 
was  to  him,  and  had  ordered  Governor  Crespo  to  arrange 
immediately  for  the  relief  of  Anza,  so  that  he  might  start 
at  once.     By  reason  of  this  delay^  Bucarely  was  unable  to 

«  C-2642.  44  C-2676. 


290      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

give  further  details  of  Anza's  achievement,  other  than 
what  Anza  had  said  in  his  letter.  He  had  spoken  of  the 
distance  saved  on  the  return  march,  and  of  the  lack  of 
incident  in  passing  through  the  lands  of  the  intervening 
tribes.*^ 

Shortly  afterward  Bucarely  received  Diaz's  diary  of  the 
return  march.  In  his  remitting  letter,  June  12,  1774,  Diaz 
explained  that  he  was  not  coming  to  Mexico  himself,  as  he 
had  originally  planned.  Referring  to  the  expedition,  he 
said  that  the  Indians  of  the  Colorado  and  Gila  were  some- 
what addicted  to  stealing,  but  they  were  very  devoted  to 
the  Spaniards,  and,  he  believed,  would  gladly  permit  of 
Spanish  establishments  in  their  territory.  This  fact  was 
due  not  a  little  to  the  Christian  spirit,  zeal,  prudence,  and 
singularly  good  conduct  of  Anza,  whose  peculiar  talents 
rendered  him  deserving  of  the  pious  attention  and  patron- 
age of  the  viceroy."*^  Copies  of  both  documents  were  for- 
warded to  Arriaga  in  Bucarely's  letter  of  September  26. 
Despite  what  Diaz  had  said,  he  had  been  ordered  to  come 
to  Mexico  to  report  in  person.^^ 

Anza's  diary  of  the  events  of  his  march  from  April  6  on 
was  not  received  by  the  viceroy  until  November,  when  it 
was  presented  by  Anza  himself,  for  he  had  concluded  it 
after  arriving  in  Mexico.  A  copy  was  forwarded  to  Arriaga 
in  Bucarely's  letter  of  November  26.  This  letter  was  con- 
cerned largely  with  Anza's  second  expedition,  which  was  on 
the  point  of  being  ordered,  but  it  had  much  to  say  about 
matters  related  to  the  expedition  just  concluded.  Bucarely 
called  attention  to  the  merits  ofjChi^  Palma,  and  of  the 
Yumas  and  their  neigEbors ;  ""he  noted  the  fertile  lands, 
hitherto  unknown,  which  Anza  had  discovered ;  he  spoke 
of  the  opportunity  for  communication  between  Sonora  and 
Alta  California;  and  he  remarked  on  the  well-grounded 
hope  that  he  had  of  extending  the  king's  rule  and  the  Cath- 
olic faith  over  the  intervening  tribes.  Extension  of  the 
faith,  which  in  Bucarely's  words  '^is  the  primary  intention 
of  His  Majesty  and  the  only  real  object  in  the  expenditures 

«  C-2706.  «  C-2644.  «  C-2721. 


1774]  THE   FIRST  ANZA   EXPEDITION  291 

that  he  makes/ ^  ^^  was  to  be  achieved  by  estabUshing  mis- 
sions, which  would  be  easy,  in  view  of  the  friendship  of  the 
Yumas,  that  tribe  being  the  most  powerful  of  those  en 
route,  and  the  one  by  whose  aid  yet  greater  projects  might 
be  undertaken.  Gifts  and  good  treatment  were  the  neces- 
sary means  of  preserving  this  friendship.  Of  Anza,  Bu- 
carely  spoke  in  the  highest  terms.  He  thought  that  it 
would  be  a  good  occasion  to  stimulate  other  officers  to  like 
services  if  Anza  were  made  a  lieutenant  colonel,  and  again 
suggested  that  an  escvdo  de  ventaja  be  given  to  each  of  the 
soldiers  who  had  displayed  such  constancy  in  accompanying 
him.'*^  Bucarely  did  not  know  that  these  last-nar|ied  rec- 
ommendations had  already  been  acted  on  favorably  by 
Arriaga  in  pursuance  of  an  earlier  suggestion  by  the  vice- 
roy. On  learning  of  this  Bucarely  not  only  attended  to 
the  matter  of  Anza^s  promotion,  but  also  gave  fitting  orders 
to  the  treasury  officials  so  that  the  soldiers  might  receive 
the  extra  pay  to  which  they  were  henceforth  entitled  for 
the  rest  of  their  lives.  In  order  that  the  presidial  troops 
might  understand  how  the  king  rewarded  those  who  dis- 
tinguished themselves  in  the  service,  he  had  ordered  the 
comandante-inspector  to  make  this  event  known  to  all  the 
troops,  so  that  they  too,  inspired  by  this  favor,  might  con- 
duct themselves  with  activity  and  zeal  on  such  occasions  as 
they  should  have  an  opportunity  to  do  so.^°  Seventeen  men 
profited  by  this  arrangement.^^ 

Preparations  for  a  new  expedition  began  at  once  upon 
Anza^s  arrival  in  Mexico.  Arriaga  had  announced  the 
royal  approval  of  the  instructions  given  to  Anza  for  his 
first  expedition  in  his  letter  of  March  9,  1774.^^     Bucarely 

**  It  may  again  be  insisted  that  Espinosa ;  Jos6  Marcos  Ramirez  ;  Juan 
statements  of  this  kind  are  not  to  be  Antonio  Valencia ;  Jo86  Toribio  Corona ; 
taken  seriously,  although  they  might  Juan  Jos6  Rodriguez  ;  Jos6  Maria  Mar- 
proceed  from  a  pious  motive,  such  as  tinez ;  Jos6  Pablo  Corona ;  Francisco 
Bucarely  himself  might  be  expected  Figueroa ;  Juan  Martinez ;  Jos6  An- 
to  feel.  tonio  Acedo ;     Isidro    Martinez ;    Jos6 

*»  C-2764.  Antonio  Romero ;  Pascual  Rivera ;  Juan 

«•  Bucarely  to  Arriaga,  Feb.  24,  1775.  Miguel  Palomino  ;  Jos6  de  Ayala;  and 

C-2861.  Juan    Angel    Castillo.      One    wonders 

"*  The  list,  C-2862,  was  enclosed  in  what  reward  was  accorded  to  that  great 

Bucarely 's  letter  of  Feb.  24,  1775,  cited  traveller     and     worthy    soldier,     Juan 

in  the  previous  note.     The  men  were  :  Bautista  Valdea. 

Corporal   Marcial  Sdnchez ;      Juan  de  « C-2567.     Also  in  C-2496. 


292      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

had  already  determined  on  a  second  expedition  when  he 
received  this  letter,  and  he  ordered  copies  of  it  to  be  drawn 
up  so  that  it  might  appear  in  the  expediente  on  which  the 
ultimate  formal  decision  in  favor  of  the  new  expedition 
should  be  based.^^  The  expedition  was  virtually  already 
ordered.  The  only  remaining  questions  were  :  What  prep- 
arations were  necessary?  What  was  the  expedition  to 
accomplish  ?  These  matters  were  allowed  to  wait,  however, 
until  Anza  reached  Mexico  to  give  his  advice  in  person. 
To  the  first  question  Anza  made  answer  in  his  report  to 
Bucarely  of  November  17.  Judging  from  his  report,  he 
had  already  discussed  the  expedition  verbally  with  Bu- 
carely, for  much  appears  without  previous  documentary 
warning.  Regarding  the  forty  soldiers,  who  were  to  go 
with  him  to  occupy  the  Rio  de  San  Francisco,  men  from 
Culiacdn,  Sinaloa,  and  Fuerte,  Sonora,  would  be  the  best 
adapted  and  the  most  easily  obtained  without  causing 
harm  to  the  region  where  they  lived,  he  said,  and  they  would 
also  receive  more  benefit  than  persons  of  other  places. 
These  people,  whom  Anza  had  just  seen,  were  in  a  state  of 
very  great  poverty  and  misery.  In  order  to  instruct  re- 
cruits in  militaiy, discipline,  Anza  wanted  five^residio_sol:i 
diers,  to  6e  chosen  by  him,  to  serve  as  sergeants  and  cor- 
porals. In  order  to  equip  his  recruits  with  what  they 
needed,  he  suggested  that  they  be  paid  in  clothing;  if  paid 
in  money,  they  would  waste  it  or  lose  it  in  gambling,  a  vice 
to  which  everybody  in  the  frontier  provinces  was  addicted. 
As  the  march  to  the  Rio  de  San  Francisco  was  to  be  by  way 
of  Anza's  route  of  1774,  it  was  indispensable  to  take  along 
soldiers  who  knew  both  the  land  and  the  people,  so  as  to 
aid  Anza  and  to  bring  about  the  consummation  of  the 
expedition  in  peace.  He,  therefore,  asked  permission  to 
take  ten  soldiers  from  Tubac  of  those  who  had  accompanied 
him  in  1774,  their  places  at  Tubac  to  be  filled  by  five  vet- 
erans from  Terrenate  and  five  recruits.  January  would  be 
the  best  time  to  start,  as  the  1774  march  proved,  but  it 
would  mean  too  great  a  delay  to  wait  until  January,  1776,  in 

63  Bucarely,  Decree,  June  30,  1774.     In  C-2496. 


1774]  THE    FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  293 

view  of  Bucarely^s  desire  to  advance  this  expedition  with 
all  possible  speed ;  so  he  thought  that  he  might  be  able  to 
start  from  Sonora  by  September,  1775.  There  would  then 
have  been  some  rain,  which  would  result  in  there  being 
enough  pasture  up  to  the  Colorado,  and  Alta  California 
would  be  entered  at  the  beginning  of  the  rainy  season. 
To  arrive  much  after  the  rain  had  set  in  would  be  harmful, 
because  of  the  great  number  of  mud-holes  that  they  would 
encounter.  Provisions  and  |^ack-mules  could  be  reckoned 
on  the  basis  of  the  1774  expedition.  They  had  enough 
then  for  four  months  for  the  number  of  persons  on  that 
expedition.  The  most  difficult  matter  in  the  preparations 
for  a  new  expedition  would  be  to  obtain  useful  horses  at 
Culiacdn  or  Fuerte,  and  to  get  them  to  Tubac,  which  was 
about  three  hundred  leagues  from  Culiacdn,  This  could 
be  accomplished  only  by  the  viceroy^s  order  to  the  alcaldes 
requiring  them  to  compel  farmers  to  exhibit  and  sell  their 
horses.  If  only  those  for  sale  were  to  be  bought,  it  would 
take  until  July  to  get  the  necessary  number.  If  Bucarely 
should  agree  to  pay  recruits_jnjgQuipJ3^eJ^V-t^6  necessary 
effects  must  be  remitted  without  loss  of  time,  so  as  to  be  in 
Culiacdn  by  the  following  March,  when  Anza  expected  to 
get  there;  Anza  might  then  distribute  them.  Not  only 
the  recruits,  but  also  their  families  would  have  to  be  sup- 
plied with  everything,  from  shoes  on  their  feet  to  ribbons 
in  their  hair.  As  there  might  be  some  desertions,  and  as 
Anza  had  found  that  judges  rarely  gave  due  assistance  in 
such  cases,  he  asked  Bucarely  to  give  him  special  powers 
in  this  and  like  matters.  He  realized  that  Bucarely  was 
very  desirous  that  presents  should  be  given  to  Indians,  al- 
though this  had  rarely  been  done,  and  then  only  to  some 
Indians  of  Chief  Palma's  villages,  wherefore  it  might  be 
well  to  grant  Anza  a  supply  of  tobacco,  and  some  blue,  red, 
yellow,  and  green  glass  beads,  as  presents  in  Bucarely's 
name.  That  would  make  them  attached  to  the  Spaniards, 
whatever  might  occur.  Chief  Palma's  services  were  par- 
ticularly deserving  of  reward  by  some  mark  of  special  favor, 
as,  for  example,  by  the  gift  of  a  long  coat  and  a  cap.^^ 

M  In  C-2496. 


294      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

Plans  for  a  second  expedition  now  went  on  at  a  rapid  rate. 
Bucarely  was  enthusiastic  about  it,  expecting  the  most 
beneficial  results  for  Alta  California,  as  appears  from  the 
remarks  already  alluded  to  in  his  November  26  letter. 
Coming  to  his  plans  for  a  second  expedition,  Bucarely  said 
in  the  same  letter  that  it  was  advisable  to  explore  the  land 
about  San  Francisco,  and  to  place  a  presidio  there,  for  that 
site  ought  by  all  means  to  be  occupied  in  order  to  advance 
the  Spanish  conquests.  Therefore,  he  had  planned  a 
second  expedition  under  Anza  with  a  larger  party,  so  that 
thirty  men  might  be  left  as  an  escort  and  guard  for  two 
new  missions  that  he  planned  to  have  there.  Cows  and 
horses  would  also  be  taken  along,  in  order  that,  by  their 
increase,  the  new  establishments  might  be  advanced.  Re- 
ferring to  Anza  Bucarely  said  that  his  presence,  good  judg- 
ment, and  talents,  which  he  had  now  experienced  in  person, 
confirmed  him  in  the  opinion  that  he  had  formed  of  Anza 
from  the  time  that  he  had  first  proposed  an  expedition. 
Bucarely  believed  him  a  competent,  suitable  person  for 
carrying  out  what  he  hoped  to  accomplish  by  the  new  ex- 
pedition.^^ Two  days  later,  Bucarely  issued  a  decree  au- 
thorizing the  Anza  expedition  and  settling  many  but  not 
all  of  the  details  in  connection  with  it.  The  authorization 
of  the  junta  was  not  asked  on  this  occasion.  The  following 
is  a  translation  of  the  decree : 

"The  enlistments,  by  which  it  is  believed  necessary  to 
increase  [the  force  of]  the  presidio  of  San  Carlos  de  Mon- 
terey in  Alta  California  ^^  are  that  of  a  lieutenant,  a  ser- 
geant, and  twenty-eight  soldiers,  so  as  to  be  able  to  detach 
from  them,  without  prejudice  to  the  existing  force  by  which 
the  missions  [already]  established  are  sustained,  the  number 
that  may  be  needed  for  the  two  new  missions  planned  for 
the  vicinity  of  the  port  of  San  Francisco,  establishing  a 
port  there,  which  may  be  marked  for  occupation,  to  be  a 
base  or  beginning  for  future  explorations.  The  lieutenant 
and  sergeant  are  to  be  chosen  from  the  presidial  troops  of 

"^5  C-2764. 
"  Called  California  Septentrional  in  the  document. 


1774]  THE    FIRST  ANZA   EXPEDITION  295 

Sonora,  and  the  soldiers  who  may  wish  to  go  voluntarily 
to  that  home  are  to  be  chosen  from  the  same  presidios,  pro- 
vided that  their  number  may  not  exceed  eight,  because  of 
the  shortage  that  they  might  cause  in  their  present  home 
[if  more  should  go].  The  other  twenty  are  to  be  recruited  by 
Captain  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza,  for  it  is  he  who  is  to  per- 
form this  new  service  for  the  king,  conducting  them  to 
Monterey  by  the  route  which,  with  so  much  glory,  he  dis- 
covered a  few  months  ago ;  [he  is]  to  deliver  them  to  the 
commandant  of  those  establishments,  Fernando  de  [Rivera 
y]  Moncada ;  [he  is]  to  assist  in  the  exploration  of  the  Rio 
de  San  F£ancisco/so  that  he  may  inform  me  of  what  he  shall 
Kave  seen,  and  [is]  to  return  by  the  same  route  with  the 
ten  soldiers,  whom  he  is  to  take,  chosen  from  [those  of] 
his  presidio ;  besides  [he  is  also  to  bring  back]  those  that 
are  permitted  to  come."  In  accordance  with  this  resolution, 
Juan  Bautista  de  Anza  will  arrange  with  Juan  Jos6  de 
Echeveste  to  draw  up  as  a  continuation  of  this  decree  the 
estimate  of  expenses  to  which  this  measure  will  amount,  so 
that  whatever  is  most  fitting  to  the  service  of  the  king  may 
be  determined,  when  this  is  considered  in  the  junta  de 
guerra  y  real  hacienda.  In  addition  to  the  estimate,  they 
will  make  a  note  of  what  they  beUeve  conducive  to  sup- 
plying the  stores  that  may  have  to  be  prepared.  As  minis- 
ters for  the  new  missions  to  be  established  are  in  Monterey, 
there  is  no  need  to  discuss  taking  missionaries  or  their  sup- 
plies, but  if  it  appear  suitable  that  Father  Garc^s  and  an- 
other [religious  as  a]  companion  go  with  the  expedition 
to  the  Colorado  River,  and  [if  it]  seem  well  that  they 
await  there  the  return  of  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza,  as  he 
[Garces]  did  on  the  first  expedition,  this  captain  will  set 
forth  what  shall  appear  most  fitting  to  him  on  the  point, 
etc."^« 

On  December  1,  in  two  communications  to  the  viceroy, 
Anza  nominated  the  men  that  he  wished  as  lieutenant  and 
sergeant.     He  proposed  as  his  first  choice  for  lieutenant, 

"  Probably  this  refers  to  those  in  Alta  California  who  might  gain  permission  to 
return  from  there.  »  In  C-2496. 


296      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

Jos6  Joaquin  Moraga/®  who  was  in  fact  appointed,^°  and 
served  on  the  expedition.  Anza^s  first  choice  for  sergeant 
was  Jose  Ignacio  Espinosa ;  second,  Antonio  Bravo ;  and 
third,  Pablo  Grijalva.^^  Bucarely  appointed  Espinosa/^ 
but  Grijalva  in  fact  went  on  the  expedition.  On  Decem- 
ber 5  Anza  was  ready  with  the  suggestions  that  Bucarely 
had  called  for  a  week  before,  confining  himself  in  his  report 
to  the  statements  in  Bucarely's  decree.  He  noted  the  num- 
ber of  soldiers  that  he  was  to  take  with  him,  forty  in  all, 
and  he  had  already  proposed  for  lieutenant  and  sergeant  the 
only  men  that  were  suitable.  The  objection  to  taking  eight 
such  presidial  soldiers  as  might  volunteer  was  that  the  sol- 
diers were  so  obedient  to  their  captains  that  they  would 
not  volunteer  without  their  consent,  and  the  captains  would 
not  care  to  get  rid  of  any  but  useless  soldiers  or  those  of 
bad  habits,  who  would  not  assist  Anza  much  in  getting  his 
recruits,  and  whose  bad  habits  might  defeat  the  objects  for 
which  they  were  intended  in  the  new  establishments.  Anza, 
therefore,  asked  permission  to  choose  these  soldiers  him- 
self. The  command  and  the  duties  imposed  on  him  he  ac- 
cepted with  the  greatest  pleasure.  Echeveste  and  Anza 
had  already  conferred  about  expenses,  and  calculated  them 
most  minutely,  estimating  that  they  would  amount  to 
21,927  pesos  and  2  reales,  of  which  the  royal  treasury  had 
6359  pesos  and  4  reales  in  goods  for  the  expedition  and 
provisions  for  Monterey.     That  left  a  total  of  only  15,567 

"In  C-2496.    Anza  explained  that  ^o  Bucarely,    Decree,  Dec.  30,    1774. 

Moraga  was  at  the  time  alferez  of  Fronte-  In  C-2496. 

ras,  and  had  seen  eighteen  years'  service  "^  In  C-2496.  Espinosa  was  a  cor- 
as  a  private  soldier  and  alferez.  He  had  poral  at  Terrenate.  He  had  been 
fulfilled  his  duties  courageously,  and  seventeen  years  in  the  service,  con- 
had  the  distinction  of  having  a  father  ducting  himself  gallantly  in  action, 
who  had  been  killed  in  action,  while  a  and  had  been  wounded  twice.  Bravo 
subaltern  at  the  same  presidio.  Moraga  of  Buena vista  had  served  ten  years, 
was  especially  desired  because  of  his  Grijalva  was  another  Terrenate  cor- 
long  service  as  an  officer,  his  superior  poral  who  had  served  about  as  long  as 
abilities,  and  his  intelligence  in  writing.  Espinosa,  and  was  of  equal  merit  and 
Anza's  second  choice  was  Cayetano  wounds.  Espinosa's  long  service  and 
Limon,  alferez  of  Buenavista,  who  had  greater  intelligence  in  it  made  him 
seen  over  twenty  years  of  service,  work-  Anza's  choice,  although  Espinosa  did 
ing  his  way  up  from  the  ranks,  and  had  not  know  how  to  write  and  the  other 
been  wounded  at  least  twice  in  military  two  did. 

actions.     Moraga     and    Limon     alone  **  Bucarely,  Decree,    Dec.    30,    1774. 

would   fulfill   the   requirements ;  hence  In  C-2496. 
he  made  no  further  proposals. 


1774]  THE   FIRST   ANZA   EXPEDITION  297 

pesos  and  6  reales,  even  estimating  the  various  items  gen- 
erously.^^ As  to  the  collecting  of  stores,  most  of  these  were 
mentioned  in  the  itemized  note  of  expense.  As  for  the  pro- 
visions to  be  obtained  in  Sonora  ready  and  fresh  at  the 
time  of  the  journey,  Anza  suggested  that  Bucarely  order 
the  governor  of  Sonora  to  see  that  they  were  supplied  from 
Horcasitas  and  the  missions  of  Pimeria  Alta,  those  being 
the  easiest  places  from  which  to  get  them.  The  missions 
could  also  sell  cattle  to  the  expedition.  Anza  would  be  too 
busy  recruiting  to  attend  to  the  collection  of  stores,  and 
suggested  the  appointment  of  Miguel  Gregorio  de  Echarri, 
who  had  served  with  credit  in  that  capacity  in  Pitic  dur- 
ing the  military  campaign  in  Sonora.  Anza  again  requested 
that  the  lieutenant,  sergeant,  and  eight  presidial  soldiers  be 
chosen  by  him,  this  being  an  important  preliminary  step 
which  would  assist  in  recruiting.  He  suggested  that  Father 
Pedro  Font  go  on  the  expedition  instead  of  Garces.  The 
former  was  at  one  of  the  Sonora  missions,  and  was  said  to 
know  how  to  take  observations  of  latitude.  In  case  he  were 
designated  to  go,  would  Bucarely  please  send  Anza  the 
necessary  instruments.^^ 

Matters  were  now  nearly  ready  for  presentation  before 
a  junta}^  For  its  consideration,  Bucarely  ordered  a  number 
of  documents  added  to  the  file  of  papers,  to  wit :  the  resolu- 
tion of  the  junta  in  favor  of  the  first  Anza  expedition ;  the 
royal  approval  of  that  undertaking ;  the  diary  of  Anza  for 
the  expedition  ;  and  four  letters  from  Rivera.^®  All  of  these 
documents  except  two  of  the  letters  of  Rivera  have  already 
been  considered.  Rivera  had  reached  Monterey  on  May 
23,  1774,  and  soon  afterward  took  over  the  command  from 
Fages.  His  letters  of  June  16  showing  the  military  weak- 
ness of  the  colony  have  already  been  used  in  another  con- 

•3  A     translation    of     the     itemized  less,  he  felt  quite  sure  of  the  result  of 

account   appears    in    an    appendix    to  its   deliberations.     Again,    there   being 

this  work.  no  mention  in  the  documents  of  this 

^  In  C-2496.  file  of  the  real  relation  of  this  expedi- 

•*  The  junta's  consent  in  this  instance  tion   to   foreign  danger,   there  was  no 

was  probably  little  more  than  a  mere  need  for  secrecy. 

formality.     Bucarely  had  received  per-  «*  Bucarely,   Decree,    Dec.    7,    1774. 

mission  to  dispense  with  it,   and  had  In  C-2496. 
already  ordered  the  expedition.    Doubt- 


298      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XII 

nection.®^  In  one  of  them  he  stated  that  the  founding  of  a 
presidio  and  missions  at  San  Francisco,  with  which  he  had 
been  charged,  would  be  impossible  without  reinforcements. 
On  October  8  Rivera  again  wrote  two  letters,  even  more  to 
the  point.  In  one  of  them  he  said  that  the  families  which 
he  had  left  at  Velicatd  had  not  yet  arrived,  but  that  he 
was  expecting  them  soon.  Consequently,  he  was  permit- 
ting five  soldiers  to  return  to  San  Bias.  He  was  in  doubt 
what  to  do  with  six  deserters  who  had  been  captured,  but 
he  was  inclined  to  give  them  their  liberty,  because  the 
Indian  women  were  very  depraved,  and  they  and  the  Indian 
men  needed  to  be  punished,  Rivera's  intimation  being  that 
that  necessitated  all  the  force  that  he  could  muster.  He 
went  on  to  say,  that  his  troops  were  too  few  to  found  a 
mission  at  San  Francisco  unless  the  presidio  were  to  be 
moved  there ;  but  if  that  were  done  there  would  be  too  long 
a  stretch  of  country  to  defend,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to 
succor  the  missions  left  behind,  when  occasion  should  de- 
mand. The  Indians,  however,  were  quiet. ^^  In  his  second 
letter  he  expressed  a  desire  to  see  an  advancement  of  the 
establishments  under  his  command,  and  said  that  he  had 
written  repeatedly  to  Bucarely  that  there  must  be  new 
buildings  and  more  laborers  if  it  were  to  occur.  There  were 
only  nine  laborers  at  the  time.^^  On  December  16,  1774,  a 
junta  considered  the  question  of  Anza's  second  expedition.^** 
After  reciting  the  various  documents  before  it,  the  junta 
proceeded  to  its  resolution,  which  amounted  to  a  complete 
acquiescence  in  the  plans  of  Anza  and  Bucarely ."^^ 

On  receipt  of  a  royal  order  of  September  22,  1774,  ap- 
proving Bucarely's  acts  for  establishing  missions  in  Alta 
California,   especially  two  at  the  port  of  San  Francisco, 

«7  Supra,  chap.  XI.  at  the  one  of  September  9,  1773.     Two 

*  In  C-2496.  new    names    appear :     Antonio     Villa- 

*  Ibid.  Urrutia,   of   the  viceroy's   council   and 
7"  Of  those  in  the  junta  of  September  subdecano  in  the  Audiencia  of  Mexico  ; 

9,   1773,  which  had  authorized  Anza's  and  Ignacio  Negreiros,  gentleman  of  the 

first    expedition,    the    following    were  order   of   Santiago.     Jos6   de    Gorrdez, 

present    at    this    meeting :     Bucarely ;  the    viceroy's    secretary,    also    signed, 

Valcircel ;    Areche ;    Barroeta ;    Abad  ;  although  not  a  member  of  the  junta. 

Toral  or  Vald6s ;    Gutierrez  ;   Mangino ;  ^^  In  C-2496.     A  translation  of  the 

and  Arce.     Mesia  had  been  present  at  document  is  given  in  an  appendix, 
the  junta  of  October  17,  1772,  but  not 


1774]  THE   FIRST  ANZA   EXPEDITION  299 

Bucarely  replied,  December  27,  1774,  telling  what  he  had 
done  to  bring  that  about.  Recognizing  its  importance  he 
had  planned  a  second  expedition  under  Anza  by  way  of  the 
Gila  and  Colorado  rivers.  Anza  was  to  take  as  many 
soldiers  as  were  necessary  for  an  escort  to  the  two  new 
missions,  and  was  to  erect  a  monument  to  indicate  that  the 
land  belonged  to  the  king  of  Spain.  This  matter,  which 
Bucarely  deemed  indispensable,  was  about  to  be  accom- 
plished as  a  result  of  the  resolutions  of  the  junta,  of  which 
Bucarely  enclosed  a  copy,  that  document  showing  that 
Anza  was  to  get  thirty  recruits,  married  men^  if  p^^^ 
and  to  take  them  and  their  families^to  the  port  of  San 
Francisco,  with  a  view  to  founding  a  goodly  colony  there, 
not  only  to  guard  the  land,  but  also  to  serve  as  a  base  for 
future  settlements.  For  that  reason,  Bucarely  had  granted 
to  these  settlers  the  utensils,  clothing,  and  other  things 
which  Anza  represented  as  necessary.  Anza  would  also 
take  ten  soldiers  from  Tubac,  who  would  return  with  him 
by  the  same  route  as  before,  after  which  Anza  would  re- 
port in  detail.  Fathers  Garces  and  Font  would  go,  —  the 
former  to  the  Colorado  River,  there  to  await  Anza's  re- 
turn, and  the  latter  all  the  way,  to  observe  latitudes.  Bu- 
carely had  left  the  erecting  of  missions  at  the  port  of  San 
Francisco  to  Serra,  and  had  instructed  Rivera  to  lend  his 
aid.  He  had  also  pointed  out  that  a  fort  should  be  es- 
tablished at  each  of  the  new  missions,  not  far  from  the 
coast."^^  The  pious  fund  was  to  contribute  12,000  pesos  to 
the  Department  of  San  Bias,  of  which  1000  each  was  for 
the  two  missions,  and  the  treasury  would  have  to  pay  the 
rest,  which  Bucarely  had  ordered.  The  ministers  were  to 
be  taken  from  the  supernumerary  religious  in  Alta  Cal- 
ifornia. Strict  expense  accounts  would  be  kept  of  the  cost 
of  the  expedition.^^  Apprised  of  this  new  project,  Arriaga 
replied  sustaining  Bucarely,  as  usual  in  his  plans  of  con- 
quest."^^ 

With  the  authorization  of  the  expedition,   and  Anza's 

'2  In  other  documents  Bucarely  re-  '''  C-2781. 

ferred  to  a  single  fort,  which  he  planned  ''*■  Arriaga  to  Bucarely,  May  15, 1775. 

to  establish  between  the  two  missions.         C-2912. 


300      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XII 

departure  from  Mexico  City,  little  more  could  be  done  by 
Bucarely  from  the  Sonora  end  relative  to  the  objects  to  be 
accomplished  by  the  expedition,  for  it  would  be  nearly  a 
year  before  it  could  start,  and  news  of  its  departure  would 
be  several  months  more  in  reaching  Mexico.  Bucarely 
was  able,  therefore,  to  occupy  himself  in  other  ways  con- 
ducing to  the  same  end.  This  was  the  time  when  naval 
activities  were  especially  prominent,  some  account  of  which 
was  given  in  a  previous  chapter.  Also  there  were  affairs 
in  the  two  Californias  and  in  the  frontier  provinces,  related 
more  or  less  directly  to  northwestward  advance,  demanding 
his  attention. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

CONDITIONS    IN    SONORA    AND    BAJA    CALIFORNIA,    1773-1776 

Before  proceeding  to  the  details  of  the  second  Anza  and 
other  expeditions  having  to  do  with  the  estabHshing  of 
overland  communications  between  Alta  California  and  So- 
nora  or  New  Mexico,  it  seems  necessary  to  give  an  account 
of  affairs  in  the  regions  adjoining  the  new  province,  for 
they  have  a  bearing  on  the  objects  to  be  achieved  by  the 
Anza  expedition.  A  full  statement  will  not  be  attempted ; 
rather,  just  enough  will  be  given  to  indicate  the  course  of 
events  in  those  provinces  which  would  tend  to  the  disad- 
vantage of  Alta  California,  unless  circumvented  or  con- 
trolled. In  Sonora,  affairs  were  unsettled  throughout  this 
period,  both  because  of  Apache  raids  from  the  outside,  and 
because  of  minor  internal  uprisings.  While  the  evils  were 
not  eradicated,  and  even  tended  to  become  worse,  the 
province  never  got  beyond  control  under  Bucarely's  rule. 
The  interest  in  Baja  California  is  in  its  material  develop- 
ment, in  order  to  judge  whether  it  might  have  become  a 
source  of  supply  for  Alta  California  in  provisions,  domestic 
animals,  and  men,  or  even  have  been  able  to  serve  as  a 
suitable  route  to  the  new  province.  There  is  nothing  in 
the  history  of  the  period,  however,  to  show  that  the  penin- 
sula had  changed.  In  fine,  the  need  for  an  overland  route, 
with  all  of  the  activity  in  Sonora  and  along  the  route,  that 
its  maintenance  would  involve,  was  as  great  as  ever,  if 
Alta  California  were  to  achieve  a  state  of  populous  settle 
ment. 


Some  mention  has  been  made  of  the  task  assigned  to 
Hugo  Oconor  to  establish  a  line  of  frontier  presidios,  inspect     \     (^ 

301 


302     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIII 

/I  *^^^^  existing  at  the  time,  and  combat  the  Apaches,  mat- 
![  ters  which  were  the  most  important  internal  problem  in 
I  i  the  region  from  Sonora  to  Texas  in  the  years  1773-76. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  follow  Oconor's  course  in  detail.  He 
began  at  the  eastern  end  of  his  field  and  proceeded  west- 
ward, although  the  whole  frontier  was  under  his  rule.  Con- 
tinually annoyed  by  attacks  of  the  Apaches,  it  was  natural 
that  Oconor  should  desire  to  chastise  them;  so,  early  in 
1774,  he  informed  Bucarely  that  he  was  going  to  sally 
forth  against  them,  enclosing  a  plan  of  campaign.  Bu- 
carely replied,  telHng  Oconor  that  he  should  complete  the 
line  of  presidios  first,  that  task  taking  precedence  over  any 
other,  and  should  dislodge  the  Indians  from  the  land  in- 
tervening between  the  line  and  the  Spanish  towns ;  other- 
wise, Oconor's  success  on  campaign  would  be  doubtful,  or 
if  attained,  might  prejudice  the  results  already  achieved 
elsewhere  by  him.  Moreover,  if  the  enemy  should  cease 
to  molest  the  provinces,  a  policy  of  kindliness  and  good 
treatment  should  be  employed  toward  them,  rather  than 
offensive  war.  Nevertheless,  Oconor  went  on  with  his 
preparations,  and  wrote  to  Bucarely  on  March  20  that  he 
was  going  to  Coahuila  with  fifty  men,  leaving  Antonio 
Bonilla  to  inspect  the  presidios  of  Sonora.  Afterward, 
they  would  meet  at  Carrizal,  and  agree  on  measures  for  a 
campaign,  of  the  advantages  of  which  he  was  unalterably 
convinced.  Bucarely  thereupon  reiterated  his  commands, 
adding  further  reasons  in  support  of  them.  After  the 
Sonora  presidios  should  be  moved  to  the  new  sites  that 
they  were  to  occupy  as  part  of  the  line,  it  would  be  well  to 
await  the  results  of  Anza^s  expedition  (for  Anza  was  at  this 
time  engaged  on  his  first  expedition),  so  as  to  avail  them- 
selves of  the  information  that  he  might  supply,  and  so  as 
not  to  put  any  obstacle  in  the  way  of  his  return,  which  might 
be  the  result,  if  the  campaign  were  opened  beforehand. 
Finally,  Bucarely  reminded  Oconor  that  his  commission  had 
to  do  with  all  of  the  frontier  provinces,  and  not  merely  with 
a  small  portion.  A  successful  issue  of  the  campaign  would 
be  more  certain,  if  the  line  were  occupied,  when   the   pre- 


1773]  CONDITIONS   IN   SONORA  303 

sidial  garrisons,  freed  from  other  tasks,  might  not  only 
defend  their  territory,  but  also  take  the  offensive.  Bu- 
carely  was  especially  insistent  on  his  opinion  because  of  the 
expedition  of  Anza.  He  had  learned  of  the  coming^of 
Tarabal,  which  made  it  appear  certain  that  Anza  would 
succeed,  and  he  did  not  wish  a  campaign  started  before  his 
return,  for  fear  that  the  enemy,  by  themselves  or  by  stir- 
ring up  others,  might  prevent  the  discoveries  which  seemed 
likely  to  be  made.  Such  was  the  tenor  of  Bucarely's  letter 
of  April  26  to  Arriaga,  reviewing  the  whole  matter,^  and 
the  latter  returned  a  specific  approval  of  the  instructions 
given  to  Oconor  checking  his  desire  to  go  on  campaign.^ 

The  Apaches  continued  their  bold  attacks,  even  in  Sonora. 
A  letter  of  Bonilla,  May  3,  1774,  said  that  large  bands  of 
Apaches  had  recently  entered  that  province,  and  they  had 
twice  attacked  a  detachment  of  ten  men  going  from  Terre- 
nate  to  relieve  the  garrison  of  Tubac.  The  Spaniards 
had  defended  themselves  in  such  a  manner  that  they  lost 
but  two  horses,  and  one  soldier  was  slightly  wounded. 
This  account  appeared  in  the  report  for  June  of  news  re- 
ceived from  the  frontier  provinces,^  which  was  forwarded 
to  Spain  with  the  viceroy's  letter  of  June  26.*  The  report 
for  August  contained  better  news.  Bonilla  had  reviewed 
all  of  the  presidios,  and  sites  for  the  new  line  had  been 
chosen.  The  Apaches  were  giving  no  trouble,  having  with- 
drawn from  the  province.^  Bucarely's  letter  of  August  27 
enclosed  this  report.^  The  same  day  he  wrote  another 
letter  in  which  he  seemed  now  more  ready  to  consider  the 
idea  of  a  campaign.  Everything  was  quiet  in  the  frontier 
provinces.  Oconor  was  still  running  the  line  of  presidios 
in  Coahuila  and  Nueva  Vizcaya.  If  there  were  now  no 
enemies  south  of  the  line,  an  offensive  campaign  beyond 
it  might  be  considered  in  order  to  compel  the  submission  or 
withdrawal  of  the  Apaches  far  into  the  interior,  so  that 
they  might  not  continue  their  assaults  with  such  frequency. 

^  C-2607.  were  summaries  of  the  most  prominent 

2  Arriaga    to    Bucarelyi     Aug.     13,  happenings  of  the  frontier. 
1774.     C-2705.  *  C-2658. 

8C-2659.      The     monthly     reports  «*  C-2708.  •C-2707. 


304     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIII 

Anza  was  coming  to  Mexico,  and  with  the  detailed  account 
of  his  expedition  Bucarely  would  know  what  changes  were 
necessary  in  the  reglamento  of  presidios,  although  Anza^s 
report  of  the  peaceful  character  of  the  tribes  along  his  line 
of  march  led  the  viceroy  to  believe  that  very  little  or  no 
change  would  be  required.  The  reviews  made  of  the 
Sonora  presidios  should  contribute  much  to  the  final  ar- 
rangement to  be  made.  Bucarely  closed,  saying  that 
among  the  duties  of  his  command  those  concerning  the 
frontier  provinces  held  first  place  in  interest.^  Bucarely 
was  mistaken  as  to  the  peaceful  character  of  the  Yumas, 
but  he  was  not  in  error  long,  as  is  shown  by  his  later  recom- 
mendations for  missions  and  presidios  in  that  country. 

The  never-ending  ebb  and  flow  of  the  Apaches  brought 
fresh  danger  to  Sonora,  early  in  1775.  Writing  to  Arriaga, 
March  27,  ,1775,  Bucarely  said  that  the  Apaches  of  the 
Gila  had  merely  pretended  to  make  peace,  and  measures 
had  been  necessary  requiring  the  troops  to  be  on  the  watch 
to  check  their  attacks.^  Meanwhile,  Oconor  had  to  com- 
bat an  enemy  every  bit  as  powerful  as  the  Apaches,  — 
graft.  In  this  period  occurred  the  incidents  connected  with 
the  names  of  Captains  Vildosola  ^  and  Tovar  ^°  already 
mentioned.  The  Tovar  case  arose  as  a  result  of  Oconor's 
review  of  the  presidio  of  Terrenate,^^  proceedings  against 
Tovar  being  held,^^  and,  as  we  have  seen,  his  dismissal  from 
the  service  recommended.  The  report  for  November, 
1775,^^  forwarded  by  the  viceroy  in  a  letter  of  the  26th,^* 
contained  an  account  of  the  discovery  of  new  mines  at 
Cieneguilla.  In  another  letter  of  November  26  Bucarely 
told  of  the  measures  taken  by  Pedro  Tueros,  in  command 
at  Cieneguilla,  and  by  himself  for  the  despatch  of  more 
troops  to  that  place.^^  Gdlvez  approved,  and  suggested  as 
an  encouragement  to  miners  that  the  duty  on  gold  be  low- 
ered in  Sonora  and  Sinaloa,  and  that  a  junta  be  called  to 
consider  granting  this  reduction.^^ 

7  C-2709.                                8  C-2878.  "  C-3038. 

'Referred    to    in  chapters   VI  and  i*  C-3037.                              "0-3039. 

XII.             ">  Referred  to  in  chapter  VI.  i«  Gdlvez  to  Bucarely,  Mar.  22,  1776. 

"C-2904.              \                 "C-2933.  C-3173. 


1773]  CONDITIONS   IN   SONORA  305 

Indians  living  in  Sonora  caused  some  uneasiness  in  1776. 
Writing,  March  27,  Bucarely  said  that  Father  Antonio 
Ramos  of  Saric  thought  that  the  Pimas  were  preparing  an 
uprising,  for  they  were  having  meetings  and  war  dances. 
Governor  Crespo  was  alarmed  by  these  rumors,  but  neither 
Oconor  nor  Vildosola  gave  them  credence,  because  no  rob- 
beries or  murders  had  been  committed.  Bucarely  was 
persuaded  by  them  that  there  was  nothing  to  worry  about.^^ 
Gdlvez  was  suspicious,  however,  and  wrote  Bucarely,  July 
8,  1776,  to  watch  the  conduct  of  the  Pimas.^^  The  report 
for  April,^^  forwarded  by  Bucarely  the  26th  of  that  month,^^ 
showed  that  a  number  of  robberies  had  been  committed, 
but  held  that  no  serious  uprising  was  likely  to  occur.  Re- 
ferring to  affairs  at  Cieneguilla  in  another  letter  of  the  same 
date  Bucarely  said  that  Tueros  was  clamoring  for  more 
troops.  Oconor  had  promised  to  send  twenty  soldiers,  and 
Bucarely  had  reiterated  the  necessity  of  so  doing.^^  Gdlvez's 
reply  of  July  26  charged  the  viceroy  to  exercise  the  greatest 
care  to  guard  those  dwelling  at  the  mines  of  Sonora. ^^  Tueros 
was  continuing  to  call  for  more  troops,  wrote  Bucarely, 
June  26,  and  as  a  royal  order  had  required  that  he  should 
have  as  many  as  he  might  ask  for,  Bucarely  had  given 
fresh  orders  to  that  effect  to  Oconor.  Meanwhile,  the 
presidios  of  Terrenate  and  Fronteras  were  being  trans- 
ferred to  their  new  sites  at  Santa  Cruz  and  San  Bernardino, 
and  it  was  expected  that  the  change  would  check  the  ex- 
cesses and  robberies  being  committed,  especially  in  the 
vicinity  of  Cieneguilla.^^  Galvez's  reply,  October  18,  1776, 
repeated  the  royal  order  to  supply  troops  to  Tueros.^*  Tue- 
ros' apprehension  seems  not  to  have  been  shared  by  other 
officers  on  the  frontier.  Crespo  wrote  Oconor,  July  3,  1776, 
that  Tueros  did  not  need  the  troops  he  was  asking  for, 
saying  that  the  road  from  Cieneguilla  to  Horcasitas  was 
entirely  free  from  danger.^^  Oconor  informed  Bucarely, 
August  9,  1776,  that  he  would  send  the  troops  asked  for 
by  Tueros,  although  he  believed  that  they  were  not  needed.^® 


"  c-3180. 
»  C-3205. 
21  C-3206. 

18  C-3268. 
so  C-3204. 

22  C-3280. 
^  C-3346. 
2»£;-3292. 

M  C-3260. 
25  C-3266. 

X 

306     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIII 

This  information  was  passed  on  to  Gdlvez  by  Bucarely's 
letter  of  September  26,^^  but  did  not  change  the  opinion  of 
the  ministro  general,  who  in  due  course  forwarded  his  ap- 
proval of  what  had  been  done  in  the  matter.^^ 

The  Indian  question,  however,  was  gradually  becoming 
more  serious.  Tovar  soon  achieved  further  discredit. 
He  had  already  been  removed  as  useless  and  prejudicial  to 
the  service,  but  was  still  in  command  at  Santa  Cruz  (the 
new  site  of  Terrenate),  not  having  been  relieved.  At- 
tacked by  a  band  of  Apaches,  July  7,  1776,  he  ordered  his 
troops  to  fight  on  foot,  although  the  horses  were  in  good 
condition.  To  this  was  ascribed  the  ensuing  disaster,  for 
Tovar  and  twenty-five  others  were  killed,  eight  soldiers 
and  one  Opata  alone  escaping.  An  account  appeared  in 
the  report  for  September,^®  which  was  forwarded  by  Bucarely 
on  the  26th.^^  G^lvez  expressed  great  regret  that  the  lack 
of  skill  and  bad  conduct  of  Tovar  should  have  caused  such 
loss  of  life.^^  In  accord  with  Oconor's  recommendation  of 
July  6,  1775,^^  it  had  been  decided  to  do  away  with  Sonora's 
"flying  company,"  but  the  Tovar  disaster  caused  Bucarely 
to  postpone  such  action  for  a  time,  lest  the  Indians  might 
have  become  emboldened.  Thirteen  men  had  already 
been  detached  from  it,  and  sent  to  Santa  Cruz.^^  This 
decision  received  Gdlvez's  approval,  with  the  condition, 
however,  that  the  company  be  disbanded,  as  soon  as  the 
present  exigency  should  pass.^^ 

On  receipt  of  Gdlvez^s  letter  of  July  8,  1776,  about  the 
Pimas,  Bucarely  reasserted  that  there  was  slight  foundation 
to  expect  an  uprising  at  Saric.  His  chief  concern  in  Sonora 
was  to  develop  the  province  and  to  furnish  it  with  pro- 
tection from  the  Apaches.^^  He  was  mistaken,  however,  as 
to  the  Pimas.  The  report  for  the  next  month,  November, 
contained  news  that  certain  Pimas  were  in  revolt,  although 
there  was  favorable  news  to  counterbalance  the  bad.     The 

«  C-3327.  S3  Bucarely  to  Gdlvez,  Sept.  26, 1776. 

M  Gdlvez  to  Bucarely,  Jan.  12,  1777.  C-3328. 
C-3462.  34  Gdlvez  to  Bucarely,  Jan.  9,  1777. 

» C-3326.  C-3460. 

30  C-3325.  36  Bucarely  to  Gdlvez,  Oct.  27,  1776. 

81 C-3403.  32  C-2949.  C-3358. 


1773]  CONDITIONS   IN   SONORA  307 

Seris  had  attacked  the  rebellious  Pimas  and  had  killed  two, 
while  the  Indians  of  Pitic  had  attacked  a  small  group  of 
Apaches  and  killed  one.  This  was  caused  in  each  case  by 
the  rebellious  Indians  who  stole  horses  from  those  who 
later  attacked  them.  Less  pleasing  was  the  note  that  1000 
pesos^  worth  of  damage  had  been  caused  by  an  Indian  at- 
tack on  the  provision  train  going  to  Cieneguilla.^®  Bucarely 
forwarded  the  report  on  November  26,^^  and  in  another 
letter  of  that  date  commented  joyfully  on  the  news  of  the 
counter-attacks  by  Sonora  Indians.^^  Indeed,  it  was  un- 
usual to  find  Seris  fighting  Spain's  enemies.  In  the  same 
month,  November,  the  long-predicted  outbreak  in  the 
vicinity  of  Saric  occurred.  A  party  of  Seris,  Pimas,  and 
Apaches  first  wrought  havoc  at  Magdalena  mission  and 
then  at  Saric,  killing  a  number  of  persons,  plundering  and 
burning,  and  driving  off  cattle.  The  savages  were  pursued, 
but  escaped. 

It  does  not  seem  worth  while  to  go  into  equal  detail  with 
regard  to  the  affairs  of  New  Mexico  and  the  other  frontier 
provinces  as  in  the  case  of  Sonora.  In  the  first  named, 
conditions  seem  to  have  continued  much  as  before.  In 
Nueva  Viz  cay  a  and  the  more  easterly  provinces  Apache 
warfare  went  on  as  it  did  in  Sonora.  Sonora  had  experi- 
enced difficulties  during  the  period  of  the  Anza  expeditions, 
but  Bucarely  and  Oconor  had  been  able  to  keep  matters  in 
hand.  In  late  1776  the  situation  was  getting  worse,  but  in 
all  probability  they  would  have  handled  it  as  capably  as 
on  previous  occasions,  without  giving  up  projects  of  fron- 
tier extension  to  the  northwest.  These  disorders,  however, 
were  to  be  a  legacy  to  the  comandancia  general,  established 
by  the  royal  order  of  August  22,  1776.^^  Teodoro  de  Croix, 
the  first  comandante  general,  arrived  in  Mexico  on  January 
22,  1777.^^  By  that  time  the  immediate  effects  of  the  Anza 
expeditions  had  been  achieved.  The  question  whether 
they  were  to  be  followed  up,  and  related  matters,  like  the 

w  C-3376.  Reference  to  the  legajo  of  the  Archivo 

"  C-3375.  General  de  Indias  has  been  lost.     Bu- 

=«  C-3377.  39  C-3293.        carely  wrote  on  January  27  that  Croix 

*o  Croix   to  Gdlvez,    Jan.  26,    1777.        was  already  in  Mexico.     C-3469. 


308     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIII 

Indian  wars  of  Sonora,  were  henceforth  in  the  decision  of 
Croix. 

Baja  CaHfomia  could  not  be  other  than  the  sterile  penin- 
sula^ that  it  always  had  been;  yet,  some  advance  in  its 
prosperity  may  be  noted  in  this  period,  although  not  enough 
to  change  the  situation  as  regards  the  needs  of  Alta  Cali- 
fornia for  a  better  supply-route.  As  for  the  events  of  the 
period  there  is  Httle  beyond  the  persistent  quarrels  of  the 
governor  with  the  rehgious,  and  the  installation  of  the 
Dominican  order,  in  May,  1773,  as  successor  of  the  Francis- 
can in  mission  work.  The  Indians  continued  to  be  as  tract- 
able as  before,  and  very  Httle  show  of  miHtary  force  was  re- 
quired. The  principal  interest  in  the  province  for  our 
purposes  consists  in  an  indication  of  its  material  progress. 
At  the  time  of  the  deUvery  of  the  missions  to  the  Domini- 
cans there  were  fourteen  such  establishments.  With  a  letter 
of  September  26,  1773,*^  Bucarely  forwarded  to  Arriaga 
an  estado  showing  the  number  of  persons  and  domestic 
animals  at  eight  of  the  missions  at  the  time  of  the  transfer 
to  Dominican  rule.**  Two  months  later  *^  he  added  like 
data  for  four  other  missions.**  Not  until  September  26, 
1774,*^  was  he  able  to  supply  that  information  for  the  re- 
maining two  missions.**  Having  by  that  date  information 
of  the  fourteen  missions  given  up  by  the  Franciscans,  he 
enclosed  an  estado  embracing  all  of  them.*^  The  figures 
follow : 

From  these  figures  it  appears  that  there  was  a  total  of 
4268  persons  and  14,716  domestic  animals  in  the  Baja 
California  missions  in  May,  1773.  An  estimate  of  the 
land  under  cultivation  and  the  annual  amount  of  the  agri- 
cultural produce  at  the  missions  was  not  made  at  this  time, 
but  Bucarely 's  September  26  letter  stated  that  orders  had 
been  given  to  include  such  information  in  future.  The 
figures  of  the  estado  give  some  idea  of  the  relative  importance 
of  the  missions. 

«  C-2393.  «  C-2439. 

«  C-2394.  •  C-2722. 

« C-2438.  <•  C-2724.  «^  C-2723. 


1773] 


CONDITIONS  IN  BAJA  CALIFORNIA 


309 


Missions 


S.  F.  Javier  Viaund6 
N.  S.  de  Guadalupe 
N.  S.  de  Loreto   .    . 
Santa  Gertrudis  .     . 
Santa  Rosalia  Mulege 
Purisima  Concepci6n 
San  Jos^  Comondti 
San  Ignacio     .     .     . 
S.  F.  de  Borja      .     . 
San  Jos^  del  Cabo  . 
Santiago  de  las  Coxas      .    . 
N.  S.  del  Pilar  6  Todos  Santos 

S.  F.  de  VeHeat^ 

Santa  Maria  de  los  Angeles 
Totals  .... 


Men 


139 

96 

103 

462 

82 

89 

155 

173 

533 

34 

47 

93 

176 

167 


2349 


Women 


140 

73 

84 

338 

83 

71 

127 

141 

467 

17 

28 

80 

120 

150 


1919 


Cows 


89 

120 

0 

196 

32 

64 

47 

125 

648 

64 

22 

703 

78 

8 


2196 


AND 

MrriiES 


115 

178 

170 

253 

47 

117 

292 

165 

387 

143 

257 

600 

13 

55 


2792 


Sheep 


396 

0 

110 

232 

243 

1413 

558 

2343 

63 

90 

153 

71 

0 


6270 


Goats 


195 

500 

0 

320 

407 

193 

249 

194 

1003 

51 

75 

131 


3403  55 


Pios 


13 
4 
0 
0 
0 
2 

20 
0 
0 
0 
0 

16 
0 
0 


Before  the  end  of  1773  Father  Mora  made  a  tour  of  the 
northern  missions  of  his  province/^  inspecting  them  and 
leaving  instructions  for  their  spiritual  and  temporal  man- 
agement.^® In  reporting  this  to  Arriaga,  June  26,  1774, 
Bucarely  remarked  that  it  was  clear  from  Mora's  narrative 
that  the  regions  visited  by  him  were  not  so  fertile  and  well 
favored  as  was  the  case  with  Alta  California,  but  the  mis- 
sions were  useful,  for  progress  in  conversions  was  being 
made.  A  new  mission  was  planned  by  the  Dominicans.^® 
Arriaga  expressed  the  royal  pleasure  at  hearing  this  news  and 
approved  the  plan  to  found  a  mission. ^^  By  the  end  of  June, 
1774,  there  were  still  fourteen  missions.  The  total  number 
of  persons  had  increased  in  the  course  of  a  year,  but  that  of 
domestic  animals  was  less,  the  figures  being  4340  and  14,558 
respectively.^^  Bucarely  announced  this  to  Arriaga,  Febru- 
ary 24,  1775.^^ 

In  a  letter  of  May  27,  1775,^^  Bucarely  forwarded  the 
monthly  report,  which  in  this  case  bore  encouraging  news  of 
mission  progress  in  Baja  California.     Before  the  end  of  the 

Nov.     4-Dec.     20, 


*»  Diary,  Nov.  4-Dec.  20,  1773. 
C-2424. 

«  For  the  instructions,  C-2501. 

w  C-2657. 

"  Arriaga  to  Bucarely,  Oct.  12,  1774. 
C-2745. 

"From    the    estado,    C-2859,     and 


extracto,  C-2860,  of  Melchor  de  Pera- 
m&a.  Of  the  persons,  2428  were  male 
and  1912  female.  There  were  2616 
cows,  1896  horses,  839  mules,  6206 
sheep,  2931  goats,  and  77  pigs. 

M  C-2858. 

"  C-2919. 


310     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIII 

year  1774  Mora  had  selected  Vinadaco,  because  of  its  fer- 
tility, as  a  good  site  for  the  new  mission,  and  one  religious 
had  been  sent  there.  Neve's  letter  of  March  23  stated  that 
a  crop  of  200  fanegas  (320  bushels)  of  grain  had  been  raised 
and  150  Indians  brought  under  mission  rule,  and  yet  fur- 
ther progress  was  expected.  A  triumph  had  been  obtained 
at  Velicata.  The  Indians  of  San  Juan  de  Dios,  near  there, 
had  always  refused  to  receive  the  Christian  faith,  but  re- 
cently the  whole  village  of  eighty  persons  had  accepted  con- 
version. Later,  the  chief  of  a  coast  village  and  fifty-two 
others  had  asked  for  baptism,  and  the  chief  had  promised 
to  bring  in  the  rest  of  his  following. ^^  The  viceroy's  letter 
of  February  26,  1776,^^  contained  an  estado  showing  in  de- 
tail the  persons,  animals,  and  this  time  the  crops  at  fourteen 
of  the  fifteen  missions  in  existence  at  the  close  of  June,  1775. 
Despite  optimistic  reports  the  province  had  remained  prac- 
tically stationary,  although  as  before  the  number  of  persons 
had  increased  slightly,  and  that  of  the  animals  had  fallen 
away.  There  were  4423  persons  and  14,036  animals.  Re- 
ports concerning  agricultural  wealth  were  received  from 
only  eleven  of  the  missions.  These  had  raised  2230  fanegas 
(3568  bushels)  of  wheat,  while  some  of  them  had  raised 
small  quantities  of  other  produce.^^ 

Bucarely's  letters  of  May  27,^^  and  July  27,  1777,^^  may  be 
taken  together  for  data  as  to  fourteen  of  the  fifteen  mis- 
sions at  the  close  of  the  year  1776.  In  the  May  27  letter, 
which  was  the  principal  one,  dealing  with  twelve  missions, 
he  complained  of  the  lack  of  clearness  in  the  answers  re- 
ceived from  the  Dominicans.  He  was  sending  the  infor- 
mation received  to  Comandante  General  Croix,  to  whose 
jurisdiction  Baja  California  had  been  assigned.  From  the 
estados  forwarded  with  each  letter  ®^  we  find  that  there  were 

^  C-2920.  although  least  of  the  eleven  in  yield  of 

s*  C-3154.  wheat.     San   Francisco   de   Borja   was 

6^  C-3152.    Among    other    commod-  perhaps     richest,     agriculturally,     not 

ities  were  barley,  maize,  kidney-beans,  only   producing   the   most   wheat,   460 

chick-peas,    grapes,   wine,    cotton,    and  fanegas,  but  also  having  over  twice  as 

wool,  but  only  a  few  missions  produced  much   land   under   cultivation   as   any 

them,  and  then  in  small  quantities,  as  other. 

a   rule.     San   Ignacio   was   by   far   the  ^  C-3563.                               « C-3624. 

most     all-round     productive     mission,  «>  Respectively,  C-3564  and  C-3625. 


1773]  CONDITIONS   IN   BAJA   CALIFORNIA  311 

at  the  fourteen  missions  referred  to  5424  persons  and  15,641 
animals.  In  eleven  missions  giving  figures  the  crops  of 
wheat  amounted  to  3034 /anegras  (4^54 1^  bushels),  and  other 
crops  had  been  raised  in  greater  quantities  than  before, 
maize  almost  competing  with  wheat.  At  the  same  eleven 
missions  there  had  been  slightly  more  than  2250  fanegas 
(3600  bushels)  of  maize.®^  These  figures  show  that  some 
slight  advance  had  been  made  by  the  Dominicans.  In- 
crease in  animals,  however,  had  been  remarkably  slight,  as 
compared  with  similar  advances  at  a  later  time  in  Alta 
California,  after  the  latter  province  became  securely  es- 
tablished. In  number  of  horses  and  mules,  perhaps  the 
most  important  class,  because  of  their  use  as  pack  animals, 
the  province  had  declined.  Some  animals,  although  not 
an  appreciable  number,  had  been  taken  to  Alta  California, 
as  will  appear  in  the  next  chapter. 

Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the  number  of  sol- 
diers in  the  military  establishments.  In  addition  to  the 
Spaniards  in  them  and  at  the  missions  there  were  some 
miners  and  cattlemen  in  the  peninsula,  but  their  num- 
bers were  probably  insignificant,  and  no  statistics  as  to 
them  or  their  possessions  have  come  to  hand. 

Barry's  quarrelling  with  the  Dominicans  was  one  of  the 
reasons  why  Bucarely  supplanted  him  with  Felipe  de  Neve. 
Writing  of  this  matter  to  Arriaga,  December  27,  1774, 
Bucarely  said  that  he  had  come  to  this  conclusion,  par- 
tially because  of  the  repeated  petitions  by  Barry  himself 
to  be  relieved  and  permitted  to  go  to  Mexico,  but  also  be- 
cause the  discord  between  him  and  the  religious  over  ques- 
tions of  jurisdiction  and  other  matters  had  reached  an 
extreme  point.  Bucarely  had  ordered  Mora  to  refrain  from 
giving  the  least  motive  for  complaint  or  resentment,  as  it 
might  put  back  the  service  and  render  of  no  account  the 
vast  sums  that  had  been  expended  there ;  this  he  did,  he 
said,  to  prevent  Mora  from  meddling  in  affairs  of  the  royal 

•*  Of    the    persons  at    the    fourteen  the   missions   there   were   5651    sheep, 

missions    2990    were    male    and    2434  3754  goats,  and  33  pigs,  to  which  should 

female.     There  were  3537  cows,   1601  be  added  329  sheep,  goats,  and  pigs  at 

horses,  and  736  mules.     At  twelve  of  the  other  two  missions. 


312     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIII 

jurisdiction,  which  belonged  to  the  governor.  Moreover, 
he  had  written  to  the  Dominican  provincial,  asking  him  to 
persuade  Mora  and  the  other  rehgious  to  hve  in  peace  with 
the  royal  officers.  At  the  time  of  his  appointment  Neve 
was  sergeant-major  of  the  cavalry  regiment  of  Queretaro. 
Bucarely  referred  to  him  as  a  man  of  mature  wisdom  and 
prudence,  but  he  had  not  failed  to  enjoin  him  to  avoid  quar- 
rels with  the  religious.  He  had  made  him  full  governor 
{en  propiedad),  because  he  deserved  it,  both  for  his  good 
qualities,  and  for  his  past  services,  especially  for  his  han- 
dling of  matters  concerning  the  material  wealth  of  the  Za- 
catecas  missions.^^  All  of  these  acts  of  the  viceroy  were 
approved  by  Arriaga,  April  26,  1775.^^  Neve  departed  at 
once  for  his  province,  and  in  March,  1775,  relieved  Barry, 
who,  soon  afterward,  became  governor  of  Nueva  Vizcaya. 

Neve,  too,  had  difficulties  with  the  friars.  They  resisted 
his  attempts  to  make  the  Indians  self-dependent,  as  had 
been  the  aim  of  Galvez's  regulation  of  1768,  whereupon 
Neve  recommended  that  steps  be  taken  with  a  view  to 
secularization.  This  was  not  the  only  concern  of  the  gov- 
ernor, for  we  find  him  complaining  of  want  in  ships,  horses, 
clothing,  and  especially  in  arms.  He  also  asked  for  more 
troops.^^  The  last-named  request  was  the  subject  of  a 
letter  by  Bucarely  to  Arriaga,  February  25,  1776.  Both 
Barry  and  Neve  had  asked  for  additional  troops,  the  latter 
for  a  sergeant  and  nine  soldiers  more.  They  were  needed 
in  part  to  escort  the  mails  to  and  from  San  Diego  and 
Monterey,  and  also  because  double  escort  was  required  when 
new  missions  were  founded.  On  the  authority  of  the  royal 
decrees  of  September  6  and  16,  1775,  requiring  the  Baja 
California  establishments  to  be  developed  by  all  means 
possible,  without  sparing  expense,  Bucarely  had  acquiesced 
in  Neve's  request. ^^     Galvez  appro ved.^^ 

In  fine,  not  enough  change  had  occurred  in  the  peninsula 
to  enable  it  to  contribute  materially  to  the  development  of 

62  C-2792.  66  C-3142. 

63  C-2896.  w  Gdlvez  to  Bucarely,  June  12, 1776. 

64  Bancroft,  N.  M.   St.   <St   Tex.,    I,       C-3248. 
740-41. 


1773]  CONDITIONS   IN   BAJA   CALIFORNIA  313 

Alta  California.  Baja  California  continued  to  be  held  for 
strategic  reasons,  and,  besides,  served  as  a  convenient  mail- 
route  between  Monterey  and  Mexico,  but  in  other  respects 
it  was  of  scant  economic  or  political  importance.  It  is 
not  surprising  that  orders  soon  came  for  the  governor  and 
lieutenant-governor  to  exchange  capitals,  the  former  going 
to  Monterey,  and  Rivera  to  Loreto. 


^  CHAPTER  XIV 

PROBLEMS   AND    PROGRESS    OF   ALTA   CALIFORNIA,    1774-1775 

Having  determined  that  Alt  a  California  must  be  de- 
veloped in  order  to  protect  New  Spain  from  foreign  en- 
croachment, Bucarely  took  steps  toward  that  end  by  pro- 
viding for  anjncrease  in  the  number  of  settlersand  dom^ 
animals,  by  sending  guns  and  other .  neededrjartides,  and  by 
giving  directions  for  promoting  agriculture.  Most  impor- 
tant of  his  projects,  perhaps,  was  the  proposed  founding  of 
establishments  at  San  Francisco,  both  to  prevent  that  port 
and  the  so-called  Rio  de  San  Francisco,  which  flowed  into 
it,  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  an  enemy,  and  to  serve  as 
a  base  for  further  northward  conquests.  A  proposal  made 
at  this  time  to  move  Monterey  presidio  to  an  inland  point 
depended  in  a  measure  on  the  successful  founding  of  San 
Francisco,  but  orders  came  from  Spain  not  to  change  the 
site  of  Monterey.  Bucarely^s  activities  will  be  discussed  in 
this  chapter  only  in  their  local  aspects,  irrespective  of  re- 
lations with  the  outside  world,  but  it  must  be  remembered 
that  ^  dominant  idea  was  that  of  avoiding  foreign  danger. 

The  outstanding  events  of  the  two  years  treated  here 
were  Rivera's  march  to  the  province  early  in  1774,  his 
expedition  to  San  Francisco  later  in  that  year,  Ayala's 
exploration  of  the  bay  at  that  port  in  1775,  and  Heceta's 
overland  trip  to  San  Francisco  in  the  same  year.  All  of 
these  bore  on  the  coming  of  Anza  with  colonists  for  the 
proposed  new  settlements  on  the  bay.  These  expeditions 
accomplished  something,  especially  Ayala's,  but  more  might 
have  been  done  by  Rivera  if  he  had  been  more  energetic  in 
carrying  out  Bucarely 's  commands.  Serra  was  an  able,  ar- 
dent supporter  of  the  projects  of  Bucarely,  although  not 
equally  interested  in  San  Francisco,  but  the  power  to  act 

314 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  315 

did  not  rest  with  him.  Of  course,  neither^jra  nor  Rivera 
appreciated  the  element  of  foreign  danger  as  Bucarely  did. 
To  them  Alta  Cahfornia  was  primarily  a  Spanish  problem. 
Concerning  local  problems  Serra  certainly  was  competent 
to  speak.  More  missions,  more  soldiers,  and  more  domes- 
tic animals,  the  last  named  to  come  from  Sonora,  were  the 
needs  upon  which  he  most  insisted.  As  regards  the  im- 
portance of  the  military  in  maintaining  the  conquest  there 
were  memorials  by  Fages  and  the  Franciscans  of  the  Col- 
lege of  San  Fernando  which  presented  even  more  com- 
pelling proofs  than  those  offered  by  Serra,  showing  clearly 
the  precarious  footing  of  the  province  and  that  the  soldiers 
were  the  backbone  of  the  conquest.  Progress  in  conver- 
sions, and  increase  of  animals  and  crops  went  on  at  a 
normal  and  encouraging  rate  up  to  the  close  of  the  year 
1775,  although  not  fast  enough  to  dispense  with  the  need 
for  more  domestic  animals.  White  settlement,  however, 
had  hardly  begun  by  that  date.  In  fine,  Alta  California 
was  waiting  for  the  one  thing  it  needed  to  ensure  its  per- 
manence, the  coming  Anza  expedition  of  1775-76. 

Alta  California's  needs  to  the  close  of  the  year  1773  have 
been  dealt  with  in  earlier  chapters,  and  the  necessity  for  an 
overland  route  pointed  out.  So  great  was  the  destitution 
of  the  province,  however,  and  so  interested  was  Bucarely 
in  the  problem  of  meeting  foreign  danger,  that  it  seemed 
best  not  to  await  the  uncertain  issue  of  Anza's  search  for  a 
route,  nor  to  rely  wholly  on  supply-ships.  Therefore, 
Fernando  de  Rivera  y  Moncada,^  who  was  to  succeed  Fages, 

^  Rivera  entered  the  service  in  1742,  Permission  to  retire  was  again  given 

working  his  way  up  from  the  ranks,  and  by  the  viceroy,  late  in  1771   (Croix  to 

becoming  captain  at  Loreto  in  the  time  Rivera,  Sept.   12,   1771).     Rivera  then 

of   the   Jesuits    (C-2566).     He   accom-  bought  a  farm  in  or  near  Guadalajara, 

panied    Portold   to   Alta   California   in  but  ran  into  debt,  so  that  in  order  to 

1769.     In  1770  he  wrote  to  Croix  from  provide  for  his  family  he  had   to  re- 

Velicata    asking    permission    to    retire,  enter   the   service.     Called    to    Mexico 

on    the    ground    that    his    health    was  he  asked  not  to  be  sent  to  Monterey, 

broken  (Rivera  to  Croix,  Mar.  2,  1770).  as  Bucarely  had  suggested,  hoping  that 

Croix   granted    his    petition    (Croix    to  he  might  get  the  money  to  pay  his  debts 

Rivera,  Nov.  12,  1770).     On  receipt  of  in  some  other  way  (Rivera  to  Bucarely, 

this  letter  Rivera  started  south  (Rivera  undated,  but  probably  early  in  1773), 

to  Croix,  May  8),  but  was  ordered  back  but  this  request  was  denied.     Rivera 

to    San    Diego    by    Governor    Barry  seems  again  to  have  asked  permission 

(Rivera    to    Croix,     May    31,     1771).  to    retire    in    1775.     Ortega    wrote    to 


316     THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XIV 

was  given  instructions,  August  17,  1773,  tending  to  the 
relief  of  Alta  California.  So  far  as  they  dealt  with  precau- 
tions against  foreign  aggression  and  with  general  problems 
of  a  religious,  military,  political,  civil,  and  routine  char- 
acter, they  have  already  been  taken  up.^  Only  a  little  re- 
mains for  discussion  here.  Before  proceeding  to  Mon- 
terey, Rivera  was  to  recruit  troops  to  replace  those  which 
were  to  retire  with  Fages,  and  the  recruits  were  to  go  with 
their  families,  in  order  to  make  a  beginning  of  effective 
settlement.  Single  men  should  carry  papers  to  prove  their 
status,  so  that  the  missionaries  might  perform  the  marriage 
ceremony  for  them  in  Alta  California  without  delay,  in  case 
they  should  wish  to  marry.  Rivera  ought  soon  to  examine 
the  site  of  San  Francisco,  if  further  examination  were  neces- 
sary, and  to  consult  with  Serra  to  see  if  a  mission  might  be 
placed  there.  They  might  also  found  other  missions,  if 
the  necessary  escort  could  be  obtained  by  withdrawing 
troops  from  the  missions  that  were  on  a  solid  footing.^  G41- 
vez's  memorial  of  March  8,  1774,  may  again  be  quoted  for 
its  insistence  that  a  route  from  Sonora  and  New  Mexico 
should  be  opened,  especially  to  Monterey  and  San  Fran- 
cisco, laying  special  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  estab- 
lishments at  the  last-named  place.'* 

Rivera  set  out  at  once  for  Sinaloa  to  recruit  the  soldiers 
and  families  for  Alta  California.  On  September  19, 1773, 
Bucarely  wrote  to  him  that  Anza  had  been  authorized  to 
seek  a  route  to  Alta  California  from  Sonora.  Rivera  was 
ordered  to  detach  exploring  parties  on  arrival  in  order  to 
aid  Anza's  project.^  Rivera  replied  from  Guadalajara, 
October  14,  1773,  that  he  had  been  delayed,  but  would 
obey  Bucarely's  orders.  Anza  might  be  expected  to  emerge 
between  San  Diego  and  San  Gabriel,  he  said,  and  Rivera 
would  have  that  region  explored.     As  to  Anza^s  proposal, 

him  that  he  regretted  to  hear  of  his  that  he  exhibited  while  in  Alta  Califor- 

request,   and  told  him  that  his  great  nia.     Except  for  the  first  reference  and 

services  in  the  past  were  apt  to  stand  the  last  the  documents  quoted  above 

in  the  way  of  his  obtaining  permission  are  in  A.G.P.,  Calif ornias,  66. 
(Ortega     to     Rivera,     May    5,     1775,  *  Supra  chaps.  X  and  XI. 

A.P.C.H.,  Prov.  St.  Papers,  I,  161-64).  » C-2350. 

Rivera's  misfortunes  may  help  to  ac-  *  C-2566. 

count  for  the  gloomy  traits  of  character  "  A.G.P.,  California^,  66. 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  317 

he  regarded  it  as  very  important,  because  of  the  length  of 
voyage  to  Alta  California,  and  lack  of  provisions  there. 
He  himself  had  once  planned  to  suggest  such  an  expedition ; 
therefore,  Anza's  undertaking  gave  him  much  pleasure. 
In  conclusion,  he  said  that  he  had  tried  to  buy  some  mares 
and  horses  of  Antonio  de  Ocio,  who  had  them  in  Baja  Cali- 
fornia, but  Ocio  would  not  sell,  because  he  needed  them 
at  his  mines.^  Rivera  recruited  a  force  of  fifty-one  per- 
sons, of  all  ages,  in  Sinaloa.  Most  of  the  soldiers  were 
married  men  with  families,  which,  in  accordance  with  Bu- 
carely's  order,  were  to  accompany  the  expedition  to  Alta 
California.^  Rivera  reached  Loreto  in  the  middle  of  March. 
Lacking  provisions  for  all  of  his  following  to  make  the 
march  up  the  peninsula  to  Velicata,  he  planned  to  go  as 
quickly  as  possible  with  part  of  the  men,  so  as  to  send  back 
the  necessary  provisions  from  Alta  California  to  Velicata 
—  an  interesting  proof  of  the  insufficiency  of  Baja  Cali- 
fornia as  a  base  of  supplies  for  the  northern  province. 
Therefore,  he  hastened  to  Monterey,  reaching  there  May 
23,  1774,^  too  late,  however,  to  meet  the  Anza  expedition, 
which  was  already  well  on  its  way  back  to  Sonora. 

The  Rivera  expedition  and  the  founding  of  missions'^ 
were  involved  in  Bucarely's  mind  with  the  question  of 
sending  supplies  to  Alta  California,  for  the  progress  of  con- 
versions depended  on  the  missions  having  food  for  the  In- 
dians. Bucarely's  activities  in  this  regard  have  been  takenJ 
up  in  detail  in  an  earlier  chapter,  but  should  be  borne  in 
mind  here.  In  a  letter  on  the  subject  of  supplies.  May  27, 
1774,  Bucarely  went  on  to  discuss  the  founding  of  new  mis- 
sions. Serra  had  asked  for  several  new  ones,  he  said,  and 
they  should  be  established,  but  the  two  planned  for  San 
Francisco  should  be  erected  first.  A  fresh  exploration  of  that 
port  should  be  made,  making  use  of  the  troops  of  Anza.® 
These  plans  were  approved  by  Arriaga,  September  22, 1774.^° 

'  Ibid.  Bucarely  was  referring  to  the  first  Anza 

■^  I  have  found  no  roster  of  the  ex-  expedition  which  he  hoped  would  join 

pedition,  but  judge  that  the  number  of  with  Rivera  to  found  the  San  Francisco 

soldiers     could     hardly     have     passed  establishments,  or  whether  this  was  a 

twelve.  reference  by  him  to  an  already  planned 

8  Palou,  Noticias,  III,  150-51.  second  expedition. 

»  C-2625.     It  is  not  clear  whether  ^  C-2718. 


A 


318     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XIV 

A  letter  from  Serra  to  the  viceroy,  June  22,  1774,  is  very 
important  evidence  as  to  the  needs  of  the  province.  Re- 
ferring to  the  departure  of  Fathers  Crespi  and  Pena  for 
Mexico,  he  said  that  they  were  not  needed  at  the  time,  as 
there  were  enough  rehgious  for  four  new  missions,  which 
Serra  hoped  to  see  estabhshed.  Speaking  of  the  brilliant 
prospects  of  the  colony,  he  said:  "Live-stock  is  the  only 
thing  that  remains  to  be  desired,  but  it  is  enough  for  us  that 
Your  Excellency  may  know  it ;  for  in  that  case  we  do  not 
doubt  that  you  may  remedy  the  matter,  whether  by  com- 
mands to  carry  into  genuine  and  due  effect  what  has  been 
agreed  on  and  enacted  for  California,  or  by  directing  that 
the  animals  come  by  way  of  Sonora,  for  once  they  have  been 
supplied,  their  increase  is  certain  in  lands  so  rich  as  these. 
No  more  will  be  necessary,  although  the  conquests  should 
penetrate  many  hundreds  of  leagues  into  the  interior,  for 
from  here  it  will  be  possible  to  go  on  supplying  the  land 
farther  on."  ^^  This  is  most  illuminating  as  to  the  situation, 
and  prophetic  so  far  as  its  claim  goes  that  only  a  few  would 
be  required.  With  the  same  letter  Serra  enclosed  a  report 
of  equal  date,  chiefly  interesting  for  its  comment  on  the 
Indians.  They  held  the  Spaniards  in  great  esteem,  or  rather, 
awe,  he  said^  At  first  they  had  thought  the  Spaniards  to 
be  chiHrenof  the  mules  upon  which  they  rode.  Indians  of 
Monterey  had  placed  food  and  broken  arrows  around  the 
cross  left  by  Portold,  in  order  that  it  might  not  get  angry 
with  them.  They  also  claimed  to  have  noticed  strange 
birds  preceding  the  march  of  the  Spaniards. ^^  Copies  of 
these  two  documents  were  sent  to  Spain  in  a  Bucarely  let- 
ter of  September  26,  1774.  They  confirmed  Vizcaino  and 
Palou,  said  the  viceroy,  as  regarded  the  fertility  and  rich- 
ness of  the  land  and  the  docile,  tractable  nature  of  its  in- 
habitants. There  ought  to  be  a  good-sized  settlement  at 
Monterey,  so  as  to  advance  the  conquest. ^^  This  elicited 
from  Arriaga,  May  14,  1775,  an  expression  of  the  king's 
gratitude  for  the  zeal  with  which  the  viceroy  was  promot- 

"  C-2653.  "  C-2720. 

"  C-2654. 


1774]  PROBLEMS   AND   PROGRESS  319 

ing  objects  which  were  among  the  principal  cares  of  His 
Majesty.^^ 

Another  Bucarely  letter  of  September  26,  1774,  did  not 
meet  with  the  usual  unqualified  approval.  A  port  on  the 
Alta  California  coast  had  been  sought  constantly,  since 
the  conquest  of  the  Philippines,  said  Bucarely,  as  a  shelter 
and  stopping-place  for  the  galleons  coming  from  Manila 
to  New  {Spain.  EaclTorsucK  a  port  might  have  been  the 
cause  for  the  loss  of  many  boats  in  early  times,  and,  at  any 
rate,  involved  risks.  Vizcaino's  discovery  of  Monterey 
gave  rise  to  the  idea  of  founding  a  colony  there  for  the 
benefit  of  the  galleon  in  case  of  accident,  but  his  death  put 
an  end  to  that  project.  Despite  some  expensive  attempts, 
later  efforts  had  been  unavailing  until  J^2SS;.J^b£[i..^...EJJ" 
sidio  was  established.  It  was  badly  located,  however, 
lacking  fresh  water,  agricultural  land,  and  timber,  which 
it  needed  for  houses.  Rivera's  letter  of  July  11  had  pro- 
posed to  transfer  it  to  the  shores  of  the  Monterey  River,  a 
better  site,  and  if  the  people  of  Monterey  should  wish  to  go, 
and  it  should  turn  out  to  be  advantageous  Bucarely  in- 
timated that  he  would  rejoice  at  the  change.  He  had 
planned  to  send  two  supply-ships  to  Alta  California,  instead 
of  one,  in  the  coming  January,  and  as  a  result  a  brilliant 
town  might  be  formed.  In  that  case  there  needed  to  be 
left  at  the  port  of  Monterey  only  a  galleon  to  receive  car- 
goes for  the  new  town.  The  idea  did  not  appear  a  bad  one 
to  Bucarely,  in  view  of  the  fertility  of  the  new  site,  and  its 
greater  nearness  to  San  Francisco,  but  he  would  decide 
on  nothing,  until  he  had  received  more  complete  reports  as 
to  the  advantages  of  the  plan  and  until  he  might  consult 
with  Anza,  whose  presence  was  necessary  before  a  decision 
could  be  reached. ^^  Arriaga's  reply.  May  14,  1775,  did  not 
approve  the  proposed  change  of  site.  The  presidio  had  been 
erected  on  the  Bay  of  Monterey,  chiefly  in  order  that  boats 
anchoring  there  might  have  prompt  assistance  from  shore 
upon  their  arrival,  and  be  guarded  by  the  garrison  and  fort.^® 

"C-2910.  "C-2911. 

»  C-2719. 


320     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XIV 

Arriaga  had  reached  this  opinion  after  consultation  with 
Gdlvez,    whose    report   will   be    taken    up    presently,    for 
it  dealt  with  other  matters  which  may  be  treated  more 
V /^appropriately  in  another  place. 

Several  of  Bucarely's  letters  to  Rivera  may  be  quoted  to 
show  the  variety  and  range  of  his  interest  in  Alta  Cahfornia. 
The  manifest  idea  in  all  of  them  is  his  eager  desire  for  the 
advancement  of  the  colony  and  the  furtherance  of  the  con- 
quest. Although  he  did  not  express  it  in  the  letters,  Bu- 
carely  himself  had  in  mind  safeguarding  Spain's  possessions 
against  foreign  enemies.  Fages  had  asked  Bucarely  whether 
lands  and  cattle  might  be  given  to  Spanish  soldiers  marry- 
ing Indian  women.  Bucarely's  answer  was  directed  to 
Rivera,  September  21,  1774.  After  consulting  with  the 
fiscal  he  had  decided  that  such  marriages  were  conducive 
to  advancing  the  settlements  and  that  it  was  advisable  to 
give  lands  in  such  cases,  as  this  would  extend  the  practice 
of  cultivating  the  fields.  So  he  would  answer  Fages'  ques- 
tion in  the  affirmative.  The  Indians,  too^  ought  to  b^ 
instructed  in  tilling  the  soil:  the  missions  and  presidios 
would  not  lack  for  provisions,  if  that  were  done.^^  On  De- 
cember 15  he  wrote  that  he  had  resolved  to  occupy  San 
Francisco,  which  could  serve  as  a  base  or  beginning  for 
future  conquests.  He  had  therefore  ordered  Anza  to  go 
there  from  Sonora  with  such  provisions,  domestic  animals, 
and  families  of  settlers  as  were  needed  to  put  the  project 
into  effect.  After  giving  some  details  of  the  expedition  he 
went  on  to  say  that  he  was  sending  by  sea  not  only  the 
usual  supply  of  provisions,  but  also  a  year's  stock  for  the 
settlers  conducted  by  Anza,  which  was  to  be  for  them 
alone,  and  even  Anza,  if  he  should  require  anything  for  his 
return  to  Sonora,  was  not  to  levy  upon  that  supply  but  was 
to  get  what  he  needed  from  the  presidio  or  mission  stock. 
These  settlers  would  meet  the  lack  of  which  Rivera  had 
complained  in  his  letter  of  June  16.  Bucarely  was  also 
sending  arms,  as  requested  in  Rivera's  letter  of  October  8. 
Reverting  to  ^an  Francisco,  a  further  reason  for  occupying^ 

"  A.P.C.H.,  Prov.  SL  Papers,  I,  90. 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  321 

it,  he  said,  was  to  furnish  irrefutable  proof  that  the  land 
belonged  to  tJpain.  The  best  way  to  accomplfsh  this,  and 
also  "^  propagate  the  faith,  would  be  to  erect  the  proposed 
missions ;  consequently,  he  had  given  appropriate  instruc- 
tions to  Serra,  whom  Rivera  was  to  aid  to  the  extent  that 
might  be  necessary.  The  troops  assigned  to  San  Francisco 
were  to  be  under  Rivera's  command  from  the  moment  that 
Anza  should  reach  Monterey  to  deliver  them,  although 
Anza  was  to  assist  in  exploring  the  Rio  de  San  Francisco, 
so  as  to  be  able  to  give  information  to  Bucarely.  In  a 
postscript,  Bucarely  repeated  his  comment  on  the  impor- 
tance_of  San  Francisco  from  the  standpoint  of  future  con- 
guests,  and  he  charged  Rivera  to  act  in  harmony  with 
Serra.  He  had  heard  that  the  Alta  Cahfornia  crops  were 
abundant  that  year,  and  had  urged  upon  Serra,  who  had  it 
in  charge,  to  do  everything  possible  to  foment  agriculture, 
so  that  the  rehgious  conquest  might  be  facilitated.  The 
presidio  to  be  erected  at  San  Francisco  should  be  placed 
near  the  coast  between  the  two  imssigas^in_ojnderJ;oJbe  a^^ 
to  aid  either^  in  case  their  escort  of  six  soldiers  each  might 
riot  suffice.^  On  the  same  day  Bucarely  wrote  to  Serra  to 
the  same  effect,  with  only  such  change  of  phraseology  as 
addressing  another  person  required. ^^  Shortly  afterward, 
Bucarely  wrote  to  Rivera  again,  repeating  his  directions  as 
to  the  location  of  the  fort  at  San  Francisco  and  enclosing  a 
copy  of  the  resolution  of  the  junta  authorizing  Anza's  ex- 
pedition. He  requested  Rivera  to  keep  an  account  of  all 
expenses  in  connection  with  the  occupation  of  San  Fran- 
cisco.^°  In  another  letter,  January  2,  1775,  he  took  up 
Rivera's  proposal  of  moving  the  presidio  of  Monterey  to  a 
better  site  a  few  leagues  away.  The  plan  did  not  appear 
a  bad  one,  but  would  better  be  delayed,  because  he  had 
ordered  Manrique  and  Anza,  and  also  Heceta  on  his  return 
from  the  north,  to  explore  the  port  of  San  Francisco,  which 
might  cause  a  change  in  plans;  therefore,  to  avoid  pos- 
sible unnecessary  expense,  the  proposed  change  of  site  was 

w  A.P.C.H.,  Prov.   St.  Papers,  Ben.  »  Bucarely  to  Rivera,  Jan.  2,  1775, 

Mis.,  II,  20-25.  A.P.C.H.,  Prov.  St.  Papers,  I,  166-67. 

i»  A.P.C.H.,  Arch.  Mia.,  I,  49-56. 


322     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIV 

to  await  further  orders.  Rivera  might  construct  build- 
ings, however,  for  the  storage  of  cargoes  arriving  on  the 
ships  from  San  Blas.^^  On  January  10  he  wrote  that  the 
cattle  and  mules  gathered  in  Sonora  for  the  Elizondo  cam- 
paign were  to  be  turned  over  to  Anza's  expedition,  now 
that  they  were  not  needed  in  Sonora.  Except  those  which 
Anza  might  need  for  his  return,  these  were  to  be  delivered  to 
Rivera  for  the  benefit  of  the  new  settlements.^^  Bucarely 
seems  also  to  have  informed  Neve  that  he  contemplated 
conquests  in  the  far  north.  This  appears  from  a  letter  by 
Neve  to  Serra,  April  8,  1775.  The  viceroy  had  written  to 
him,  he  said,  that  the  lands  traversed  by  Anza  in  his  first 
expedition  might  be  taken  from  the  Franciscans  and  awarded 
to  the  Dominicans,  because  he  thought  of  using  the  former 
in  a  more  northerly  field,  meaning  the  lands  that  might  be 
opened  up  as  a  result  of  Perez's  discoveries.^^ 

There  was  no  doubt  that  the  viceroy's  plans  for  mission 
progress  would  find  an  ardent  supporter  in  Serra.  On 
September  9,  1774,  he  wrote  to  Bucarely  complaining  of 
P6rez  and  Rivera  for  not  helping  to  found  the  two  San 
Francisco  missions  at  once.  Serra  had  hoped  to  do  so  in 
October,  when  the  families  left  by  Rivera  at  Velicatd  were 
expected  to  arrive,  and  P^rez  had  planned  to  wait  and  help 
Serra,  but  had  changed  his  mind,  and  was  resolved  on  an 
immediate  return  to  San  Bias.  Nor  was  Rivera  stirring 
himself  in  the  matter.  He  claimed  to  be  unable  to  act 
because  of  the  non-arrival  of  the  families  left  at  Velicatd, 
and  because  Anza  had  left  him  no  soldiers.  He  really  in- 
tended to  use  the  families  at  the  presidio  that  he  was  plan- 
ning, four  or  five  leagues  from  Monterey,  said  Serra,  and 
not  at  the  San  Francisco  missions.^* 

The  families  from  Velicat^  reached  San  Diego,  Septem- 
ber 26.  Some  were  despatched  to  Monterey  by  Lieutenant 
Ortega,  comandante  at  San  Diego,  reaching  their  des- 
tination in  November.     Rivera  now  felt  strong  enough  to 

21  A.P.C.H.,  Pr&o.  St.  Pavers,  I,  16&-  ^  C-2716.     Both  the  Spanish  and  a 

69.  translation    of    this    document    appear 

^  Ibid.,  171.  in  Historical  Society  of  Southern  Cali- 

M  M.N.,  Doc.  Rel.  Mis.  Cal,  II.  fomia,  Publications,  II,  73-80. 


1774],  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  323 

attempt  the  oft-enjoined  exploration  of  the  port  of  San 
Francisco.  His  party,  which  included  Father  Palou,  left 
Monterey  on  November  23.  This  time  no  attempt  was 
made  to  reach  the  old  port  at  Point  Reyes,  but  the  ex- 
pedition went  up  the  peninsula  to  within  the  limits  of  the 
modern  city  of  San  Francisco,  placing  a  cross  on  the  hill 
overlooking  the  Seal  Rocks.  Nothing  more  was  done  be- 
cause of  the  beginning  of  winter  rains.  The  party  returned 
to  Monterey,  arriving  there  on  December  13.^^  The  ex- 
pedition is  described  by  Serra  in  a  long  letter  to  Bucarely 
dated  January  8,  1775.  Palou  had  noted  six  sites  between 
Monterey  and  San  Francisco  suitable  for  missions,  but 
Serra  did  not  want  even  one  in  that  remote  region  without 
a  presidio.  This,  coming  from  so  enthusiastic  a  missionary 
as  the  Father  President,  is  high  evidence  of  the  importance 
of  the  military,  but  it  will  already  have  been  noted  that 
Serra  never  failed  to  insist  on  the  need  for  troops.  Con- 
tinuing, he  said  that  he  desired  the  conversion  of  those 
lands,  but  before  anything  else  (unless  both  things  could 
be  done  at  the  same  time)  four  new  missions  ought  to  be 
founded  between  San  Diego  and  Monterey.  That  would 
in  a  measure  complete  the  chain  of  which  there  was  so 
much  need.  Above  all,  the  two  missions  of  San  Buena- 
ventura and  Santa  Clara  ^^  should  be  established.  There 
were  plenty  of  provisions  and  religious  for  these  two.  He 
repeated  his  former  suggestion  that  the  military  establish- 
ment of  the  province  should  be  increased  from  eighty  to  a 
hundred  men,  the  extra  twenty  to  be  used  as  the  escort  of 
new  missions  according  as  he  should  decide.  Unless 
specific  orders  to  that  effect  were  given,  the  additional 
number,  if  granted,  would  be  used  at  the  presidios.  Re- 
ferring to  the  existing  missions,  he  said  that  an  advance 
had  been  made  in  all  respects,  as  would  appear  from  his 
annual  report,  which  he  would  send  later.  The  Indians 
continued  to  be  docile,  and  a  rumor  that  those  of  San  Luis 

25  For    the    Rivera    diary,   C-2761 ;  "  Not  to  be  confused  with  the  site 

for  that  of  Palou,  C-2762.     The  latter  of  the  later  Santa  Clara  mission.     Serra 

is    printed    in    Palou,    Notidas,    III,  referred    to    a    place    south    of    Santa 

261-316.  Barbara. 


X 


324     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIV 

Obispo  were  planning  to  burn  the  mission  had  proved  to  be 
groundless.  The  soldiers  unfortunately  killed  a  good  In- 
dian in  connection  with  that  event.  The  matter  of  a  change 
in  site  of  the  San  Diego  mission,  crops  there  and  at  Car- 
melo,  and  his  intention  to  bring  mules  and  other  animals 
at  Velicatd  to  Alta  California  missions  were  alluded  to  by 

iSerra.  He  then  reiterated  his  proposal  of  two  years  be- 
fore, that  families  of  settlers  be  sent  to  Alta  California. 
Soldiers  could  be  brought  from  Sinaloa,  who  should  be  of 
good  character,  and  some  of  whom  at  least  should  be  mar- 
ried men  and  come  with  their  families.  There  ought  to  be 
two  families  at  each  mission,  so  that  the  wives  might  serve 
to  instruct  the  Indian  women  at  the  missions.^^ 
On  receipt  of  the  news  from  Alta  California,  Bucarely 
wrote  to  both  Rivera  and  Serra  on  May  24,  1775.  To  the 
former  he  said  that  he  realized  that  his  expedition  to  San 
Francisco  had  occurred  at  a  poor  time  of  year  for  the  es- 
tablishing of  missions,  but  he  wished  him  to  continue  his 
efforts  to  find  sites.  Serra  and  Palou  had  recommended 
six  new  missions,  several  of  them  between  Monterey  and  San 
Diego,  but  the  establishing  of  a  fort  and  two  missions  at 
the  port  of  San  Francisco  was  the  most  important  thing  to 
do.  Nor  ought  the  missions  proposed  by  Serra  to  be  de- 
ferred. Rivera  was  ordered  to  arrange  for  their  establish- 
ment, therefore,  provided  they  did  not  stand  in  the  way  of 
the  two  at  San  Francisco,  or  interfere  with  the  maintenance 
of  the  existing  missions  and  presidios.^^  Bucarely  wrote  to 
Serra  to  the  same  effect,  but  in  a  different  tone.  Whereas 
he  had  enjoined  Rivera  to  help  Serra,  he  now  bade  Serra 
not  to  be  too  impatient  for  his  missions.  Bucarely  realized 
the  advantages  that  would  come  from  founding  them  at 
-the  places  named  by  Palou  and  Serra,  but  those  at  San 
Francisco  must  come  first.  Therefore,  he  trusted  that  Serra 
would  be  able  to  work  in  harmony  with  Rivera,  who,  he 
believed,  in  view  of  Bucarely^s  orders,  would  contribute  to 
the  establishing  of  missions.     Resolutions  would  be  taken 

^  C-2826.     Appended  to  this,  under       then  serving  them, 
date  of  January  10,  is  a  list  of  the  Alta  ^  A.P.C.H.,    Prov.     St.     Papers,     I, 

California   missions    and    the    religious       171-74. 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  325 

in  due  time  upon  what  Serra  pointed  out  as  necessary  for 
the  propagation  of  the  faith,  and  of  these  matters  Bucarely 
would  advise  Serra  in  season.^^  Writing  to  Arriaga  of 
these  events,  May  27,  1775,  Bucarely  blamed  the  weather 
for  the  failure  of  Rivera  and  Palou  to  carry  out  his  orders 
and  their  own  intentions.  Nevertheless,  they  had  advanced 
Spanish  knowledgeof  the  vicinity  of  San  Francisco,  had 
examined  lands  adapted  for  missions,  and  had  beheld  an 
abundant  spiritual  harvest  ready  for  the  gospel  —  or,  in 
other  words,  had  found  numerous  Indians.  Anza  and 
Ayala  had  been  given  orders  to  occupy  the  port  of  San  Fran- 
cisco. As  to  Serra's  request  for  the  estabhshing  of  mis- 
sions along  the  Santa  Barbara  Channel,  he  would  tell  both 
Rivera  and  Serra  to  do  what  prudence  might  dictate,  but 
without  prejudice  to  the  new  missions  to  be  established  at 
San  Francisco,  or  to  the  old  missions  and  presidios.  He 
called  attention  to  Serra's  report  of  the  increase  in  Chris- 
tian converts.  Similarly,  the  increase  in  crops  gave  prom-_, 
ise  that  before  long  the  new  province  might  maintaijL 
itself,jrTrom  time  to"  time,  families  mi^t  be  sent,  as  Serra 
had  requested,  and  in  case  of  urgency,  Bucarely  would 
send  the  twenty  additional  recruits  asked  for,  so  as  to  run 
no  risk  of  losing  the  gains  thus  far  made.^^  In  acknowledg- 
ing this  letter,  September  6,  1775,  Arriaga  took  special  note 
of  Serra 's  requests  for  families  and  more  soldiers,  approving 
Bucarely's  decision.^^ 

We  may  now  refer  again  to  Rivera's  plan  to  remove  the 
presidio  of  Monterey  to  a  new  site.  Arriaga  referred  the 
three  Bucarely  letters  of  September  26,  1774,  already  dis- 
cussed in  this  chapter,  to  Gdlvez  for  an  opinion.^^  Gdlvez 
replied  on  April  15,  1775,  looking  with  favor  on  all  of  Bu- 
carely's  measures,  except  the  Rivera  project.  He  did  not 
believe  Rivera's  allegations  that  Monterey  lacked  fresh 
water,  lands  for  crops,  and  lumber  for  buildings.  Nobody 
else  had  said  so,  and  Costanso  and  Fages  had  reported^the 
contrary.     He  repeated  his  suggestion  of  the  year  before, 

29  M.N.,  Doc.  Rel.  Mis.  Cal.,  octavo  ^2  Arriaga  to  Gdlvez,  Jan.  27,  1775. 
series.                                                                  C-2837.     The     Bucarely     letters     are 

30  C-2916.  31 C-2983.       C-2719-21. 


326     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIV 

that  tlie  govemor^^f_the.  CaMornm  live  in  Alt  a. 

California]  He  also  urged  that  cattle  be  sent  there  from 
BaJanCalifornia  and  Sonora,  and  that  the  missions  be  in-^ 
creased^o' as  many  as  possiblOj  making  use  of  all  the  un- 
employed Fernandinos  in  Alta  California,  and  of  others 
from  the  College  of  San  Fernando.  Finally,  remarking  on 
the  importance  of  maintaining  communication  between  that 
province  and  Sonora  along  the  route  discovered  by  Anza, 
and  of  advancing  the  mission  conquest  among  the  numerous 
and  peaceful  people  that  the  expedition  had  made  known,  he 
said  that  these  affairs  were  being  discussed  at  the  time  by 
the  Council  of  the  Indies.^^  Arriaga's  letter  to  Bucarely 
need  not  be  repeated.  In  reply,  August  27,  1775,  Bucarely 
said  that  he  had  not  ordered  the  change  of  site,  although 
the  project  did  not  seem  a  bad  one  to  him ;  he  had  told 
Rivera  that  the  matter  could  not  be  determined  until  the 
results  of  the  Ayala  and  Anza  expeditions  were  at  hand. 
Similar  considerations  had  held  back  any  change  of  the 
Department  of  San  Bias;  that  would  depend  on  whether 
Russian  settlements  should  be  found  by  the  Santiago,  in 
which  case  he  implied  that  a  better  port  would  be  neces- 
sary. If  a  port  were  needed  merely  to  assist  the  new  pos- 
sessions, San  Bias  would  answer  the  purpose.'*  Shortly  after 
Gdlvez^s  accession  to  power  as  ministro  general  he  gave 
definite  orders  to  Bucarely,  April  10,  1776,  forbidding  the 
removal  of  the  presidio  of  Monterey  from  the  port,  and 
requiring  Neve  and  Rivera  to  exchange  places.'^  Bucarely's 
reply,  July  27,  1776,  stated  that  directions  had  been  given 
accordingly.'^ 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  Ayala  expedition, 
its  thorough  exploration  of  San  Fra-ncisco  Bay,  and  the  en- 
thusiastically favorable  reports  of  Ayala  and  Canizares  as 
tpH^  merits  of  the  bay.     Ayala  left  Monterey  late  in  July, 
1775/ and  was  in  the  bay  and  its  offshoots  all  of  August  and 
"^nost    of   September,    reaching    Monterey   on   the    return, 
September  22.     He  had  found  that  the  bay  had  a  practi- 
se C-2885.  36  C-3193. 
«  C-2979.                                                           «« C-3285. 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  327 

cable  entrance,  and  not  merely  one  port  but  many.  Rivera 
had  been  ordered  to  cooperate  with  a  land  expedition,  and 
the  two  were  to  erect  buildings  for  the  settlers  coming  with 
Anza,  but  as  some  of  Rivera's  troops  were  temporarily 
absent  in  the  south,  he  was  unwilHng  to  withdraw  any  from 
his  presidio.  On  the  return  of  his  soldiers  he  planned  to 
send  a  party  overland,  but  he  did  not  do  so  before  Ayala 
left  the  bay.  Meanwhile,  Heceta  had  endeavored  to  en- 
ter San  Francisco  on  his  return  from  the  north,  but  had 
missed  it  in  the  fog.  Arrived  at  Monterey,  he  procured 
soldiers  from  Rivera,  those  in  the  south  having  returned, 
and  started  overland  for  San  Francisco,  accompanied  by 
Fathers  Palou  and  Campa.  The  party  left  Monterey  on 
September  14,  and  reached  San  Francisco  on  the  22d,  just 
after  Ayala's  departure.  Two  days  later,  Heceta  started 
back,  and  was  at  Monterey  on  October  1.  Neither  the 
buildings  for  Anza's  settlers  nor  the  missions  had  been 
erected,  but  there  wa§  iio.lQngex.any^^  of 

the„ji.Qit.^^  Ayala  reached  San  Bias,  November  6,  1775, 
and  informed  Bucarely  of  the  result  of  the  northward  voy- 
ages. Of  Ayala's  exploration  Bucarely  wrote  to  Arriaga 
on  the  26th,  that  the  natives  of  San  Francisco  Bay 
seemed  peaceful,  the  port  good,  and  the  place  well  adapted 
to  settlement.  There  was  plenty  of  fresh  water,  firewood, 
and  stone ;  the  climate  was  cold,  but  healthful,  and  free 
from  the  fogs  that  Monterey  experienced.^^ 

In  another  letter  of  November  26,  Bucarely  forwarded 
Serra's  report  of  the  progress  made  in  1774  by  the  five  Alta 
California  missions.  Three  other  missions  were  about  to 
be  erected,  one  at  San  Juan  Capistrano  and  the  two  at 
San  Francisco.^®  The  report  showed  a  gain  during  the  year 
of  62  marriages  and  297  converts,  the  totanTeopliyte  popu- 
lation being  759.  There  had  been  an  increase  in  domestic 
anmials  as  follows :  livestock,  from  205  to  304 ;  horses,  67 
to  100  ;  mules,  77  to  85  ;  sheep,  94  to  170  ;  goats,  67  to  95  ; 
swine,   102  to    131.     The   number   of   asses   remained   the 

^  Bancroft,  CaL,  I,  244-48.  »  C-3036. 

»  C-3033. 


328     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIV 

same,  to  wit,  4.^*°  In  fine,  thea^vanjcejh^  bee^^ 
not  enough  to  lessen  in  an  appreciable  manner  the  needs  of 
the  province,  but  encouraging;  to  have  held  the  province 
at  all,  with  the  means  at  hand,  was  no  small  achievement. 
Gdlvez  wrote  to  Bucarely,  February  29,  1776,  praising  his 
zeal  for  the  distant  province,  as  evinced  by  his  measures  for 
its  advancement,  and  approving  what  he  had  done,  includ- 
ing the  decision  to  found  the  three  missions. "^^ 

Yet,  in  considering  these  figures,  one  must  bear  in  mind 
a  latent  factor,  which  if  it  knew  its  power,  might  possibly 
have  rendered  everything  without  avail.  The  Indians  of 
Alt  a  California  have  usually  been  accounted  exceptionally 
docile  in  their  reception  of  Spaniards,  and  there  are  numer- 
ous documents  which  attest  that  view,  based  on  the  usual 
conduct  and  the  lack  of  military  equipment  of  the  natives. 
Some  hints  to  the  contrary,  notably  in  the  letters  of  Verger 
and  Serra,  have  already  appeared  in  this  work.  We  may 
now  look  into  that  matter  a  little  more  closely.  One  of  the 
most  important  documents  that  the  writer  has  seen  con- 
cerning conditions  in  Alta  California  is  a  report  by  Pedro 
Fages  dated  November  30,  1775.'*^  After  being  relieved  of 
his  command  by  Kivera,  he  had  departed  for  Mexico  in 
August,  1774.  As  might  have  been  expected,  Bucarely 
had  asked  him  to  draw  up  a  report  concerning  the  far 
northern  province,  of  which  Fages  was  competent  to  speak 
by  reason  of  five  years'  residence  there,  supplemented  by 
intellectual  capacity  of  no  mean  quality.  Fages  describes 
>r  the  land  and  the  people  from  San  Diego  to  San  Francisco, 
noting  the  progress  made  by  the  Spanish  settlements  and. 
the  obstacles  which  they  had  to  encounter.  The  natural 
features  of  the  route  traversed  in  1769  are  given  in  detail, 
that  route  being  still  in  use  in  Fages'  time  for  most  of  the 
way.  He  tells  of  the  products  of  the  soil  supphed  by  nature, 
remarking  that  the  land  was  much  richer  than  it  had  seemed 
at  first,  being  perhaps  the  most  fertile  of  any  that  had  been 

*"  C-2841.  M.   Ternaux-Compans  is  in  the  NoU" 

*^  C-3162.  velles  annates  des  voyages  et  des  sciences 

« C-3042.     A  free  translation  from  giographiques   (Paris,  1844),  v.  I  (CI), 

a  copy  stated  to  be  in  the  library  of  145^82,  311-47. 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  329 

conquered.     He  speaks  of  the  animals  of  the  province,  but 
most  important  of  all,  perhaps,  is  his  description  of  the 
Indians,  their  barbarous  traits,  notably  their  religious  cus- 
toms, and  their  propensity  to  war,  one  village  with  anotheiu«« 
On  Spain^s  relations  with  the  Indians  depended  the  success 
of  her  establishments ;   it  is  natural,  therefore,  that  he  de- 
votes to  them  the  greater  part  of  his  account,  dealing  also 
with  mission  progress.     Of  the  missionaries  he  speaks  in 
terms  of  praise,  a  contrast  to  the  way  in  which  Serra  was 
wont  to  speak  of  him.     The  most  noticeable  lack  in  the 
document  is  its  failure  to  make  any  reference  to  affairs  at 
the  presidios,  but  the  importance  of  the  military  appears 
frequently,  showing  that  the  oft-reported  accounts  of  the\ 
docility  of  the  Indians  must  not  be  overrated  by  us,  just  J 
because  no  great  disaster  to  the  Spanish  establishments  in  > 
fact  occurred.     That  none  did,  was  due  to  the  presence ! 
of  soldiers,  trained  in  frontier  methods,  and,  it  would  seeiaj 
efficiently  led.     It  is  to  this  phase  of  the  report  that  at- 
tention will  now  be  directed. 

After  the  overland  expedition  had  left  San  Diego  for  the 
north  in  1769,  the  Indians  attacked  the  Spania^  remain- 
ing at  that  port,  T53revihg  themselves  sure  of  victory  by 
reason  of  their  superiority  in  numbers.  Yet,  although  few 
Spaniards  were  able  to  bear  arms,  they  killed  three  Indians, 
wounded  others,  and  drove  the  enemy  away.  Thereafter, 
the  Indians  were  not  openly  hostile,  although  at  night  they 
occasionally  killed  horses  and  other  animals  of  the  Span- 
iards, but  more  for  the  meat  than  as  an  act  of  hostility. 
In  describing  the  traits  of  the  Indians  of  San  Diego  and 
the  region  for  thirty  leagues  north  of  it,  Fages  remarked 
upon  their  treacherous  nature,  saying  also  that  they  were 

The  principal  establishment  of  the  next  region  described, 
embracing  thirty-two  leagues,  was  the  mission  San  Gabriel. 
An  impulse  to  mission  progress  there  had  been  given  by 
bringing  five  families  of  Christian  Indians  from  Baja  Cali- 
fornia.'*^    These  were  acquainted  with  agriculture,  and  as 

*>  Among  these  were  Sebastian  Tarabal  and  his  family. 


330     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XIV 

the  site  was  good,  they  were  able  to  grow  sufficient  crops  to 
supply  not  only  the  Indians  of  the  mission  proper  but  the 
recent  converts  as  well.     The  Indian  problem,  especially 
^  in  the  forty  leagues  and  more  between  San  Gabriel  and 
y  San  Diego,  was  no  mean  one.     In  that  space  the  Indians 
were  wont  to  show  hostility  whenever  Spaniards  passed 
without    a   numerous    and    formidable    convoy.     On   that 
account   Fages   recommended   establishing   more   missions 
with  a  due  number  of  presidios,  first  making  a  thorough 
exploration  of  the  region,  however.     As  matters  were,  there 
was  a  great  stretch  of  land  in  which  nothing  had  been  done 
to  reduce  it  to  the  faith  or  to  render  it  secure  for  whoever 
might  pass  that  way.     Every  journey  still  had  to  be  made 
with  an  armed  force,  just  as  on  the  occasion  of  Portold's 
first  march ;    the  seeming  docility  of  the  Indians  at  such 
times  was  rather  the  result  of  their  fear  than  of  any  feeling 
of  friendship. 
^^      The  next  region  discussed  ran  a  distance  of  thirty-seven 
J>   leagues,  in  part  along  the  Santa  Barbara  Channel.     There 
were  no  missions  in  that  space,  but  the  Indians  were  nu- 
merous and  very  different  from  the  others  in  the  province. 
(They  were  of  a  good  disposition  and  fond  of  work,  but  very 
<  avaricious,  and  displayed  an  aptitude  for  trade,  being  as 
(Fages  called  them  ^Hhe  Chinamen  of  California.''     They 
were  well  disposed  toward  the  Spaniards,  but  warlike  with 
one  another,  an  almost  continuous  state  of  war  existing 
between  the  villages.     They  were  too  bold,  however,  for 
the  Spaniards  to  count  safely  on  their  seeming  affability 
and  lack  of  good  weapons.     In  fine,  they  were  barbarians, 
and  therefore  capable  of  committing  any  kind  of  hostile 
act,  if  it  should  strike  their  fancy.     It  was  for  that  reason 
that  the  mission  of  San  Buenaventura,  which  the  Mar- 
qu6s  de  Croix  had  decided  to  found  there,  had  not  been 
established. 
^,^     The  next  region  embraced  thirty-three  leagues  and  con- 
J^tained  but  one  mission,  San  Luis  Obispo.     To  this  place 
also    five   families    of   Baja    California    Indians   had    been 
brought,  for  it  too  was  a  fertile  site.     San  Luis  Obispo  and 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  331 

San  Gabriel  together  could  in  time  supply  all  of  the  other 
missions  without  need  of  a  recourse  to  San  Bias  for  grain. 
The  needJc^r^Spi^USh^^  is  apparent 

from  a  new  point  of  view  when  we  note  the  attitude  of  the 
Indians  of  San  Luis  Obispo.  According  to  Fages  they 
regarded  the  Spaniards  as  exiles  from  their  own  land,  for 
they  had  noted  that  the  newcomers  had  no  desire  to  attack 
them,  nor  did  they  seem  to  wish  to  settle  the  country,  since 
only  men  came.  Therefore,  they  had  reached  the  above- 
named  conclusion,  and  consequently  were  a  bit  disquieted 
and  lacking  in  confidence.  Some  of  the  soldiers  at  San  Luis 
Obispo  had  offered  to  bring  their  wives  and  families  to  Alta 
California,  which  would  certainly  help,  said  Fages,  to  up- 
root the  singular  idea  held  by  the  Indians  of  that  neighbor- 
hood. The  Indians  there  and  for  twelve  leagues  around 
were  affable  and,  except  as  already  noted,  friendly  to  the 
Spaniards.  Reverting  to  the  region  of  the  Santa  Barbara 
Channel,  Fages  recommended  the  establishing  of  missions 
there,  under  guard  of  a  presidio  of  fifty  or  sixty  soldiers. 
Such  a  number  was  necessary,  because  of  the  populousness 
of  that  district. 

Between  San  Diego  and  Monterey  the  fine  of  march  layTvT 
either  directly  through  or  at  least  within  gunshot  of  twenty  ^^ 
or  more  villages.  Along  the  march  also  were  cliffs  and 
other  bad  places  where  the  natives  might  dispute  and  im- 
pede a  passage,  and  instances  had  occurred  when  they  had 
done  so.  At  a  village  called  Rincon  they  had  stoned  a 
party  under  Fages  himself  in  the  year  1772,  while  he  was 
passing  through  a  difficult  place.  No  soldiers  were  lost, 
but  it  had  been  necessary  to  kill  one  or  two  Indians.  This 
was  apt  to  occur  whenever  small  parties  passed,  and  the 
only  remedy  for  it  would  be  the  establishing  of  a  mission  and 
a  presidio. 

The  fifth  region  taken  up  in  Fages'  report  covered  ninev^^^^ 
teen   leagues,    and   contained   one   mission,    San   Antonio.  ->^ 
The  Indians  were  very  friendly,  being  willing  to  give  any- 
thing that  they  had  to  the  Spaniards.     From  that  region  to'TTTT 
San  Francisco  had  been  thirty-six   and  a  half  leagues  by^-^"^ 


332     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIV 

Portold's  march,  leaving  Monterey  to  one  side.  There 
were  no  missions  except  San  Carlos  at  Carmelo,  near  Mon- 
terey. The  Indians  of  the  mission  and  its  vicinity  were 
peaceful,  but  at  Zanjones,  six  leagues  away  on  the  route  to 
San  Diego,  the  Indians  had  dared  to  attack  couriers  and 
other  passers-by.  No  Spaniards  had  lost  their  lives,  but 
they  had  killed  a  number  of  the  Indians.  Most  of  the 
Indians  in  the  region  beyond  the  sphere  of  mission  in- 
fluence were  hostile  both  to  the  converted  and  unconverted 
of  the  mission  region ;  before  the  founding  of  Monterey 
presidio  there  had  been  continual  war,  and  fights  still  con- 
tinued, especially  in  the  groves  where  acorns  were  found, 
that  article  of  food  being  the  object  in  controversy.  The 
presence  of  the  Spaniards  had  served  to  check  warfare, 
because  of  the  fear  on  the  part  of  outside  Indians  that  the 
Spaniards  would  aid  those  who  lived  at  or  near  the  mission. 
This  explained  the  great  affection  of  the  latter  for  the 
Spaniards,  of  whose  aid  and  protection  thev  gi^Qp^  absolut(^)y 
in  need,^ 

"^Qiiite  a  remarkable  document  of  a  different  character  is 
an  account  by  the  religious  of  the  college  of  San  Fernando 
of  discoveries  between  30°  26'  and  57°  18'  from  1769  to 
1776.  This  was  addressed  to  the  king,  although  sent  to 
Bucarely  to  be  forwarded  by  him,  and  was  dated  February 
26,j  1776\  The  account  was  based  on  the  diaries  and  other 
repbrts^sent  by  the  Fernandinos  of  Alta  California  to  the 
college,  with  the  conclusions  of  the  writers  with  regard  to 
the  discoveries.  The  San  Fernando  memorij,L  lacks  the 
precision  of  the  Fages  document,  a  number  of  subjects  being 
discussed  with  no  apparent  attempt  at  orderliness  of  ar- 
rangement. Yet  this  account,  although  perhaps  less  im- 
portant than  that  of  Fages,  is  not  less  interesting.  After 
a  few  preliminary  remarks  it  treats  of  the  voyages  of  Heceta 
and  Bodega  is  1775.  The  principal  point  of  this  part  of 
the  document  is  an  argument  as  to  the  probable  existence 
of  a   strait  through  the   continent,   whether  at  Aguilar's 

^  A  copy  of  this  memorial  was  sent  to  Gdlvez  by  Fages  with  his  letter  of  March 
25,  1776.     C-3175. 


1774]  PROBLEMS  AND   PROGRESS  333 

River  or  at  the  Strait  of  Juan  de  Fuca,  coming  out  pos- 
sibly in  Hudson  Bay.^^  The  latter  part  of  the  memorial 
deals  most  largely  with  the  expeditions  to  Alta  California 
of  1769-70.  The  importance  of  San  Francjssp,  and  es- 
pecially of  the  so-called  Rio  de  San  Francisco,  is  emphasized. 
According  to  Father  Crespi,  who  had  accompanied  the 
expeditions  of  1769,  1770,  and  1772,  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
bay,  San  Francisco  was  in  the  midst  of  a  vast  country, 
capable  of  maintaining  many  cities.  The  river  was  navi- 
gable for  probably  a  hundred  leagues,  and  might  flow 
near  Pimeria  Alta  and  perhaps  near  New  Mexico,  and 
would  have  plenty  of  timber  along  its  banks  with  which  to 
construct  boats.  This  made  it  appear  how  da,n^erous  to 
Spain  it  would  be  if  another  power  should"^  possess  the 
river  and  port  of  San  Francisco ;  not  only  would  that 
check  further  northward  conquest,  but  it  would  also  mean  a 
loss  of  the  prospective  wealth  of  Moqui,  and  the  endanger- 
ing of  the  provinces  already  reduced. 

After  speaking  of  the  hostility  of  the  Indians  between 
VeHcatd  and  San  Diego,  the  memoriahsts  went  on  to  say 
that  from  San  Diego  northward  conditions  were  much 
better.  The  land  was  better  for  agriculture  and  grazing, 
there  was  an  abundance  of  water  and  timber,  and  the 
Indians  had  received  the  Spaniards  in  peace.  This  last 
remark  had  to  be  qualified,  however.  A  revolt  at  San 
Gabriel,  when  that  mission  was  founded,  illustrated  one  of 

"•^  The  argument  for  a  strait  is  sup-  historian    as   Torquemada   must   have 

ported  at  great  length,  not  merely  by  had  authentic  documents  on  which  to 

the  incidents  of  the  Heceta  and  Bodega  base    his    account,    said    the    writers, 

voyages,    but    by    a   reference    to    the  Would  that  he  might  be  mistaken,  for 

Monarqula  Indiana  of  the  Franciscan  great  harm  would  result  to  New  Spain 

Torquemada  (published   1615)   and  to  and  to  religion,  if  a  Protestant  power 

the  career  of  the  Spanish  mystic,  Maria  should  discover  the  strait  and  possess 

de    Jestis    de    Agreda,    the    celebrated  itself  of  its  mouths.     The  account  of 

"Blue  Lady"  of  the  American  South-  Torquemada,    however,    had    also    the 

west.     Torquemada     had     said      that  support  of  Maria  de  Jesiis  de  Agreda. 

Aguilar's  River  was  understood  to  be  This  servant  of  God,  said  the  writers, 

the  Strait  of  Anian,  joining  the  Atlantic  was  carried  from  Spain  to  the  Indies 

to  the  Pacific,  and  passing  by  a  great  by  the  agency  of  the  angels  many  times 

city  which  some   Dutchmen  had  dis-  between  1620  and  1631  to  preach  the 

covered  when  they  went  through  the  faith  to  the  Indians,  especially  in  the 

strait,  and  he  had  expressed  an  opinion  provinces  of  New  Mexico,  Quivira,  and 

that  Quivira  [at  that  time  placed  by  Jumanas.     These   visits   had   the   high 

some  maps  on  the  coast  of  Alta  Cali-  proof  of  Maria's  own  account,  to  doubt 

fornia]  was  in  the  vicinity  of  the  river  which  was  to  doubt  religion, 
discovered  by  Aguilar.     Such  a  careful 


334      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XIV 

the  causes  of  trouble  with  the  Indians,  for  which  the  fault 
lay  with  the  Spaniards.  Soldiers  were  wont  to  assault 
Indian  won^ien,  a  practice  prevalent  at  all  of  the  missions, 
and  one  which  the  rehgious  had  not  been  able  to  prevent 
in  entirety.  This  was  not  only  scandalous  but  it  involved 
the  province  in  very  grave  danger  of  being  lost.  The 
Fernandinos  had  been  able  to  check  the  evil  in  a  measure, 
and  the  Indians  had  remained  at  peace.  Yet,  such  hos- 
tilities as  had  occurred  showed  that  the  missions  could  not 
exist  without  the  protection  of  a  competent  escort,  to  de- 
fend them  in  case  of  need,  and  to  keep  the  converts  in  proper 
subjection.  Too  much  rehance  should  not  be  placed  on 
Indian  docility  and  affability,  for  this  might  be  feigned,  or 
more  apparent  than  real,  in  proof  of  which  an  incident  of 
the  Heceta  voyage  [omitted  here]  was  cited.  After  de- 
scribing native  reHgions  the  memorial  goes  on  to  say  that 
the  Alta  California  Indians  had  their  false  ministers  or 
priests,  and  the  Spanish  conquest  meant  depriving  them  of 
employment.  This  might  cause  them  to  be  discontented, 
because  of  their  loss  of  honor  and  profit,  and  might  lead 
them  to  stir  up  rebellion.  If  insults  by  the  soldiery,  such 
as  could  not  fail  to  occur,  were  added  to  the  incitements  of 
these  men,  there  would  be  great  danger  of  an  outbreak. 
Moreover,  the  unconverted  Indians  near  the  missions  had 
threatened  the  converts,  unless  they  should  make  an  end 
of  the  missionaries  and  soldiers.  For  these  reasons  it  was 
essential  that  there  be  a  competent  number  of  soldiers  at 
all  missions,  and  that  they  be  good  Christians,  in  whicK  case 
more  could  be  accomplished  with  a  few  soldiers  than  with 
many  whose  manner  of  life  was  bad.*^  This  is  convincing 
evidence  that  the  military  were  the  backbone  of  conquest, 
at  least  until  such  time  as  a  region  became  well  settled  by 
Spaniards ;  missions  were  an  effective  and  necessary  agency, 
but  they  depended  on  military^md.  What  is  more  to  the 
point  here,  this  memorial  helps  to  show  how  far  Alta  Cali- 
fornia  was  from  being  on  a  safe,  well-settled  basis.^^ 

«  For  the  memorial,  C-3156.  a  letter  to  Arriaga  of  the  same  date, 

*">  The  memorial  was  enclosed  with       C-3155.      Other     enclosures     were     a 


1774]  PROBLEMS   AND   PROGRESS  335 

As  the  year  1775  drew  to  a  close  everything  was  ripe  for 
the  arrival  of  Anza's  settlers,  and  the  founding  of  the  new 
missions  at  San  Francisco.  Until  Anza  should  come,  there 
would  be  delay  because  of  Rivera's  lack  of  troops.  It  was 
this  which  caused  Rivera  to  write  to  Bucarely,  August  8, 
1775,  that  he  intended  to  postpone  exploring  San  Fran- 
cisco until  Anza's  arrival,  when  he  would  erect  the  two 
missions  and  the  fort.  For  the  latter  he  intended  to  install 
two  of  the  four  cannon  at  Monterey.  Bucarely  replied, 
January  20,  1776,  signifying  his  approval,  and  suggesting 
that  the  two  cannon  be  carried  from  Monterey  to  San  Fran- 
cisco on  the  San  Carlos  when  that  boat  should  take  the 
suppHes  that  were  to  be  given  to  the  new  settlements.**^ 
Meanwhile,  not  only  Serra,  but  also  the  other  Fernandinos 
in  Alta  California  were  impatient  for  new  missions,  there 
being  more  missionaries  at  the  time  than  the  existing  num- 
ber of  missions  required.  Palou's  letter  of  September  14, 
1775,  to  Father  Superior  Pangua  voices  this  eagerness  of 
the  Fernandinos.  He  wrote  that  he  was  only  a  super- 
numerary at  San  Carlos,  but  wished  active  service  in  this 
field  of  innumerable  heathen  awaiting  conversion.  Rivera 
was  obdurate  and  immutable,  however,  being  incapable  of 
agreeing  to  anything  that  he  had  not  first  proposed,  on 
which  account  Serra  was  not  wont  to  insist  very  much,  but 
gave  Rivera  mere  hints,  and  said  no  more,  if  he  got  a  nega- 
tive answer.  This  was  not  altogether  pleasing  to  Palou, 
who  was  impatient  for  new  missions,  and  grieved  to  see  so 
many  Indians  dying  without  baptism.  Serra  had  not  in- 
sisted more,  as  he  did  not  wish  to  break  with  Rivera,  whose 
help  was  important."*^ 

An  account  of  mission  progress  in  Alta  California  during 
1775  may  now  be  given,  although  it  was  not  until  Decem- 
ber 27,  1776,  that  Bucarely  was  able  to  remit  this  infor- 

pamphlet  of  Father  Alonso  de  Bena-  of  the  1774  Rivera  expedition,  C-2762 ; 

vides  of  New  Mexico  in  1631,  in  which  and  Campa's  diary  of  the  Heceta  voyage 

the    incident    of    Marfa    de    Jestis    de  of  1775,  C-2870. 

Agreda  is    discussed,    C-28;    Crespl's  «A.P.C.H.,    Prov.    St.    Papers,    I, 

diary   of   the    1772    Fages   expedition,  193-94. 

C-1925;    Pefia's    diary   of   the    P6rez  *>  M.N. ,  Doc.  Rel.  Mis.  Cal.,  II. 

voyage  of  1774,  C-2640 ;  Palou's  diary 


336     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XIV 


mation  to  Spain.^^  The  following  tables  show  the  totals  at 
the  end  of  both  1774  and  1775,  and  indicate  the  increase 
in  the  latter  year. 

Progress  op  Conversion 


Baptisms 

Mabriaoes 

Deaths 

Living 

1774 
1775 

833 

1725 

124 

284 

74 
419 

759 
1280 

Increase    .    . 

892j 

160 

345 

521 

Domestic  Animals 


Cows 

Sheep 

Goats 

Pigs 

Mares 

Horses 

Mules 

Asses 

1774 
1775 

304 

447 

170 
191 

95 
145 

130 
131 

31 
60 

69 

68 

85 
98 

4 
5 

Increase 

143 

21 

50 

1 

30  [sic] 

-1 

13 

1 

Crops  " 


Wheat 
Sown 

Crop 

Maize 
Sown 

Crop 

Kidney- 
beans  Sown 

Crop 

Barley 
Sown 

Crop 

1774 
1775 

22.5 
34 

475 

1029 

554 

103 
63.5 

540 
974 

13.5 
26 

40 
45.5 

18 

118 

Increase  . 

11.5 

40  [sic] 

434 

12.5 

5.5 

18 

118 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  year  had  been  a  good  one  from  the 
standpoint  of  conversions.  A  striking  feature  was  the  pro- 
nounced increase  in  the  number  of  deaths.  Was  the  in- 
ferior race  already  giving  way  in  the  presence  of  civilization  ? 
The  most  important  set  of  figures  is  the  one  concerning 
domestic  animals.  They  were  still  too  few  to  insure  the 
permanence  of  Alta  California.  Crops  had  about  doubled 
as  compared  with  the  yield  of  the  previous  year.  In  that 
respect  the  province  seemed  well  on  the  way  to  prosperity. ^^ 
There  were  still  no  settlers  but  the  soldiers  and  friars  and 
the  few  families  that  Rivera  had  brought. 


50  C-3410. 

61  The  amounts  given  are  in  fanegas, 


a  fanega  being  about  1.6  bushels. 
'  82  For  the  estado,  C-3411. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE   SECOND    ANZA   EXPEDITION   AND    RELATED   EVENTS, 

1775-1776 

Not  content  with  the  manifold  activities  that  he  had 
already  set  on  foot  to  insure  the  preservation  of  Alta  Cali- 
fornia, —  by  an  increase  in  number  and  efficiency  of  the 
provision  boats,  by  the  voyages  to  the  northwest  coast,  by 
projects  in  relation  to  the  Anza  route  for  faciUtating  trans- 
mission of  settlers  and  domestic  animals  and  the  occupation 
of  San  Francisco,  and  by  the  Crame  expedition  to  find  an 
easier  route  for  the  transportation  of  artillery  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  —  Bucarely  was  meditating  yet 
other  projects  with  the  same  object  in  view.  One  was  the 
discovery  of  new  routes^  a  more  northerly  and  more  direct 
route  than  Anza's  from  Sonora  to  Monterey,  another  from 
New  Mexico  to  Alta  California,  and  another  from  Sonora 
to  New  Mexico.  Another  project  was  to  take  the  second 
step  in  closing  the  gap  between  Sonora,  the  Californias,  and 
New  Mexico  by  founding  missions  and  presidios  along  the 
Gila  and  Colorado  rivers ;  this  done,  but  little  more  would, 
be  necessary  bet  ore  Sonora  would  become  an  interior  prov- 
ince, with  the  two  Californias  as  one  fairly  accessible, 
natural  frontier,  and  New  Mexico  another. 

Steps  were  taken  in  1775-76  with  a  view  to  the  discovery 
of  routes.  The  New  Mexico  to  Alta  California  route  was 
in  fact  discovered  through  the  separate  explorations  of 
Father  Escalante  from  New  Mexico  and  Father  Garces 
from  Alta  California.  Both  reached  Moqui.  Escalante 
and  Dominguez  attempted  without  success  to  find  a  more 
northerly  route  from  Santa  Fe  to  Monterey.  Proposals 
were  made  for  opening  a  direct  route  from  Sonora  to  New 
z  337 


338       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

Mexico,  but  except  for  Garc^s'  journey  by  way  of  the  Colo- 
rado, nothing  was  accompHshed,  and  the  same  held  true 
of  the  projected  more  northerly  route  from  Sonora  to  Mon- 
terey. More  was  not  done,  because  a  second  Anza  expedi- 
tion and  the  occupation  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado  were 
necessary  preliminaries.  The  first  of  these  projects  was 
fulfilled,  Anza  going  overland  to  Alta  California  with  so 
many  families  of  settlers  and  domestic  animals  that  the 
permanence  of  the  new  establishments,  although  not  on  a 
strong  basis/ was  assured.  The  expedition  reached  Alta 
California  just  in  time  to  prevent  the  possible  loss  of  the 
province  as  a  result  of  a  dangerous  Indian  uprising  at  San 
Diego.  Furthermore,  after  Anza's  departure,  a  settlement 
was  made  at  San  Francisco,  an  importantst^ep^in  B^ 
programme  ordefenceagainst  foreign  attack.  Anza,  Garces, 
Diaz,  Oconor,  and  Bucarely  himself  were  among  those  who 
favored  placing  Spanish  establishments  at  the  two  rivers, 
especially  in  the  Yuma  country.  Anza's  march,  Garces' 
stay  at  the  junction  and  his  explorations,  Veldzquez's  dis- 
covery of  a  route  from  Baja  California  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Colorado,  the  visit  of  the  Yuma  chief  Palma  to  Mexico 
City,  and  th^^cMld-Jite  f 9r.ji^i.ssipns 

were  factors  tending  to  bring  the  event  closer.  Just  as 
Bucarely  was  about  to  act,  however,  the  new  government 
of  the  comandancia  general  was  promulgated,  placing  these 
matters  under  the  direction  of  Teodoro  de  Croix. 


Many  proposals  tending  to  the  accomplishment  of  the 
projects  which  are  the  subject  of  this  chapter  had  been 
made  in  years  past,  some  of  which  have  already  been  noticed. 
The  success  of  Anza's  first  expedition  led  to  a  renewal  of 
these  suggestions.  Anza  is  said  to  have  proposed  founding 
missions  on  the  Colorado  when  he  was  at  Mexico  in  1774, 
but  was  opposed  to  such  foundations  on  the  Gila  because 
of  the  danger  from  Apache  raids.  The  establishing  of 
missions  on  the  Colorado,  he  had  said,  should  be  preceded 
by  explorations,  and  a  presidio  should  be  placed  there  for 
their  protection.     A  letter  from  Oconor  to  Garces  at  this 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  339 

time  indicates  that  official  sanction  had  already  been  ob- 
tained for  a  transfer  of  the  presidios  of  Horcasitas  and 
Buenavista  to  the  Gila  and  Colorado.^ 

Bucarely's  letter  of  January  2,  1775,  to  Garc^s  tended 
toward  carrying  out  the  suggestion  attributed  to  Anza. 
Bucarely  had  just  received  the  Garc^s  diary  of  1774,  Garces 
having  remained  behind  on  the  Gila,  after  Anza^s  departure, 
to  make  further  explorations.  In  his  diary  Garces  had  in- 
dicated a  number  of  places  where  missions  might  be  placed, 
the  natives  being  ready  for  conversion.  Bucarely  said 
that  he  was  particularly  eager  to  found  missions  among 
the  Yumas,  who  seemed  so  desirous  of  having  them,  and  he 
informed  Garces  of  the  plans  for  a  new  expedition  on  a 
vast  scale  under  Anza's  leadership,  with  Font  to  take  ob- 
servations of  latitude.  BeHeving  that  Garces  would  like 
to  have  a  part  in  it,  Bucarely  had  already  asked  the  Father 
Superior  at  Queretaro  to  allow  Garces  to  go.  Bucarely 
desired  him  to  go  only  to  the  junction  of  the  Colorado  and 
Gila,  and  there  to  await  Anza's  return.  In  the  meantime 
he  could  explore  that  region,  treat  with  the  neighboring 
tribes,  and  find  out  their  disposition  for  the  catechism  and 
vassalage  to  the  king.  He  reminded  Garces  that  this 
would  be  an  important  service,  because  it  might  be  the 
basis  of  future  measuresi^ 

Bucarely  had  written  to  Governor  Crespo  on  September 
21,  1774,  asking  his  opinion  with  regard  to  the  proposed 
Anza  expedition.  Crespo's  reply,  December  15,  1774, 
reached  Mexico  after  the  expedition  had  been  authorized, 
and  proved  to  have  a  more  direct  relation  to  the  projects 
now  being  considered ;  the  influence  of  Garces'  ideas  is 
apparent  throughout  the  letter.  Crespo  regarded  himself 
as  qualified  to  speak  with  some  degree  of  authority,  be- 
cause he  had  made  an  exploration  of  the  Gila  River  in  the 
vicinity  of  its  junction  with  the  San  Pedro,  and  had  talked 
with  Garces.  Such  an  expedition  as  Anza.'-S..was- necessary 
to  accomplish  an  extension  of  the  faith,  and  for  that  pur- 

» Bancroft,    Ariz.      &     New    Mex.,  » A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  62. 

390-91. 


340       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

pose  he  would  place  missions,  not  only  at  San  Francisco, 
but  also  among  the  docile  natives  of  the  Colorado  and 
Gila.  This  likewise  would  insure  the  route,  would  aid  in 
supplying  the  Californias  (for  these  regions  were  adapted 
to  agriculture  and  stock-raising),  would  serve  as  a  check 
against  the  Apaches,  partially  through  the  aid  of  the  In- 
dians of  the  two  rivers,  and  would  facilitate  a  passage  to 
New_Mexii?o .  and  the  reduction  of  Moqui.  Coming  more 
directly  to  the  expedition,  Crespo  was  inclined  to  disparage 
many  of  its  projects.  The  presidio  at  San  Francisco  ought 
to  be  delayed  until  it  could  be  learned  where  the  best  site 
for  it  would  be,  bearing  in  mind  the  possible  establishing 
of  communications  with  the  east  [New  Mexico].  Much  of 
the  route  discovered  by  Anza  was  a  stretch  of  sand,  im- 
passable for  large  parties,  because  of  the  scarcity  of  water, 
and  there  was  a  like  scarcity  between  Caborca  and  the 
Yuma  country,  on  which  account  the  expedition  ought  to 
go  by  way  of  the  Gila  River,  cross  the  Colorado  in  the 
land  of  the  Jalchedunes  above  the  junction  of  the  rivers, 
and  from  there  take  a  direct  route  to  Monterey.  The 
passage  of  the  Colorado  might  present  some  difficulty,  but 
the  rest  of  the  march  ought  to  be  easy.  The  mountains 
were  a  guarantee  of  the  existence  of  water,  and  the  distance 
should  not  be  great ;  Garces  had  said  that  the  Jalchedunes 
were  accustomed  to  trade,  through  the  agency  of  inter- 
vening tribes,  with  the  Indians  of  the  coast,  which  was 
four  days'  journey  away.  At  any  rate,  it  would  always 
be  possible  to  descend  the  Colorado  to  the  junction,  and 
proceed  from  there.  Unless  in  case  of  raids  of  the  Apaches, 
the  proposed  route  was  easy,  as  far  as  the  Colorado  River. 
The  Apache  danger  could  be  remedied  by  establishing  three 
presidios,  one  of  which  might  be  at  the  Colorado  River. 
There  should  be  two  missions  among  the  Pimas  Gilenos, 
who  were  eager  for  them,  besides  which  their  help  against 
the  Apaches  could  be  counted  upon.  Following  Anza's 
expedition  the  viceroy  should  await  exact  reports  before 
taking  further  action,  unless  he  should  decide  to  establish 
the  missions  and  presidios  just  mentioned,  in  which  case, 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION       '  341 

cattle  and  provisions  might  be  sent  there,  but  not  settlers ; 
the  latter  should  wait  until  it  could  be  ascertained  how  many 
would  be  needed.  Although  the  route  to  Monterey,  thence- 
forth, would  be  farther  north,  a  mission  might  be  erected 
among  the  Yumas  for  the  sake  of  harmony.  Coming 
then  to  the  plan  which  seemed  to  him  the  most  important 
of  all,  the  exploration  of  routes  to  Moqui  and  New  Mexico, 
Crespo  gave  a  number  of  reasons  why  he  thought  it  feasible. 
Garc6s  had  obtained  information  from  the  Indians  which 
seemed  to  indicate  that  Moqui  was  only  about  seven  days 
distant  from  the  Gila,  and  seven  more  from  New  Mexico. 
Further  proof  of  a  route  to  Moqui  was  that  the  Jalchedunes 
had  dark  woollen  blankets  of  Moqui  make.  Above  all,  a 
Pima  Gileno,  captured  by  the  Apaches  three  or  four  years 
before,  had  said  that  he  was  taken  in  five  days  to  a  place 
where  he  saw  a  religious  say  mass,  and  where  there  were 
Indians  with  Moqui  blankets.  He  escaped,  and  got  back  to 
his  tribe  after  seven  days,  travelling  only  by  night.  He  must 
have  been  in  New  Mexico,  thought  Crespo.  An  expedition 
to  New  Mexico  ought,  therefore,  to  be  attempted.  In 
conclusion,  Crespo  remarked  that  he  contemplated  a  dif- 
ferent commander  for  this  expedition,  for  extended  explo- 
rations would  be  necessary,  requiring  an  officer  of  particu- 
larly good  qualifications  and  conspicuous  talents.  With 
an  attempt  at  modesty,  Crespo  then  offered  his  own  ser- 
vices.^ As  immediately  affecting  the  Anza  expedition, 
Crespo's  plans  had  no  chance  of  adoption,  even  had  they 
been  received  before  that  expedition  was  authorized.  They 
involved  considerable  expense  and  delay  in  the  Alta  Cali- 
fornia settlements,  which  were  at  this  time  Bucarely's 
chief  concern.  Crespo,  in  Sonora,  where  foreign  aggres- 
sion was  inconceivable,  could  not  grasp  the  importance  of 
founding  San  Francisco.  In  spite  of  Crespo's  cool  conceit, 
however,  Bucarely  gave  his  plans  serious  consideration,  for 
in  many  respects  they  accorded  with  Bucarely's  policy  of 
northwestward  advance.  Crespo's  projects  found  support, 
as  might  have  been   expected,   from   Carets.     The  latte 

8  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  25. 


342       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

was  on  his  way  to  Mexico  to  report  in  person  to  Bucarely, 
when  he  received  a  letter  from  the  Father  Superior  of  the 
college  at  Queretaro,  informing  him  of  the  decision  for  the 
new  Anza  expedition,  and  the  part  that  he  was  to  play  in  it. 
Being  at  the  time  at  the  mission  of  Ures,  Garces  got  Father 
Diaz,  who  had  accompanied  him  in  the  expedition  of  the 
previous  year,  to  write  a  statement,  March  21,  1775,  of 
Garces^  opinions  on  the  needs  of  the  frontier.  Diaz  added 
that  he  too  agreed  with  the  recommendations  of  Garces. 

The  new  Anza  expedition  would  serve  a  good  purpose, 
they  said,  but  they  did  not  think  that  Anza,  embarrassed 
as  he  would  be  by  conducting  families,  could  hope  to  make 
any  new  explorations.  Yet,  explorations  were  necessary, 
as  the  present  route  to  Alta  California  had  many  difficul- 
ties, especially  from  lack  of  water.  There  ought,  there- 
fore, to  be  a  separate  expedition,  designed  to  explore  a  new 
route  to  Alta  California,  and  not  only  that,  but  also  a  route 
to  New  Mexico.  If  decided  upon,  it  would  be  advisable 
to  intrust  its  execution  to  Governor  Crespo,  who  was  well 
fitted  for  an  undertaking  of  this  nature.  As  to  Bucarely^s 
suggestion  that  Garces  explore  the  Colorado  River  with  a 
view  to  founding  missions  there,  Garces  was  in  full  accord 
with  the  plan,  but  it  was  even  more  desirable  to  found  them 
on  the  Gila,  for  the  following  reasons :  the  great  desire  of 
the  Pimas  Gilenos  for  missions,  as  evidenced  by  their  re- 
peated petitions  for  missionaries ;  the  aid  which  they  had 
given  in  the  past  against  the  Apaches;  their  intelligence, 
in  which  respect  they  were  in  advance  of  the  other  Indians 
of  that  region ;  their  ability  to  assure  communication  with 
both  Monterey  and  New  Mexico,  better  than  the  Yumas 
could ;  and  the  great  fertility  of  their  lands.  The  only 
objection  would  be  the  increased  expense  necessitated  by 
some  additional  troops  for  the  new  foundations.  That 
led  the  two  Fathers  to  make  a  suggestion  which  if  adopted 
would  aid  the  provinces,  and  not  greatly  increase  expense. 
The  presidios  as  then  arranged  were  not  able  to  keep  out  the 
Apaches,  being  too  far  apart.  Moreover,  there  were  so 
many  presidios  with  duties  that  had  nothing  to  do  with 


1775]  THE   SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  343 

fighting  the  Apaches,  that  there  was  scarcely  a  soldier  able 
to  give  his  attention  to  punishing  them,  the  time  being  taken 
up  in  guarding  the  horses  of  the  presidio,  escorting  pre- 
sidial  property  from  place  to  place,  and  in  other  like  duties.* 
It  was  possible  to  aid  the  proposed  missions,  without  greatly 
increasing  the  forces,  they  said,  by  a  change  in  the  regla- 
mento  for  the  location  of  the  presidios.  Horcasitas  and 
Buenavista  might  be  suppressed,  leaving  detachments  of 
ten  and  fifteen  men  respectively,  as  a  check  against  the 
Pimas  of  Suaqui  and  the  Seris.  Altar  might  retain  fifteen 
men,  to  attend  to  the  Pimas  Piatos  and  western  Papa- 
gueria.  San  Bernardino,  the  site  proposed  for  Fronteras 
in  the  reglamentOy  was  a  good  location.  That  might  have 
eighty  men  for  use  against  the  Apaches.  Terrenate,  or- 
dered to  Nutrias,  would  be  better  located  at  Santa  Cruz, 
thirty-five  leagues  from  San  Bernardino ;  that,  too,  should 
have  eighty  men,  attending  principally  to  the  Apaches. 
Tubac  might  be  moved  to  the  junction  of  the  San  Pedro 
River  and  Santa  Teresa  Creek,  twenty  leagues  from  Santa 
Cruz,  rather  than  to  Arivaca,  as  it  was  planned  to  do.  That 
should  have  ninety  men,  in  order  to  protect  the  Gila  mis- 
sions and  punish  the  Apaches.  Instead  of  placing  Altar 
between  Caborca  and  Bisani,  as  provided  in  the  reglamentOy 
it  was  most  important  that  it  be  placed  about  thirty  leagues 
northeast  of  the  junction  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado,  with  a 
garrison  of  fifty  or  sixty  soldiers,  to  sustain  the  projected 
Colorado  missions.  These  changes  would  not  add  greatly 
to  expense.  A  hundred  more  soldiers  in  Sonora  might  be 
advisable ;  but  they  were  needed  anyway,  if  the  effronteries 
of  the  Apaches  were  to  be  checked.  The  two  Fathers  men- 
tioned six  prominent  advantages  of  their  proposal,  only 
one  of  which  need  be  noticed  here,  —  that  it  would  be  most 
helpful  in  assuring  routes  to  Monterey  and  New  Mexico. 
As  to  the  objection  that  the  Marques  de  Rubi  had  studied 
the  situation  before  suggesting  the  reglamentOj  times  had 
changed  matters,  the  discovery  of  a  route  to  Monterey,  the 

*  This   seems   to   refer  to   the   pre-       another  indication  of  the  graft  from 
aidios  as  a  kind  of  military  ranch,  —      which  the  frontier  provinces  suffered. 


344      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XV 

suppression  of  the  Seris  and  Pimas  Piatos,  and  the  new 
missions  proposed  for  the  Colorado  having  presented  a 
situation,  which  the  marques  himself  would  recognize  as 
different,  if  he  were  present.^ 

Bucarely  wrote  to  Arriaga  of  the  plan  at  considerable 
length,  May  27,  1775,  sa3rLng  that  although  he  considered 
it  well  thought  out,  he  had  said  in  reply  only  that  he  was 
examining  it  to  determine  what  was  best  to  do.  Oconor 
was  just  about  to  enter  Sonora  to  review  the  presidios,  and 
to  treat  of  their  changes  of  site ;  so  Bucarely  had  sent  him 
a  copy  of  the  memorial  with  a  request  for  his  opinion,  not 
to  be  given,  however,  until  after  receipt  by  him  of  opinions 
from  Governors  Crespo  of  Sonora  and  Mendinueta  of  New 
Mexico.  Bucarely  was  especially  desirous  of  Oconor^s 
opinion  as  to  the  expense  that  it  would  occasion,  saying  that 
although  obhged  to  avoid  superflous  expenditure  he  would 
not  fail  to  assent  to  a  necessary  amount,  once  an  evil  sit- 
uation demanded  correction,  until  a  remedy  should  be 
secured.  Until  he  should  hear  from  Oconor  he  would  do 
nothing.^  Arriaga's  approval  came  in  due  course,  dated 
September  6,  1775.^  Thus  it  was  that  the  Garc6s-Diaz 
representation  was  marked  "Suspended  until  the  reports 
of  Oconor  and  Mendinueta  come." 

The  writer  has  not  seen  memorials  of  Crespo  and  Oconor 
concerning  the  Garc^s-Dlaz  plan,  but  it  is  certain  that 
Oconor  favored  it,  and  probable  that  Crespo  did,  if  we  may 
judge  from  his  memorial  already  quoted.  Oconor's  report 
recommended  transferring  the  presidios  of  Horcasitas  and 
Buenavista  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers.^  Mendi- 
nueta's  opinion  was  influenced  by  the  explorations  and  re- 
ports of  a  New  Mexican  friar,  Father  Silvestre  V61ez  de 
Escalante.  "In  June  1775,  or  possibly  1774,  he  spent 
eight  days  in  the  Moqui  towns,  trying  in  vain  to  reach  the 
Rio  Grande  de  Cosninas  beyond.  In  a  report  to  the  gov- 
ernor he  gave  a  description  of  the  pueblos   .  .  .   and  his 

*  A.G.P.,  Prov.  Int.,  v.  88.  a  Bucarely  letter   of    March   27,   1776 

6C-2917.  7C-2984.  (C-3180),    and   in   Oconor's   memorial 

8  Bolton,  Guide,  102.    Additional  evi-  to  Teodoro  de  Croix  of  July  22,  1777 

dence  of  Oconor's  opinion  appears  in  (C-3606). 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  346 

ideas  of  what  should  be  done.  He  earnestly  recommended 
.  .  .  that  the  Moquis  should  be  reduced  by  force  of  arms  and 
a  presidio  established  there.  ...  As  to  the  routes,  Esca- 
lante  thought  from  what  he  could  learn  by  Indian  reports 
that  the  way  from  Terrenate  by  the  Gila  and  thence  north 
to  Zuni  would  not  be  very  difficult ;  that  the  central  route 
from  the  Colorado  to  Moqui  would  probably  be  found 
impracticable;  but  that  the  best  of  all  was  one  leading 
from  Monterey  eastward  in  a  nearly  direct  line  to  Santa 

Mendinu eta's  report  to  Oconor,  November  9,  1775, 
begins  by  giving  a  description  of  the  province  of  Moqui, 
relying  on  Escalante's  account.  The(^Moqiii^  numbered 
about  7494  persons,  and  were  prosperouiTTLaving  good 
crops  of  grain  and  a  number  of  domestic  animals,  particu- 
larly sheep.  Their  government  was  in  the  hands  of  a  body 
of  elders,  who  exercised  absolute  authority.  They  were 
a  peaceful  people,  engaging  somewhat  in  trade,  but  they 
were  opposed  to  Christianity,  and,  moreover,  were  enemies 
of  the  Apaches.  They  could  not  be  conquered  by  force 
of  arms  without  endangering  the  Spanish  foothold  in  New 
Mexico,  for  it  would  also  be  necessary  to  fight  the  Yutas 
and  Navaj6s.  The  only  practicable  method  of  conquest 
was  by  sending  missionaries  with  gifts  for  the  chiefs,  who 
might  thus  permit  the  Catholic  faith  to  be  taught.  There 
were  evidences  of  the  existence  of  a  route  to  Sonora.  Ber- 
nardo Miera,  who  took  part  in  a  campaign  of  1747,  said  that 
there  was  a  route  by  way  of  the  Rio  de  San  Francisco  ^^  to 
the  Gila.  In  that  campaign  the  Spaniards  from  New 
Mexico  got  within  three  days  and  a  half  of  Terrenate,  ac- 
cording to  some  Pimas  whom  they  encountered.  Marcial 
Barrera,  commanding  an  expedition  of  Zunis  against  the 
Apaches  in  1754,  captured  a  Christian  mestizo,  Manuel 
Tomds,  by  name,  who  had  been  taken  by  the  Apaches  near 
Terrenate,  and  carried  to  the  place  where  Barrera  came  upon 
him.     Therefore,  Sonora  was  not  far  away  and  communi- 

^  Bancroft,  Ariz.  &  New  Mex.,   260-  lo  Not  to  be  confused  with  the  great 

61.  river    described    as    flowing    into    San 

Francisco  Bay. 


346       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

cations  were  not  difficult,  provided  the  Apaches  might  be 
pacified,  but  that  was  essential.^^ 

Meanwhile,  the  second  Anza  expedition  had  started. 
Contemporaneous  with  it  was  another  of  lesser  note,  but 
worthy  of  record.  The  leader  was  Jose  Veldzquez,  an  al- 
ferez  of  Baja  California.  From  a  Bucarely  letter  of  Feb- 
ruary 25,  1776,  we  learn  that  he  was  stationed  along  the 
northern  frontier  of  the  peninsula,  and  had  been  described 
by  Neve  as  an  useful  officer.^^  An  account  of  the  Velazquez 
expedition  appears  in  a  letter  written  by  him,  December 
8,  1775,  to  certain  missionaries  of  the  peninsula.  Neve 
had  ordered  him  to  explore  the  northern  coast  of  the  Gulf, 
and  a  valley  that  had  been  observed  near  that  coast,  where- 
upon Veldzquez  left  Velicatd  on  November  17,  proceeded 
through  the  valley  mentioned  without  encountering  any 
obstacle,  not  even  a  small  hill,  and  eventually  reached  the 
mouth  of  the  Colorado.  The  Colorado  came  flowing 
through  beautiful  valleys,  he  said,  so  level  and  pleasing  that 
he  thanked  God  at  seeing  them.  Only  on  the  Sonora  coast 
were  there  any  hills.  The  lands  traversed  were  suited  to 
mission  work,  being  well  wooded,  and  having  many  streams 
of  running  water,  much  pasture,  and  many  Indian  villages. 
Seeing  that  there  were  only  four  in  his  party,  some  Indians 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Colorado  had  threatened  them,  but 
desisted  when  Veldzquez's  men  put  hands  to  their  weapons. 
The  route  had  been  north  to  east  from  Velicata,  and  west, 
coming  back.  Velazquez  did  not  know  where  he  would 
come  out  on  the  return  march,  but  he  came  upon  the  Alta 
Cahfornia  road  between  Santa  Isabel  and  San  Rafael, 
about  sixteen  leagues  north  of  the  new  Dominican  mission 
of  Santo  Domingo,  reaching  that  mission  on  November 
26.^^  The  expedition  is  mentioned  by  Bucarely  in  a  letter 
of  March  27,  1776.  He  referred  to  Garces'  reports  from  the 
Colorado  River  of  the  inclination  of  the  natives  there  to 
receive  the  faith,  and  said  that  he  was  also  sending  news  of 
Velazquez's  expedition,  because  of  its  immediate  connec- 

"  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  52.  i3  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  52. 

12  C-3142. 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  347 

tion  with  the  accounts  of  Garces.  He  then  described  the 
journey  in  ahnost  the  same  terms  that  Velazquez  had 
used  in  the  letter  just  described.  Consag  in  1746  could 
not  have  seen  the  valley  through  which  Veldzquez  travelled, 
said  Bucarely,  or  he  would  not  have  described  the  land  as 
lacking  in  inhabitants  and  full  of  sand-dunes,  the  con- 
trary being  the  fact.  This  expedition  proved  that  missions 
on  the  Colorado  could  be  assisted  from  Baja  California,  as 
well  as  from  Sonora,  thus  assuring,  so  much  the  more,  the 
route  to  Alta  California.  He  was  in  favor  of  serious  at- 
tempts for  a  thorough  occupation  of  the  Californias,  mind- 
ful also  of  the  discoveries  that  might  afterward  be  made 
between  New  Mexico  and  Alta  California,  a  matter  to  which 
he  was  devoting  much  attention.  In  conclusion,  he  told  of 
the  remarkable  progress  being  made  at  the  new  Dominican 
mission  of  Rosario  de  ViJaiadaco,  172  Indians  having  been 
converted  since  his  preceding  report.^^  This  letter  is  note- 
worthy evidence  of  Bucarely's  plans.  All  it  drew  from 
Gdlvez,  however,  was  an  acknowledgement,^^  not  that  the 
new  ministro  general  was  not  interested,  but  possibly  be- 
cause the  affair  had  by  that  time  fallen  within  the  authority 
of  the  comandante  generalj  replacing  the  viceroy. 

We  may  now  take  up  the  Anza  expedition. ^^  The  roster 
of  the  expedition  as  it  left  Tubac  is  worth  quoting,  as  it 
bears  directly  on  the  objects  which  were  intended  to  be 
accomplished : 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Anza 1 

Fathers  Font,  Garces,  and  Eixarch 3 

The  purveyor,  Mariano  Vidal 1 

Lieutenant  Jos6  Joaquin  Moraga 1 

Sergeant  Juan  Pablo  Grijalva 1 

Veteran  soldiers  from  the  presidios  of  Sonora      ...  8 

Recruits         20 

Veterans  from  Tubac,  Anza's  escort 10 

"  C-3184.  gards  events,  except  so  far  as  they  are 

1*  C-3274.  discussed  in  the  official  correspondence. 

"  This,  like  the  first  expedition,  will  A  consideration  of  the  diaries  of  the 

be  treated  in  summary  fashion  as  re-  expedition  appears  in  an  appendix. 


348      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

Wives  of  the  soldiers  ^^    . 29 

Persons  of  both  sexes  belonging  to  families  of  the  said 

thirty  soldiers  ^^ 136 

Muleteers 20 

Herders  of  beef-cattle 3 

Servants  of  the  Fathers        4 

Indian  interpreters 3 

Total 240 

The  vast  total  of  1050  domestic  animals  was  taken,  to 
wit: 

Mules  with  provisions,  munitions,  Anza's  equipment, 

and  gifts  for  the  Indians 140 

Mules  carrying  private  effects  of  the  soldiers      ...  25 

Horses,  including  also  some  saddle-mules        ....  500 

Mares,  colts,  and  asses         30 

Total  of  horses,  mules,  etc.      .     .     .     .     .     .  695 

Cattle  for  subsistence  en  route  and  for  the  new  settle- 
ments at  San  Francisco 325 

Private  cattle about  30 

Total  of  cattle        ^^355 

Thus,  not  only  was  Alta  California's  population  to  be 
vastly  increased,  with  the  element  of  which  it  stood  most 
in  need,  families  of  settlers,  but  its  supply  of  domestic  an- 
imals was  to  lie  he^aHy''^^  The  mules,  most  of  the 
TiofSes  and  cattle,  and  the  very  wearing  apparel  of  the  set- 
tlers were  paid  for  at  government  expense.     Families  of 

1^  Of  the  thirty  soldiers  who  were  to  states  the  number  of  horses  as  340,  of 

remain    in    Alta    California,     Moraga  cattle  302,  and  does  not  mention  the 

alone  was  not  accompanied  by  his  wife,  60    mares,     etc.,    and    private    cattle, 

for  she  was  ill  at  Terrenate.  (Anza,  Diary,  A.G.P.,  Hiatoria,  v.  396.) 

"  Included  in  the  group  of  136  were  Font's  list  was  made  after  the  expedi- 

some   families   of   settlers,    comprising,  tion  had  started,  for  on  October  22,  the 

great    and    small,    seventeen    persons.  day  before  the  expedition  left  Tubac, 

This  group  also  included  three  infants  he  writes  that  he  did  not  set  down  the 

born   during   the   march   from   Horca-  numbers  of  persons  and  animals  of  the 

sitas  to  Tubac.     Later,  five  more  chQ-  expedition  because  he  had  not  ascer- 

dren  were  born,  and  the  wife  of  one  of  tained  them.     (Font,  Ures  diary.)     As 

the  soldiers  died  in  childbirth,  the  day  regards  number  of  persons  Font  and 

that  the  expedition  left  Tubac.  Anza  agree. 

!•  Font,      Tubutama     diary.      Anza 


1775]  THE   SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  349 

settlers,  whether  soldiers  or  not,  were  treated  alike,  "re- 
ceiving pay  for  two  years  and  rations  for  five.  The  ex- 
pense of  each  family  was  about  eight  hundred  dollars,"  ^° 
high  evidence  of  the  importance  of  the  expedition,  when 
we  consider  the  state  of  the  Spanish  treasury. 

A  large  part  of  the  expedition  had  left  Horcasitas  on 
September  29,  1775,'  Anza  did  not  consider  himself  as 
under  way,  however,  until  he  left  Tubac,  on  October  23, 
on  which  date  he  began  his  diary.  The  route  led  north  to 
the  Gila,  and  down  that  river  to  its  junction  with  the  Colo- 
rado, where  the  expedition  arrived  on  November  28. 
It  was  everywhere  well  received,  particularly  by  the  Yumas 
and  their  principal  chieftain,  Salvador  Palma.  The  more 
important  facts  of  the  march  are  presented  in  a  series  of 
letters  to  Bucarely  by  Anza,  all  dated  December  8,  at 
Santa  Olaya,  to  which  place  Anza  had  proceeded  shortly 
after  arriving  at  the  junction.  In  one  of  these  letters  he 
said  that  he  had  sent  forward  a  party  of  soldiers  before 
reaching  the  junction  to  see  if  they  could  find  a  better 
route  across  the  Colorado  Desert.  They  had  rejoined 
him  at  the  junction,  and  reported  that  they  had  found  no 
water,  and  that  conditions  were  not  more  favorable  than 
those  which  had  been  known  before.  He  would  take  the 
same  route  as  before,  therefore,  but  in  three  divisions,  be- 
cause of  the  scarcity  of  water.  The  divisions  would  march 
a  day  apart,  uniting  again  at  San  Gregorio  on  the  other 
side  of  the  desert.  This  was  a  difficult  stretch,  and  would 
cause  a  loss  of  some  animals,  for  they  were  already  weak 
from  their  long  journey,  and  would  have  to  go  with  almost 
no  food  for  two  days  in  crossing  the  desert.^^  In  a  second 
letter  he  said  that  he  had  met  with  delays  which  might 
cause  him  to  change  his  original  plan  of  seeking  a  direct 
route  to  Monterey,  and  go  first  to  San  Gabriel,  being  forced 
to  this  measure  by  a  possible  failure  of  provisions,  because 
he  had  planned  for  only  a  seventy  days'  march.  He  might 
have  to  push  ahead  himself,  therefore,  leaving  his  sick  at 

*>  Bancroft,    Cod.,  I,    258.     Cf.    ap-  ^  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  396. 

pendix  IV. 


350      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

San  Gabriel.^^  A  third  letter  explained  why  he  had  been 
delayed,  despite  the  viceroy's  order  to  hurry  to  Alta  Cali- 
fornia. It  had  been  due  to  sickness  of  the  expeditionaries. 
Usually  about  one-fourth  of  the  expedition  had  been  sick, 
and  there  were  always  two  or  three  dangerously  ill,  as  was 
the  case  at  the  moment  of  writing,  but  only  one  person,  a 
woman,  had  died.  The  greatest  delays  had  been  caused 
by  the  birth  of  children,  in  which  event  it  was  not  possible 
for  the  mother  to  ride  on  horseback  for  four  or  five  days.^^ 
The  fourth  letter  related  to  the  Indians.  So  great  was  the 
docility  and  g:ood-will  of  the  Yumas,  that  thanks  were  due 
the  Almighty.  In  endeavors  to  please  the  Spaniards  Sal- 
vador Palma  had  been  and  would  always  be,  he  thought, 
the  model.  Anza  had  given  to  Palma  the  present  which 
Bucarely  had  sent  to  him  in  the  name  of  the  king.  Palma 
had  come  out  to  meet  Anza  two  days  before  his  arrival. 
He  wished  Anza  to  reiterate  his  former  re<g[uest_fox.jnisr 
sipnaries,  saying  that  he  and  all  his  people  were  desirous  of 
being  subject  to  the  religion  and  the  government  of  the 
Spaniards,  and  Anza  had  told  him  that  he  might  expect 
the  fulfilment  of  his  desires  in  a  very  short  time.  The 
fertihty  of  the  plains  of  the  Colorado  River  was  more  evi- 
dent at  this  season  than  on  Anza's  first  visit,  and  he  had 
learned  that  the  Yumas  numbered  a  third  less  than  he  had 
formerly  estimated  them.  The  error  had  been  caused  by 
a  failure  to  distinguish  between  inhabitants  and  visitors 
from  outside  coming  to  see  his  party.  The  same  held  true 
of  the  Cocomaricopas  and  the  Opas.  On  his  previous 
visit  Anza  had  found  these  and  other  tribes  engaged  in  a 
most  devastating  war,  and  he  had  bidden  them  in  the  king's 
name,  to  cease  fighting.  Now  they  were  at  peace,  and  had 
thanked  Anza  for  it.  The  results  were  astonishing.  For- 
merly, Anza  had  been  surprised  at  the  barrenness  of  their 
river-plain ;  now  it  was  the  contrary  that  excited  his  won- 
der. Moreover,  clothing  had  become  more  prominently  in 
evidence  than  at  the  time  of  his  former  march. ^^  The  route 
from  Tubac  to  the  Gila  went  within  three  leagues  of  the 

22  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  396.  23  jbid.  2*  Ibid. 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  351 

Casa  Grande,  the  ruin  of  a  palace  which  the  Aztecs  were 
supposed  to  have  occupied  during  their  migration  south- 
ward. In  his  fifth  letter  Anza  told  of  going  to  explore  it, 
and  he  enclosed  an  ichnographical  description.^^  In  his 
sixth  letter,  Anza  said  that  he  was  leaving  Garc^s  and 
Eixarch  at  the  rivers,  as  Bucarely  had  planned.  Palma  had 
said  that  he  would  answer  for  their  security  while  with  the 
Yumas.  They  had  three  interpreters  and  four  servants, 
and  Anza  enclosed  a  list  showing  the  provisions  and  animals 
he  had  left  with  them;  the  list  noted  a  goodly  supply  of 
food,  gifts  for  the  Indians,  five  head  of  cattle,  and  thirteen 
horses.^^ 

Commenting  on  these  reports  in  a  letter  of  March  27, 
1776,  Bucarely  said  that  he  was  only  waiting  to  see  what 
progress  Garc6s  might  make,  and  to  receive  news  from  Anza 
on  his  return,  to  resolve  upon  missions  in  the  Colorado- 
Gila  country,  under  the  protection  of  presidios,  for  without 
them  no  progress  would  ever  be  made.  With  that  idea  in 
mind,  as  also  that  of  facilitating  communication  later  with 
Moqui  and  New  Mexico,  so  many  times  recommended 
since  the  year  1702,  a  proposal  of  Oconor's  to  transfer  the 
presidios  of  Horcasitas  and  Buenavista  to  the  two  rivers 
had  seemed  good  to  him.  The  Garces-Diaz  plan  had  been 
to  the  same  effect,  and  had  also  asserted  that  such  estab- 
lishments would  serve  as  a  barrier  against  the  Apaches,  a 
point  worthy  of  attention.  Bucarely  intended  to  await 
Anza's  return,  however,  before  taking  action.^^ 

One  other  fact  worthy  of  note,  not  discussed  by  Anza 
in  his  letters,  but  referred  to  in  the  diaries  of  the  expedition, 
was  the  problem  of  crossing  the  Colorado  River,  a  much 
more  serious  matter  than  it  had  been  with  his  light  expedi- 
tion of  1774.  Font  states  that  the  ford  by  which  Anza 
had  crossed  the  river  in  1774  no  longer  existed,  for  the 
current  had  deepened  the  river  at  that  place.  In  spite  of 
the  fact  that  it  was  then  the  season  when  the  Colorado  was 

^lUd.    AlsoC-3044.     For  the  plan,  "  C-3183.     Acknowledged    by  G&l- 

C-3045.  vez,  July  9,  1776.     C-3270. 

2«  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  396. 


352       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XV 

at  its  lowest,  it  was  impossible  to  cross  the  river  there.^^ 
Anza  remarks  that  he  at  first  planned  to  get  the  expedition 
across  on  rafts,  but  the  Indians  told  him  that  it  would  be 
impossible,  because  the  water  was  too  cold  [for  Indians  would 
have  had  to  swim  with  the  raft  to  guide  it],  and,  at  any  rate, 
they  could  not  get  more  than  one  raft  across  a  day,  and 
even  then  there  would  be  danger  of  its  being  upset.  This 
would  have  occasioned  a  long  delay,  and  therefore  Anza 
himself  spent  the  morning  of  November  29  in  search  of  a 
ford.  He  found  one  above  the  junction,  where  the  river 
divided  into  three  shallow  branches,  but  at  a  place  impos- 
sible of  approach  on  horseback  because  of  the  thickness  of 
the  forest.  Consequently,  Anza  had  his  men  clear  a  way 
that  afternoon,  and  on  the  next  day  the  entire  expedition 
crossed  the  river  in  safety.^^ 

Anza  left  Santa  Olaya  on  December  9,  followed  by  Gri- 
jalva  on  the  10th,  and  by  Moraga  on  the  11th.  The 
passage  of  the  desert  was  successfully  accompHshed,  but 
Moraga's  division  endured  great  hardships.  All  were 
reunited  on  December  17  at  San  Sebastian,  whence  they 
proceeded  together  to  San  Gabriel,  arriving  January  4, 
1776.  The  expedition  had  suffered  greatly  from  the  cold 
en  route,  and  had  lost  about  a  hundred  animals,  but  no 
human  life.  To  have  crossed  such  a  stretch  of  territory, 
including  the  Colorado  Desert,  with  such  a  large  party  of 
both  sexes  and  all  ages,  and  not  to  lose  a  life  must  indeed 
be  regarded  as  a  remarkable  achievement.  The  scores  of 
deaths  among  those  attempting  to  follow  the  same  route 
in  the  days  of  the  gold  rush  to  California  are  testimony  to 
the  hardihood  and  endurance  of  eighteenth  century  Span- 
iards of  the  frontier. 

In  fact  the  expeditionaries  may  have  been  in  greater 
danger  than  they  realized.  Garc^s  is  authority  that  the 
high  regard  in  which  Anza  was  held  by  the  Indians  was  all 
that  saved  his  party  from  being  attacked  on  the  march  to 
San  Gabriel.     A  rebellion  had  broken  out  at  San  Diego, 

**  Font,  Tubutama  diary.  ^  Anza,  Diary,  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v. 

396. 


1775]  THE   SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  353 

November  4,  1775^  in  which  several  Spaniards  were  killed. 
A  Quemaya  Indian  brought  word  of  the  San  Diego  out- 
break, said  Garces,  who  was  at  the  junction  of  the  rivers  at 
the  time,  and  reported  that  several  tribes  were  already  united 
to  fight  the  Spaniards.  They  did  not  interfere  with  Anza's 
men,  on  the  ground  that  they  had  done  no  harm,  and  be- 
cause they  were  the  Yumas^  friends.  It  was  easy  to  see, 
remarked  Garces,  how  important  it  was  to  have  the  tribes 
of  the  river  friendly  to  the^^Bpamards,  not  only  that  the 
latter  might  go  that  way  to  Monterey,  but  also  that  the  es- 
tablishments of  Alta  California  might  continue  to  exist. 
Garces  ascribed  the  prompt  pacification  of  San  Diego  to  the 
failure  of  the  Yumas  to  rise  against  the  Spaniards  at  the 
time  of  the  Quemayd^s  visit,  and  to  the  fact  that  the  Que- 
maya had  learned  there  of  the  good  treatment  that  the 
Yumas  had  experienced  at  the  hands  of  Anza.^^  This  fail- 
ure of  the  Yumas  to  join  against  the  Spaniards  is  the  more 
noteworthy  in  that  they  were  kinsmen  of  the  San  Diego 
Indians.  Garces'  opinion  is  even  more  emphatically  stated 
by  him  in  a  letter  (undated)  to  his  Father  Superior,  Diego 
Ximenez.  The  letter  was  written  after  his  return  from  his 
wanderings  in  1776,  and  with  it  he  sent,  in  advance  of  his 
diary,  a  summary  of  all  that  he  had  done,  and  made  sug- 
gestions accordingly.  The  revolt  at  San  Diego  was  no 
reason  for  not  founding  missions  on  the  Colorado,  he  said, 
for  there  was  no  doubt  that  the  Colorado  Indians  in  great 
part  caused  the  failure  of  that  rebellion,  and  that  their 
attitude  prevented  the  occurrence  of  any  mishap  to  Anza's 
expedition.^^  If  Garces'  analysis  of  the  situation  was  a 
correct  one,  then  by  his  personality  alone,  Anza  had  ren- 
dered an  inestimable  service  to  Alta  California,  possibly- 
saving  the  establishments  there  from  destruction.  Anza, 
however,  knew  nothing  of  this  at  the  time,  and  did  not 
perhaps  appreciate  the  real  seriousness  of  the  San  Diego 
revolt.  To  Rivera,  who  reached  San  Gabriel  the  day 
before  Anza's  arrival,  the  affair  was  all  important.     Anza 

»  Garc6s  (Coues  ed.),  I,  205-8,  257.  "i  C-3110. 

Also  C-3001. 

2a 


354       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

agreed  to  take  seventeen  men  and  to  accompany  Rivera 
to  San  Diego,  for  the  time  being  suspending  the  projects 
that  he  had  been  ordered  to  accompHsh.  By  January  11, 
when  they  reached  San  Diego,  matters  seemed  to  have 
quieted  down. 

If  Garc6s  praised  Anza^s  services  in  relation  to  the  San 
Diego  revolt  from  the  standpoint  of  his  influence  upon  the 
Yumas,  Bucarely  was  equally  emphatic  as  to  the  impor- 
tance of  Anza's  presence  in  Alta  California  at  the  time  that 
the  uprising  occurred.  In  a  letter  of  March  27,  1776,  he 
reported  that  Anza  had  reached  San  Gabriel  without  more 
serious  misfortune  than  the  loss  of  a  few  head  of  cattle 
and  some  horses.  His  arrival  was  indeed  providential,  for 
the  San  Diego  Indians  had  just  burned  the  mission  there, 
and  the  aid  of  Anza's  forces  was  just  as  if  it  had  come  from 
Heaven,  changing  the  face  of  matters.  At  about  the  same 
time,  the  supply-ships  San  Carlos  and  Principe  arrived. 
So  the  Indians,  seeing  forces  coming  from  all  sides,  had  be- 
come afraid  that  they  were  sent  to  punish  them.  Rivera 
had  asked  for  twenty-five  more  soldiers,  and  Bucarely  had 
ordered  Neve  to  recruit  them  in  Baja  California.  Some 
persons  had  made  accusations  against  the  Colorado  River 
Indians  in  connection  with  the  uprising,  but  Bucarely  held 
them  to  be  guiltless.  "Of  late,"  he  concluded,  "necessity 
makes  clear  that  if  those  distant  lands  are  to  be  preserved, 
a  greater  number  of  troops  there  is  indispensable,  and  in 
consequence  a  greater  expense  from  the  royal  treasure. 
All  my  plans  are  directed  to  this  important  end,  for  I  know 
that  it  agrees  with  the  plans  of  the  king."  ^^  Galvez's  reply, 
July  8,  1776,  directed  that  Neve  change  his  residence  from 
Baja  to  Alta  California  as  soon  as  possible.^^ 

In  the  light  of  such  documents  as  the  memorials  of  Fages 
and  the  officials  of  the  College  of  San  Fernando  concerning 
conditions  in  Alta  California,  the  San  Diego  revolt  and 
Anza's  part  in  its  suppression,  even  although  he  was  not 
obliged  to  strike  a  blow,  are  worthy  of  special  emphasis. 
Spain's  retention  of  the  province  hung  by  a  slender  thread, 

32  C-3186.  "s  C-3269. 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  355 

and  the  San  Diego  affair  had  nearly  snapped  it.  Its  full 
import  can  be  grasped  by  a  comparison  with  the  Yuma 
disaster  of  1781,  an  event  fraught  with  great  consequences 
as  we  shall  see.  Yet  the^San^IHego  revolt  was  more  widely 
planned,  had  fewer  difficulties  to  encounter,  and  because  of 
the  distance  from  New  Spain  seemed  more  likely  to  be 
permanent  in  effect,  if  successful.  As  for  the  revolt  ^itself^^^ 
little  need  be  said.  On  the  night  of  November  ,4 .Cj 775 ^  j 
the  mission  was  attacked  by  hundreds  of  Indians.  There 
were  but  eleven  men  there  of  Spanish  blood,  but  they  de- 
fended themselves  bravely  until  morning,  when  the  Indians 
retired.  Two  Spaniards  were  killed,  including  one  of  the 
missionaries,  and  all  were  wounded,  one  of  the  wounded 
men  dying  a  few  days  later.  The  mission,  as  already  noted, 
was  burned  during  the  attack^  ~Kx  the  presidio,  several 
miles  away,  there  were  but  eleven  soldiers  at  the  time,  of 
whom  four  were  sick  and  two  in  tlie  stocks.  Indian  plans 
to  attack  the  presidio  having  miscarried,  the  soldiers  fit 
for  duty  were  able  to  aid  the  mission  force  on  learning,  next 
day,  of  the  disaster.  Subsequent  investigation  showed  that 
tribes  for  miles  around  were  in  league  against  the  Spaniards,"^ 
the  uprising  being  of  a  national  character,  out  of  fear  lest 
the  Spaniards  should  continue  to  be  successful  in  making  I 
conversions,  and  should,  therefore,  subject  the  entire  coun- 
try. There  was  even  some  evidence  of  collusion  on  the 
part  of  the  converts  with  the  attacking  party. 

While  at  San  Diego  a  quarrel  developed  between  Anza 
and  Rivera,  the  former  wishing  to  proceed  north  to  found 
the  settlements  at  San  Franiscoi,  as  ordered,  while  Rivera 
was  unwilling  to  co5perate,  feeling  that  the  uprising  had 
changed  the  aspect  of  affairs.  After  a  stay  of  about  three 
weeks  at  San  Diego,  Anza  decided  to  wait  no  longer  for 
Rivexa,  but  to  proceed  with  his  expedition.  On  February 
9,  1776,  ]he  started  for  San  Gabriel,  reaching  that  mission 
three  days  later.  On  the  21st  he  set  out  for  Monterey,  tak- 
ing with  him  seventeen  soldiers  with  their  families,  and  six 
more  soldiers  of  his  escort,  besides  the  religious.  Font. 
The  others  were  to  follow  in  a  few  days  under  the  command 


356       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

of  Moraga,  who  was  just  then  pursuing  an  Alta  CaHfornia 
deserter  in  the  direction  of  the  Colorado  River.  Anza 
arrived  at  Monterey  on  March  10,  and  Moraga  came  up  soon 
afterward.  While  at  the  nearby  mission  at  Carmelo  Anza 
fell  seriously  ill,  but,  while  still  too  sick  to  walk,  insisted  on 
returning  to  Monterey  on  horseback  to  prepare  an  im- 
mediate expedition  to  San  Francisco.  On  March  23  he 
set  out  from  Monterey,  accompanied  by  Font,  Moraga, 
eight  of  his  own  soldiers  and  three  from  Monterey.  His 
gxplprMiofi^  the  site  of  San  Francisco,  March  27  to  29, 
proved  that  everything  needed  for  the  new  settlements 
was  near  at  hand,  even  timber  for  buildings,  which  some 
previous  explorers  had  not  been  able  to  find,  although 
in  1770  Rivera  had  reported  finding  some.  Anza  then 
marched  around  the  bay,  and  ascended  the  San  Joaquin 
River  a  short  distance.  Thence,  he  crossed  the  mountains 
south  of  Mt.  Diablo,  and  got  back  to  Monterey  on  April 
8.  Shortly  afterward,  he  parted  from  those  whom  he  had 
brought  to  settle  in  the  new  country,  leaving  them  at  Mon- 
terey, and  started  for  Sonora  and  the  City  of  Mexico  to 
report. 

On  August  27, 1776,  Bucarely  wrote  that  Anza  had  reached 
Horcasitas  on  June  1.  His  return  had  been  accomplished 
without  mishap,  the  Yumas  according  him  a  fine  reception, 
and  Chief  Palma,  to  whom  was  due  the  success  of  Anza's 
two  expeditions  and  the  good-will  of  Indians  of  the  Colo- 
rado toward  Spaniards,  was  coming  to  Mexico  with  Anza 
to  get  better  acquainted  with  Bucarely.  Referring  to 
Anza's  explorations  in  Alta  California,  Bucarely  regretted 
that  the  San  Francisco  settlements  had  not  been  made, 
due  to  Rivera^s  belief  in  the  greater  importance  of  the  San 
Diego  affair.  Anza  was  not  entirely  blameless,  said  Bu- 
carely, and  he  had  written  to  both  Anza  and  Rivera,  tell- 
ing them  that  they  had  acted  improperly  in  not  making  a 
beginning  of  the  settlements  and  fort  at  San  Frauciscp^ 
Neve's  transfer  to  Alta  California  came  in  good  time,  he 
thought.  He  had  told  Neve  that  the  San  Francisco  es- 
tablishments were  to  receive  his  principal  attention,  and 


1775]  THE   SECOND  ANZA   EXPEDITION  357 

he  had  also  written  to  him  how  annoyed  he  was  by  the 
dissension  between  Anza  and  Rivera,  for  that  had  been 
largely  responsible  for  the  bad  outcome  of  Bucarely's 
measures.  He  felt  that  Neve  would  resolve  the  situation 
well,  praising  that  officer  highly.  He  closed  saying  that 
there  was  nothing  to  worry  about,  and  that  his  own  chief 
care  was  to  find  a  way  by  new  explorations  for  conducting 
provisions  to  those  establishments,  a  matter  that  held 
precedence  in  his  attention.'^  Bucarely  seems  here  to  be 
contemplating  explorations  for  new  routes  to  Alta  Cali- 
fornia with  a  view  to  replacing  the  supply-ships.  The 
Anza  route  was  not  good  enough  to  replace  them.  This 
letter  would  indicate,  also,  that  Bucarely  did  not  know 
that  frontier  affairs  were  soon  to  be  taken  from  his  com- 
mand. In  acknowledging  Bucarely's  letter  Gdlvez  ordered 
that  Palma  be  tendered  a  good  reception  in  Mexico,  given 
presents,  and  in  other  ways  distinguished.^^ 

One  incident  of  Anza's  return  helps  to  make  clear  why  a 
new  route  to  Alta  California  was  desired,  the  difficulty 
experienced  by  Anza  in  crossing  the  Colorado  River.  He 
Had  arrived  at  the  junction  in  June,  when  the  Colorado  is 
high,  and  although  he  now  had  but  a  small  party  and  few 
effects  it  took  him  two  days,  June  13  and  14,  to  effect  a 
passage.  He  was  virtually  restricted  to  crossing  at  a 
point  where  the  river  ran  between  hills  for  about  a  quarter 
of  a  league  and  was  about  a  hundred  yards  wide,  with  a 
very  rapid  current  and  terrible  eddies.  There  were  other 
places  of  much  greater  width,  where  the  river  divided  into 
branches,  but  they  would  have  been  impossible  of  passage 
owing  to  the  vast  mudholes  and  forests  through  which  one 
had  to  go  in  order  to  reach  the  river.  On  the  13th  he 
launched  a  raft  at  ten  o'clock  with  part  of  his  men  and 
baggage,  guided  by  twenty-three  Yumas,  but  it  was  not 
until  half  past  three  that  it  got  across.  Another  raft  was 
launched,  but  it  failed  to  reach  the  other  side.  The  next 
day,  small  articles  placed  in  large  vases  were  carried  across 
by   the   Indians,   for  the   Yumas   were   expert   swimmers. 

«  C-3301.  35  C-3404. 


358      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

Finally,  the  rest  of  the  men  and  the  larger  effects  were  put 
upon  two  rafts,  and  under  the  guidance  respectively  of  thirty 
and  about  forty  Yumas,  made  the  passage  in  safety.  On 
one  occasion  when  it  appeared  that  a  raft  might  become 
submerged,  over  two  hundred  Indians  threw  themselves 
into  the  river  in  order  to  render  aid  if  it  should  prove  neces- 
sary. Commenting  on  his  passage  of  the  Colorado,  Anza 
wrote  :  "On  another  occasion  I  have  said  that  if  the  peoples 
who  dwell  along  this  great  river  are  attached  to  us,  we  will 
effect  its  passage  without  excessive  labor,  and  that  if  they  are 
not,  it  will  be  almost  impossible  to  do  so."  He  went  on  to 
say  that  his  present  experience  confirmed  his  former  re- 
mark, for  even  with  the  aid  of  the  natives,  rendered  vol- 
untarily, it  had  taken  him  four  days  to  cross  the  river,^^ 
and  at  no  time  in  his  journey  had  he  been  so  fatigued  by 
his  efforts.  Without  Indian  aid,  it  would  have  taken 
double  the  time.  The  river  could  not  be  forded,  except 
from  December  to  the  middle  of  February,  and  then  only 
by  crossing  both  the  Gila  and  the  Colorado.  At  other  times 
there  would  be  a  need  of  rafts,  and  the  best  place  to  cross 
would  be  at  the  place  where  he  had  done  so.  As  to  the  rest 
of  Anza's  account  of  the  return  journey,  it  need  only  be 
remarked  that  he  continued  to  speak  well  of  the  Yumas 
and  the  fertility  of  their  lands. ^^  In  fine,  if  Anza^s  account 
of  his  first  expedition  was  in  some  degree  too  highly  colored, 
he  had  furnished  a  proper  corrective  in  the  account  of  his 
second  journey.  If  he  overestimated  the  constancy  of 
Yuma  friendship,  he  made  it  perfectly  clear  that  a  good 
disposition  of  the  Yumas  toward  the  Spaniards  was  a 
prerequisite  to  using  the  route  that  he  had  discovered. 
We  have  already  seen  that  Bucarely  understood  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  Ahza  route,  and  appreciated  the  Indian  sit- 
uation perhaps  better  than  Anza  himself. 

Bucarely's  attention  to  the  Gila-Colorado  country  con- 
tinued to  be  manifest  in  the  correspondence  of  the  latter 

"On    the    12th  some    preparations  fore,  when  the   raft   seemed   about  to 

were  necessary,  and  on  the  15th  a  raft  upset. 

had  to  be  sent  for  two  soldiers  and  a  ^  Anza,  Diary,  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v. 

boy,  who  had  jumped  off,  the  day  be-  396. 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  359 

part  of  the  year  1776.  We  have  already  seen  that  since 
early  in  1775,  on  receipt  of  the  Garces-Diaz  plan,  he  had 
contemplated  a  transfer  of  Horcasitas  and  Buena vista  pre- 
sidios to  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  and  this  project  had  re- 
ceived Gdlvez^s  approval,  February  14,  1776.  A  Bucarely 
letter  of  September  26,  1776,  shows  that  he  still  viewed 
that  project  favorably.^^  On  October  27,  he  wrote  that 
Anza  had  arrived  in  Mexico,  accompanied  by  Palma  and 
three  other  Indians.  Palma  had  asked  that  a  mission  and 
a  presidio  be  established  in  the  Yuma  country,  and  Bu- 
carely was  in  favor  of  it,  because  of  the  fruitfulness  of  that 
land  in  maize,  kidney-beans,  and  wheat,  with  which  it 
might  assist  Alta  California,  as  also  because  such  estab- 
lishments would  mean  a  reduction  to  the  church  of  the  vast 
numbers  of  Indians  along  the  Colorado  and  Gila.^^  Bu- 
carely^s  November  26  letter  had  more  to  say  of  Palma^s 
visit.  The  three  Indians  with  him  were  a  brother  and  two 
other  relatives.  Palma  had  presented  a  memorial  asking 
for  missions,  but  seeking  even  more  that  he  and  his  com- 
panions be  baptized  before  leaving  Mexico.  Bucarely 
was  favorable,  regarding  it  as  important  for  the  extension 
of  religion  and  the  royal  domain.^^  Palma's  memorial 
bore  date  of  November  11,  being  drawn  up  for  him  by 
Anza  whose  hand  is  also  evident  in  the  events  and  ideas 
set  forth  in  the  document.  It  recited  the  Hfe  of  Palma, 
especially  his  relation  to  the  Anza  expeditions  and  his  seven 
hundred  league  journey  to  Mexico.  These  achievements 
he  offered  as  evidence  of  the  sincerity  of  his  petition  for 
missions  and  his  desire  for  baptism.^^  Gdlvez's  replies 
to  the  two  Bucarely  letters  just  referred  to  are  worth  noting. 
Answering  the  first,  he  wrote,  February  10,  1777,  ordering 
that  the  Yumas  be  given  as  many  missionaries  and  pre- 
sidial  troops  as  might  be  required."*^  This  was  expressed 
in  unequivocal  terms,  and  the  same  words  were  used  in  a 
communication  of  equal  date  to  Teodoro  de  Croix,  in  whose 
province  the  execution  of  the  command  then  lay.^^     Only 

38  C-3328.  «  C-3379.  «  C-3474. 

39  C-3360.  41  C-3365.  «  C-3475. 


360       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XV 

four  days  later,  in  answer  to  the  November  26  letter,  Gdlvez 
authorized  the  baptism  of  Palma  and  his  companions,  and 
^^in  its  time"  the  founding  of  the  missions  and  presidios 
asked  for>*  The  order  to  Croix  was  in  much  the  same 
terms,  except  that  the  settlement  of  the  Colorado-Gila  was 
to  occur  "in  its  due  time."^^  Thus  Gdlvez  undid  the 
effect  of  his  earlier  order.  With  Bucarely  in  charge  it  would 
have  made  no  difference,  but  Croix's  interpretation  of 
"due  time"  was  apt  to,  and  did,  involve  too  great  delay. 
In  November,  1776,  Bucarely  learned  that  San  Francisco 
had  been  founded.  Rivera  had  flatly  refused  to  help  Anza 
to  explore  San  Francisco  or  to  found  the  settlements  that 
Bucarely  had  ordered,  but  later  he  changed  his  mind.  While 
in  San  Diego  he  sent  an  order  on  May  8,  1776,  to  Moraga 
to  proceed  to  San  Francisco,  and  erect  a  fort.  Moraga's 
force  of  soldiers  and  settlers  and  their  famihes,  accompanied 
by  Fathers  Palou  and  Camb6n,  reached  San  Francisco  on 
June  27.  They  passed  the  first  "Fourth  of  July"  un- 
aware how  near  they  had  come  to  selecting  a  resounding 
date  for  their  arrival.  Meanwhile,  the  preparation  of 
buildings  went  on,  and  on  September  17,  1776^  a  formal 
ceremony  took  place  to  indicate  that  the  presidio  of  San 
Francisco  had  definitely  begun  its  official  existence.  On 
October  9  there  was  another  solemn  function,  this  time  to 
signalize  the  founding  of  the  mission  San  Francisco  de 
Asis,  now  more  commonly  called  Mission  Dolores.  Bu- 
carely had  at  length  achieved  one  of  the  great  objects  for 
which  he  had  been  striving  for  more  than  three  years.  Al- 
though he  could  not  have  realized  it  at  the  time,  he  had  also 
reached  the  culminating  point  in  his  achievements  in  be- 
half of  the  Calif ornias,  for  the  coming  of  the  settlers  and 
doniegtic  animals  with  Anza  and  the jucc<^ful  founding  of^ 
Sail  Francisco  mark  the  establishment  of  the  Alta  Calif or- 
nia  settTements  on  a  permanent  basis. 

TBucarely's  plans^  However,  contemplated  a  much  more 
pronounced  development  of  the  province,  and  it  is  to  this 
part  of  Bucarely 's  programme  that  Carets'  activities  of  1776 

«  C-3478.  «  C-3479. 


1775]  THE   SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  361 

belong.  Bucarely^s  instructions  to  Garces  had  contem- 
plated only  the  preparation  of  the  Yuma  and  surrounding 
districts  for  the  coming  of  missionaries,  and  subjection  to 
the  Spanish  crown.  On  January  12,  1776,  Garces  wrote 
to  the  viceroy  from  the  junction  of  the  rivers  about  the 
lower  Colorado  country.  He  had  just  returned  from  a 
trip  to  the  mouth  of  the  river,  having  travelled  among 
various  tribes.  They  received  him  better  than  he  had 
expected,  and  he  had  even  bfeen  able  to  end  a  war  which 
the  Yumas  and  two  other  tribes  were  waging  against  the 
Cucapds.  All  of  these  peoples  were  eager  for  the  coming 
of  Spanish  missionaries  and  settlers.  Their  lands  were 
suitable  for  every  kind  of  seed,  and  in  the  main  adapted  to 
the  raising  of  cattle  and  horses,  especially  along  the  river. 
There  were  not  many  sites  for  villages  because  of  the  floods 
of  the  Colorado,  but  there  were  some  table-lands.  Garces 
expected  equal  success  with  the  tribes  up  the  Colorado, 
whom  he  planned  to  visit  in  a  short  time.**^  A  month  later, 
on  February  14,  Garc6s  started  north.  The  idea  occurred 
to  him  of  attempting  to  reach  Monterey  by  the  northerly 
route,  as  he  had  wished  to  do  at  the  time  of  the  first  Anza 
expedition,  but  he  was  unable  to  procure  guides.  He  went 
instead  to  San  Gabriel,  finding  guides  for  this  route,  which 
followed  the  line  of  the  modern  Santa  Fe  Railroad  along  the 
Mojave  River  and  through  Cajon  Pass.  He  remained  at 
San  Gabriel  from  March  24  to  April  9,  when  he  set  out  in 
a  fresh  attempt  to  reach  Monterey  by  an  interior  rgjate. 
This  carried  him  past  modern  Bakersfield  to  the  vicinity 
of  Tulare  Lake,  whence  he  turned  back,  and  headed  for  the 
Colorado  River  at  the  point  where  he  had  left  it.  Not  satis- 
fied with  what  he  had  done,  he  resolved  to  attempt  another 
of  his  favorite  projects,  —  to  reach  Moqui  from  the  Colo- 
rado. This  he  accomplished  by  July  2.  Thence  he  re- 
traced his  steps  to  the  Colorado,  and  proceeded  to  his  mis- 
sion of  San  Javier  del  Bac,  where  he  arrived  on  September 
17.'*^  Thus  another  of  Bucarely's  great  projects,  although 
without  his  authorization,  had  been  accomplished.     It  was 

*«  A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  52.  ^  Garc6s,  Diary. 


362       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

previously  known  that  a  route  existed  from  New  Mexico 
to  Moqui ;  Garces  had  proved  that  one  might  go  on  from 
Moqui  to  the  Pacific  coast. 

•  Bucarely's  first  information  of  Garces'  success  seems  to 
have  come  from  New  Mexico  through  a  letter  written  from 
Moqui  by  Garc6s,  July  3,  1776,  to  the  religious  at  Zuni. 
He  told  of  his  arrival  in  Moqui,  saying  that  the  Moquis  had 
not  been  pleased  to  see  him ;  troops,  Christian  Indians,  and 
gifts  would  be  necessary,  if  they  were  to  be  subjected.  He 
announced  that  he  had  found  a  route  which  could  be  used, 
following  the  establishment  of  a  presidio  on  the  Colorado, 
for  communication  and  commerce  with  Sonora.^^  Bu- 
carely  commented  on  this  letter  in  his  communication  of 
December  27,  1776,  to  Galvez.^^ 

Shortly  after  his  return  Garces  gave  a  general  report,  in 
an  undated  letter  to  his  Father  Superior,  Diego  Ximenez, 
of  the  results  of  his  trip.  The  Pimas  Gilenos  had  never 
risen  against  Spain,  he  said,  and  they  had  recently  asked 
for  missions.  Nothing  would  be  more  important  in  the 
service  of  God  and  the  king  than  the  founding  of  one  or  two 
establishments  on  the  Gila,  a  comparatively  simple  task, 
too,  because  there  were  five  villages  in  a  distance  of  two 
leagues  and  a  half,  so  that  a  few  cattle  and  horses  would 
suffice.^^  Garces  described  his  journey  to  Moqui  and  back, 
dealing  primarily  with  the  character  of  the  Indians  along 
his  route.^^  When  he  got  back  to  the  Colorado-Gila  junc- 
tion the  Yumas  wished  to  detain  him,  believing  that  the 
missionaries  and  settlers  were  on  the  point  of  arriving,  but 
he  left  them  and  returned  by  way  of  the  Gila.  He  recom- 
mended missions  among  the  Pdpagos,  as  well  as  others  on 
the  Gila,  for  a  post  on  the  Papagueria  route  to  the  Colorado 
would  be  of  value  in  case  of  uprisings  of  the  tribes  between 
Sonora  and  the  rivers.     Even  without  such  a  line  of  com- 

«  C-3265.  "  Moqui  he   described    as  the    best 

<9  C-3416.  Indian  village  that  he  had  seen  in  New 

^  Garc6s   seems    to  have    in    mind  Spain,  because  of  its  excellent  site,  the 

beasts  of  burden,   of  which  a  smaller  height    of    the    Indian    houses,    their 

number    would    be    necessary    because  doorways   (which  were  accessible  only 

of  the  nearness  of  the  villages  to  each  by  use  of  ladders),  and  the  industrious 

other.  character  of  the  inhabitants. 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  363 

munications,  however,  the  Colorado  settlements  could  be 
maintained  by  sea,  being  very  near  San  Diego.  "I  am  of 
the  opinion/^  said  Garces,  predicting  in  part  what  was 
later  to  occur,  "that  if  the  matter  of  missions  on  the  Gila 
and  Colorado  is  allowed  to  cool  .  .  .  there  is  danger  that 
all  will  be  lost,  and  that  the  Yumas  may  be  the  first  to 
enter  a  league,  and  by  their  aid  the  Apaches  can  unite 
with  the  Pimas/^  Garces  rejoiced  that  the  Apaches,  who 
had  recently  sought  an  alliance  with  the  Pimas,  had  treach- 
erously killed  some  of  the  latter,  for  an  Apache-Pima  alli- 
ance would  mean  grave  danger  to  the  provinces,  whereas 
Pima  hostihty  to  the  Apaches  would  secure  the  Gila  mis- 
sions, if  founded.  After  referring  to  the  relation  of  the 
Yumas  to  the  San  Diego  revolt  in  the  terms  already  noted, 
Garces  added  that  if  establishments  were  not  founded  on 
the  Colorado  within  a  few  years,  the  Alta  California  settle^ 
ments  could  not  be  maintained,  even  with  two  hundred  more 
iheii  than  were  there  at  the  time.  Settlers  for  the  Colorado 
should  not  be  taken  from  the  frontier  provinces,  however, 
as  these  regions  lacked  a  sufficient  population.  He  had 
thought  of  recommending  missions  among  the  Jalchedunes, 
Jamajabes,  and  Yumas,  but  on  second  thought  had  de- 
cided for  the  Yumas,  Cajuenches,  and  Cucapas,  believing 
that  if  the  Yumas  were  well  secured,  there  would  be  no 
trouble  with  the  settlements  farther  down  the  river.  For 
the  present,  he  did  not  recommend  the  use  of  routes  from 
the  Colorado  to  New  Mexico  or  San  Francisco  and  Mon- 
terey, because  to  march  through  tribes  where  there  were 
no  Spanish  establishments  would  be  pernicious  in  its  effect, 
without  any  advantage  whatsoever.^^  A  copy  of  this  letter 
soon  reached  Bucarely,  who  forwarded  it  to  Spain  with  his 
communication  of  January  27,  1777.  He  regarded  with 
favor  the  project  for  establishing  presidios  and  missions  on 
the  Colorado,  for  not  only  did  the  security  of  the  Alta 
California  establishments,  the  route  thereto,  and  perhaps 
the  ability  to  send  provisions  there  from  Sonora  depend  on 
such  establishments  being  made,  but  also  the  natives  visited 

MC-3110. 


364       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA       [Ch.  XV 

by  Garc^s  as  far  as  Moqui  might  be  attracted  to  the  faith, 
in'  which  case  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  effect  their  con- 
quest.^^  Acknowledging  this  letter,  May  3,  1777,  Gdlvez 
wrote  that  Garces^  account  had  given  the  king  much  satis- 
faction, and  he  directed  Bucarely  to  extend  to  Garc6s  the 
king's  thanks, ^^  which  the  viceroy  accordingly  did.^^ 

A  copy  of  Garc6s'  diary  was  sent  to  Bucarely  when  com- 
pleted, and  another  forwarded  direct  to  Gdlvez,  April  18, 1777, 
by  Father  Xim^nez.^®  Both  Bucarely  ^^  and  Xim6nez  ^* 
sent  Gdlvez  maps  covering  the  second  Anza  expedition  and 
Garces'  wanderings  of  1775-76  in  entirety.  They  touch 
many  phases  of  the  subject-matter  of  this  work,  such  as 
the  prevailing  ideas  of  geography  and  the  names  of  places 
and  people  mentioned  in  written  accounts.^^  Bucarelyalso 
sent  a  Font  map  covering  the  Anza  march  from  Monterey 
to  San  Francisco.^^  Perhaps  the  most  valuable  part  of 
Garc6s'  diary  is  that  which  contains  his  reflections,  or  con- 
clusions. He  begins  with  a  list  of  the  tribes  he  visited, 
giving  in  some  cases,  an  estimate  of  their  number,  with 
other  remarks  concerning  them.  It  need  only  be  stated  that 
the  tribes  were  many,  and  that  the  total  numbers  of  those 
along  the  Gila  and  Colorado  in  the  regions  that  he  visited 
were  estimated  as  respectively  8000  and  16,500.  Next,  he 
takes  up  the  question  of  their  relations  with  one  another. 
We  may  note  that  the  Yumas  were  wont  to  be  on  good 
terms  with  the  Jamajabes,  Yabipais  Tejuas,  and  Pdpagos, 
and  at  war  with  the  Cocomaricopas,  Pimas  Gilenos,  Jal- 
chedunes,  Jequiches,  Jalliquamais,  and  Cajuenches.  It 
would  be  necessary  to  rule  over  the  tribes  of  the  Colorado, 

'3  C-3465.  including   Alta   California,    is   also   in- 

"C-3540.  serted.     This    is    in    A.G.I.,    95-7-21, 

"  Bucarely  to  Gdlvez,  Aug.  27,  1777.  and  is  referred  to  in  Torres  Lanzas,  II, 

C-3655.  no.  349,  at  pp.  27-28. 

^«C-3527.  60C-3430.     This  map  is    published 

"C-3431.  in     Pedro     Font,  .  .  .  San     Francisco 

^  C-3432.  Bay  and  California  in  1776 ;  three  maps 

'9  C-3432    is  inserted    in    the    text.  .  .  .  with    an    explanation    by    Irving' 

A  similar  map  appears  in  Garc6s  (Coues  Berdine    Richman.     Providence,    1911. 

ed.),     I,     frontispiece,     apparently     a  The  other  two  maps  show  respectively 

rather  crude  copy  from  this  or  from  the  route  of  the  entire  march  by  Anza's 

some  other  like  map.     For  comparative  expedition  of  1775-76,  and  the  entrance 

purposes  a  Font  map  of  the  northwest-  to  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco. 

ern   portion   of  the  frontier  provinces. 


K  i\ 


>  "♦ 


4       <?        -is 


1775]  THE   SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  365 

he  said,  in  order  to  render  permanent  the  estabHshments 
of  Alta  CaHfornia ;  otherwise,  if  these  tribes  were  hostile 
and  should  join  those  of  Alta  California,  that  province 
could  not  be  maintained,  except  at  great  expense.  Con- 
versely, anything  expended  on  the  conquest  of  the  Colorado 
would  lighten  the  burden  of  the  Monterey  establishments, 
and  although  the  Indians  of  the  mountains  might  remain 
unconquered,  they  were  not  a  people  to  be  feared,  especially 
since  help  might  be  sent  in  case  of  need  either  from  the 
Colorado  or  from  Alta  California.  An  occupation  of  the 
Colorado  would  facilitate  conquering  the  Apaches,  who, 
under  existing  conditions,  were  able  to  take  refuge  among 
the  Yabipais  Tejuas  ®^  and  Chemeguabas.  The  Indians  of 
the  Colorado  and  Gila  were  ready  to  receive  the  faith,  and 
Garces  named  no  less  than  fifteen  sites  where  missions  were 
needed.  Supposing  the  king  had  already  decided  on  two 
presidios  of  fifty  men  each,  one  on  the  Gila  and  the  other 
on  the  Colorado,  that  would  provide  for  four  missions.  If 
others  were  established,  they  should  have  an  escort  of  ten 
soldiers  each,  and  it  would  be  well  if  the  soldiers  were  mar- 
ried. The  Grila  presidio  should  be  established  some  dis- 
tance north  of  that  river  in  the  region  between  lands  of  the 
Pimas  Gilenos  and  the  Moquis,  for  Garces  felt  that  he  had 
proved  that  the  latter  were  not  far  away.  Three  important 
advantages  would  result,  besides  the  defence  of  the  Gila 
missions :  the  Apaches  would  be  cut  off  from  their  hiding- 
places  in  the  lands  of  the  Yabipais  Tejuas  and  Moquis, 
and  thus  might  be  the  more  easily  reduced;  the  presidio 
might  serve  as  a  base  for  opening  communications  with 
New  Mexico  by  way  of  Moqui,  and  for  subjecting  the  in- 
solent Moquis;  and  finally,  it  would  protect  the  route  to 
Monterey ,y  and  especially  a  more  northerly  and  better 
route,  Garces  believed,  than  the  one  taken  by  Anza.  Some- 
what more  than  the  number  planned  was  recommended  as 
the  force  for  this  presidio,  to  wit,  fifty  cuirassiers,  eighty 
dragoons,  and  fifty  convicts,  and  if  there  could  be  more, 

^\  In  one  place  Garces  says  that  the       Apaches ;  in  another  that  the  Yabipais 
Yabipais    Tejuas    are    friends    of    the       are  really  Apaches. 


366       THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XV 

SO  much  the  better.  In  commenting  upon  a  letter  of  Es- 
calante,  apparently  written  after  Escalante's  visit  of  1775 
to  Moqui,  Garces  said  that  one  ought  to  be  able  to  go  direct 
from  New  Mexico  to  Monterey  or  San  Francisco,  if  it  were 
not  for  the  tule-marshes.  An  attempt  to  find  such  a  route 
would  be  advisable,  however,  as  it  might  lead  to  discovering 
a  great  river  in  the  northwest,  to  which  there  had  been 
various  references  by  early  writers.  If  this  river  were 
found,  it  might  be  possible  to  descend  it  to  the  tule-marshes, 
and  go  thence  in  small  boats  to  San  Francisco.  This  route 
might  be  used  for  supplying  New  Mexico  with  goods  brought 
to  San  Francisco  from  China,  utilizing  also  the  Mississippi 
for  transportation  of  goods  from  Spain.  Proceeding  to 
the  matter  of  equipping  the  proposed  Colorado  River  mis- 
sions and  presidio,  Garces  was  not  inclined  to  favor  using 
the  overland  route  for  that  purpose,  giving  as  reason  the 
great  distance  from  Mexico  (over  600  leagues),  certain 
difficulties  of  the  route  itself,  the  possibility  of  uprisings 
by  intermediate  tribes,  and  the  expense  involved  in  its  use. 
He  therefore  suggested  two  other  routes,  one  by  way  of  the 
Gulf,  and  the  other  overland  from  San  Diego,  goods  to  be 
sent  to  that  port  previously  from  Mexico.  The  latter  ap- 
pealed to  Garces.  In  case  it  were  to  be  used,  he  said,  the 
San  Diego  colony  should  be  under  the  commandant  of  the 
Colorado  River  district.  San  Diego,  being  nearer  than 
Monterey,  would  then  be  able  to  aid  the  Colorado  estab- 
lishments more  promptly  in  case  of  need,  and  the  Indians 
along  the  route  could  be  effectively  controlled.  Also,  the 
friction  that  would  almost  inevitably  arise  if  the  establish- 
ments were  under  separate  authority  would  then  be  avoided. 
Bucarely's  remitting  letter  was  dated  May  27,  1777.  He 
praised  Garces'  diary,  and  even  more  the  reflections  with 
which  he  brought  it  to  a  close,  referring  specifically  to  some 
of  the  suggestions  that  it  contained.  Garces  had  also 
proved  that  the  journeys  of  Father  Juan  de  la  Asumpcion 
in  1538,  and  Coronado  in  1540  were  not  apocryphal,  as  had 
been  supposed.  The  Indians  that  Garces  saw  wore  the 
same  style  of  clothing  described  in  the  early  accounts,  and 


1775]  THE    SECOND   ANZA   EXPEDITION  367 

he  saw  a  town  called  Quivira  with  houses  two  or  three 
stories  high.  Bucarely  agreed  with  him  as  to  the  need  for 
presidios  and  missions  on  the  Colorado,  for  they  would  re- 
sult in  advancing  the  conquest,  and  would  serve  to  protect 
Alta  California.  As  this  matter  was  now  in  the  comandante 
generaVs  jurisdiction,  he  had  sent  Croix  the  necessary  papers 
concerning  it,  for  on  this  important  matter  depended  check- 
ing the  Apaches  in  that  part  of  Sonora.^^ 

One  other  expedition  in  line  with  Bucarely ^s  projects 
had  started  before  the  new  government  of  the  frontier  went 
into  effect.  This  was  the  journey  of  Fathers  Dominguez 
and  Escalante  of  New  Mexico  in  search  of  a  route  to  Mon^ 
terey.  On  Jul^  29^  1776,  the  party,  consisting  of  nine 
persons,  left  Santa  Fe,  going  northwest  rather  than  west, 
partially  due  to  a  belief  that  a  better  route  would  thereby 
be  found.  This  took  the  party  to  n.orthern  Utah^  whence 
it  turned  southwest  in  the  direction  of  Monterey.  Find- 
ing no  indications  of  a  route,  and  no  knowledge  of  one  among 
the  natives,  it  abandoned  the  attempt  and  set  out,  October 
11,  to  return  1)0  Banta  Fe,  arriving  there  on  January  2,  1777. 
While  on  their  return,  November  25,  1776,  the  two  Fathers 
wrote  briefly  to  Governor  Mendinueta  of  their  journey  to 
Moqui,  as  they  called  it,  describing  the  country.^^  This 
letter  soon  afterward  reached  Bucarely,  and  was  forwarded 
by  him  to  Gdlvez  on  February  24,  1777.  The  Dominguez- 
Escalante  expedition,  he  said,  bore  a  relation  to  his  project 
for  establishments  on  the  Colorado  and  Gila,  which  were, 
in  his  opinion,  a  matter  of  very  great  importance,  and  all 
the  more  so  now  that  Salvador  Palma  and  his  companions 
had  been  baptized. ^^  ^ 

By  this  time,  however,  Teodoro  de  Croix,  the  first  coman- 
dante general  of  the  new  frontier  government,  was  already  in 
Mexico.  In  his  hands  henceforth  lay  the  development  of 
the  Californias,  the  founding  of  the  Colorado-Gila  estab- 
lishments, and  the  opening  of  new  routes.  Bucarely  turned 
these  projects  over  to  him  with  much  already  done,  and  the 
rest  at  the  psychological  moment  for  action. 

«  C-3562.  M  C-3373.  «  C-3494. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


DEPARTMENT   OF   SAN   BLAS,    1775-1777 

Much  has  been  said  in  this  work  about  the  problem  of 
subsistence  in  Alta  Cahfornia,  and  not  a  Httle  about  the 
difficulties  under  which  Baja  California  and  Sonora  labored 
in  that  respect.  So  far,  not  much  attention  has  been  paid 
to  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  which,  with  the  two  prov- 
inces just  named,  was  Alta  California's  source  of  supply. 
The  problem  of  supplying  Alta  California  was  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  San  Bias,  its  main  reliance  for  goods,  effects, 
and  food  suppHes,  was  in  itself  a  knotty  point  in  the  many 
cares  devolving  upon  the  viceroy  in  matters  of  frontier 
advance.  An  understanding  of  these  difficulties  makes  it 
the  more  clear  to  us  why  overland  communication  had  been 
desired.  With  the  growth  of  Alta  CaHfornia  these  troubles 
became  worse,  for  San  Bias  lacked  the  necessary  equip- 
ment to  attend  with  ease  to  the  added  burden  of  supply, 
and  it  required  all  of  Bucarely's  diligence  to  supply  the 
Cahfornias  at  all. 

Two  other  matters  are  also  reviewed  in  this  chapter. 
One  deals  with  the  orders  sent  out  from  Spain  on  receipt  of 
news  that  the  English  navigator.  Cook,  was  about  to  make 
a  voyage  to  the  Californias.  The  other  takes  up  Bucarely's 
concluding  measures  in  the  year  1776  for  the  development 
of  Alta  California.  Both  are  indirectly  related  to  San 
Bias,  as  the  steps  ordered  and  taken  in  each  case  depended 
on  the  use  of  that  department,  but  they  are  inserted  here 
to  round  out  the  story  of  Bucarely's  activities  in  northwest- 
ward advance,  prior  to  considering  the  action  of  Croix. 
At  least  one  measure  of  importance  developed  from  Bu- 
carely's   attention   to    these   matters,  —  the   viceroy's   in- 

368 


1775]  -  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  369 

struction  to  Governor  Neve,  which  was  to  be  the  actual 
basis  for  the  administration  of  Alta  Cahfornia  under  the 
regime  of  Croix. 


It  had  been  intended  to  follow  up  the  1775  voyages  of 
exploration  to  the  far  northwest  with  others,  but  even 
before  the  return  of  Heceta  and  Bodega  it  was  clear  that 
difficulties  would  be  encountered.  The  Department  of  San 
Bias  had  exhausted  its  funds  and  had  been  obliged  to  borrow 
7976  pesos  because  of  the  expense  involved  in  fitting  out 
the  1775  voyages.  Bucarely  more  than  made  up  the 
deficiency  by  remitting  20,000  pesos  chargeable  to  explo- 
rations.^ A  more  serious  difficulty  arose  when  the  port  of 
San  Bias  began  to  fill  in.  Bucarely  referred  to  this  in  a 
letter  to  Arriaga  of  June  26,  1775,  saying  that  the  depart- 
ment might  have  to  be  moved  to  another  port.^  On  Au- 
gust 27,  he  wrote  two  letters  to  Arriaga  on  this  subject. 
In  one,  he  said  that  he  had  directed  Miguel  de  Corral,  a 
Heutenant  colonel  of  engineers,  to  make  soundings  at  San 
Bias  and  other  ports  in  the  vicinity.^  In  the  other,  he 
implied  that  a  better  port  than  San  Bias  would  be  neces- 
sary, if  Russian  establishments  were  found  in  the  northwest. "* 
On  July  27,  1776,  we  find  Bucarely  writing  to  G^lvez  of 
measures  that  had  been  taken  in  view  of  the  filling  in  of  the 
port  of  San  Bias.  The  nearby  ports  of  Chacala  and  Ma- 
tanchel  had  been  explored,  and  there  was  something  to  be 
said  in  favor  of  moving  the  department  to  one  or  the  other. 
Barring  urgent  necessity,  however,  no  such  course  should 
be  taken,  he  said,  for,  if  the  voyages  of  discovery  to  the 
northwest  were  to  be  continued,  either  San  Francisco  in 
Alta  California,  or  Trinidad,  Guatemala,  would  be  a  better 
site  for  a  marine  department.^  Gdlvez^s  reply  of  January 
9,   1777,  gave  orders  to  continue  the  department  at  San 

^  Bucarely     to     Arriaga,     May    27,  by  land  from  the  Atlantic  coast  than 

1775.     C-2923.  was  San  Bias.     For  the  same  reason 

2  C-2934.  Bucarely  had   thought  of  making  use 

3  C-2975.  of  the  Tehuantepec  route,  explored  by 
*  C-2979.  Crame,  to  transport  effects  for  Alta 
6  C-3288.     Trinidad  was  suggested,  California.     Bucarely  to  Arriaga,  Mar. 

it  would  seem,  because  more  accessible       27,  1774,  C-2597. 
2b 


370      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVI 

Bias  until  its  port  should  become  wholly  useless,  and  then 
to  move  it  temporarily  to  Acapulco.  Ultimately,  it  might 
be  established  in  some  good  port  of  Alta  California.^  None 
of  these  plans  for  a  change  of  site  matured,  however. 

One  of  the  greatest  diflficulties  that  the  department  had 
to  encounter  arose  from  a  lack  of  enough  boats  with  which 
to  carry  on  its  duties,  despite  the  fact  that  there  were  five 
boats  in  the  department  in  1776.  Several  factors  arose 
in  that  year  to  complicate  this  problem.  One  of  these 
resulted  from  the  development  of  Alta  California,  which 
made  it  necessary  to  send  more  supplies.  The  San  Carlos 
and  Principe  had  sailed  on  March  10,  wrote  Bucarely,  on 
the  27th,  fully  laden  with  provisions,  and  yet  it  had  not 
been  possible  to  avoid  leaving  behind  some  of  the  supplies 
needed  at  the  missions  and  presidios.  There  was  need  for 
another  boat."^  The  problem  was  accentuated  by  the  re- 
ceipt of  orders  for  fresh  voyages  of  discovery  to  the  north- 
west, to  be  made  in  the  year  1777.^  In  reply,  August  27, 
1776,  Bucarely  stated  that  such  a  voyage  would  be  impos- 
sible before  December,  1777,  for  the  Santiago  was  the  only 
serviceable  boat  then  at  San  Bias,  the  San  Carlos,  Principey 
Concepcion,  and  Sonora  being  absent  on  provision  voyages, 
the  two  former  to  Alta,  and  the  two  latter  to  Baja  Cali- 
fornia. Moreover,  a  boat  was  necessary  for  Areche,  the 
viceroy's  fiscal,  who  had  been  appointed  visitador  to  Peru, 
and  Alta  California  had  developed  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  Santiago  was  needed  as  an  additional  supply-ship. 
The  two  boats  then  in  use  had  been  obliged  to  leave  behind 
many  effects  for  which  the  missionaries  were  clamoring. 
Heceta  and  Bodega  were  eager  to  make  the  new  expedi- 
tion, but  the  first  thing  to  do  was  to  hold  what  had  already 
been  occupied.^  A  month  later,  Bucarely  again  referred 
to  the  uncertain  status  of  the  proposed  voyages  for  1777. 
He  had  arranged  for  calling  a  junta  at  San  Bias  to  deter- 
mine what  boats  were  to  be  used  for  supplying  Alta  Cali- 
fornia  and   carrying  Areche  to  Lima.     He  suggested  that 

«C-3457.  sGdlvez     to     Bucarely,     May     20, 

■>  C-3185.  1776.     C-3223. 

» C-3299. 


1775]  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  371 

two  new  frigates  be  built  at  Guayaquil.  ^^  The  junta  con- 
cluded that  the  voyages  of  exploration  should  be  postponed 
for  a  year.  At  least  two  boats  were  needed  on  such  voy- 
ages, it  held,  but  it  was  impossible  to  procure  them,  because 
of  the  necessity  of  getting  Areche  to  Lima  and  supplies  to 
Alta  California."  The  boat  situation  did  not  improve. 
On  November  26,  Bucarely  wrote  that  the  Principe  had  just 
returned  to  San  Bias.  It  had  sailed  from  there  in  March, 
taking  seventy  days  to  reach  Monterey.  The  San  Carlos 
had  sailed  at  the  same  time,  requiring  ninety-one  days  for 
the  same  voyage,  and  had  not  yet  returned.  Bucarely  had 
hoped  to  send  the  Principe  again,  early  in  1777,  but  as  it 
was  in  need  of  repairs  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  wait 
for  the  San  Carlos.  Quir6s  had  planned  to  take  it  to  San 
Francisco  with  provisions,  and  this  additional  voyage  might 
account  for  its  delay.  Its  absence  was  unfortunate,  how- 
ever, because  it  was  necessary  to  reckon  on  the  San  Carlos 
in  deciding  what  steps  could  be  taken.^^ 

Bucarely  prepared  to  follow  the  advice  of  the  junta. 
On  December  7,  1776,  he  gave  orders  to  Arteaga,  then  head 
of  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  to  take  command  of  the 
Santiago,  in  which  he  had  decided  to  send  Areche  to  Peru,^^ 
and  on  the  same  day  he  gave  instructions  to  Heceta,  who 
was  to  succeed  Arteaga  at  San  Bias,  in  accord  with  the 
decision  of  the  junta}^  It  was  decided  that  a  naval  officer 
should  go  to  Peru  in  order  to  solicit  a  frigate  there  for  use 
in  northwest  explorations,  Bodega  being  selected  as  the  one 
to  go,  and  measures  were  devised  for  hastening  supplies  to 
Alta  California,  for  reports  had  come  that  the  province  did 
not  have  as  much  as  it  required.  Bucarely  purposed  to 
send  them  first  to  San  Francisco,  for  it  was  a  new  settle- 
ment, lacking  in  resources,  and  there  were  more  soldiers 
and  settlers  at  that  port  than  elsewhere.  He  had  feared, 
however,  that  he  would  be  unable  to  send  all  of  the  supplies 
that  Alta  California  needed,  when  the  situation  was  changed 

10  Bucarely  to  Gdlvez,  Sept.  26,  1776.  cio  de  Arteaga  to  Gdlvez.  C-3370. 
C-3331.  "C-3380. 

"  C-3311.     This  was  enclosed  in  a  is  C-3390. 

letter  of  November  23,  1776,  by  Igna-  "  C-3389. 


372     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XVI 

by  the  chance  arrival  of  a  merchant  ship  at  Acapulco,  the 
Fenix,  which  had  come  from  Guayaquil  with  a  cargo  of 
cacao.  Writing  of  this  event,  December  27,  Bucarely  said 
that  Areche  could  go  to  Peru  in  the  Fenix,  and  the  Santiago 
could  be  employed  in  carrying  provisions  to  Alta  California, 
enabling  that  province,  he  hoped,  to  receive  a  sufl&cient 
quantity.  An  extra  frigate  was  still  needed,  however,  and 
Bodega  was  to  go  to  Peru  to  seek  one.  Only  one  more 
might  now  be  required,  instead  of  two,  and  it  would  still 
be  possible  to  make  the  explorations  of  1778,  and  to  supply 
Alta  California.  If  the  Santiago  and  the  Principe  could 
not  carry  enough  supplies,  Bucarely  would  also  send  the 
San  Carlos,  thus  enabling  Alta  California  to  be  less  em- 
barrassed in  1778,  while  the  voyages  of  exploration  were 
being  carried  on.  At  all  events,  it  was  more  important  to 
supply  that  province  than  to  make  the  explorations,  for, 
otherwise,  all  gains  thus  far  made  might  be  lost.^^ 

Bucarely 's  letters  about  the  projected  voyages  were 
approved  by  Gdlvez.  A  specific^  approval  was  given, 
December  24,  1776,  to  Bucarely 's  suggestion  that  two  boats 
be  built  in  Peru  for  use  in  New  Spain,^^  and,  the  same  day, 
orders  were  directed  to  the  viceroy  of  Peru  to  construct 
promptly  at  Guayaquil  two  good  frigates  for  use  in  north- 
west explorations.^^  On  March  19,  1777,  Galvez  approved 
Bucarely's  letter  of  the  preceding  December,^^  and  sent 
orders  to  the  viceroy  of  Peru  that  only  one  frigate  for  Bu- 
carely needed  to  be  built,  if  Bodega  should  succeed  in  pur- 
chasing another.^^  Not  to  pursue  this  matter  further  it 
may  be  said  that  one  boat  was  procured  in  Peru,  and  an- 
other built  at  San  Bias,  and  the  two  left  San  Bias  for  the 
northwest  coast  in  February,  1779. 

It  may  be  wondered  why  both  ships  were  not  built  at 
San  Bias.  One  reason  was  the  inability  of  the  department 
to  procure  the  ordinary  manufactured  articles  of  which  it 
stood  in  need,  such  as  iron,  tools,  artillery,  canvas,  and 
tackle.     In  a  letter  of  August  27,  1775,  Bucarely  asked  of 

"  C-3413.  17  C-3402. 

i«  C-3401.  18  C-3521.  19  C-3522. 


1775]  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  373 

Arriaga  that  a  supply  of  iron  and  tools  be  shipped  from 
Spain  to  Vera  Cruz  for  use  at  San  Bias.  He  had  already 
asked  for  a  supply  of  the  other  effects  from  Havana,  he 
said.^°  In  a  letter  of  September  26  he  asked  for  2500  bind- 
ing plates  (planchuelas)  for  use  in  making  water-barrels  for 
the  San  Bias  ships. ^^  Grimaldi,  acting  for  Arriaga,  who  was 
ill,  gave  orders  that  the  iron  and  other  effects  from  Spain 
be  assembled  at  Cddiz  for  shipment  to  Vera  Cruz,^^  and 
that  the  materials  sought  from  Havana  be  shipped  from 
there  as  soon  as  possible.^^  On  the  same  day,  December 
22,  1775,  he  wrote  to  Bucarely  reciting  what  he  had  done.^^ 
There  was  a  comparatively  prompt  response  to  the  orders 
as  regards  the  effects  sought  in  Spain.  On  April  9,  1776, 
Ruiz  informed  Gdlvez  that  they  had  been  sent  to  Vera 
Cruz.^^  The  articles  sought  in  Havana,  however,  were 
not  forthcoming.  On  October  21,  1776,  Bonet  the  naval 
commander  at  Havana,  wrote  to  Castej6n,  of  the  ministry 
of  marine  in  Spain,  that  it  was  in  the  interests  of  the  service  . 
that  the  effects  desired  for  San  Bias  be  procured  in  Peru 
rather  than  at  Havana.^^  Castej6n  addressed  Gdlvez 
about  the  matter  on  December  31,^^  and  the  latter  wrote 
to  Bucarely  ^^  and  to  the  viceroy  of  Peru^^  on  January  4, 
1777,  to  see  if  they  might  arrange  as  Bonet  had  suggested. 
Bucarely  replied,  April  26,  1777,  that  he  had  written  to  the 
viceroy  of  Peru,  remarking  also  that  it  would  be  less  ex- 
pensive if  the  goods  could  be  procured  in  that  viceroyalty.^^ 
Nearly  two  years  had  passed  since  he  first  asked  for  them, 
and  they  seemed  to  be  no  nearer  arrival  than  ever. 

Not  only  effects  but  also  men  were  lacking  at  San  Bias. 
A  letter  from  two  officers  of  San  Bias,  Diego  Choquet  de  la 
Isla  and  Juan  de  la  Bodega  y  Cuadra,  to  Andres  Reggio  of 
Isla  de  Le6n,  Spain,  dated  February  13,  1775,  recited  some 
of  the  needs  of  San  Bias  in  this  respect,  telling  also  of  the 

20  C-2976.     He  enclosed   a  detailed  24  C-3051. 
list  of  the  effects  needed.     C-2977.  2b  C-3191. 

21  C-2998.  26  C-3351. 

22  Grimaldi  to  FeUpe  Ruiz,  Dec.  22,  ^  C-3423. 
1775.     C-3053.  28  C-3454. 

23  Grimaldi  to   Macuriges,  Dec.   22,  »  C-3453. 
1775.     C-3052.  » C-3534. 


374      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVI 

unhealthfulness  of  the  site  and  the  disorderhness  of  ships' 
crews. ^^  The  letter  was  forwarded  to  Arriaga,^^  who  wrote 
to  Bucarely  on  November  3,  1775,  requiring  him  to  provide 
San  Bias  with  a  surgeon  and  a  chaplain,  neither  of  which 
it  had  at  the  time,  and  to  send  enough  soldiers  to  compel 
the  crews  to  observe  a  proper  respect  for  authority.^^  In 
a  letter  of  February  25,  1776,  Bucarely  spoke  of  a  need  for 
carpenters,  pilots,  and  a  calker  at  San  Blas.^*  Galvez 
seems  to  have  taken  up  the  matter  with  Castejon,  for  the 
latter  wrote  to  him  on  June  14  that  two  pilots,  two  car- 
penters, and  one  calker  would  be  supplied  for  use  at  San 
Blas.^^  Francisco  Manxon  of  the  Casa  de  Contratacion 
wrote  to  Galvez  from  Cadiz  on  July  5  that  he  was  awaiting 
orders  to  send  the  calker  and  the  carpenters,  but  that  the 
two  pilots  had  not  yet  appeared. ^^  Gdlvez  replied,  July  12, 
that  these  men  and  the  pilots  should  be  sent  at  government 
expense  on  the  first  boat  from  Cddiz,^^  and  on  the  same  day 
he  wrote  to  Bucarely  of  the  orders  that  he  had  given. ^^ 

It  had  been  contemplated  that  the  boats  for  the  depart- 
ment should  be  built  in  the  shipyard  of  San  Bias  itself. 
However,  if  there  were  to  be  boats,  there  had  to  be  men 
who  knew  how  to  build  them.  Bucarely  wrote  to  Galvez, 
on  November  26,  1776,  that  a  ship-builder,  boatswain,  and 
other  shipyard  employes  were  needed  at  San  Bias.  He  was 
seeking  a  builder  in  Havana,  but  wanted  one  from  Spain  if 
he  could  not  get  one  in  Cuba.^^  On  December  27,  he  wrote 
that  Goya  of  San  Bias  had  asked  for  eighty  sailors,  two 
boatswains,  twelve  shipyard  employes,  four  phlebotomists, 
two  light-tenders  (farolero^),  and  two  armorers.  Bucarely 
had  ordered  fifty  sailors,  a  boatswain,  and  twelve  shipyard 
employes  sent  there,  and  Jj^d  told  Goya  to  try  in  future  to 
recruit  men  from  the  neighborhood. ^°  By  February  24, 
1777,  he  was  able  to  inform  Gdlvez  that  he  had  procured 
twelve  shipyard  employes  in  Vera  Cruz.*^     Bonet  was  un- 


31  C-2846. 

36  C-3267. 

32  Reggio  to  Arriaga,  Sept.  26,  1775. 

37  C-3275. 

C-3000. 

38  C-3276. 

33  C-3026. 

39  C-3382. 

34  C-3143. 

«  C-3418. 

3*  C-3252. 

«  C-3496. 

1775]  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  375 

able  to  find  a  ship-builder  in  Havana,^  but  Galvez  wrote 
to  Bucarely  on  February  15  that  one  would  be  supplied.'*^ 
He  took  the  matter  up  with  Castejon,  who  repHed  on  April 
20  that  Jose  Chenard  had  been  designated  for  the  position,^ 
and  Galvez  sent  a  letter  next  day  to  Bucarely  to  that  effect.'*^ 
Bucarely  wrote  at  length,  May  27,  1777,  reiterating  the 
need  for  a  ship-builder/^  for  it  was  not  until  July  that  he 
learned  of  the  appointment  of  Chenard. ^^  The  latter  did 
not  go  to  Mexico,  however.  On  October  22,  Castejon  in- 
formed Galvez  that  Chenard  was  unable  to  go,  and  asked 
if  there  was  still  a  need  for  a  ship-builder  at  San  Blas.^^ 
Galvez  replied  on  October  27  that  the  king  desired  such  a 
man  to  be  sent,^^  whereupon  Castejon  notified  Galvez  on 
November  22  that  Francisco  Segurola  had  been  appointed 
in  place  of  Chenard.^^  Galvez  sent  word  to  Bucarely  to  that 
effect  the  following  day,^^  giving  orders  at  the  same  time  to 
one  Francisco  Rdbago  of  Coruna  to  send  Segurola  by  the 
next  boat.^^  This  arrangement  did  not  please  Segurola, 
who  wrote  to  Galvez  on  the  30th  that  his  precipitate  de- 
parture would  compel  him  to  leave  his  family  destitute. ^^ 
Segurola's  wishes  seem  not>  to  have  been  considered,  how- 
ever, for  we  find  a  petition  of  Antonio  de  la  Cuesta,  dated 
December  13,  1777,  asking  that  Segurola's  son  Ilam6n  be 
allowed  to  take  the  next  boat  to  Havana,  in  order  to  join 
his  father  there, ^*  a  request  which  was  granted  through 
Gdlvez's  letter  of  the  23d  to  Rabago.^^ 

The  above  review  is  enough  to  give  an  idea  of  the  diffi- 
culties experienced  by  the  Department  of  San  Bias.  Bu- 
carely did  all  that  he  could  to  repair  the  deficiencies,  but 
delays  were  unavoidable,  for  the  men  or  commodities  wanted 
were  not  always  at  hand  or  readily  assembled.  Despite 
these  handicaps  he  had  been  a>le  to  sustain  and  develop 
the  CaHfornias,  and  to  carry  on  the  exploring  voyages  to 
the  northwest  coasts. 


«Bonet   to  Gdlvez,    Jan   31,    1777. 

«  C-3676. 

C-3470. 

«  C-3678. 

«  C-3481.                              «  C-3529. 

»  C-3687. 

«  C-3530.                              «  C-3565. 

"  C-3688. 

«  Bucarely  to  Gdlvez,  July  27,  1777. 

52  C-3689. 

w  C-3693 

C-3626. 

M  C-3697. 

w  C-3712 

376     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XVI 

At  this  place  we  may  refer  to  a  new  factor  in  northwest- 
ward exploration  caused  by  the  news  of  an  EngHsh  voyage 
to  the  Pacific  under  Captain  Cook.  An  exceedingly  im- 
portant letter  of  Bucarely^s,  June  26,  1776,  sets  forth  the 
situation.  It  begins  by  quoting  in  full  the  royal  order  of 
March  23,  apprising  the  viceroy  of  this  matter.  The  king 
had  certain  information  from  London,  said  the  royal  order, 
that  two  frigates,  the  Resolution  and  Discovery ^  were  being 
equipped  for  a  voyage  to  the  Pacific  under  Captain  Cook, 
ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  to  the  island  of 
Tahiti  in  the  south  Pacific  an  Indian  whom  Cook  had  taken 
from  there  on  a  previous  voyage.  The  real  objects  seemed 
to  be  for  Cook  to  go  over  the  route  of  the  next  Spanish 
fleet,  to  explore  the  Ladrones  Islands,  going  on  from  there 
to  the  Calif ornias  with  a  view  to  establishing  commerce 
with  New  Mexico,  and  to  attempt  to  discover  the  famous 
northwest  passage  in  order  to  gain  the  reward  offered  by 
the  House  of  Commons.  Although  such  a  variety  of  ob- 
jects might  cause  a  doubt  of  the  authenticity  of  the  in- 
formation, it  was  necessary,  nevertheless,  to  exercise  the 
greatest  vigilance,  lest  the  English  should  try  any  one  of 
these  projects.  They  had  not  lost  hope  of  finding  a  passage, 
despite  their  repeated  failures  in  attempts  from  the  At- 
lantic side.  The  viceroy  was  ordered  to  take  precautions 
requiring  the  officers  in  the  CaHfornias  to  be  on  the  watch, 
and  to  bring  about  a  failure  of  these  projects,  if  possible, 
but  without  employing  force.  The  English  ships  were  to 
be  checked  by  furnishing  them  sparingly  with  supplies,  or 
in  some  other  like  way.  Moreover,  if  either  boat  should 
come  to  the  Californias,  the  officials  there  were  to  make 
inquiries  to  learn  their  objects  and  the  instructions  which 
they  bore,  practising  all  the  formalities  required  by  law  in 
such  cases,  giving  notice  thereof  to  the  viceroy,  who  would 
in  turn  advise  the  king. 

In  reply,  Bucarely  referred  to  an  account  of  the  voyages  of 
Biron,  Carteret,  Wallis,  and  Cook,  printed  at  Paris  in  1774. 
There  was  nothing  in  that  work  about  the  coasts  of  New 
Spain,  or  concerning  the  recent  Spanish  explorations  up  to 


1775]  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  377 

58°.  Nevertheless,  it  was  clear  that  the  English  interest 
in  discoveries  was  constant,  and  that  the  idea  of  finding  a 
northwest  passage  had  never  been  lost  sight  of  by  the  Eng- 
lish. The  Bodega  and  Heceta  explorations,  which  had  been 
very  carefully  executed,  made  it  appear  improbable  that 
such  a  passage  would  be  found.  Furthermore,  Anson's 
voyage  around  Cape  Horn  and  north  to  Acapulco  was 
evidence  of  the  difficulties  to  be  encountered  in  a  voyage 
to  the  Pacific  coast  o'f  New  Spain,  even  with  a  knowledge 
of  the  places  in  which  Anson  contrived  to  refit.  Even  if 
Cook  could  keep  his  ship  in  repair,  he  would  be  far  from 
likely  to  succeed  in  his  search  for  a  passage ;  Spanish  sailors 
had  objected  to  transferring  the  Department  of  San  Bias 
to  Acapulco,  because  it  was  so  far  from  Alta  California,  mak- 
ing it  hard  to  send  supplies  there,  and  impossible  to  advance 
the  work  of  exploration,  but  it  was  much  more  difficult  in 
the  case  of  Cook.  Gdlvez  knew  what  great  efforts  had  been 
necessary  in  dealing  with  the  problems  of  the  northwest 
coast,  both  before  and  after  the  expeditions  which  occupied 
Alta  California,  at  the  cost  too  of  considerable  expenditure. 
Bucarely  then  referred  to  no  less  than  forty-seven  of  his 
despatches  to  the  ministro  generalj  showing  the  multitude 
of  measures  that  he  had  taken  to  prevent  possible  Russian 
encroachments.  It  was  for  that  reason  that  he  had  caused 
two  expeditions  to  go  from  Sonora  and  one  from  Baja 
California  to  Alta  California,  brought  about  an  exploration 
of  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec,  and  despatched  repeated 
expeditions  by  sea,  all  of  these  measures  being  intended  to 
develop  Alta  California  to  the  point  which  it  had  now 
reached.^®     Those  letters  would  show  what  he  thought,  he 

"  The  following  are  the  serial  num-  1258  (C-2520) ;  1259  (C-2521) 

bers  of   the   forty  seven   letters   men-  1280  (C-2551) ;  1353  (C-2597) 

tioned  by  Bucarely,  followed  in  paren-  1364  (C-2608) ;  1608  (C-2763) 

thesis  by  my  Catalogue  number,  in  cases  1639  (C-2780) ;  1640  (C-2781) 

where  they  have  been  used  in  this  work.  1641  (C-2783) ;  2031  (C-3032) 

Of    letters  sent  via  reservada,  that  is,  2032  (C-3033) ;  2033  (C-3034) 

to  say,    those  about  which   there  was  2034  (C-3035) ;  2073  (C-3057) 

more    than   ordinary    secrecy   as    con-  2074  (C-3058). 

earned  who  should  handle  them,  there             Others  sent  in  the  ordinary  course 


were  the  following:  1048  (C-2337) 
1086  (C-2365);  1104  (C-2397) 
1182       (C-2430);       1224       (C-2464) 


were:  738  (C-2152)  ;  1097  (C-2388) 
1279  (C-2550) ;  1365 ;  1389  (C-2624) 
1489       (C-2706);        1519      (C-2719) 


378      THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVI 

said.  His  measures  had  been  successful,  and  now  that  the 
coast  had  been  explored  as  far  north  as  58°,  there  was  very 
slight  cause  for  fear.  There  would  now  be  time  to  develop 
Alta  California,  so  that  it  might  sustain  itself  and  furnish 
supplies  to  such  more  northerly  settlements  as  might  be 
established  in  future,  as  for  example  at  the  port  of  Trinidad, 
of  which  Heceta  took  possession. 

Referring  to  the  reports  early  in  1773  of  a  projected  voy- 
age by  the  Englishman  Bings  to  the  North  Pole  with  a  view 
to  reaching  the  Californias,  Bucarely  said  that  such  a  voy- 
age seemed  to  him  less  diificult  than  the  one  which  Cook 
was  undertaking.  Cook  was  destined  to  suffer  many  dis- 
appointments, for  even  if  he  should  reach  Monterey  and 
form  a  settlement  (and  in  fact  he  could  not  sustain  one  if 
he  did),  the  project  of  establishing  commercial  relations 
with  New  Mexico  was  fantastical.  Bucarely  had  encoun- 
tered great  difficulties  in  his  attempts  to  open  communication 
from  New  Mexico,  and  had  labored  not  a  little  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  the  intermediate  lands,  and  to  arrange  that 
Monterey  might  count  on  assistance  from  New  Mexico, 
Sonora,  and  San  Bias.  He  was  awaiting  the  return  of 
Anza  to  treat  further  of  the  matter,  and  might  decide  to 
make  Anza  temporary  governor  of  New  Mexico  in  order  to 
bring  about  the  estabHshment  of  communications  with  Alta 
California  from  there. 

Between  the  instructions  of  Bucarely  for  the  treatment  of 
boats  arriving  at  the  Spanish  settlements  and  those  given 
by  Gdlvez  for  observance  with  Cook,  there  was  a  wide  di- 
vergence, said  Bucarely.  Without  a  display  of  force  against 
him.  Cook  would  not  show  his  instructions,  but  if  he  himself 
were  powerfully  equipped,  there  was  no  corresponding 
strength  either  in  the  Spanish  settlements  or  in  the  boats 

1520      (C-2720) ;        1521       (C-2721) ;  valuable  list  of  materials  bearing  on  the 

1539 ;  1609  (C-2764) :   1612  (C-2766) ;  subject-matter  of  this  work,  but  they 

1642    (C-2785) ;      1682  ;     1691 ;     1718  do  not  include  all  that  Bucarely  wrote. 

(C-2857);    1738   (C-2861) ;     1752    (C-  For   example,    no.    1562,    Bucarely    to 

2874) ;  1753  (C-2875) ;  1823  (C-2916) ;  Arriaga.  Sept.  28,  1774  (C-2732,  used 

1848;    1856  (C-2935) ;  1937  (C-2975) ;  in    chap.    X),    is    an   important   letter 

1938    (C-2976);     1939    (C-2978);   1940  directly  in  point.     A  great  number  of 

(C-2979) ;    2008  (C-3025).  others,  many  of  which  I  have  used,  are 

These  documents  are  an  exceedingly  also  directly  or  indirectly  pertinent. 


17751  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  379 

of  San  Bias  with  which  to  confront  him,  nor  indeed  was 
there  a  suitable  supply  of  arms.  Ship-commanders  were 
at  the  time  under  instructions  to  avoid  communication  with 
foreign  ships,  and  steps  ought  to  be  taken  to  apprise  them, 
in  case  a  new  rule  were  to  obtain,  so  that  they  might  know 
what  to  do,  if  obstacles  were  to  be  placed  in  Cook's  way, 
after  his  passage  of  Cape  Horn.  If  it  were  decided  to  use 
force,  it  would  be  well  to  find  out  the  strength  of  Cook's 
expedition,  so  as  to  make  proper  provision  at  Acapulco,  and 
do  what  was  possible  at  San  Diego,  Monterey,  and  San  Fran- 
cisco. Meanwhile,  Bucarely  would  limit  his  measures  to  a 
literal  obedience  of  the  royal  order,  giving  provisions  spar- 
ingly, and  indeed  there  would  be  few  to  give,  and  trying  in 
a  peaceful  way  to  find  out  Cook's  plans.^^ 

At  about  the  same  time,  to  wit,  on  July  14,  1776,  another 
royal  order  was  directed  to  the  viceroy,  informing  him  that 
Cook's  two  ships  had  left  London,  and  were  believed  to  be 
bound  for  the  northern  coasts  of  the  Californias.  Appro- 
priate orders  should  be  given  to  the  governors  of  coast  prov- 
inces, especially  to  the  governor  of  the  Californias,  to  be  on 
the  watch  for  the  English  boats,  and  if  the  latter  should  ap- 
proach land,  to  deny  them  admittance  to  Spanish  ports. 
Quoting  this  order  in  his  reply  of  October  27,  Bucarely  said 
that  he  had  communicated  it  to  the  authorities  at  Acapulco 
and  San  Bias  and  to  the  governor  of  the  Californias,  charg- 
ing them  with  exact  fulfilment  of  the  order,  although  he 
knew  how  slight  a  resistance  could  be  opposed  in  the  new 
settlements,  and  the  port  of  Acapulco  was  hardly  in  a  bet- 
ter state.  ^^ 

On  receipt  of  Bucarely's  June  26  letter,  Gdlvez  replied 
with  a  royal  order  of  October  18,  requiring  that  measures 
be  taken  in  accord  with  his  directions  of  March  23.  The 
latter  had  been  given  in  full  knowledge  of  the  weakness  of 
the  Californias,  but  if  there  should  be  force  enough,  owing 
to  the  diminished  strength  of  Cook  on  arrival  or  for  other 
reasons,  proceedings  were  to  be  taken  to  detain,  imprison, 

"  A.G.P.,  Cor.  Vir.,  series  I,  v.  12,  » Ibid.,  no.  2534. 

no.  2296. 


380     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XVI 

and  try  him  and  his  men  as  the  laws  directed.  Following 
the  usual  custom,  Bucarely  incorporated  this  order  in  his 
reply,  January  27,  1777,  and  announced  that  he  would  send 
orders  by  the  first  mail  to  San  Bias  and  Acapulco,  calling 
for  an  exact  obedience  to  the  royal  mandate.  As  for  the 
Calif ornias,  he  would  send  the  royal  order  to  the  comandante 
general  J  together  with  the  one  of  March  23.^^ 

This  correspondence  shows,  in  the  first  place,  that  Bu- 
carely was  not  greatly  alarmed  by  the  news  of  the  Cook 
voyage,  and  secondly,  that  he  saw  no  way  of  meeting  a 
strong  expedition  with  the  means  at  command.  Never- 
theless, although  clearly  out  of  sympathy  with  Gdlvez^s 
order,  he  took  the  necessary  preliminary  steps  to  carry  it 
out,  and  might  have  done  a  great  deal  more,  if  the  matter 
had  remained  within  his  jurisdiction.  The  tone  of  his 
letter  of  June  26,  1776,  is  almost  identical  with  that  of  his 
letter  of  July  27,  1773,  three  years  before,  which  dealt  with 
measures  as  against  possible  English  or  Russian  aggression. 
Bucarely  was  sceptical  then,  but  we  have  seen  how  much  he 
did,  despite  his  own  lack  of  worry.  This  time,  however, 
the  matter  was  out  of  his  hands. 


The^esit  significance  of  the  second  Anza  expedition  ha^ 
been  that  it  had  placed  Alta  California  on  a  permanent 
basis,  although  it  was  not  at  once  apparent,  nor  w^as  it  pos- 
sible to  cease  altogether  to  send  aid.  The  situation  as  re- 
gards domestic  animals  had  been  greatly  helped  by  Anza's 
"expedition,  but  tliere~still  seemed  to  be  a  need  of  animals 
of  the  sort  to  provide  for  natural  increase.  In  a  letter  of 
August  27,  1776,  Bucarely  said  that  the  animals  sent  to  Alta 
California  had  been  bought  in  Sonora,  and  more  were  being 
purchased  there  at  the  time  for  the  same  purpose,  but  the 
cost  of  conducting  them  to  Alta  California  was  very  great. 
He  had  decided,  therefore,  to  get  what  he  needed  from  the 
peninsula.  Neve  had  written.  May  9,  1776,  that  some  an- 
imals could  be  furnished  from  San  Jos6  Comondu,  Guada- 
lupe,  San  Ignacio,   and  San  Francisco  Borja.     Not  only 

69  A.G.P.,  Cor.  Vir.,  series  I,  v.  13,  no.  2702. 


17751  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  381 

were  these  missions  near  Alta  California,  but  also  they  had 
found  it  possible  to  raise  domestic  animals,  wherefore 
Bucarely  thought  of  sending  a  number  with  the  twenty- 
five  recruits  who  were  going  north  in  consequence  of  the 
San  Diego  revolt.  Neve  was  to  distribute  the  animals  as 
he  saw  fit,  giving  San  Francisco  the  preference,  however.®^ 
Bucarely  enclosed  a  list  showing  the  number  and  kinds 
of  animals  to  be  taken.  They  had  been  selected  with  a 
view  to  the  procreation  of  more  in  Alta  California.®^ 

On  October  27,  Bucarely  wrote  that  he  had  repeated  his 
orders  for  Neve  to  transfer  his  residence  to  Monterev.®^    In 
another  letter  he  told  of  measures  taken  to  develop  both^ 
agriculture   and   stock-raising  in  Alta   California,   with   a  I 
view  to  providing  the  Manila  galleon  with  supplies,  that  I  ^ 
boat  having  been  ordered,  by  a  decree  of  May  16,  1776,  to  | 
stop,  in  future,  either  at  Monterey  or  at  San  Francisco.®^ 
A  Bucarely  letter  of  November  26  enclosed  documents  con- 
cerning the  progress  of  Alta  California,  and  in  particular 
two  letters  of  Serra,  one  dated  June  27,  1776,  about  the 
founding  of  San  Francisco,®*  and  the  other  of  October  8 
about  the  work  being  done  on  the  new  mission  at  San  Diego 
to  replace  the  one  destroyed  by  the  Indians.®^     Bucarely 
complained  of  Rivera's  letters,  saying  that  they  contained 
nothing  but  confused  notices.     He  had  learned,  however, 
that  San  Diego  was  again  at  peace,  and  that  the  twenty- 
five  soldiers  recruited  in  Guadalajara  and  San  Bias  had 
arrived  there.     Serra   said   that   ninety   cattle   and  many 
provisions  and  effects  had  been  taken  along  for  the  found- 
ing of  San  Francisco.     With  the  San  Francisco  settlers,  the 
twenty-five  recruits  just  mentioned,  and  some  sailors  who 
had  been  left  by  the  Principe,  the  province  might  be  con- 
sidered as  having  advanced  and  become  better  guarded, 

*°C-3300.   Gdlvez  approved,  C-3455.  writer  of  the  document,  11  more  breed- 

«i  C-3070.     The     animals    were     as  ing-mares,  1  more  stallion,  1  ass,  and 

follows :     40    breeding    mares ;  3    stal-  3  fillies. 

lions ;  17    colts    (caballos   orejanos) ;  16  ^  C-3357. 

mules ;  6  asses,   4  of  them  she-asses ;  ^  C-3484. 

60  cows  for  breeding  purposes  ;  4  bulls ;  "  C-3262.     The  date  of  this  letter 

8  rams   and   he-goats ;  60  lambs ;  and  is  clearly  wrong,  possibly  three  months 

60  goats.     In  all  there  were  274.    There  too  early. 

ought    also    to    be,    according    to    the  ^  C-3343. 


382     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XVI 

but  it  had  also  made  it  necessar}^to_send  gre 

of  supplies,  until  such  time  as  the  soil  should  provide  enough 

to  free  the  royal  treasury  from  this  costly  burden.     If  Rivera 

{Bad  devoted  himself  more  to  developing  agriculture,  as  he 
had  been  instructed  to  do,  the  province  would  be  much 
further  advanced,  and  already  there  would  be  crops,  per- 
haps, with  which  to  maintain  the  settlers.  Bucarely  ex- 
pected better  results  from  Neve.  As  to  new  missions,  Serra 
had  convinced  him  that  they  were  most  needed  along  the 
Santa  Barbara  Channel ;  if  some  were  founded  there,  it  might 
make  possible  the  establishing  of  a  monthly  mail  service 
from  Alta  California  by  way  of  the  coast  of  Sonora.^^ 

On  December  27,  ifTe)  Bucarely  announced  the  return 
of  the  ISan  TTarlos.^'^  It  had  sailed  from  San  Francisco,  and 
brought  news  of  the  rapid  progress  of  the  newly  founded 
settlement,  but  great  as  its  progress  had  been,  wrote  Bu- 
carely in  another  December  27  letter,  he  was  taking  no 
chance  of  a  possible  decline.  He  had  ordered  the  purchasing 
agent  of  the  Californias  to  seek  a  surgeon,  a  carpenter,  a 
mason,  and  a  smith  in  Mexico  for  San  Francisco,  and  he 
was  sending  to  San  Bias  by  forced  marches  a  quantity  of 
clothing,  tools,  and  other  utensils  and  effects  for  San  Fran- 
cisco, those  for  agricultural  uses  being  especially  abundant. 
He  was  also  planning  new  missions  in  Alta  California  to 
i^^i^io^S^ommmxicd^iiori  with  Sonora  and  San  Bias,  and  to 
permit,  perhaps,  of  establishing  a  monthly  mail  service. 
Furthermore,  cattle  were  being  forwarded  from  Baja  Cali- 
fornia. Having  heard  that' 'tHeFe  was  a  scarcity  of  pro- 
visions at  San  Francisco,  Bucarely  had-  ordered  the  Santiago 
to  sail  direct  for  that  port,  without  a  previous  stop  at  San 
Diego  or  Monterey.  With  this  letter  he  enclosed  a  copy  of 
the  instruction  that  he  had  given  to  Neve.  Among  other 
things,  he  had  charged  Neve  to  get  on  well  with  the  mis^ 
sionaries,  of  whom  he  spoke  in  terms  of  the  highest  praise, 
for  to  them  more  than. to  anybody  else  he  ascribed  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  province,  claiming  that  the  governors  had 
not  developed  the  settlements  under  their  command  to  the 

M  C-3380.  67  C-3409. 


1775]  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  383 

extent  that  they  should  have.  He  expected  good  results 
from  Neve,  however,  because  of  his  good  conduct,  experi- 
"ence^  and  moderation. ^^ 

The  instruction  to  Neve  was  a  document  of  twenty-seven 
paragraphs,  dated  December  25,  1776,  and  it  contained 
orders  of  a  temporary  nature,  as  well  as  those  of  permanent 
application,  a  practice  that  seems  to  have  been  general  at 


that  time.  [1]  Bucarely  acknowledged  receipt  of  word  from 
Neve  that  he  was  gathering  cattle  to  take  to  Alta  Califor- 
nia. [2]  Rivera  was  then  a^San_Diego  being  in  fear  of 
another  uprising,  but  his  fears  were  silly,  as  the  land  was 
at  peace.  [3]  Bucarely  announced  the  good  news  of  the 
founding  of  San  Francisco.  [4]  Neve  was  to  take  measures 
to  restore  the  mission  of  San  Diego,  and  to  reestablish  a 
satislacEbry  general  situation  there.  [5]  Punishment  of  the 
San  Diego  chiefs  was  to  be  suspended,  although  Neve  was 
not  to  trust  them,  especially  those  who  had  rebelled. 
[6]  Two  missions  should  be  established  along  the  Santa  Bar- 
bara Channel  at  an  early  date,  for  they  would  serve  as  stop- 
ping places  for  a  mail  service,  which  might  be  established 
from  Alta, California  either  to  Loreto,  or,  byway  of  the  Colo- 
rado, to  Alamos,  Sonora,  and  thence  by  boat  to  San  Bias. 
[7]  Neve  was  to  proceed  with  erecting  a  mission  at  San  Juan^ 
Capistrano,^^  and  there  ought  to  be  yet  another  between 
San  Gabriel  and  San  Diego,  and  another  at  San  Francisco 
in  addition  to  the  one  already  there.  [8]  Bucarely  praised 
the^  missionaries,  especially  Serra,  and  told  Neve  to  main- 
tain proper  harmony  with  him  in  extending  the  king^s 
domain.  [9]  There  should  be  a  mission  between  San  Fran- 
cisco and  Monterey,  but  not  until  after  the  erection  of  the 
others  named.  Santa  Clara  ^^  and  San  Juan  Capistrano 
were  to  have  the  preference.  [10]  Instead  of  having  nothing 
to  do,  as  heretofore,  Spanish  settlers  should  be  given  lands,  \/ 
and  encouraged  to  take  up  agriculture,  for  the  soil  was  rich.  'Z^ 
[Tl]  i5ucarely  had  sent  sonie  plougE^hares  and  other  uten- 

•*  C-3412,  '0  This  migratory  name  referred   in 

•8  This  had  previously  been  begun,  this  instance  to  the  second  San  Fran- 

but  had  been  suspended  because  of  the  cisco  mission. 

San  Diego  revolt. 


384     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA      [Ch.  XVI 

jils  of  husbandry,  not  only  those  that  had  been  asked  for, 
f  but  others  besides.  [12]  Neve  was  to  distribute  the  utcix- 
/\  sils  and  cattle  under  a  condition  of  ultimate  repayment  to 
^  the  royal  treasury.  [13]  Soldiersjwere  to  share  in  distrj^^ 
>  bution  of  lands,  but  they  could  also  have  a  vegetable  patch 
in  common.  [14]  Then  followed  a  paragraph  about  the 
salaries  of  officers  and  men.  [15]  Rations  were  not  to  be 
distributed  equally,  but  according  to  whether  a  man  were 
married  and  had  children,  the  amounts  given  being  in  pro- 
portion to  the  number  dependent  on  him,  [16]  a  method 
that  had  been  followed  by  Anza.  [17]  Not  counting  officers 
and  sergeants.  Neve  had  seventy-five  soldiers,  including  the 
twenty-five  sent  in  consequence  of  the  San  Diego  revolt. 
This  excess  number  was  to  be  used  in  the  new  missions, 
with  not  less  than  six  soldiers  to  a  mission.  [18]  Reference 
was  made  to  the  Rivera  instruction,  which  was  to  be  obeyed 
as  far  as  was  consistent  with  later  orders.  [19]  Bucarely 
had  received  petitions  from  San  Diego  and  San  Francisco 
for  clothing  and  other  effects,  and  had  complied  with  these 
requests.  The  same  amount  as  was  allotted  to  San  Diego 
was  sent  to  Monterey,  although  no  petition  had  been  re- 
ceived from  there.  [20]  Because  of  reports  of  scarcity,  Bu- 
carely had  ordered  the  Santiago  to  San  Francisco  with  goods 
that  were  being  sent  from  Mexico  to  San  Bias  by  forced 
marches,  and  the  Principe  was  to  follow  with  effects  for  San 
Diego  and  Monterey.  [21]  An  image  of  St.  Francis  was 
being  sent  for  use  in  the  chapel  of  the  fort  at  San  Francisco. 
A  surgeon,  a  carpenter,  and  a  smith  from  Mexico,  and 
a  mason  from  San  Bias  were  also  being  sent  to  San  Fran- 
cisco, both  Moraga  and  Rivera  having  asked  for  them. 
[22]  Church  utensils  desired  for  San  Francisco  would  be 
forwarded  as  soon  as  possible.  [23]  Then  followed  a 
paragraph  concerning  the  building  of  houses  and  a  warehouse 
at  San  Francisco.  [24]  Bucarely  doubted  whether  Her- 
menegildo  Sal  was  competent  to  act  as  storekeeper  at  San 
Francisco,  and  Neve  was  to  appoint  another  to  replace  him. 
[25]  Bucarely  insisted  on  ^steps_forjthe^  economic  develop- 
ment of  Alta  California,  and  the  general  measures  of  the 


1775]  BUCARELY'S   DIFFICULTIES  385 

instruction  to  Rivera,  little  observed  thus  far,  were  to  be 
put  into  effect.  [26]  The  only  way  to  win  over  Indians  was  )( 
by  good  treatment  and  gifts,  which  methods  were  pref- 
eFable  to  more  rigorous  ones.  Care  of  Indians  was  the 
specific  work  of  the  religious,  and  it^  was  the  duty  of  tEe 
troops  to  protect  and  aid  them  in  this  work.  \T7Y'AF'1ot 
the  missionaries,  Bucarely  was  so  well  content  with  the 
zeal  and  religious  bearing  of  the  Father-President  and  the 
other  rehgious  that  he  looked  forward  to  happy  results,  if 
Neve  should  observe  the  instructions  bearing  on  his  re- 
lations with  them.^^  With  this  instruction  Bucarely's  work 
for  Alta  CaHfornia  was  well-nigh  done,  except  for  the  mat- 
ter of  the  supply-ships,  which,  fortunately,  continued  to 
be  under  his  management. 

71  C-3406. 


2c 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE   OF   CROIX,    1776-1783 

The  year  1776  marks  the  culminating  point  in  the  north- 
westward movement  as  an  effective  force.  By  that  time 
the  northwest  coasts  had  been  explored,  Alta  California 
had  been  placed  on  a  permanent  although  not  very  strong 
basis  by  the  success  of  Anza's  second  expedition  and  the 
founding  of  San  Francisco,  the  Colorado  and  Gila  region 
had  become  well  known,  a  route  to  Moqui  had  been  dis- 
covered, Sinaloa  had  achieved  a  well-settled  state,  and 
Sonora  seemed  likely  soon  to  do  so.  Thereafter,  the  proj- 
ects undertaken  resulted,  for  the  most  part,  in  failure,  diie 
principally  to  the  weakness  of  the  Spanish  Empire.  Great 
rulers  in  New  Spain  had  for  a  time  achieved  results  out  of 
all  proportion  to  their  resources,  but  Spain's  need  for  funds 
now  became  so  great  that  the  government  felt  unable  to 
incur  more  expense  in  North^merica  on^groj  ects,  of  frontier 
advance.  Able  rulers  might  still  have  accomplished  some- 
thing, but  a  fatal  move  was  made  when  Teodoro  de  Croix 
was  named  comandante  general  of  a  new  government  of  the 
frontier  provinces.  To  be  sure,  he  not  only  had  to  face 
the  problem  of  economy,  but  he  also  had  serious  Indian 
wars  with  the  Apaches  and  others,  —  wars,  however,  of  the 
same  character  that  the  viceroys  had  always  been  obliged 
to  contend  with.  The  task  was  a  great  one ;  but  a  Bu- 
carely  could  have  managed  it.  ■--.. 

The  comandancia  general  was  established  in  August,  1776, 
and  went  into  operation  in  the  following  January.  Gdl- 
vez's  idea  in  founding  the  new  government  was  that  the 
northwestward  advance  should  continue,  and  the  importance 
of  the  Californias  stood  forth  as  almost  the  principal  con- 

386 


1776]  THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  387 

sideration  in  the  document  providing  for  the  new  govern- 
ment. But  Teodoro  de  Croix^  the  first  comandante  general , 
was,.infiapable  of  taking  a  broad  view  of  aff airs^  neYficT-^Jiaap- 
ing  the  ideas  of  Gdlvez  and  Bucarely  with  regard  to  the 
significance  of  foreign  danger  and  the  consequent  need  for^ 
advancing  the  conquest.  Sonora  he  regarded  as  the  most 
serious  of  his  problems,  but  only  because  of  the  internal  dis« 
order  there ;  its  importance  as  a  link  in  the  chain  of  con- 
quest seems  not  to  have  impressed  him  greatly.  Yet, 
despite  his  solicitude  for  Sonora,  he  kept  away  from  that 
province  until  late  in  1779.  He  took  little  interest  in  the 
Calif ornias  and  the  proposed  Colorado-Gila  establishments, 
and  he  never  understood  their  needs  or  their  importance. 
Fortunately,  the  former  had  an  able  ruler  in  Felipe  de 
Neve,  who  was  able  to  accomplish  many  of  the  things  that 
had  been  ordered  prior  to  Croix's  accession  to  power.  More- 
over, Croix  approved  anything  that  Neve  actually  did.  The 
case  of  the  Colorado-Gila  establishments  and  the  matter  of 
routes  from  them  to  New  Mexico,  Sonora,  and  the  Califor- 
nias  did  not  end  so  happily.  Were  it  not  for  the  orders 
given  to  him,  Croix  might  never  have  thought  of  these 
projects.  After  a  fatal  delay,  he  at  length  founded  weak 
settlements  at  the  junction  of  the  two  rivers.  Having  little 
interest  in  the  matter  himself,  he  made  economy  the  keynote 
of  his  policy  for  the  new  foundations.  He  himself  had  other 
tilings  on  his  mind,  as  instanced  by  his  voluminous  memo- 
rials on  the  internal  affairs  of  his  government ;  one  wonders 
if,  after  all,  his  mind  were  not  primarily  on  the  memorials 
themselves.  The  failure  of  the  Colorado  est^.hliRhTYipnts 
was,  under  the  circumstances,  inevitable.  It,-.came.  .mth 
the  Yuma  masgacre  of  1781.  On  July  17  of  that  year  the 
"SpanisITsettlements  were  wiped  out,  and  in^ January,  1783^ 
a  decision  was  reached  to  abandon  the  project  of  such  es- 
tablishments, and  as  a  consequence,  to  give  up  the  idea  of 
overland  communication  with  the  Calif  ornias.  Croix  was 
at  fault,  but  claimed  falsely  that  Garces  and  Anza  had  de-"" 
ceived  him.  Garces  having  perished  in  the  massacre,  Anza 
was   made   the   scapegoat.     The   achievements   of   Gdlvez 


388     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

and  Bucarely,  ably  supplemented  by  those  of  Neve,  were 
not  undone  by  the  disaster,  but  their  work  suffered  a  per- 
manent check.  They  had  placed  Alta  California  on  an  en- 
during basis,  but  it  was  settled  on  July  17,  1781,  that  the 
province  was  not  to  develop  at  that  time  on  a  large  scale. 
Thus  gold  was  to  remain  undiscovered  for  over  half  a  cen- 
tury,^ and  the  Pacific  coast  to  be  without  sufficient  allure- 
ment to  induce  to  its  conquest  by  a  strong  power,  until  at 
length  the  United  States  was  in  a  position  to  be  a  decisive 

i factor.  Had  the  Alta  California  settlements  failed,  Eng- 
land or  Russia,  presumably  the  former,  might  well  have 
occupied  the  territory.  That  Spain^s  establishments  did 
not  fail  was  the  work  of  Bucarely.  That  they  did  not  be- 
come rich  and  populous  was  in  large  measure  the  fault  of 
Croix. 


x 


We  have  seen  that  the  project  of  a  separate  government 
for  various  portions  of  the  vast  kingdom  of  New  Spain, 
particularly  of  the  frontier  provinces,  had  long  been  advo- 
cated. Gdlvez  did  not  let  much  time  pass,  after  he  be- 
came ministro  general^  before  he  put  his  ideas  on  that  mat- 
ter into  a  royal  order,  dated  August  22,  1776.  The  plan 
itself  was  not  bad  ;  the  only  objection  that  can  be  made  was 
to  the  man  selected  to  carry  it  out.  The  entire  northern 
frontier,  including  the  outlying  Californias,  New  Mexico, 
and  Texas  provinces,  was  included  in  the  new  government. 
Arispe,  Sonora,  was  to  be  the  capital,  on  the  ground  that 
it  was  midway  between  Nueva  Viz  cay  a  and  the  Cahfornias, 
although  far  west  of  the  centre  of  the  entire  comandancia 

i general.  The  principal  object  of  the  government  was  to  be 
the  "defence,  development,  and  extension"  of  the  terri- 
tories comprised  in  it,  but  the  most  important  of  all  (motivo 
principalisimo)  was  to  achieve  the  reduction  to  the  faith 
and  to  Spanish  rule  of  the  Indians  to  the  north,  to  which 
Croix  was  directed  to  devote  his  first  attentions.  Frontier 
settlements  were  to  be  formed  and  explorations  constantly 

1  Some  gold  was  found  before  1848,  but  not  in  sufficient  quantity  to  produce 
any  marked  effect. 


1776]  THE    INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  389 

undertaken.     The_^reservatio]g^^ 
mentjil^Alta^C^ 

service  of  God  and  the  km^j  wherefore  Croix  was  ordered 
to  visit  that  province  as  soon  as  possible  and  to  secure  its 
communication  with  Sonora.  Moreover,  a_miite  was  to 
be  opened  between  Alta  CaHfornia  and  New  Mexico  by  ex- 
peditions proceeding  from  both  Monterey  and  Santa  F6. 
More  settlers  and  cattle  and  whatever  else  might  be  needed 
were  to  be  sent  to  Alta  California  from  Sinaloa  and  Sonora 
to  aid  in  the  development  and  protection  of  the  province. 
The  San  Bias  supply-ships  were  also  to  be  retained.^ 

This  document  shows  that  Gdlvez  had  much  the  same 
ideas  as  those  which  Bucarely  had  been  putting  into  prac- 
tice, including  a  tendency  to  regard  the  Alta  California 
settlements  as  extremely  important.  Whole  paragraphs 
dealt  specifically  with  Alta  California,  while  not  a  single 
line  referred  exclusively  to  Nueva  Viz  cay  a  and  the  eastern 
provinces.  A  good  illustration  of  Gdlvez's  attitude  is 
shown  in  the  concluding  paragraph  where  he  gives  specific 
orders  for  Alta  California  officials  to  report  anything  of 
particular  note,  and  then  says  generally  that  officials  of 
other  parts  of  the  comandancia  general  are  to  do  likewise. 
Quite  as  remarkable  as  Gdlvez^s  interest  in  Alta  California  \/ 
is  Croix's  lack  of  it  and TnsTailure  to  obey  tHe  insitructJon  ^^ 
promptly  or  at  "all.  Croix  never  visited  Alta  California, 
and  his  attention  to  the  Sonora  route  was  limited  to  the 
worse  than  useless  attempt  which  was  to  provoke  the  dis- 
aster of  1781.  Instead  of  proceeding  to  the  northwest 
upon  arrival,  Croix  went  to  Nueva  Vizcaya  and  Texas,  and 
did  not  reach  Sonora  until  November,  1779.  Further  evi- 
dence that  Galvez  had  in  mind  his  earlier  projects  is  con- 
tained in  a  royal  order  of  September  24,  1776,  to  Croix. 
The  latter  was  ordered  to  fulfil  the  arrangements  made  by 
Galvez  in  1768-69,  save  such  as  time  or  other  eventuality 
might  have  rendered  undesirable,  and  in  that  case  Croix 
was  to  write  secretly  to  Gdlvez  of  the  matter.^ 

2  C-3293.     A  notice  to  Bucarely,  substantially  the  same  as  the  preceding,  bears 
the  same  date,  C-^294.  »  C-3323. 


390     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

Teodoro  de  Croix  was  a  nephew  of  the  former  viceroy, 
the  Marques  de  Croix.  He  was  employed  by  Gdlvez,  dur- 
ing the  latter's  residence  in  New  Spain,  and  seems  to  have 
been  an  efficient  subordinate,  but  that  appears  to  have 
been  the  Kmit  of  his  capacity.  Serious-minded  and  indus- 
trious he  certainly  was,  as  is  attested  by  the  many  volumi- 
nous, well-ordered  reports  that  he  made  on  the  state  of  the 
frontier  provinces,  and  also  by  the  very  tone  of  his  letters. 
As  a  first  assistant  to  somebody  else,  or  even  as  ruler  in  a 
realm  where  there  were  no  serious  difficulties  to  encounter, 
he  would  have  been  a  marked  success,  but  as  a  leader  in 
the  frontier  provinces  of  New  Spain  he  lacked  the_bxoad 
vision  to  compass  the  whole  range  of  his  duties.  While 
working  hard  to  settle  some  one  problem,  he  was  apt  to  let 
the  others  take  care  of  themselves,  or  try  to  have  somebody 
else  handle  them,  certainly  as  regards  matters  affecting 
northwestward  advance.  In  fine,  Croix  was  a  hard-work- 
ing, painstaking,  well-meaning,  but  rather  stupid  man. 

He  remained  in  Mexico  City  from  January  to  August, 
1777,  getting  information  about  his  government,  and  form- 
ing plans.  The  latter  did  not  agree  with  those  which  Bu- 
carely  had  followed  and  which  in  fact  were  in  acqcrd-wi^ 
the  ideas  of  Gdlvez.  On  May  17  Croix  askei^Oconor  for 
information  about  the  frontier  provinces,^  and  the  latter 
replied,  July  22,  with  a  long  memorial  of  245  paragraphs, 
giving  an  account  of  his  own  work  since  his  appointment 
as  comandante  inspector,  September  10,  1771,  and  making 
a  number  of  general  recommendations.  He  began  by  ob- 
serving, in  no  friendly  tone,  that  Croix^s  plans  were  opposed 
in  every  respect  to  his  own.  Among  other  matters  referred 
to  by  him,  he  favored  transferring  Horcasitas  and  Buena- 
vista  presidios  to  the  Colorado  and  Gila  rivers,  and  main- 
taining routes  to  Alta  California,  provided  the  Yumas 
could  be  kept  friendly.  The  Apaches  he  regarded  as  the 
only  effective  hostile  force,  and  he  made  suggestions  how 
to  deal  with  them  which  showed  that  he  had  grasped  the 
idea  of  the  unity  of  the  frontier^     He  himself  had  found  the 

*  C-3547. 


1776]  THE    INCOMPETENT   RULE   OF   CROIX  391 

provinces  in  a  disturbed  condition,  but  had  left  them  in 
good  shape  for  his  successor.^ 

However  Oconor  may  have  left  the  provinces,  there  was 
certainly  plenty  to  do  in  them  at  the  time  that  he  wrote  his 
memorial,  although  perhaps  no  more  than  was  usually  the 
case.  We  may  confine  our  attention  to  Sonora,  remem- 
bering, however,  that  the  Apache  wars  continued  to  be  a 
factor  embracing  the  whole  frontier  from  Sonora  to  Texas. 
Late  in  1776  the  Seris  with  some  Pima  alHes  began  again 
to  burn,  plunder,  and  kill,  the  missions  of  Pimeria  Alta 
being  the  particular  object  of  their  attacks.  Writing  of 
this  to  Bucarely,  January  18,  1777,  Governor  Crespo  ex- 
pressed a  fear  that  Sonora  might  reach  a  worse  state  than  in 
the  previous  Seri  war,  for  now  the  Seris  might  expect  an 
alliance  with  the  Apaches,  which  formerly  they  had  lacked. 
Pimeria  Alta  was  in  danger  of  destruction.®  Croix  appre- 
ciated the  danger,  he  wrote  to  Gdlvez,  March  24,  1777,  and 
since  Crespo  was  coming  to  Mexico,  he  was  sending  Anza 
to  put  down  the  insurrection.^  The  Apaches,  too,  made 
sudden  attacks  in  their  customary  manner,  and  one  of 
them  gave  rise  to  a  most  spectacular  incident  in  the  military 
history  of  Sonora.  On  February  6,  1777,  while  at  a  place 
called  Tinaja,  four  or  five  leagues  from  his  presidio  of  San 
Bernardino,  with  his  family,  ten  soldiers,  and  a  few  others, 
Captain  Castillo  was  attacked  by  over  four  hundred  Apaches. 
The  battle  lasted  all  day,  every  one  of  Castillo's  party  being 
wounded,  but  they  at  length  escaped.^  Another  seat  of 
perennial  trouble,  the  rich  mining-camp  of  Cieneguilla, 
appears  frequently  in  the  correspondence  of  this  period. 
Tueros'  letter  to  Croix  of  June  8  gives  an  idea  of  the  situ- 
ation. Cieneguilla  was  in  a  state  of  decline,  not  from  any 
failure  of  its  inexhaustible  wealth,  but  because  the  miners 
were  fleeing  from  the  danger  of  Indian  attack.*  Four 
months  later,  Tueros  wrote  to  Gdlvez  that  Indian  affairs 

"  C-3606.  forwarded   with   a   letter  of   April   26, 

«C-3464.  C-3538.      For   his    courage   and    skill 

'  C-3525.  on  this  occasion  Castillo  was  made  a 

8  The    account    appears    in    Croix's  lieutenant-colonel,  C-3638-39. 
monthly  extract  for  April,  1777,  C-3539,  »  C-3574. 


392     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

were  getting  worse,  expressing  an  opinion  that  Croix 
ought  to  come  in  person  to  punish  the  Indians  as  they 
deserved. -^^  With  all  this  Indian  trouble  we  also  encounter 
the  old  difficulty  of  graft  at  the  expense  of  the  presidial 
troops.-^^ 

Anza  had  been  appointed  governor  of  New  Mexico  that 
he  might  bring  about  communication  between  Santa  F6 
and  Monterey,  but  it  is  typical  of  Croix  that  he  postponed 
Anza's  departure  for  New  Mexico,  using  him  instead  to 
combat  the  Indians  of  Sonora.  By  May  7,  1777,  Anza  was 
at  Horcasitas.^^  During  nearly  a  year  thereafter  he  faced 
great  difficulties  and  acquitted  himself  with  credit.  No 
less  than  forty-one  paragraphs  of  Croix's  voluminous 
memorial  of  October  30,  1781,  treat  of  Anza's  achievements 
as  military  governor  of  Sonora  down  to  March,  177S,  when 
Anza  was  succeeded  by  Tueros.  Anza  found  the  Seris  in 
rebellion,  and  there  was  a  danger  that, others  might  rise, 
especially  the  Pimas  Altos  and  the  Opatas.  Anza  put 
down  the  Seris,  and  the  others  kept  at  peace.  He  had  not 
been  able  to  check  Apache  incursions,  but  that  was  ex- 
cusable, said  Croix.  The  province  was  in  a  much  better 
condition  when  he  left  it,  but  Tueros,  his  successor,  was  not 
equally  successful.-^^ 

Croix  himself  waited  many  months  before  venturing  to 
appear  in  person  in  the  frontier  provinces.  In  a  long 
letter  to  Gdlvez,  August  23,  1777,  he  sets  forth  his  ideas. 
He  had  at  first  planned  to  do  no'thing  until  he  could  visit 
the  provinces  and  verify  personally  the  truth  of  the  re- 
ports about  them,  but  the  Indian  situation  seemed  so  bad, 
that  he  had  decided  to  ask  Bucarely  for  two  thousand  sol- 
diers, making  a  total  force  of  four  thousand  troops  for  the 
frontier  provinces.  Sonora  was  then  in  the  worst  state  of 
all,  and  needed  fifteen  hundred  men.^*  Croix  had  in 
fact  asked  Bucarely  for  two  thousand  men,  the  day  be- 
fore,^^  but  they  were  not  granted  to  him.     On  October  16 

"  C-3671.  13  C-4430. 

"  C-3558,  3613,  3705.  ^*  C-3650. 

12  Croix    to  Gdlvez,    July  26,  1777.             »  C-3641. 
C-3615. 


1776]  THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  393 

we  find  Croix  asking  Bucarely  for  the  means  with  which  to 
raise  a  thousand  soldiers,  at  least,  and  meanwhile  for  the 
loan  of  a  company  of  fusileers.^^  Commenting  on  this  in 
a  letter  to  Galvez  of  November  24,  Croix  said  that  he  be- 
lieved that  Bucarely  would  not  give  him  more  than  two 
"flying  companies,"  which  he  had  already  offered,  but  he 
hoped  to  get  at  least  three  such  companies,  which  would 
serve  the  purpose  until  he  could  complete  his  tour  of  the 
provinces.  He  certainly  was  not  going  to  Sonora  until  he 
might  have  enough  troops  to  overcome  the  evils  from  which 
it  was  suffering.  Yet  that  province  was  his  most  impor- 
tant consideration,  and  partly  on  that  account  he  was  going 
to  Coahuila  and  Texas  first,  so  that  he  might  stay  in  Sonora, 
once  arrived  there.  Meanwhile,  Anza,  to  whom  he  took 
occasion  to  accord  high  praise,  could  keep  things  in  hand 
until  reenf  or  cements  could  come.^^  Croix  was  doomed  to 
disappointment.  Galvez  wrote  to  him,  December  29,  1777, 
that  when  he  should  obtain  personal  knowledge  of  the  state 
of  the  frontier  provinces,  the  king  would  determine  the 
number  of  troops  required. ^^  The  decision  was  not  at  all 
surprising.  When  the  addition  of  from  twenty  to  a  hundred 
soldiers  to  such  important  establishments  as  those  of  the 
Californias  could  be  debated,  there  was  small  likelihood  of 
Croix's  obtaining  thousands,  which  would  have  enormously 
increased  expense.  It  is  also  possible  to  detect  in  Croix 
a^tendgacj;_J^_avoid  responsibility,  as  witness  his  unwill- 
ingness to  go  to  Sonora. 

On  July  31,  1777,  Bucarely  sent  Croix  sixteen  letters 
from  Rivera,  Serra,  and  Neve  which  embodied  important 
suggestions  concerning  Alta  California.  Croix  was  at  that 
time  on  the  point  of  leaving  Mexico  City  for  his  journey  to 
Texas,  and  so  returned  them  to  Bucarely,  asking  him  to 
attend  to  them,  although  recognizing  their  importance. 
This  called  forth  a  reply  from  Bucarely,  dated  August  27. 
It  was  not  in  the  power  of  either  Croix  or  himself,  he  re- 
minded the  former,  to  change  royal  orders  at  will.  Hence, 
since  the  Californias  were  in  Croix's  jurisdiction,  he  was 

i«  C-3673.  "  C-3691.  w  C-3719. 


394     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

sending  back  the  papers.  He  went  on,  however,  to  give 
Croix  information  about  the  CaHfornias  and  to  tell  him 
what  he  himself  would  do,  if  still  in  charge.  Neve's  sug- 
gestions should  be  adopted,  even  although  they  involved 
additional  troops  and  more  expense,  for  these  matters,  in 
Bucarely's  opinion,  should  take  precedence  of  others  in 
Croix's  jurisdiction.  There  should  be  additional  missions, 
too,  in  both  Californias  and  along  the  Colorado  and  Gila 
rivers,  so  that  there  might  be  no  gaps  in  the  chain  of  com- 
munication with  Sonora.^^ 

Neve  wished  to  erect  a  fort  and  three  missions  along  the 
Santa  Barbara  Channel,  to  form  settlements  on  the  Santa 
Ana,  San  Gabriel,  and  Guadalupe  rivers,  and  to  increase 
the  forces  at  San  Diego,  Monterey,  and  San  Francisco. 
He  wanted  fifty-seven  fully  equipped  soldiers,  to  be  recruited 
by  Rivera  in  Sinaloa,  their  equipment  (which  would  in- 
clude clothing,  horses,  and  lesser  effects)  to  be  paid  for  by 
the  Real  Caja  of  Alamos.  Many  of  the  soldiers  would  be 
married  men,  and  their  families  should  come~l.oo.  He  also 
desired  sixty  families  of  laborers  to  be  recruited,  their  num- 
bers to  include  artisans  of  various  kinds.  In  making  these 
requests  he  gave  a  detailed  account  of  the  pay  and  equip- 
ment that  should  be  given  to  each  family,  as  also  an  ac- 
count of  things  for  general  use  at  each  settlement,  including 
wages,  rations,  domestic  animals,  farming  utensils,  and 
weapons.  The  animals  should  come  from  Sonora,  he  said, 
and  the  other  effects  from  Mexico  by  way  of  San  Bias.  In 
addition,  he  asked  for  more  animals  of  a  type  likely  to  pro- 
vide for  an  increase  at  the  settlements  already  in  existence. 
The  Neve  requests  are  stated  in  letters  by  Croix  to  Anza, 
Pedro  Corbaldn,  and  the  oficiales  reales  of  Alamos,  all  dated 
October  20,  1777,  and  all  alike  in  phraseology.^"^  With  each 
he  enclosed  a  note  of  the  men,  animals,  and  effects  asked  for 
by  Neve.^^  He  asked  whether  it  would  be  possible  to  grant 
Neve's  requests,  without  damage  to  Sinaloa  and  Sonora. 
Corbaldn's  reply,  December  31,  1777,  opposed  Neve's  proj- 
ects, on  the  ground  that  the  men  and  animals  were  needed 

w  C-3660.  20  C-3674.  "  C-3676. 


1776]  THE    INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  395 

in  Sonora.^^  Anza  wrote,  January  1,  1778,  that  the  men 
and  cattle  should  be  obtained  elsewhere  than  in  Sonora, 
but  he  agreed  with  Neve's  plan.^^  Norberto  de  Corres, 
answering  for  the  Alamos  officials,  January  15,  1778,  said 
that  Sonora  had  need  of  any  surplus  of  men  that  Sinaloa 
might  have,  but  those  wanted  by  Neve  could  be  obtained  in 
Mexico.  The  animals  could  be  purchased  in  Sinaloa  and 
Sonora.^^ 

It  was  some  time  before  Croix  gave  this  matter  any  fur- 
ther attention.  He  had  left  Mexico  in  August,  1777,  going 
by  way  of  Queretaro  to  Durango,  which  he  reached  in 
October.  From  there  he  proceeded  to  Coahuila  and  Texas, 
and  did  not  receive  the  three  letters  just  referred  to  until 
March,  1778,  when  he  arrived  at  Chihuahua,  on  his  return 
from  Texas.  It  was  not  until  September,  1778,  that  he 
took  up  Neve's  proposals  again.  On  the  23d  of  that  month 
he  wrote  to  Gdlvez,  enclosing  the  correspondence  that  has 
thus  far  been  cited,  and  exhibiting  a  degree  of  petulance  and 
lack  of  sympathy  with  the  subject.  He  complained  of 
Bucarely's  refusal  to  handle  the  CaHfornias,  and  yet  he  had 
not  been  prompt  to  authorize  on  his  own  responsibility 
what  Bucarely  had  suggested.  He  incorrectly  quoted  the 
three  Sonora  officers  as  opposed  to  Neve's  projects,  and  said 
that  he  had  read  other  documents  about  the  CaHfornias 
sent  to  him  from  the  viceroyalty,  with  the  result  that  his 
confusion  had  been  only  redoubled.  No  steps  must  be 
taken  that  would  take  people  away  from  Sonora,  he  said. 
Nevertheless,  he  had  approved  Neve's  projects,  but  would 
wait  until  he  got  to  Arispe,  Sonora,  before  attending  to  them. 
The  animals  and  effects  could  be  obtained  from  Sonora, 
and  the  men  from  Sinaloa.  Meanwhile,  he  had  asked  Neve 
to  make  detailed  reports  of  what  was  needed  in  the  prov- 
ince, to  take  steps  for  the  formation  of  a  new  reglamento, 
and  to  send  Rivera  to  meet  Croix  in  Arispe.^^  Gdlvez's 
reply,  April  19,  1779,  bade  Croix  to  take  careful  note  of 
Rivera's  reports,  when  he  should  meet  him.^^ 

«  C-3723.  24  C-3743. 

23  C-3741.  25  C-3880.  «•  C-3974. 


396     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

Meanwhile,  some  advance  in  the  affairs  of  Alt  a  California 
had  occurred,  based  on  the  earlier  authority  granted  by 
Bucarely.  In  November,  1776,  the  mission  San  Juan  Ca-_ 
pistrano  had  been  founded  followed,  in  January,  1777,  by 
tEeTounding  of  Santa  Clara.  Neva. was  now  in  Alta  Cali- 
fomia^liaving  "leached  Monterey  in  February,.  1 777. '  In 
November  of  that  year,  he  founded  one  of  the  settlements 
that  he  had  proposed,  apparently  without  any  authority 
except  that  of  his  own  initiative,  San  Jos6  de  Guadalupe 
(modern  San  Jose),  taking  fifteen  families  from  Monterey 
and  San  Francisco  for  this  purpose.  Neve  told  Croix  about 
it  in  a  letter  of  April  15,  1778,^^  and  the  latter  replied, 
September  3,  1778,  giving  his  appro val.^^  Apprised  of  the 
matter  by  a  Croix  letter  of  September  23,^®  Galvez  also 
approved.^^  In  another  letter  of  September  23,  Croix  had 
forwarded  an  estado  showing  in  detail  the  state  of  the  mis- 
sions and  presidios  of  the  Calif ornias.^^  Gdlvez^s  reply, 
March  6,  1779,  indicated  clearly  that  he  was  still  of  the 
opinion  that  the  affairs  of  the  Californias  were  the  most 
important  in  Croix's  jurisdiction.  He  bade  Croix  to  view 
them  with  the  preference  and  attention  which,  in  view  of 
their  importance,  they  deserved. ^^ 

Although  it  was  not  until  after  his  arrival  in  Sonora  in 
November,  1779,  that  Croix  was  ready  to  give  attention  to 
Neve's  requests  of  over  two  years  before.  Neve  had  con- 
tinued to  be  busy.  Before  hearing  from  Croix  on  the  mat- 
ter he  had  begun  to  prepare  a  new  reglamento,  basing  his 
action  on  Arriaga's  order  to  Bucarely  of  March  Z^,  1775.^^ 
In  a  long  report  to  Croix  dated  December  29,  1778,  he 
showed  what  the  existing  reglamento  provided,  how  con- 
ditions varied  from  it  in  fact,  and  what  they  would  be  if 
his  recommendations  were  adopted.  There  was  a  vast 
difference  between  the  amount  stated  as  devoted  annually 
to  the  Californias  and  the  amount  actually  expended  on 
them.     Alta  California  soldiers  were  paid  only  forty  per 

27  C-3791.  31  C-3881. 

28  C-3879.  32  C-3965.     The  whole  document  is 

29  C-3882.  given  in  an  appendix. 

30  C-3966.  33  C-2872. 


1776]  THE    INCOMPETENT   RULE   OP   CROIX  397 

cent  of  the  amount  theoretically  allotted  to  them,  and  those 
of  Baja  California  and  San  Bias  received  fifty  per  cent  only, 
paid  wholly  in  clothing,  effects,  and  provisions.  Further- 
more, goods  were  charged  to  them  at  an  advance  of  a  hun- 
dred to  a  hundred  and  fifty  per  cent  to  allow  for  the  costs  of 
carriage.^*  These  goods  were  not  sufficient  to  maintain  a 
soldier  in  a  fitting  manner,  and  yet,  the  execution  of  the  regla- 
rnento  had  been  even  worse  than  the  law  for  in  some  years 
not  even  the  meagre  effects  allotted  had  arrived  in  entirety. 
The  men  were  often  in  deplorable  need  of  both  clothing  and 
military  equipment,  for  all  necessities  had  to  be  brought  at 
royal  expense,  there  being  no  commerce  with  the  Calif or- 
nias.  If  the  present  system  of  paying  wholly  in  goods  were 
employed,  nobody  would  want  to  come  there.  Neve 
recommended  that  three-fourths  of  the  pay  be  in  goods  and 
the  rest  in  cash,  and  that  the  troops  be  paid  more  than  at 
present,  at  least  as  much  as  those  of  the  other  frontier 
provinces.  In  that  case  they  would  be  willing  to  remain, 
and  others  would  be  induced  to  come.  Moreover,  goods 
should  be  sold  at  their  purchase  price  in  Mexico,  in  which 
case  salaries  might  be  reduced  twenty-five  per  cent.  There 
was  much  else  in  this  notable  document,  but  it  may  suffice 
to  recite  Neve's  claims  that  conditions  would  be  bettered, 
if  his  plan  were  adopted,  and  that  a  saving  of  4706  pesos  a 
year  would  also  be  effected.^^ 

Meanwhile,  Croix  had  written  to  Neve,  September  30, 
1778,  asking  him  to  draw  up  a  reglamento.  Neve  rephed, 
March  31,  1779,  saying  that  he  would  do  so,  making  allow- 
ance for  a  new  presidio,  three  missions,  and  a  pueblo ,  to  which 
Croix  had  consented  in  accord  with  Neve's  suggestions.^® 
By  June  1,  1779,  Neve's  reglamento  was  ready.  Interest- 
ing and  important  as  it  is,  we  may  pass  it  by  here,  with  the 
remark  that  it  embodied  substantially  the  suggestions  of 
his  December  report .^^  In  his  remitting  letter  of  the  same 
date  he  stated  that  in  view  of  the  delays  incident  to  the 

^  Thus,  an   Alta   California   soldier  »  Jq  C-3917. 

was   supposed   to   receive   but   sixteen  ^  In  ibid. 

per  cent  of  what  his  full  salary  would  ^  C-3997.     Also  in  Arrillaga,  Reco- 

have  purchased  in  Mexico.  pilacidn  for  1828,  121-75. 


398     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

return  of  approval  he  was  putting  the  reglamento  into  effect 
at  once,  subject  to  such  changes  as  Croix  might  make.^^ 
Procrastination  seems  not  to  have  been  a  Neve  trait.  On 
April  23,  1780,  Croix  wrote  to  Gdlvez  that  he  favored  adopt- 
ing Neve's  reglamento,  but  it  would  depend  on  certain 
arrangements  to  be  made  with  Viceroy  Mayorga.^®  This 
referred  to  the  preparations  for  the  new  establishments 
which  Neve  had  recommended  in  1777,  Mayorga's  cooper- 
ation being  necessary,  since  many  of  the  effects  had  to  come 
from  Mexico,  as  also  the  funds  for  administering  the  prov- 
ince."*^ Croix  had  written  to  Mayorga  on  February  9,  1780, 
that  he  proposed  to  found  a  presidio  and  three  missions  along 
the  Santa  Barbara  Channel  and  a  pueblo  on  the  Porciun- 
cula  [Los  Angeles]  ,^^  and  he  had  written  again  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  telling  of  the  help  that  he  needed  from  the 
viceroy."*^  Croix  reported  this  matter  to  Gdlvez  in  a  letter 
of  February  23,  1780."*^  The  latter  returned  a  rather  late 
approval  February  8,  1782,**  and  on  the  same  day  wrote  to 
Mayorga  that  he  had  approved  the  new  establishments 
and  the  Neve  reglamento,  and  that  Mayorga  was  to  furnish 
the  assistance  which  Croix  had  asked  for.*^  Mayorga  re- 
plied, May  23,  1782,  that  he  would  furnish  such  help  as 
should  be  necessary.*^  Before  that  late  date,  even  Croix 
had  had  time  to  act,  taking  some  steps  with  relation  to 
the  long-proposed  establishments  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado, 
for  it  was  by  that  route  that  the  new  settlers  for  Alta 
California  were  destined  to  go. 

Croix's  intended  policy  with  regard  to  settlements  on  the 
Colorado  and  Gila  and  related  matters  appears  in  his  dis- 
cussion of  the  Domlnguez-Escalante  expedition.  He  turned 
over  the  diary  of  that  expedition  *^  to  Father  Juan  Morfi 
for  an  opinion.  Morfi's  memorial  (undated  but  probably 
of  July,  1777)  is  worth  quoting  in  some  detail.  He  began 
by  comparing  the  diary  with  other  accounts  from  Onate's 

38InC-3917.  «C-4492. 

89  C-4131.     Martin  de  Mayorga  had  «  C-4493. 

succeeded  Bucarely  on  the  death  of  the  *^  C-4633. 

latter  in  1779.  «  For   the  diary,   C-3291.     Printed 

*>  C-3293.  *^  C-4095.  in    Documentos    para    la    historia    de 

<2  C-4097.  «  C-4103.  Mexico,  2d  series,  I,  375-558. 


1776]  THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE   OF   CROIX  399 

time  on.  Dominguez  and  Escalante  did  not  reach  San 
Francisco  or  Monterey,  because  they  mistook  the  route, 
he  said ;  not  knowing  the  situation  of  Monterey ;  they 
imagined  it  to  be  northwest,  when  in  fact  it  was  almost  due 
west  from  Santa  Fe,  and  they  would  almost  certainly  have 
reached  there,  had  they  gone  in  that  direction.  They  mer- 
ited thanks  for  their  zeal,  however,  for  they  had  made  a 
journey  of  over  630  leagues  in  lands  never  before  visited  or 
known  by  Spaniards.  Such  missionary  expeditions,  made 
without  due  reflection,  were  rarelyjof^rearieri^^  because 
of  the  impossibility  of  sending  aid  to  such  advanced  posts, 
if  they  should  be  occupied.  They  advanced  knowledge 
very  little,  for  dependence  had  to  be  placed  on  diaries,  and 
second  expeditions  over  the  same  route  had  rarely  been 
able  to  recognize  descriptions  in  diaries  of  the  first.  Such 
expeditions  even  worked  harm,  because  the  missionaries 
told  the  Indians  of  the  wealth  of  the  king,  and  gave  prom- 
ises of  Spanish  friendship,  when  they  themselves  were 
almost  nude  and  in  need  of  Indian  seeds.  The  Indians  could 
not  understand  a  Spaniard's  descriptions  of  wealthy  cities, 
never  having  seen  any,  and  when  nothing  came  of  the 
promised  gifts  and  friendship,  serious  consequences  were 
apt  to  occur."^^  If  the  missionaries  would  confine  their  zeal 
for^ exploration  to  regions  near  or  between  the  Spanish 
settlements,  it  would  be  better.  For  example,  if  the  region 
between  Pimeria,  the  Colorado  River,  Nueva  Vizcaya,  and 
New  Mexico  had  been  explored,  the  Spaniards  would  at 
least  know  the  haunts  of  the  Indians  and  where  they  got 
their  water,  thus  enabling  war  to  be  waged  with  some  hope 
of  success.  The  only  Indians  really  hostile  to  Spain  were 
the  Comanches,  who  gave  trouble  to  New  Mexico  and  the 
El  Paso  district,  and  the  various  branches  of  the  Apaches, 
of  whom  those  of  the  Gila  were  a  menace  to  Sonora,  Nueva 
Vizcaya,  and  New  Mexico,  and  the  Natajes  and  Lipanes  to 
Nueva  Vizcaya,  Coahuila,  Nuevo  Leon,  and  even  to  Texas. 
The  Seris,  Suaquis,  Piatos,  Pdpagos,  and  Pimas  would  not 

^  These  words  might  have  been  used  to  describe  the  cause  of  the  Yuma  massacre 
of  1781. 


400     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

rise,  unless  the  Apaches  of  the  Gila  gave  them  aid  or  a  pre- 
text, nor  would  the  Taraumares,  but  for  the  Natajes  and 
Lipanes.  These  hostile  tribes  ought,  therefore,  to  be  re- 
duced or  exterminated,  and  missionary  activities  should 
contribute  to  that  end.  This  was  not  the  time  for  new 
establishments,  embarrassing  the  arms  and  occupying  the 
attention  of  the  government,  just  when  active  and  con- 
tinuous war  was  to  be  undertaken,  because  troops  would 
be  needed  at  such  new  missions  and  would  have  to  conduct 
to  the  missionaries  whatever  they  required.  Money  spent 
for  the  proposed  missions  among  friendly  Indians,  such  as 
the  Yuma,  Cucapa,  Jalliquamay,  Cajuenche,  Jalchedun, 
Jamajab,  Pima  Gileno,  Cocomaricopa,  and  Pdpago  tribes, 
would  be  wasted,  if  on  the  basis  that  these  peoples  give  aid 
in  war,  for  only  the  old,  the  children,  and  the  women  would 
remain  in  the  missions,  and  they  would  be  full  of  misgiving 
and  little  inclined  to  conversion.  Anza  had  also  expressed 
an  opinion,  he  said,  that  these  establishments  would  be 
inopportune,  when  with  a  delay  of  one,  two,  or  at  most  three 
years  it  would  be  possible  to  make  solid  foundations.  If 
Croix  should  achieve  the  pacification  of  North  America, 
the  Colorado  and  Roxo  [Red]  rivers  should  be  taken  as 
boundaries  for  the  royal  dominions,  for  it  would  seem  from 
Escalante's  map  that  these  two  rivers  and  the  Rio  Grande 
had  their  sources  within  fifteen  leagues  of  each  other,  and 
embraced  a  territory  of  great  fertility.  He  then  described 
the  Colorado  and  spoke  of  the  little  known  Roxo,  or  Colo- 
rado of  the  east,  and  of  his  project  for  settling  the  country 
between  the  boundaries  that  he  had  named,  with  all  the  lines 
of  colonization  centring  on  Chihuahua.  Anza  would  soon 
have  to  go  to  his  province,  although  his  presence  in  Sonora 
might  be  more  useful,  and  could  be  directed  to  go  there  by 
the  northern  bank  of  the  Colorado  to  its  junction  with  the 
Saguaguanas,  which  was  the  nearest  point  to  tribes  already 
annoyed  by  the  establishments  of  Monterey.  There  he 
could  meet  Escalante,  who  should  be  sent  there  from  New 
Mexico.  Anza  could  then  proceed  by  way  of  Moqui  to 
New  Mexico,  taking  note  of  good  sites,  and  paying  special 


1776]  THE    INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  401 

attention  to  the  Moqui  and  Navajo  lands,'  with  a  view  to 
their  conquest,  later.  Escalante  should  explore  the  upper 
reaches  of  the  Colorado,  Roxo,  and  Rio  Grande  before 
joining  Anza.  A  shorter  route  than  this  between  Mon- 
terey and  Santa  Fe  might  be  found,  but  it  would  pass  through 
a  mountainous  country  lacking  in  facilities  for  its  defence, 
whereas  a  line  of  presidios  could  be  built  along  the  Colorado. 
Although  the  Comanches  were  hostile  to  Spain,  their  aid 
might  be  obtained,  because  they  hated  the  Apaches,  and  a 
man  like  Anza,  skilful  in  dealing  with  the  Indians,  might 
handle  this  affair  with  good  effect.  Furthermore,  granted 
peace  or  an  alliance  with  the  Comanches,  an  exploration 
of  the  Roxo  by  some  religious  would  be  possible.  These 
plans  would  require  neither  troops  nor  expense.  It  would 
be  well,  too,  to  send  Garc6s  and  another  religious  to  the 
Yumas,  which  would  probably  be  enough  for  the  present, 
since  Palma  and  the  warriors  would  have  to  join  in  the 
general  campaign  that  Croix  was  planning ;  thus,  few  men 
would  be  left.  Moreover,  the  two  religious  might  serve  to 
keep  the  neighboring  tribes  at  peace.  If  Croix  should  be 
successful  in  nis  campaign,  nothing  would  hinder  the  secu- 
larization of  all  of  the  missions  of  New  Mexico,  Nueva  Viz- 
caya,  Sonora,  Pimeria,  Chinipas,  Taraumara,  and  Nuevo 
Leon,  and  many  of  Coahuila  and  Texas.  The  native 
parishioners  might  then  pay  tribute  to  the  king  and  tithes 
to  the  church,  effecting  a  saving  of  50,000  pesos  a  year, 
enough  to  support  166  missionaries  at  300  pesos  a  year,  and 
one  schoolmaster  at  200  pesoSy  besides  the  positive  gain  of 
the  tribute  and  tithes.  In  conclusion,  Morfi  referred  to 
the  suggestion  of  Garc^s,  that  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  Colo- 
rado River  be  used  as  a  supply-route  for  the  presidios  on 
the  one  side,  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  Roxo  River  on 
the  other.  Anza  might  examine  the  mouth  of  the  Colorado, 
to  see  if  this  were  practicable.  As  for  the  Roxo,  Morfi 
knew  only  that  it  was  a  large  river  near  its  source,  and  that 
some  Louisiana  deserters  in  New  Mexico  claimed  to  have 
sailed  on  it.*^ 

«  C-3433. 
2d 


402     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

The  Morfi  memorial,  brilliant  as  it  was  in  many  respects, 
represented,  nevertheless,  the  new  way  of  doing  things. 
Whereas  Bucarely  saw  the  need  for  extending  the  frontier 
as  a  measure~~or^^ence,  and  unostentatiously  got  things 
done,  Cfmx  was  given  to  brilliant  plans,  which  failed,  how- 
ever,  t"o^grasp  the  essential  point,_2uad^ere  Jpllowed  by  de- 
lay of  action.  In  a  letter  to  Gdlvez,  July  26,  1777,  Croix 
stated  that  all  of  Morfi's  reflections  seemed  to  him  very  well 
founded,  and  especially  the  parts  concerning  Anza's  pro- 
jected journey  to  New  Mexico,  the  simultaneous  explo- 
rations of  Escalante,  the  proposed  treaty-  with  the  Co- 
manches,  the  exploring  of  the  Roxo,  and  the  sending  of  Garces 
and  another  to  the  Colorado.  These  were,  for  the  present, 
the  best  and  only  measures  that  could  be  taken  for  the  suc- 
cess of  the  proposed  Colorado-Gila  establishments,  for 
freedom  of  communication  between  Sonora,  the  Californias, 
and  New  Mexico,  and  for  reducing  the  numerous  tribes 
discovered,  and  punishing  the  Apaches.  These  matters 
were  of. such  import,  however,  that  he  would  not  presume 
to  give  orders,  without  first  consulting  the  viceroy,  as  also 
Anza,  Mendinueta,  Garces,  Domlnguez,  and  Escalante.^^ 
Truly,  the  day  of  action  had  passed.  Even  those  "best 
and  only"  measures  of  Croix  were  either  not  undertaken 
by  him,  or  so  long  delayed  that  no  advantage  resulted. 

Something  was  attempted  eventually  toward  establish- 
ing communications  with  Sonora  from  New  Mexico.  Anza, 
who  had  at  length  been  allowed  to  proceed  to  his  province, 
although  not  by  way  of  the  Colorado,  was  in  charge  of  the 
project.  On  November  9,  1780,  Anza  left  New  Mexico 
with  a  force  of  151  men,  and  on  December  18  emerged  in 
Nueva  Vizcaya,  near  the  Sonora  line.^^  Referring  to  this 
expedition  in  one  of  his  long  memorials,  October  30,  1781, 
Croix  said  that  the  aim  had  been  to  come  out  by  the  pre- 
sidio of  Santa  Cruz,  Sonora,  whereas  Anza  had  appeared 
almost  in  front  of  Janos.     It  would  therefore  be  necessary 

"  C-3619.  among    other    papers    includes    diaries 

"  Croix  to  G^lvez,  March  26,  1781.  of    the    expedition    written    by    Anza, 

C-4354.     This  is  the   principal   docu-  Jos6  de  Vildosola,  and  Francisco  Mar- 

ment    of    a    considerable    file,    which  tinez,  all  in  C-4244. 


1776]  THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE   OF  CROIX  403 

to  repeat  the  expedition. ^^     Nothing  further  seems  to  have 
been  done,  however,  during  Croix's  regime.     Nothing  was 
ac  cgmj^lighed,  -  as -^-.xegards,,.  Jhfe.  San^^ 
despite    Gdlvez's    instructions.     In    the    above-mentioned- 


Croix  memorial  of  October  30,  1781,  Croix  said  that  the 
discovery  of  such  a  route  remained  to  be  made,  and  it  would 
be  well  also  to  seek  routes  to  San  Antonio  de  Bejar,  Texas, 
and  to  the  presidio  of  the  Rio  Grande,  Coahuila.^^  Croix 
does  not  appear  to  have  considered  making  use  of  the  Carets 
route  to  New  Mexico,  although,  to  be  sure,  there  were  steps 
taken  at  this  time  with  a  view  to  converting  the  Moquis. 
Not  only  had  Gdlvez's  instruction  of  August  22,  1776, 
called  Croix's  attention  to  the  importance  of  founding  es- 
tablishments on  the  Gila  and  Colorado,  but  Gdlvez  had 
repeated  the  statement  in  a  royal  order  of  February  14, 
1777,^*  and  Bucarely  had  turned  over  to  Croix  the  file  of 
papers  bearing  on  that  project.  Croix  decided,  charac- 
teristically, to  postpone  action  until  he  should  reach  Sonora. 
Until  1779  the  matter  was  allowed  to  rest,  although  Chief 
Palma  of  the  Yumas  continued  to  petition  for  missionaries. 
On  February  3,  1779,  Pedro  Tueros  of  the  presidio  of  Altar, 
Sonora,  wrote  to  Croix  of  Palma's  solicitations,  and  told  of 
the  distinguished  treatment  which  he  himself  had  accorded 
the  Yuma  chief.^^  Croix,  who  had  already  heard  of  Palma's 
renewed  petitions,  now  decided  to  take  action.  On  Feb- 
ruary 5  he  wrote  to  that  effect  to  the  Queretarano  Father- 
President,  Francisco  Barbastro,  but  said  that  he  could 
afford  to  send  only  two  missionaries,  of  whom  Carets  should 
be  one.^^  On  the  same  day  he  wrote  to  Garc6s  ^^  and  Pedro 
Corbalan,^^  to  the  same  effect,  as  also  to  Tueros  on  Feb- 
ruary 22.^^  Corbaldn  replied  that  he  would  ^sist  Garces,^^ 
and  the  other  three  announced  their  pleasure  at  Croix's 
decision.^^  A  military  escort  had  been  promised  to  Garces, 
and  the  details  left  for  Carets  and  Tueros  to  arrange.     In  a 

«C^430.  »InC-3926. 

w76id.  MInC-3924. 

"  C-3478-79.  «  In  C-3926. 

65  In  C-3924.  «  Tueros'    reply  is   in  C-3924 ;  the 

6«  In  C-3925.  other  two  in  C-3925. 

"  In  ibid. 


404     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

communication  to  the  latter  of  March  23  Garces  made  a 
number  of  suggestions.  His  escort  should  be  twelve  sol- 
diers, at  least,  and  he  named  those  that  he  wanted.  There 
should  also  be  a  carpenter.  The  soldiers  should  be  ac- 
companied by  their  wives,  or  everything  might  be  lost. 
Provisions  for  three  months  and  gifts  for  the  Indians  should 
be  carried,  the  supplies  to  be  furnished  from  Altar,  the 
nearest  presidio.  The  soldiers  should  be  instructed  not  to 
hinder  conversions,  and  especially  to  keep  away  from 
Indian  women.  Both  the  soldiers  and  the  settlers  should 
have  domestic  animals  and  crops  of  their  own,  and  they 
should  be  under  the  missionaries  in  everything  except  in 
military  affairs.  Because  of  the  danger  from  neighboring 
tribes,  other  settlers  from  Sonora  should  be  permitted  to  go 
to  the  Colorado,  if  they  should  wish  to,  and  some  Nixoras 
Indians,  then  in  Sonora,  should  be  taken  along  as  interpre- 
ters. The  commander  at  Altar  should  be  ordered  to  supply 
horses  to  transport  the  provisions  and  utensils. ^^  Tueros 
replied,  April  14,  granting  Garc^s^  requests,  or  saying  that 
he  would  try  to  arrange  for  them,  —  with  two  exceptions. 
He  feared  that  the  Indians  might  covet  the  soldiers^  wives, 
and  so  would  not  order  that  the  latter  go  along,  and  he  left 
Croix  to  decide  whether  more  settlers  should  be  allowed  to 
go.^^  Both  documents  he  forwarded  to  Croix  in  his  letter 
of  April  29.6* 

On  May  15  Corbaldn  wrote  that  a  sum  of  2000  pesos  had 
been  advanced  to  Father  Diaz,  who  was^  to  accompany 
Garc6s,  and  charged  to  the  Real  Caja  of  Alamos.^^  This 
sum  did  not  last  long.  On  July  8  Diaz  rendered  an  account 
showing  that  all  had  been  spent,  gifts  for  the  Yumas  being 
prominent  in  the  list,  as  well  as  mules  and  necessary  effects.^^ 
It  was  not  until  August  that  the  tiny  force  started,  and  by 
reason  of  the  difficulties  encountered,  only  Garces  and  two 
soldiers  pushed  on,  at  the  time,  for  the  Colorado.  Shortly 
after  his  arrival  Garces  wrote  to  Corbalan,  September  2, 
that  nearly  all  of  his  provisions  were  gone,  and  that  he 

82  In  C-3924.  <»  In   C-3926.     Approved  by  Croix 

«3  In  ibid,  on  July  28,  in  ibid. 

«  In  ibid.  w  In  C-3926. 


1776]  THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE   OF   CROIX  405 

needed  a  supply  of  gifts  for  the  chiefs.  He  asked  for  300 
pesos  to  be  expended  for  beads,  shoes,  cloth,  and  other 
things  that  the  Indians  liked. ^^  Corbaldn  forwarded  Diaz's 
account  and  Garc6s'  letter  to  Croix  on  September  30.^^ 
Croix,  meanwhile,  had  changed  his  mind  about  the  new 
settlements,  and  seems  to  have  issued  an  order  on  May  14 
to  abandon  the  idea,  but  the  order  reached  Sonora  too 
late. 

Conditions  at  the  Colorado  River  are  amply  described  in 
three  letters  from  Garces  to  Croix.  In  the  first,  September 
2,  1779,  he  announced  his  arrival,  after  a  journey  of  some 
difficulty  through  Papagueria.  Because  of  the  unusually 
light  rainfall,  Garces  and  two  soldiers  had  pushed  on  alone, 
leaving  the  rest  of  the  party  at  Sonoita.  The  Yumas  were 
much  scattered  at  the  time,  it  being  the  season  for  planting, 
but  Garces  was  in  hopes  that  they  would  come  together 
soon,  so  that  houses  might  be  built  and  agricultural  lands 
made  ready  for  the  Spaniards.  To  avoid  taking  too  much 
land  from  the  Yumas  he  hoped  that  a  mission  might  be  es- 
tablished among  the  Cajuenches,  and  that  there  might  also 
be  missions  among  the  Cucapds,  Pimas  Gileiios,  and  Papa- 
gos,  all  of  whom  were  well  disposed,  although  a  bit  jealous 
of  the  preference  shown  for  the  Yumas.  With  a  stronger 
escort,  missions  might  also  be  placed  among  the  Jalchedunes 
and  Jamajabes.  The  presidio  for  their  protection  might 
be  postponed  for  a  time,  but  certain  expenditures,  such  as 
those  involved  in  erecting  houses,  paying  interpreters,  and 
making  gifts  to  the  chiefs  of  the  various  tribes  of  the  Col- 
orado, were  absolutely  necessary.  Muleteers  and  carpen- 
ters were  more  necessary  than  soldiers  at  present.  Palma 
was  as  cordial  as  ever.  He  had  managed  to  keep  the  Yumas 
at  peace,  although  with  difficulty,  for  they  had  wished  to 
make  war,  notably  against  the  Jalchedunes.^^ 

Garces'  second  letter  was  dated  November  6,  1779.  Diaz 
had  arrived  on  October  2  with  the  soldiers.  Garces  had 
learned  that  the  Jalchedunes,  Cajuenches,  and  Cucap^s 
wanted  missions,  although  from  motives  of  self-interest,  be- 

"^  In  ibid.  M  In  ibid.  •  In  C-4017. 


406     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

lieving  that  they  would  receive  all  manner  of  material  wealth 
from  the  Spaniards.  The  same  was  true  of  the  Yumas,  who 
had  been  spoiled  by  the  good  treatment  accorded  to  them 
and  Chief  Palma  in  the  past.  When  Garces  arrived  with  so 
little  in  the  way  of  presents,  he  had  found  it  difficult  to  get 
even  a  little  maize  from  the  Yumas.  In  fine,  the  Yumas 
were  no  better  than  the  other  Indians  of  the  Colorado,  and 
it  was  not  going  to  be  so  easy  to  convert  them  as  Palma  had 
said.  Too  much  reliance  should  not  be  placed  on  Palma 
who  was  only  one  of  many  chiefs,  and  at  the  head  of  only 
one  very  small  village.  Moreover,  the  chiefs  had  no  real 
authority,  except  in  so  far  as  the  Indians  wished  to  obey 
them.  Palma  was  certainly  well  disposed  and  seemed  to 
exercise  much  influence  in  matters  of  war.  Presents  were 
an  essential  to  success.  If  Corbalan  should  grant  the  300 
pesos  that  Carets  had  asked  for,  the  Indians  might  be  per- 
suaded to  build  a  dweUing  and  a  chapel  and  with  what  was 
left  a  muleteer  and  two  interpreters  could  be  maintained. 
Artisans  were  another  necessity.  The  present  settlement  of 
twelve  men  could  not  subsist  by  itself,  wherefore  there 
should  be  other  settlements  among  the  Cajuenches  and 
Jalchedunes,  thus  allowing  recourse  to  them  in  case  of  need, 
for  Sonora  and  Alta  California  were  too  far  away  to  render 
aid.  Moreover,  the  Colorado-Gila  establishment  should 
be  increased,  another  mission  founded,  and  more  settlers 
induced  to  come.  In  addition,  if  the  soldiers  were  well 
chosen  from  the  standpoint  of  good  character,  and  if  some 
financial  aid  were  granted,  success  might  be  expected,  for 
the  land  was  favorable  for  grazing  and  agriculture.  The 
Gila  route  was  preferable  to  the  one  through  Papagueria, 
but  its  use  would  necessitate  an  establishment  among  the 
Pimas  Gilenos  and  a  military  escort  for  the  region  between 
Tucson  and  the  Gila,  because  that  section  was  much  fre- 
quented by  the  Apaches.  The  soldiers  at  the  Colorado 
should  not  be  changed  as  Garces  had  heard  it  was  proposed 
to  do.  Soldiers  would  not  bring  their  families  unless  they 
were  to  remain,  and  it  was  essential  that  they  should  bring 
them,  so  that  the  wives  could  cook  for  the  men  and  keep 


1776]  THE    INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  407 

them  from  such  wrong-doing  or  desertion  as  had  occurred 
in  the  case  of  the  soldiers  of  Monterey J° 

In  his  third  letter,  December  27,  1779,  Garces  reported 
that  affairs  at  the  Colorado  settlement  were  in  a  critical 
condition,  and  Diaz  was  leaving  in  order  to  see  Croix  to 
explain  the  situation  to  him.  Corbalan  had  refused  to 
grant  the  300  pesos  that  Carets  had  wanted.  Oarers  had 
word  of  Croix's  decision  to  suspend  the  estabhshment,  and 
rejoiced  that  it  had  not  come  in  time ;  otherwise,  Palma 
would  have  been  murdered,  both  because  the  Yumas  would 
have  believed  that  he  had  deceived  them  and  because  he 
was  hindering  their  going  to  war.  Indeed,  to  keep  the 
Indians  at  peace  was  a  task  requiring  more  abiUty  than 
Garces  believed  himself  to  have;  more  funds  and  more 
troops  would  be  required.^^ 

Arrived  at  Arispe,  Diaz  presented  his  petition  to  Croix 
on  February  12,  1780.  There  should  be  missions  among 
the  Cajuenches  and  Jalchedunes,  he  said.  The  latter  and 
the  Yumas  were  bitter  enemies,  and  if  war  should  break 
out,  the  Spaniards  might  be  obliged  to  help  the  Yumas,  in 
which  case  the  Cocomaricopas,  the  Pdpagos  of  the  north, 
and  the  Pimas  Gileiios  would  be  estranged,  for  they  were 
friends  of  the  Jalchedunes.  War  between  the  Yumas  and 
Cajuenches  was  also  likely  to  occur.  The  two  proposed 
missions  could  prevent  these  wars.  Twenty  soldiers  should 
be  added  to  the  twelve  now  at  the  Colorado,  to  be  under 
missionary  authority  as  at  present.  For  three  years  an 
allowance  should  be  made  to  each  mission  for  a  good  inter- 
preter, a  carpenter,  a  mason,  a  muleteer,  and  a  farm-laborer, 
the  last  named  to  instruct  the  Indians  in  cultivating  the  soil. 
Each  mission  should  have  two  reHgious.  A  second  mission 
among  the  Yumas  would  be  of  advantage,  with  an  addi- 
tional ten  men,  in  which  case,  although  even  then  with 
difficulty,  the  Yumas  could  be  made  to  keep  the  peace  with 
their  neighbors.*^^ 

Five  days  later  Croix  issued  a  decree  providing  for  two 

'0  In  C-4017.  deserter,    Jos6    Hermenegildo    Flores. 

71  In    ibid.     In   this    letter    Garc6s  "  In  C-4017. 

notes     the     arrival     of     a     Monterey 


408     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

Spanish  settlements  among  the  Yumas.  There  were  to  be 
twenty-one  soldiers  in  all,  eleven  at  one  settlement,  and  ten 
at  the  other,  and  thirty-two  civilian  settlers  evenly  divided 
between  the  two.  Among  the  latter  were  to  be  artisans 
and  interpreters  for  each  place.  The  soldiers  were  to  be 
married  men  and  were  to  bring  their  families.  Lands  were 
to  be  divided  among  the  Spaniards  as  the  laws  of  the  Indies 
provided,  one  portion  being  reserved  for  usage  in  common, 
and  another  for  the  benefit  of  the  church.  Croix  planned 
for  the  Yumas  to  share  in  the  lands,  as  well  as  the  Spaniards, 
but  was  undecided  whether  they  should  be  given  individual 
plots  or  a  larger  area  in  common.  He  also  doubted  whether 
it  was  wise  for  the  religious  to  manage  the  material  wealth 
(temporalidades)  of  missions;  he  had  intended  to  put  that 
in  charge  of  the  commandant,  but,  in  view  of  Diaz's  ob- 
jection, suspended  his  decision.  The  settlers  were  to  re- 
ceive pay  and  such  other  aid  as  they  needed.  Finally, 
there  were  to  be  two  religious  at  each  mission.^^ 

Diaz  was  asked  to  comment  on  the  decree  and  to  add 
anything  he  thought  necessary.  He  did  so  in  a  document 
dated  February  19,  showing  that  he  was  in  substantial  agree- 
ment with  Croix.  He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
Yumas  knew  how  to  plant  crops  and  were  accustomed  to 
individual  property  in  land,  wherefore  those  who  wished 
to  join  the  Spanish  settlements  could  be  assigned  lands  at 
an  early  date,  for  they  would  know  how  to  manage  them. 
He  argued  for  missionary  control  of  the  mission  wealth,  be- 
cause of  the  many  expenses,  incidental  to  mission  work,  but 
it  would  be  even  better  if  an  additional  fund  of  200  pesos 
for  these  expenses  might  be  granted.^^  On  February  29, 
Croix's  asesor,  Pedro  Galindo  Navarro,  gave  his  opinion  on 
Diaz's  answer.  It  would  be  against  law  and  equity  to  dis- 
possess the  Indians  of  lands  actually  occupied  by  them,  he 
said ;  therefore,  matters  had  best  be  left  as  they  were, 
as  concerned  the  division  of  lands  among  them,  until  the 
Spaniards  should  become  better  informed.  The  impor- 
tance of  having  Spanish  establishments  on  the  Colorado 

"  In  C-4017.  74  In  Hyi^. 


1776]  THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  409 

had  been  urged  in  several  royal  decrees,  wherefore  he  favored 
granting  the  extra  200  pesos  that  Diaz  had  asked,  for  it 
was  necessary  to  treat  the  Yumas  well  in  order  to  attract 
them  to  the  faith,  and  this  expense  would  conduce  to  that 
end.  Funds  advanced  to  the  settlements  should  eventually 
be  repaid,  on  which  account  it  would  be  well  to  set  aside  a 
portion  of  land  for  that  purpose  in  each  settlement.  Such 
lands  should  be  managed  by  a  council  elected  by  the  sol- 
diers and  settlers  from  among  their  own  numbers.^^  Croix 
gave  orders,  March  3,  for  the  decree  to  be  drawn  up  as 
modified  by  the  asesor's  reports,^^  and  this  was  done,  the 
final  decree  being  dated  March  7,  1780.^^ 

On  April  23,  Croix  wrote  at  length  to  Gdlvez,  reviewing 
his  action  concerning  the  Colorado-Gila  establishments, 
since  taking  charge  of  his  government.  His  plan  differed 
from  that  of  Bucarely,  he  said,  and  he  proceeded  to  argue 
its  advantages.  The  former  viceroy  had  wished  to  transfer 
Horcasitas  and  Buenavista  presidios  to  the  Gila  and  Colo- 
rado, and  that  had  in  fact  been  ordered,  but  it  would  not 
be  possible  to  effect  the  transfer  for  many  years,  because 
of  the  Apache  and  Seri  wars.  The  chief  advantage  of 
Croix's  plan  was  in  its  economy.  Temporarily,  it  would 
cost  more  than  the  Bucarely  project,  but  not  so  much  as 
it  would  have,  if  the  presidios  had  been  transferred,  and 
their  places  supplied  by  others,  as  would  have  been  neces- 
sary. His  two  colonies  at  the  Colorado  would  attain  the 
objects  that  Galvez  had  desired.  Croix's  next  task  would 
be  the  matter  of  founding  a  presidio  at  the  junction  of  the 
Gila  and  San  Pedro  with  a  view  to  securing  the  Gila  route 
to  the  Californias."^^  With  this  letter  Croix  submitted  two 
estados,  one  of  which  showed  that  the  two  settlements 
would  cause  an  increase  in  expense  of  4704  pesos  a  year,^^ 
and  another  showing  that  his  plan  would  effect  a  saving  of 
9174  pesos,  6  reales,  and  eventually  13,878  pesos,  6  reales, 
over  that  of  Bucarely.^^ 

"  In  ibid.                               ^«  In  ibid.  Troops  of  the  two  villages           5120 

"  In  ibid.  78  C-4128.  Settlers  ditto 2400 

79  C^130.  Twelve  servants  ....           2304 

80  The  figures  in  pesos  were  as  follows  :  The  two  latter  items  were  expected 
Annual  expenses  of  Horca-  to  cease.     These  figures  did  not  men- 

sitas  18,998-6       tion  Buenavista  presidio. 


410     THE    FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

So  much  then  for  the  preliminaries  of  the  ill-fated  Colo- 
rado colonies.  In  one  respect  the  documents  exonerate 
Croix  from  charges  that  were  made  against  him  by  con- 
temporary writers  who  have  been  followed  by  later  his- 
torians. The  mixed  character  of  his  settlements  resulting 
from  the  close  association  planned  for  missionaries,  soldiers, 
settlers,  and  Indians  was  not  against  the  wishes  of  the  re- 
ligious, but  resulted  primarily  from  their  suggestions. 
Similarly,  Croix  had  adopted  Diaz's  recommendation  as 
regarded  the  mission  property.  The  real  criticism  of  Croix 
is  because  of  his  long  delay  in  approaching  the  problem, 
which  had  resulted  in  a  loss  of  the  moment  when  the  Yumas 
were  most  kindly  disposed,  and  his  false  economy,  when  once 
he  had  decided  on  the  establishments.  Perhaps  some 
idea  of  his  attitude  may  be  obtained  by  considering  his 
long  memorials,  documents  of  very  great  value  to  his- 
torical scholars  for  conditions  in  the  frontier  provinces, 
which  show,  however,  Croix's  neglect  of  the  Colorado-Gila 
country. 

Croix  seems  to  have  acquired  the  taste  for  writing  long 
memorials  in  one  that  he  dated  January  23, 1780,  a  document 
of  194  paragraphs  or  headings.  This  was  wholly  about 
his  military  policy,  past,  present,  and  future,  but  did  not 
concern  itself  with  the  lands  along  the  route  to  Alta  Cali- 
fornia. He  criticized  the  location  of  the  line  of  presidios, 
and  proposed  a  new  line  supported  by  a  second  line  of  set- 
tlements.^^ Croix  now  planned  a  monumental  report  in 
five  parts,  as  follows :  1.  the  individual  state  of  each  prov- 
ince; 2.  the  most  notable  events  during  his  rule;  3.  his 
measures ;  4.  their  results  ;  5.  measures  that  should  be  taken 
in  future.  The  first  part  was  ready  by  October  30,  1781,  a 
mighty  document  of  612  paragraphs,  of  which  the  affairs  of 
Sonora  formed  the  major  part,  and  the  Calif ornias  but 
little.^^  For  the  Californias  he  took  Neve's  suggestions, 
and  it  was  well  that  he  did.     He  showed  a  complete  mis- 

81  C-4082.     The  copy  that    I    used  paragraphs ;  New   Mexico,   39 ;  Nueva 

covered   248   pages   of   closely   written  Vizcaya,   66 ;    Sonora,    335 ;    the  Cali- 

manuscript.  fornias,   47.     The    document  was    856 

8*  Texas  and  Coahuila  required   120  pages  long. 


17761  THE   INCOMPETENT   RULE   OF  CROIX  411 

understanding  of  the  Gila-Colorado  situation  on  the  eve  of 
the  calamity  that  was  to  happen  there.^^  The  most  im- 
portant feature  to  him  was  the  saving  that  he  was  efifecting. 
His  concern  for  Sonora  was  indeed  greatest  of  all,  —  possibly 
because  he  was  then  in  that  province.  Yet  his  interest 
was  entirely  local,  based  primarily  on  the  Apaches,  and  to  a 
less  extent  on  the  Seris.  His  remedy  was  a  fresh  change 
of  presidial  sites  so  as  to  form  something  like  a  half  circle 
around  Janos,  Nueva  Vizcaya,  as  a  centre.  There  was  not 
a  word  in  the  entire  document  about  the  larger  projects 
which  had  engaged  the  attention  of  Gdlvez  and  Bucarely 
—  not  a  word  about  the  possibility  of  foreign  invasion  of 
the  Pacific  coasts,  at  a  time  too  when  this  was  more  than 
ever  a  probability.^^  In  fine,  if  this  document  is  a  monu- 
ment to  Croix^s  painstaking  thoroughness  in  matters  of 
detail  which  were  before  his  eyes,  it  also  bears  the  record 
of  his  exceeding  narrowness  of  vision. 

Croix's  remarks  about  the  Colorado-Gila  settlements 
may  be  referred  to  a  little  more  in  detail.  He  approaches 
this  matter  by  giving  an  invaluable  summary  of  documents 
from  1735  on,  concerning  the  location  of  frontier  presidios. 
Anza's  discovery  of  a  route  to  Alta  California  had  caused 
a  change  in  the  situation,  as  a  result  of  which  Bonilla, 
Oconor,  Crespo,  Anza,  Diaz,  Garc^s,  and  many  others  had 
recommended  that  one  presidio  be  placed  at  the  junction  of 
the  Colorado  and  Gila,  and  another  at  the  confluence  of  the 
Gila  and  San  Pedro,  so  as  to  secure  communication  with 
Monterey.  Oconor  had  proposed  that  Horcasitas  and 
Buena^dsta  presidios  be  transferred  respectively  to  those 
sites.  Two  of  Croix's  officers,  Ugarte  and  Rocha,  were 
unfavorable  to  the  location  of  a  presidio  on  the  San  Pedro, 

*3  The  memorial  is  of  later  date  than  royal  order  of  March  22,  1778,  concern- 

the  disaster,    but   clearly  was   written  ing  the  movements  of  the  English  and 

before   Croix  had   heard  of  it.     Croix  French.     Croix    replied    that    he    had 

got  the  news  in  August,  but  did  not  on  given  instructions  to  the  governors  of 

that  account  change  his  memorial.  Texas,  Coahuila,  Sonora,  and  the  Cali- 

8*  No    attempt    has  been    made    to  fornias  about  these  movements.     This 

record  Gdlvez's  warnings  to  Croix  con-  shows  that  some  danger  was  threaten- 

cerning  foreign  danger,   although  it  is  ing  in  the  Pacific  —  possibly  a  reference 

certain  that  they  were  made.     A  Croix  to  Cook's  voyage, 
letter  of  July  27,  1778,  refers  to  a  secret, 


412     THE   FOUNDING   OP   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

and  Croix  was  of  their  opinion.  He  had  also  decided  to 
depend  on  his  two  settlements  at  the  Colorado  to  hold  the 
ground  there.  Horcasitas  and  Buenavista  could  not  be 
moved,  for  the  Seris  were  not  sufficiently  subjected,  as 
shown  by  their  outbreaks  in  1777  and  more  recently  in  1780. 
Croix  spoke  with  enthusiasm  of  the  brilliant  prospects  of 
his  Colorado  settlements,  and  dilated  upon  the  saving  of 
14,000  pesos  a  year  that  he  was  effecting  by  not  placing  a 
presidio  there.^^ 

By  April  23,  1782,  Croix's  second  part  was  ready.  This 
filled  572  paragraphs,  but  was  longer  than  the  preceding.^^ 
This  did  not  follow  his  original  plan,  but  dealt  with  his 
miHtary  measures  in  the  frontier  provinces.  It  was  in- 
tended to  be  general,  for  the  whole  government,  whereas 
the  previous  document  was  particular  for  each  province, 
but  it  included  much  detail  about  the  different  provinces. 
The  Californias  alone  were  not  considered,  and  were  spe- 
cifically stated  as  being  outside  the  plan.  The  keynote  of 
the  document,  as  might  be  expected,  was  the  Apache  wars.*^ 
If  Croix  wrote  any  more  long  memorials,  they  have  not 
come  to  light.  Events  had  occurred,  meanwhile,  which  may 
well  have  tempered  Croix's  fondness  for  indulging  in  these 
reports,  most  prominent  of  which  was  the  Yuma  massacre 
of  1781. 

The  two  colonies  on  the  Colorado  were  founded  in  the  fall 
of  1780,  both  on  the  west  bank,  Purisima  Concepcion  near 
the  junction,  and  San  Pedro  y  San  Pablo  de  Bicufier  farther 
down  the  river.  Trouble  began  almost  at  once.  The 
Spanish  paid  small  regard  to  the  rights  of  the  natives  in 
allotting  lands,  and  their  cattle  ruined  the  Yuma  crops. 
In  these  and  other  respects  the  Spaniard  of  everyday  life 
lacked  the  halo  with  which  the  Yumas  had  surrounded  the 
transient  gift-bearing  visitors  of  other  days.  When  pro- 
visions were  exhausted,  the  Yumas  refused  to  supply  them, 
unless  at  exorbitant  prices,  and  the  chiefs  of  the  Yumas, 
even  Palma,  began  to  incite  their  people  against  the  set- 

85  C-4430.  in  the  document  that  I  used. 

86  There  was  an  even  thousand  pages  ^7  C-4568. 


1776]  THE    INCOMPETENT   RULE    OF   CROIX  413 

tiers.  The  storm  broke  in  July,  1781.  Rivera  had  arrived 
in  June  with  an  expedition  of  forty  recruits  and  their  fam- 
ilies, bound  for  Alta  California,  in  fulfilment  of  Neve^s 
plan  for  developing  that  province.  Having  seen  them 
safely  on  their  way,  luckily  for  them,  Rivera  recrossed 
the  Colorado  with  eleven  or  twelve  soldiers,  and  encamped 
there  in  order  to  strengthen  his  animals  before  proceeding 
himself  to  Alta  California.  Rivera's  arrival  had  only  added 
to  the  discontent,  for  his  cattle  destroyed  mesquite  plants 
of  the  Yumas,  and  he  had  not  been  liberal  with  gifts.  On 
July  17  the  natives  attacked  San  Pedro  y  San  Pablo,  killing 
the  two  religious  and  most  of  the  men,  holding  the  women 
and  children  as  captives.  The  same  thing  occurred  at 
about  the  same  hour  at  Purisima  Concepcion,  although 
Fathers  Garces  and  Barreneche  were  temporarily  spared. 
Rivera  and  his  men  were  attacked,  next  day,  and  all  were 
killed,  and  the  following  day,  Garces  and  Barreneche  were 
put  to  death. ^^ 

Punitive  campaigns  were  planned,  and  several  expedi- 
tions made  in  1781-82,  but  beyond  ransoming  the  survivors 
they  accomplished  little.  Croix  was  not  the  type  of  man  to 
acknowledge  blame.  In  casting  about  for  a  scapegoat  he 
hit  upon  Garces  and  Anza,  charging  them  with  gross  ex- 
aggerations in  praise  of  the  Yumas  and  their  lands.  This 
appears  in  his  letter  to  Gdlvez  of  November  4,  1782,  in 
which  he  announced  that  he  was  about  to  hold  a  junta  to 
decide  whether  a  presidio  should  be  established  at  the 
Colorado  River  to  keep  communication  open  with  the  Cali- 
f  ornias.^^  The  injustice  of  jUroix's  attack  is  .apparent  to 
i!i5J_QJ>ie.-3dioTias  Tea3  the  Garces  and^Artza  memorials 
and  diaries^  We^Tia^^"~seen  nSGat^'Snzar  had  said  that  his 
roTifewould  be  impracticable,  if  the  Yumas  should  be  hos- 
tile, or  even  if  no  more  than  unfriendly,  owing  to  the  diffi- 
culty of  crossing  the  Colorado  in  seasons  of  flood,  at  which 
time  Indian  help  was  necessary,  and  that  Garces  had  re- 
peatedly recommended  establishing  a  presidio  at  the  Colo- 
ns A  detailed  account  (85  pages  long)  718  of  February  28,  1782,  0^614. 
is  to  be  found  in  Croix's  letter  number  ^  C^727. 


414     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

rado  and  Gila,  while  Croix's  long  memorial  of  October  30,. 
1781,  quoted  Anza  to  the  same  effect.  The  trouble  wa& 
that  Croix  had  not  adopted  their  recommendations. 

At  the  junta,  held  January  3,  1783,  there  appeared,  be- 
sides Croix,  Pedro  Galindo  Navarro,  Pedro  Tueros,  Pedro 
Corbaldn,  and  Felipe  Neve,  the  last  named  having  been 
promoted  to  be  inspector  general  of  the  comandancia  general. 
Neve  had  recently  come  from  Alta  California  by  way  of  the 
Anza  route.  He  condemned  the  Colorado  country,  saying 
that  it  was  a  region  of  salt  marshes  and  sand,  with  slight 
rainfall  and  scant  pasture.  Settlers  would  have  to  get 
everything  from  Sonora,  he  said.  Others  referred  to  the 
Seri  and  Apache  wars,  which  required  all  of  the  troops  to  be 
used  elsewhere,  and  also  to  the  fact  that  it  would  be  pos- 
sible to  use  the  route  to  Alta  California  in  case  of  need, 
if  thirty  armed  men  were  sent  along,  as  the  Yumas  were 
weak  foes.  Therefore,  as  the  settlements  would  cause 
heavy  expense,  and  as  in  the  junta^s  opinion  they  would  do 
no  good,  it  was  held  to  be  best  to  abandon  them.  These 
proceedings  were  reported  in  Croix's  letter  of  January  27, 
1783^0 

he  Yuma  disaster  was  a  severe  blow  to  the  career  of 
that  capable  explorer,  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza,  for  now  that 
Garces  was  dead,  Anza  had  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  blame. 
Croix  brought  the  matter  up  again  in  a  letter  of  March  24, 
1783,  in  which  he  described  his  military  policy  since  enter- 
ing office.  It  seems  that  Oconor  had  prophesied  the  Yuma 
disaster,  whereupon  Croix  asserted  that  Oconor  probably 
knew  that  it  had  occurred  when  he  claimed  to  foresee  it; 
anyway,  it  was  not  his  fault,  said  Croix,  but  Anza's.  Anza 
had  misrepresented  the  country,  he  said,  and  it  was  that 
which  had  caused  its  occupation  and  therefore  the  disaster.®^ 
Late  in  the  same  year  Croix  was  promoted  to  be  viceroy 
of  Peru  —  possibly  a  gracious  way  of  relieving  him  from  a 
task  that  had  proved  too  big  for  him  —  and  Njeve  became 
comandante  general.  The  latter's  bitterness  against  Anzajs 
surprisingly  great,  and  a  little  displeasing  to  the  investi- 

""wCHlTe?.    """^  wC-4793. 


1776]  THE   INCOMPETENT  RULE   OF   CROIX  415 

gator  who  has  formed  a  high  opinion  of  both.  For  example, 
Neve  told  Anz a  to  omit  in  future  in  his  annual  service  re- 
port  {hoja  We  sermcwj  to  call  himself  the  discoverer  of  the 
route  to  Alta  California,  for  not  he  but  the  Indian  Tarabal 
had  discovered  it.  Similarly,  Anza  was  not  to  lay  claim 
tojiaving  defeated  the  Comanche  chief  Cuernp  Verde,  for 
that  victory  was  due  to  Azuela,  Anza's  subordinate  in  that 
fight.  This  and  much  else  of  the  same  character  appear 
in  Neve's  letter  to  Gdlvez  of  January  26,  1784,  and  its 
enclosures.^^  Some  of  the  reasonsjFor^Neve's  animus  may 
be  conjectured  with  a  fair  degree  of  probability.  It  is  not 
Hkely  that  Neve  took  pains  to  read  over  the  Anza  diaries 
and  reports  about  the  Colorado-Gila  settlements,  for  the 
idea  had  been  abandoned  before  he  became  comandante 
general,  and  naturally,  he  took  the  estimate  of  the  em- 
JDiittered  Croix,  eager  to  exculpate  himself.  ~Th"e"  Tatter, 
possibly  by  quoting  certain  portions  of  Anza's  reports  and 
omitting  others,  made  it  appear  that  Anza  had  painted  the 
Colorado  country  as  a  kind  of  paradise  and  the  Yumas  as 
having  an  angelic  character.  Neve  had  seen  for  himself 
the  falsity  of  such  views,  not  realizing  that  if  the  whole 
truth  were  known  Anza  would  be  found  to  have  represented 
the  situation  with  substantial  correctness.  Moreover,  the 
disaster  had  checked  a  very  great  work  in  Alta  California 
that  Neve  had  set  on  foot,  and  Neve  seems  not  to  have  been 
a  man  to  be  patient  with  failure,  for  which  in  this  case  he 
wrongly  blamed  Anza.  Finally,  there  seems  to  have  been 
some  misunderstanding  between  them  with  regard  to 
affairs  in  New  Mexico.  Had  Anza  and  Neve  been  per- 
sonally acquainted  Neve  might  have  better  judged  his 
man,  but  the  evidence  of  their  annual  service  reports  would 
tend  to  show  that  they  never  met. 

Neve's  successors  tried  to  repair  the  injury  done  to  Anza. 
Neve  Tiad~asl:ed  that  Anza  be  relieved  from  the  govern- 
ment of  New  Mexico,  claiming  that  he  was  incompetent. 
A  later  comandante  general,  Jacobo  Ugarte,  wrote  to  Gdlvez, 

*2C-4938.  The  enclosures  consist  Reyes,  C-4935,  and  four  to  Anza, 
of   one   letter   from    Neve    to    Bishop       C-4915,  4932-34. 


416     THE   FOUNDING   OF   SPANISH   CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVII 

December  21,  1786,  that  Neve^s  opinion  of  Anza's  admin- 
istration in  New  Mexico  had  been  founded  on  the  incorrect 
reports  of  Anza's  opponents,  and  that  Anza  had  merited 
praise  for  his  government  of  New  Mexico  rather  than  re- 
moval.^^  This  was  a  courageous  letter,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  Gdlvez  had  already  appointed  a  new  governor.  In 
supporting  Anza's  petition  for  a  province  under  the  vice- 
roy,®* Ugarte  warmly  recommended  him  in  a  letter  dated 
February  1,  1787.®^  Jose  Antonio  Rengel,  who  a  little 
earlier  had  been  temporary  comandante  general^  and  was 
at  the  time  inspector  general  and  commander  of  the  Nueva 
Vizcaya-New  Mexico  district,  wrote  across  Anza^s  petition 
that  he  too  indorsed  it.  Yet  again,  July  15,  1787,  Ugarte 
wrote  to  Gdlvez  in  behalf  of  Anza.  This  time  he  urged 
that  he  be  made  governor  of  Texas. ®^  The  result  of  Ugarte's 
efforts  has  not  thus  far  been  revealed.  Anza  seems  to  have 
been  succeeded  as  governor  of  New  Mexico  by  Fernando  de 
la  Concha  in  1788,  after  which  no  further  record  of  his 
career  has  yet  come  to  light.®'' 

Yet  the  career  of  Anza  or  of  Croix  is  of  slight  account 
compared  to  the  tremendous  importance  of  the  Yuma  dis- 
astfiL.  That  event  checked  the  development  of  Alta  Cali- 
fornia just  at  the  moment  when  a  great  forward  move- 
ment was  being  made.  If  measures  are  to  be  judged  by 
their  results,  perhaps,  after  all,  Teodoro  de  Croix  is  de- 
serving of  a  monument  —  but  it  should  be  erected  by  the 
United  States.  And  back  of  Croix  lies  Gdlvez,  who  was 
responsible  for  him.  Investigation  will  likely  prove  that  it 
was  due  to  the  fatal  weakness  in  Galvez's  character,  which 
made  him  work  for  himself  above  his  country,  that  he  chose 
so  inefficient  an  instrument  as  Teodoro  de  Croix  to  carry 
out  the  projects  which  he  himself  had  brilliantly  inaugurated. 

"  C-5206.  that  Concha  did  not  succeed  Anza  until 

"  For  Anza's  petition,  C-5204.  late  in  1789.     It  is  clear,  however,  that 

85  C-5227,  Concha   was   referred    to    as    governor 

»«  C-5244.  and  was  writing  letters  from  Santa  F6 

97  Bancroft,  Ariz,  and  New  Mex.,  268,  in    1788.     Twitchell,    Spanish   archives 

and  Twitchell,  Leading  facts,  451,  say  of  New  Mexico,  II,  303,  308-10. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE   AFTERMATH,    1783-1822 

The  end ^f„the  Spanish  northwestward  movement  had 
come  with  the  Yuma  massacre  of  1781,  but  there  were  a 
number  of  contributory  factors.     A  Spanish  voyage  to  the 
northwest  coast  in  1779  failed  to  discover  any  Europeans; 
a  series  of  voyages  from  1788  on  found  too  many,  for  Eng-  , 
lish  fur  traders,  following  in  the  wake  of  Cook,  had  begun 
to  come  from  China  to  the  North  American  coast  in  1785. 
Spain  considered  engaging  in  the  trade  herself,  which  she 
might  have  done  to  far  greater  advantage  than  her  competi- 
tors, but  she  let  the  opportunity  slip.     The  attempt  to  oust 
the  English  led  to  the  Nootka  controversy,  by  which  Spain  J^ 
suffered  a  decisive  check.     Henceforth,  the  matter  of  ex-  ^ — 
pense^  which  had  always  been  an  important  factor  holding  jj^ 
back  the  conquest,  became  a  controlling  element  in  con- 
sidering such  projects^     The  Anza  route  was  officially  aban-^^^,^ 

doiTedT  internal  disorder  continued  to  be  a  problem  in  the    11] 
affairs  of  Sonora  and  New  Mexico ;   and  changes  in  juris-  -"'^ 
diction  in  the  frontier  provinces  became  so  frequent  that  a ^  .y  ^ 
consistent  policy  of  northwestward  advance  would  in  any  ^>-*" 
event  have  been  difficult  to  follow.     In  fine,  Sj)ain  had  taken 
the  defensive,  not  the  aggressive  defensive  of  the  time  of 
Bucarely,  but  a  waiting  kind,  the  inevitable  outcome  of 
wEicFwas  disintegration. 

Y'ei7need  for  a  route  still  existed,  if  Alta  California  were 
to  become  rich  and  populous,  and  despite  its  Indian  wars 
Sonora  could  have  supplied  the  sinews  of  development. 
Foreign  danger,  too,  had  become  more  than  ever  a  fact  in 
the  northwest.  Although  Alta  California  had  obtained  a 
sufficient  quantity  of  domestic  animals,  other  needs  were 
2e  417 


418     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 

unsupplied  or  at  the  mercy,  of  an  enemy^s  ships.  Goods 
and  effects  could  come  from  San  Bias  or  be  smuggled  in  on 
foreign  ships,  and  a  few  settlers  could  cross  the  Gulf  and 
come  up  the  peninsula.  But  unless  there_were  some  power- 
fully impelling  motive,  such  as  actually  came  with  the  dis- 
covery of  gold  in  1848,  the  province  could  only  become  pop- 
ulous by  its  own  natural  increase,  which  would  have  taken 
centuries,  or  by  the  use  of  an  overland  route.  Fages, 
Borica,  Arrillaga,  and  others  favored  reopening  the  Anza 
route  or  developing  a  route  from  New  Mexico,  but  their 
proposals  found  scant  response.  Thus  it  was  that  Alta 
California  settled  down  to  an  Acadian  existence,  able  to 
hve  happily  and  well,  and  to  keep  out  the  casual  foreigner, 
but  not  populous  enough  to  thrust  back  up  the  river  val- 
leys where  lay  the  magic  gold,  which,  had  it  been  discovered, 
would  at  once  have  changed  everything.  Meantime,  the 
United  States  was  pushing  westward,  not  knowing  that  her 
advance  was  in  fact  a  race  with  other  powers  for  the  Pacific 
before  the  discovery  of  gold.  Unaware  that  they  were  doing 
an  important  work  for  an  alien  country,  the  Spanish  Cali- 
fornians  held  the  land,  as  it  were  in  trust,  for  future  de- 
livery to  the  United  States. 


All  along,  the  principal  impulse  for  the  Spanish  advance 
had  come  from  a  fear  of  foreign  encroachments,  and  here- 
tofore, the  promise  of  danger  in  the  far  northwest  had  been 
greater  than  the  fact,  but  that  had  been  enough  to  stir 
G^lvez  and  Bucarely  to  action.  Henceforth,  the  actual 
peril  was  to  be  greater  than  it  ever  had  been  before,  but  it 
was  not  to  rouse  Spain  to  equal  efforts  with  those  of  the 
past.  We  have  seen  that  preparations  for  a  new  voyage 
were  made  after  the  return  of  Heceta  and  Bodega  in  1775, 
and  that  this  did  not  take  place  until  1779.  In  that  year 
Arteaga  and  Bodega  in  the  Princesa  and  Favorita  made  a 
careful  exploration  of  the  Alaska  coast,  but  found  no  Rus- 
sians, although  at  one  time,  near  the  actual  Russian  post 
on  Kadiak  Island.  After  their  return  a  royal  order  was 
issued,   May   10,   1780,   calling  for  the  discontinuance  of 


1783]  THE   AFTERMATH  419 

such  voyages.  Events  were  soon  to  cause  a  fresh  attempt 
however.  Cook^s  voyage  has  already  been  noted.  When 
his  ship  brought  some  furs  to  China,  a  new  force  entered  into 
the  history  of  the  northwest.  Captain  Hanna^  an  Enghsh- 
man,  was  the  first  voyager  to  foTIow*up  this  phase  of  Cook's 
discoveries.  He  was  on  the  northwest  coast  in  1785/  having 
come  from  China,  and  he  took  back  a  cargo  of  furs.  In  the 
next  three  years  numbers  of  En^hshmen  followed  Hanna's 
lead.  Meares,  Tripping,  Lowrie,  Guise,  Strange,  Portlock, 
Dixon,  Barclay,  Duncan,  Colnett,  and  Douglas  were  leaders 
in  these  voyages,  some  of  them  coming  more  than  once. 
Two  American  shij)s  also  came^  Kendrick  and  Gray  being 
the  commanders.  Most  of  these  boats  came  from  China, 
and  made  Nootka  Sound,  off  Vancouver  Island,  their 
rendezvous.  In  addition  a  French  voyage  of  exploratioiw 
ujider  La  P6rouse  passed  alongthe  northwest  coast  in  1786,y 
and  reported  that  the  Russians  had  several  establishments 
in  the  far  northwest. 

'""^The  Spaniards  seem  not  to  have  participated  greatly  in 
the  rich  fur  trade  of  this  period,  but  a  very  significant  proj- 
ect for  that  purpose  was  broached  from  Manila  by  Ciriaco 
Gonzdlez  Carvajal,  intendant  of  the  Philippines.  He  had 
heard  of  Hanna's  voyage  of  1785,  and  forwarded  to  Gdlvez 
a  file  of  papers  concerning  it.^  His  own  letter,  dated  Feb- 
ruary 3,  1786,  recommended  the  establishment  of  a  fur  trade 
by  the  Spaniards,  who  had  the  advantage  of  the  ports  of 
Manila  in  the  Philippines  and  San  Francisco  in  the  Cali- 
fornias  to  facilitate  the  trade.  His  idea  was  that  the  furs 
obtained  in  the  Californias  (that  is,  the  Californias  con- 
sidered as  extending  from  Cape  San  Lucas  to  the  extreme 
northwest  of  North  America)  could  be  sold  in  China,  and 
that  quicksilver  might  be  procured  in  China  to  develop 
gold  mining  in  the  Californias.^  In  another  letter,  on  June 
20,  he  suggested  utilization  of  the  port  of  Lampon  (on  the 
eastern  shore  of  Luzon,  Philippine  Islands)  and  one  of  the 
ports  of  the  far  northwest  discovered  by  Arteaga  in  1779, 
forming  a  settlement  at  the  latter.^     In  September,  1787,  . 

1  C-6160.  « G-5161.  «  C-5176. 


420     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIIl 

the  matter  was  referred  to  the  directors  of  the  PhiHppine 
Company  for  an  opinion/  and  when  they  neglected  to  re- 
ply, an  order  was  sent  to  them  in  July,  1788,  to  hasten  their 
answer.^  The  company  replied  on  August  13  that  Gonzalez's 
ideas  were  not  practicable ;  that  there  were  not  many  furs 
in  the  Californias,  or  any  knowledge  of  the  way  to  catch  the 
animals  or  cure  the  skins ;  and  that  quicksilver  was  very 
scarce  and  expensive  in  China.  They  were  awaiting  further 
reports  from  the  Philippines,  however.^  The  company 
feared,  very  Hkely,  that  this  project  might  in  some  way  in- 
jure its  own  trade.  The  Council  of  the  Indies  decided  to 
await  the  reports  referred  to.^  The  matter  came  up  again, 
however,  as  a  result  of  a  letter  from  the  viceroy,  January 
12,  1790,  which  referred  to  the  project  as  a  possible  means 
of  occupying  the  northwest  coasts,  to  the  exclusion  of  for- 
eigners, without  incurring  the  great  expenses  hitherto  un- 
dergone in  the  voyages  of  exploration.^     In  reply,  July  29, 

1790,  the  ministro  general  reserved  decision.^     As  late  as 

1791,  the  matter  was  still  being  considered,^^  but  at  that 
point  the  evidence  ceases.  The  interest  in  the  file  of  papers 
is  in  the  possibilities  that  might  have  resulted  if  the  scheme 
had  been  tried.  There  certainly  were  furs  and  gold  in  the 
Californias. 

Whatever  the  Spanish  ministry  may  have  thought  about 
the  projects  of  Gonzdlez,  the  reports  of  La  Perouse  about 
the  presence  of  Russians  were  not  to  be  disregarded.  Con- 
sequently, the  Princesa  and  San  Carlos  were  sent  out  in 
1788  under  Martinez  and  Haro.  This  time  the  Russians 
were  found,  and  reports  brought  back  that  they  intended 
to  settle  Nootka.  Information  of  the  English  pretension 
to  that  port  was  also  received.  This  caused  Spain  to  take 
steps  which  brought  on  the  Nootka  controversy,  of  which 
little  need  be  said  here.  Spain  sent  out  an  expedition  which 
seized  some  English  ships  at  Nootka  in  1789,  whereupon 
England  threatened  war.     Spain  appealed  to  France  under 

*  C-5258.  .                                                       8  C-5453. 

« C-5297.  9  C-5458. 

« C-5298.  10  C-5492. 
7  C-5302. 


1783]  THE   AFTERMATH  421 

the  terms  of  the  Family  Compact,  but  the  French  National 
Assembly,  then  in  control  of  the  government,  refused  to 
live'up  to  the  treaty.  Spain  had  to  yield,  acknowledging 
the  right  of  English  ships  to  trade  and  make  settlements  on 
the  Pacific  coast,  north  of  the  Spanish  settlements,  and^ 
even  granting  them  a  right  to  enter  Spanish  ports  but  not 
to  trade.^^ 

A  Spanish  interpretation  of  these  events  appears  in  a 
memorial  of  278  paragraphs  by  Viceroy  Revilla  Gigedo,^ 
April  12,  1793.  This  purports  to  be  a  history  of  the  De- 
partment of  San  Bias  and  of  the  CaHfornias  (in  the  largest 
geographic  sense  of  the  term)  since  1769.  The  keynote  of 
the  document  is  the  matter  of  expense.  Some  of  Revilla 
Gigedo's  remarks  on  that  subject  are  worth  noting.  It  had 
been  hoped,  he  said,  that  the  salt  mines  of  Zapotillo  under 
royal  administration  might  meet  all  the  expenses  of  the 
Department  of  San  Bias,  but  such  a  result  had  never  been 
attained ;  rather,  expense  increased.  He  then  showed  how 
the  projects  of  Bucarely  had  increased  expenditure,  such 
that  the  annual  cost  of  the  CaHfornias  had  become  nearly 
60,000  pesos  greater  than  it  had  been  at  the  outset,  without 
including  closely  related  expenses,  such  for  example  as  those 
incurred  in  connection  with  the  Colorado  River  settlements. 
He  praised  Bucarely,  however,  and  said  that  he  might  have 
achieved  even  greater  results,  if  he  had  been  able  to  make 
larger  expenditures.  After  17g0  strict  economy- l)figan_to 
bejpractised,  and  in  1786  the  salaries  and  gratuities  of  San 
Bias  employes  were  cut  down,  but  expenses  soon  became 
heavy  again,  because  of  a  fresh  series  of  explorations  and 
the  Nootka  affair.  Revilla  Gigedo  displayed  some  scepti- 
cism as  to  the  existence  of  a  passage  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific,  but  felt  that  the  doubt  should  be  settled,  after 
which,  voyages  to  the  northwest  should  be  abandoned. 
^'From  now  on,''  he  says,  ^^  every  project  which  coroDels 
us  to  incur  heavy  expenses  should  be  opposed,  even  if  the 

\i  The  best  account  of  the  Nootka  viceroy  from   1789  to   1794.     He  was 

affair  is   William   Ray   Manning,    The  a  son  of  the  former  viceroy  of  that 

Nootka  Sound  controversy.  name. 

12  The  Conde  de  Revilla  Gigedo  was 


422     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 

most  positive  assurances  are  made  of  brilliant  results,  be- 
cause it  is  always  understood  that  these  results  will  be  in 
the  future,  whereas  the  expenditures  have  to  come  out  in 
cash  from  a  treasury  full  of  urgent  necessities,  and  whose 
debts  are  increasing.  Once  the  treasury  funds  and  those 
of  its  money  lenders  [are]  exhausted,  the  projects  cannot 
be  sustained,  their  advantages  will  vanish,  the  recovery  of 
the  money  expended  will  be  difficult,  and  it  even  may  be- 
come necessary  to  continue  in  other  and  larger  outlays  with 
the  very  nearly  certain  risk  of  obtaining  still  worse  results. 
During  the  period  of  twenty-five  years,  many  millions  of 
dollars  have  been  expended  in  estabhshing  and  maintaining 
the  new  settlements  of  Alta  California;  in  repeated  ex- 
plorations of  its  northern  coasts ;  and  in  the  occupation  of 
Nootka.  But  if  we  persist  in  other  still  more  distant  and 
adventurous  enterprises,  then  there  will  be  no  funds  left 
to  carry  these  on.''  ^^ 

With  a  complacency  that  would  have  been  strange,  twenty 
years  before,  Revilla  Gigedo  remarked  that  the  Russians  had 
establishments  on  the  continent  reaching  southward  almost 
to  the  vicinity  of  Nootka,  but  Spain  had  too  few  troops  and 
ships  of  war,  and  too  scant  funds  to  dislodge  them.  How- 
ever, there  was  plenty  of  time  in  which  to  perfect  a  de- 
fence both  of  the  lands  already  possessed  and  of  those  that 
might  be  acquired  in  future,  because  it  would  be  a  long 
time  before  Russia  could  carry  her  intentions  into  effect. 
He  saw  more^to„feaijjBjhe_En^^  so  much  because  of 

tte^luf  trade,  which  he  regarded  as  over-estimated  or  di- 
minishing, but  because  they  wished  to  engage  in  illicit  trade 
with  the  Spanish  dominions,  and  thus  destroy  the  com- 
merce between  New  Spain  and  the  Philippines.  This  was 
why  they  disputed  the  ownership  of  Nootka,  he  thought, 
and  why  they  claimed  that  San  Francisco  Bay  should  be  the 
boundary  of  Spanish  possessions,  and  that  the  region  north 
of  that  be  under  joint  English  and  Spanish  occupation.     The 

"From  the  translation  in  Land  of  word  "these"  in  the  last  line  of  the 

sunshine:   cf.   n.   15.     I  have  changed  translation  refers  to  the  lands  already 

"Upper  California"   and  "Nutka"   to  occupied  by  Spain,  in  particular  Alta 

"Alta  California"  and  "Nootka."    The  California. 


1783]  THE   AFTERMATH  423 

same  reason  accounted  for  their  desire  to  be  allowed  to  fish 
at  a  distance  of  ten  leagues  from  the  Spanish  coasts. 

He  proposed  that  expense  should  be  limited  to  forestalling 
the  English,  after  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  an  in- 
teroceanic  waterway  had  been  proved.  To  check  them  he 
recommended  the  following  projects :  the  occupation  of 
the  port  of  Bodega/^  and  possibly  the  mouth  of  the  Co- 
lumbia River;  the  fortification  of  those  points  and  the(  V 
presidios  of  San  Francisco,  Monterey,  San  Diego,  and 
Loreto ;  the  transfer  of  the  Department  of  San  Bias  to 
Acapulco ;  the  conservation  and  development  of  the  pious, 
fund  and  the  Zapotillo  salt  mines,  so  that  fresh  burdens  of 
providing  for  missions  in  the  Californias  might  not  fall  on 
the  royal  treasury.  If  the  Columbia  should  prove  to  be 
an  interoceanic  strait,  he  would  take  possession  and  hold 
it  for  the  king  of  Spain.  If  it  were  but  a  river,  with  its 
sources  not  far  from  its  mouth,  he  would  discontinue  ex- 
ploration, perhaps  establishing  a  post  there,  in  order  to  get 
a  better  title,  and  to  remove  the  territory  held  in  common 
by  Spain  and  England  to  a  great  distance  ffom  the  actual 
Spanish  settlements.  But  if  the  source  of  the  Columbia 
were  near  New  Mexico,  it  would  be  necessary  to  occupy  the 
river  and  the  intervening  territory  with  presidios  and  mis- 
sions. The  transfer  from  San  Bias  to  Acapulco  was  rec- 
ommended because  of  the  superiority  of  the  latter  port. 
He  made  a  long  plea  for  the  better  management  of  the  pious 
fund.  The  total  value  of  the  fund  was  715,500  pesos,  which 
should  yield  an  interest  of  35,575  pesos.  Thus  there  should 
be  a  surplus,  as  the  missionaries  required  only  22,000  pesos 
a  year.  These  advantages  had  not  been  accruing,  and  the 
estates  making  up  the  fund  were  going  to  ruin.  Similarly, 
the  salt  mines  of  Zapotillo  ought  to  be  more  productive. 
His  projects  were  not  based  on  problematical  future  ad- 
vantages, said  Revilla  Gigedo,  but  were  merely  to  guard 
against  the  alienation  of  a  territory  which  had  cost  Spain 
so  much  in  life,  hardship,  and  treasure.  He  was  opposed 
to  extending  the  Spanish  dominion  to  the  northern  coasts, 

"  Modern  Bodega  Bay,  a  few  miles  north  of  San  Francisco. 


424     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 

as  it  involved  a  distant,  adventurous,  and  costly  enterprise. 
The  retention  of  Nootka,  or  the  occupation  of  any  other 
distant  locality  would  also  be  inadvisable  because  of  the 
liability  to  foreign  complications  as  well  as  the  matter  of 
expense.  For  his  part,  he  would  cede  Nootka  to  the  Eng- 
lish, who  seemed  to  desire  it  in  a  spirit  of  vainglory,  to 
uphold  a  claim  which  had  been  controverted.^^  Clearly 
the  Spanish  Empire  was  on  the  defensive.  An  attempt 
to  occupy  Bodega  was  made,  but  failed,  and  the  affair  was 
permanently  postponed.  If  anything  else  of  consequence 
was  attempted  in  fulfilment  of  Revilla  Gigedo's  sugges- 
tions, the  writer  has  seen  no  evidence  of  it. 

Other  considerations  contributed  to  check  the  Spanish 
advance,  one  of  which  was  the  failure  to  maintain  overland 
]]r  communications  between  the  Californias  and  New  Spain. 
By  a  decree  of  1786  even  the  punitive  campaigns  against 
the  Yumas  were  ordered  to  be  given  up,  until  the  Apaches 
should  be  conquered.  The  Indians  of  Sonora  were  peri- 
odically troublesome.  Having  re-acquired  the  habit  of 
revolt  in  1776,  the  Seris  seem  not  to  have  lost  it  thereafter 
in  the  eighteenth  century,  for  any  great  length  of  time. 
.They  were  regarded  as  incorrigible,  and  various  plans  were 
put  forth  for  banishing  them  altogether,  or  for  segregating 
them  on  Tibur6n  Island.  The  Pimas  and  Papagos  planned 
an  outbreak  in  1796,  but  the  plot  was  discovered  in  time  to 
avert  evil  consequiences.  The  Apaches  gave  trouble,  of 
course,  but  in  178p  a  new^^dicy  was  inaugurated  which 
proved  successful ;  incessant  war  was  to  be  waged  against 
them,  unless  they  would  consent  to  make  peace,  and  good 
treatment  was  to  be  accorded  them  if  they  would,  in  which 
event  they  were  to  receive  gifts  of  articles  which  they  them- 
selves could  not  make,  even  guns  and  powder,  although  of 
inferior  quality.  They  were  also  to  be  plied  with  Jiquor  in 
order  to  demoralize  them,  and  encouraged  to  make  war 
on  one  another,  the  authorities  hoping  that  inTthis  way  they 
might  be  exterminated.     Furthermore,  attempts  to  settle 

"  Revilla  Gigedo,  Informe.     Also  C-5613.     Translation  in  Land  of  sunshine  for 
1899.  V.  XI. 


1783]  THE   AFTERMATH  425 

Spaniards  and  friendly  Indians  on  the  frontiers  were  also 
to  be  made.  This  policy  seems  to  have  been  successful. 
Between  1786  and  1797  peace  with  different  groups  of  Apaches 
was  established,  and  was  maintained  for  about  twenty  years 
longer  at  an  annual  cost  of  18,000  to  30,000  pesos.  New 
Mexico,  too,  had  the  usual  Indian  troubles.  There  was 
scant  hope  of  relief  for  the  Calif ornias  from  that  quarter. 

Yet,  despite  wars,  and  despite  letters  saying  that  no  men 
could  be  spared  from  the  province,  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Sonora  was  not  altogether  unfavorable  for  a  forward  move- 
ment. .  In  1780  Sonora  actually  returned  a  profit  to  the 
royal  treasury,  receipts  in  that  year  being  284,519  pesos 
and  expenses  278,703  pesos ^  leaving  a  balance  of  5816 
pesos.  The  figures  are  more  striking  when  it  appears  that 
Croix's  salary  of  20,000  pesos  was  charged  against  the 
province.  The  largest  item  was  that  of  the  six  presidios, 
which  accounted  for  136,308  pesos.  This  information  ap- 
pears in  an  estado  of  September  14,  1781/^  forwarded  to 
Spain  in  Croix's  letter  of  September  23.^^  A  summary,  of 
the  same  date,  of  receipts  and  disbursements  in  all  of  the 
provinces  of  Croix's  government,  omitting  the  Californias, 
showed  864,182  pesos  received,  as  against  856,853  expended, 
a  profit  of  7329  pesos.^^  The  provinces  of  the  viceroyalty 
just  back  from  the  frontier  were  still  yielding  richly,  how- 
ever, as  is  evident  from  the  accounts  of  the  Real  Caja  of 
Guadalajara.  As  for  Sonora,  full  figures  for  other  years 
have  not  come  to  hand,  but  it  is  known  that  the  mines 
continued  to  yield  richly.  Further  evidence  of  the  well- 
settled  character  of  Sonora  may  be  obtained  from  the  sta- 
tistics of  population.  Croix's  great  memorial  of  October 
30,  1781,  included  a  table  of  the  population  of  Sinaloa  and 
Sonora  by  districts.  The  two  provinces  contained  87,644 
persons,  of  whom  25,928  were  men.  From  Fuerte  de 
Montesclaros  northward,  or  about  the  equivalent  of 
modern  Sonora,  there  were  52,228  persons,  including 
15,323  men,^®  the  figures  probably  including  all  persons  but 

i«C-4406.     The  figures  probably  in-  "  c^408.  is  C-4409. 

elude    Sinaloa.     "Sonora"    was    often  19^-4430,     The  whole  table  is  given 

used  for  both  Sinaloa  and  Sonora.  as  an  appendix. 


426     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 

the  unchristianized  Indians.  In  1793  the  two  provinces 
had  advanced  to  a  total  of  93,396  persons.  At  that  time 
the  figures  given  for  New  Mexico  were  30,953,  and  for 
the  two  Cahfornias  12,666.  In  1803  Sinaloa  and  Sonora 
had  reached  a  population  of  121,400.  It  would  seem, 
therefore,  that  Sonora  could  have  furnished  the  sinews  of 
advancement. 
^  Another  factor  tending  to   check  an  advance  was  the 

j[^  rapid  changes  in  government  of  the  frontier  provinces.  In 
1785  the  comandancia  general  was  split  into  three  units  only 
partially  under  the  comandante  general,  who  himself  ruled 
Sinaloa,  Sonora,  and  the  Californias.  The  viceroy^s  superior 
authority  was  at  the  same  time  restored.  His  power  was 
at  first  supposed  to  be  only  a  special  case  due  to  the  peculiar 
abihty  of  Viceroy  Bernardo  de  Gdlvez,  a  nephew  of  the 
ministro  general.  After  his  death,  late  in  1786,  the  coman- 
dante general  resumed  full  authority,  but  in  March,  1787, 
the  power  of  the  viceroy  was  in  part  given  back.  In  the 
same  year  the  three  comandancias  were  consolidated  to  form 
two,  one  of  the  east,  the  other  of  the  west,  each  ruled  by  a 
comandante  general,  to  some  extent  under  the  viceroy.  In 
1788  the  full  authority  of  the  viceroy  was  restored,  although 
the  two  comandancias  were  retained  for  purposes  of  ad- 
ministration. A  royal  order  of  1792  returned  to  the  plan 
of  1776,  except  that  Nuevo  Leon,  Nuevo  Santander,  and 
the  Californias  were  to  be  under  the  viceroy.  This  went 
into  effect  in  1793.  In  1804  a  decree  called  for  the  modifica- 
tion of  this  plan  by  dividing  what  then  formed  the  coman- 
dancia general  into  two  comandancias,  respectively  of  the 
east  and  west.  This  did  not  go  into  effect  until  1812,  but 
remained  thenceforth  to  the  end  of  Spanish  rule.  It  will 
be  noted  that  the  Cahfornias  on  the  one  side,  and  Sonora 
and  New  Mexico  on  the  other  were  in  different  governments 
from  1793  on.  This  helps  to  account  for  the  opposition  of 
later  comandantes  generates  to  reopening  the  Anza  route, 
It  meant  the  making  of  an  effort  for  the  sake  of  regions  be- 
yond their  frontiers,  and  a  divided  authority  over  any  route 
that  might  be  opened.     It  must  also  have  tended  to  make 


1783] 


THE   AFTERMATH 


427 


local  concerns  seem  to  them  of  more  account  than  the  pos- 
sibility of  foreign  danger. 

The  need  for  an  ^.oxerland  route  to  Alta  California  still 
existed,  both  from  the  standpoint  of  foreign  danger  and  from 
that  of  local  progress.  Enough  has  been  said  on  the  first 
point.  As  to  the  second,  one  need  had  been  successfully- 
met .  The  province  could  not  well  complain  of  want  in 
domestic  animals,  henceforth.  Rather,  their  numbers  be- 
gan soon  to  outrun  the  requirements  of  the  settlers.  For 
the  rest,  there  were  the  usual  diflficulties  with  the  old 
routes.  Manufactured  articles  and  perhaps  some  agri- 
cultural products  had  to  come  by  sea  from  San  Bias,  although 
the  need  for  food-supplies  became  less  and  less,  and  as  time 
went  on,  the  supply-ships  came  infrequently.  Then  it  was 
that  foreign  traders  were  welcomed,  despite  the  laws  against 
tEem.  ATta"California  was  also  able  to  get  all  that  it  re- 
quired of  goods  and  effects,  although  at  the  risk  of  inter- 
ruption of  the  trafl&c  by  the  enemies  of  Spain.  The  greatest 
need  for  an  overland  route  was  that  more  settlers  might  come. 
A  few  persons  came  from  Sinaloa  in  later  years  by  way  of  the 
peninsula,  but  the  g^reat  majority  of  the  settlers  werq  those 
Tyho  had  coTT),fi  bf^fnre  17S2  fiTiH  thp^j-  Hpfirendants.  This 
could  not  permit  of  a  growth  in  population  great  enough 
to  induce  the  inhabitants  to  leave  the  coast  and  go  up  the 
river  valleys  where  the  gold  lay  in  such  abundance.  On 
the  other  hand,  enough  sutlers  had  come  to  save  the  prov- 
ince from  all  likelihood  of  abahdohrhent~aiid  to  hold  the 
land  for  Spain  against  any  but  a  strong  attacking  force. 
The  following  table  shows  the  state  of  the  missions  in  1790 
and  in  1800. 


Number 

OF 

Missions 

Crop 

Large  Stock 

Small  Stock 

Christiaw 
Indians 

1790 
1800 

11 
18 

30,000 
75,000 

22,000 
67,000 

26,000 
86,000 

/    7,500   N 
10,700      J 

Gain 

7 

45,000 

45,000 

60,000 

3.200     ' 

428     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 

The  crop  represents  the  number  of  bushels,  mostly  wheat, 
for  the  particular  year,  an  amount  which  varied  greatly  in 
different  years,  but  on  the  whole  undoubtedly  increased 
over  a  long  period  of  time.  Large  stock  includes  horses, 
mules,  and  horned  cattle ;  small  stock,  —  goats,  pigs,  and 
sheep,  although  almost  wholly  the  last  named.  These 
figures  do  not  represent  the  total  wealth  of  the  province, 
although  forming  the  greater  part  of  it.  The  presidios  and 
puehloSj  particularly  the  latter,  had  considerable  crops  and 
large  numbers  of  animals,  but  it  is  difficult  to  state  figures 
with  any  degree  of  certainty.  The  number  of  presidios 
remained  four,  but  the  pueblos  increased  from  two  to  three. 
The  whites,  including  mestizos  and  mulattoes,  may  have 
numbered  970  in  1790,  and  1200  in  1800,  of  whom  most  of 
the  men  were  soldiers.  The  troops  usually  numbered  205, 
the  quota  allowed  by  the  government.  Most  of  the  men 
were  married,  and  their  sons  passed  into  the  military  forces, 
for  no  more  troops  were  sent  from  New  Spain.  Alta  Cali- 
fornia_,]ti^d^^lready_  outs^^  the  peninsula  in  popula^ 

tion  and  produce^  the  latter  Temg  retained7as~rn  the  pasl, 
for  strategic  reasons,  and  as  a  mail  route  to  the  northern 
province. 

Proposals  to  reestablish  the  overland  route  to  the  Cah- 
fornias  were  made  several  times  in  the  closing  years  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  For  a  time  they  were  frowned  upon, 
and  in  1786  Viceroy  Gdlvez's  instruction  to  Ugarte  pro- 
hibited the  reopening  of  the  route.^^  Shortly  afterward, 
the  Apaches  began  to  give  less  trouble,  which  may  account 
for  the  comparatively  favorable  reception  accorded  to  cer- 
tain proposals  by  Pedro  Fages  in  1787.^^  The  matter  was 
explained  in  a  letter  of  Viceroy  Revilla  Gigedo  to  the  king, 
November  26,  1789.  In  1784  the  Dominicans  had  been 
ordered  to  add  two  missions  to  the  three  new  ones  that  they 
had  already  built,  the  better  to  connect  Baja  with  Alta 
California.  San  Miguel  del  Encino  had  been  erected  in 
1787,  but  the  other  had  been  suspended  on  the  ground  that 

20  Gdlvez,  Instruccidn,  par.  115.  1782.     This    was    the    same    Fages    of 

21  Fages  had  been  governor  of   the       earlier  days. 
CaJifornias  since  Neve's  departure  in 


17831  THE   AFTERMATH  429 

it  would  have  to  be  on  a  route  toward  the  Colorado  River 
in  order  to  avoid  encroaching  on  the  territory  of  the  Fer- 
nandinos.  Consideration  of  this  matter  led  Fages  to  make 
three  proposals  :  that  four  new  missions  be  erected  between 
San  Diego  and  Santa  Clara  to  complete  the  chain  in  Alta 
California ;  that  carjent^yg,  smith s^  Tnf^f=f07^^^  atiH  ntVipr 
artisans  be^  sent  to  Alta  California  to  instruct  the  Indians, 
for  that  was  the  way  to  civilize  them ;  that  a  presidio  of  a 
hundred  men  be  established  at  Santa  Olaya,^  from  which 
number  twenty  might  be  detached  and  placed  at  Sonoita,^^ 
and  twenty  more  in  the  valley  of  the  San  Felipe.^^  In  this 
way  Alta  California  could  be  more  securely  held  and  the 
160  leagues  between  San  Diego  and  Altar  protected,  bring- 
ing Sonora  and  Alta  California  into  communication.  Fages' 
plan  was  submitted  to  a  number  of  persons  for  opinions. 
The  comandante  general,  Ugarte,  favored  it  in  all  respects. 
Miguel  Costanso  was  not  unfavorable,  being  especially 
impressed,  it  would  seem,  by  the  project  for  sending  ar- 
tisans. The  Father  Superior  of  San  Fernando  discussed 
the  plan  for  new  missions.  Soledad  and  Santa  Cruz  were 
the  only  sites  that  he  knew  of  that  would  be  suitable  for 
missions,  he  said,  but  he  was  ready  to  provide  as  many 
missionaries  as  should  be  needed.  If  there  were  any  in- 
tention of  advancing  northward  from  San  Francisco  to 
Nootka,  he  would  like  to  cede  the  present  Fernandino 
missions  to  the  Dominicans,  and  take  up  the  new  territory. 
Revilla  Gigedo  favored  Fages'  first  proposal.  He  had 
ordered  two  missions  founded,  he  said,  and  a  search  for 
sites  for  two  others  between  San  Diego  and  San  Buenaven- 
tura. He  was  also  taking  steps  to  erect  two  more  in  Baja 
California  to  fill  the  gaps  there.  He  said  nothing  about 
Fages'  second  project,  although  he  probably  favored  it,  for 
the  artisans  were  sent.  He  opposed  the  third.  A  mail 
service  had  been  established  from  Guaymas  to  Baja  Cali- 
fornia, in  part  supplying  the  need  for  an  overland  route, 
he  said,  and  the  advantages  of  the  new  presidio,  he  thought, 

^  On  the  west  bank  of  the  Colorado,  ^*  In  Baja  California,  but  along  the 

below  the  Gila  junction.  Anza  route. 

*'  In  northwestern  Sonora. 


430     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 

would  not  equal  the  cost.  Furthermore,  the  multitude  of 
Indians  along  the  Colorado,  whose  power  had  been  made 
evident  in  the  massacre  of  1781,  was  a  factor  making  it 
advisable  to  suspend  this  project  until  a  time  of  greater 
need.^^  Some  action  was  taken,  however,  to  found  new 
missions,  "^anta  Cruz  and  Soledaxl  were  founded  in  1791. 
In  1797  San  Fernando  Rey  was  erected,  followed  in  1798 
by  San  Luis  Rey.  Several  other  missions  also  date  from  this 
period,  as  also  a  settlement  at  Santa  Cruz  called  the  villa 
of  Branciforte.  The  matter  of  the  Santa  Olaya  presidio 
came  up  a  second  time  in  1792,  and  again  objection  was 
made  on  the  ground  that  Santa  Olaya  was  surrounded  by 
natives  disposed  to  be  hostile.^^ 

In  1796  renewed  proposals  were  made  emanating  from 
Borica  and  Arrillaga,  respectively  rulers  of  Alta  and  Baja 
California.  Borica  was  influenced  by  a  journey  of  explo- 
ration from  Sonora  to  New  Mexico  by  Jos6  Zuniga  in  1795.^^ 
He  had  heard  that  the  journey  was  related  to  the  fact  that 
there  were  1500  white  persons  in  New  Mexico  without 
lands  or  work.  He  therefore  sent  for  Oarers'  1776  diary 
and  map,  with  a  view  to  exploring  a  route  from  New  Mexico 
to  Alta  California,  in  the  hope  that  the  latter  might  obtain 
the  former^s  surplus  of  settlers.  He  urged  his  project  in  a 
report  of  October  2,  1796.  It  was  received  favorably  by 
the  viceroy  and  his  fiscal,  and  the  former  proceeded  to  ask 
for  reports.  At  about  the  same  time,  October  26,  1796, 
Arrillaga  made  his  proposal,  the  same  that  had  emanated 
from  Fages  several  years  before,  of  a  presidio  at  Santa  Olaya 
and  garrisons  at  Sonoita  and  San  Felipe.  He  suggested  as 
an  alternative  measure  a  presidio  at  the  mouth  of  the  Col- 
orado. Arrillaga' s  plan  resulted  from  explorations  by  the 
Dominicans  and  himself  toward  the  Colorado,  the  most  im- 
portant of  which  had  been  conducted  by  himself.  Between 
June,  1796,  and  January,  1797,  he  made  two  journeys  of 

M  C-5400.  diary,  April  9  to  May  29,  1795,  C-5712 ; 

2«  Borb6n,     Parecer,    in     A.P.C.H.,  for  the  remitting  letter  from  Chihuahua 

Prov.  SL  Papers,  XVIII,  37-44.  by  Pedro   de   Rada  to   the  Conde  de 

27  For    the    instructions   to    Ziifiiga,  Campo   de   Alange   in   Spain,    July   9, 

March  31,  1795,  C-5711;  for  Ztiniga's  1795,  C-5722. 


1783]  THE   AFTERMATH  431 

exploration,  and  on  one  of  them,  in  October,  1796,  he  reached 
the  Colorado,  where  he  had  a  fight  with  the  Indians,  and  later 
returned  by  way  of  San  Diego  to  Loreto. 

Borica  viewed  Arrillaga's  proposals  with  favor,  although 
he  wrote  on  September  4,  1797,  that  it  would  be  unsafe  for 
parties  of  less  than  thirty-five  to  follow  Anza's  route,  for 
which  reason  he  preferred  Arrillaga's  alternative  proposal. 
Arrillaga  did  not  make  light  of  the  Indian  danger  at  Santa 
Olaya ;  it  was  on  that  account  that  he  had  made  his  second 
proposal,  which  he  designed  to  be  only  a  temporary  meas- 
ure. The  presidio  at  the  mouth  should  be  on  the  western 
bank,  he  said,  at  a  distance  of  twenty  to  twenty-five  leagues 
from  Santa  Catalina,  in  northeastern  Baja  California,  but 
he  failed  to  point  out  a  place  for  the  location  of  the  pre- 
sidio. Borica  thought  it  would  be  sufficient  for  the  present 
to  think  only  of  gathering  the  Indians  between  Santa  Cata- 
lina and  the  Colorado  into  a  mission,  treating  them  well, 
and  procuring  the  cultivation  of  the  lands  and  the  increase 
of  herds ;  the  selection  of  a  presidio  site  might  come  later, 
after  careful  explorations  had  been  made.^^  An  opinion 
was  asked  of  the  comandante  general,  Pedro  de  Nava,  who 
wrote,  on  June  22,  1797,  that  he  did  not  consider  it  difficult 
to  open  a  route,  but  that  its  value  for  some  time  would  be 
limited  to  traffic  with  the  Indians.  Even  this  would  amount 
to  little,  unless  the  most  detailed  information  were  ob- 
tained of  places,  distances,  and  Indian  customs.  The  set- 
tlers of  the  Californias  and  New  Mexico  were  not  in  a 
position  to  carry  on  commerce  with  each  other  or  to  keep 
the  route  open,  and  they  would  not  be  so  for  many  years. 
As  to  the  proposal  to  take  1500  Spaniards  from  New  Mexico 
to  Alta  California,  it  would  be  unwise  to  weaken  New  Mex- 
ico; these  men  could  be  used  to  good  advantage,  without 
removing  them  from  their  native  soil.^^ 

Favorable  action  was  taken  by  the  viceroy  despite  Nava's 
disapproval  and  the  difficulties  raised  by  Borica  and  Arri- 
llaga  themselves.     The    mission    of    Santa   CataHna   was 

28Borb6ii,     Parecer,    in     A.P.C.H.,  ^  Ibid. 

Prov.  St.  Papers,  XVIII,  37-44. 


432     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 

founded  in  November,  1797,  but  there  the  project  rested 
for  several  years.  In  1801  it  came  up  again  in  conjunction 
with  another  proposition,  that  of  the  pohtical  separation  of 
Baja  from  Alta  Cahfornia.  Both  of  these  matters  were 
referred  by  the  viceroy  to  Borbon,  his  fiscal.  The  latter 
replied,  March  4,  1801.  On  the  matter  of  the  separation 
Borb6n  reported  favorably.  As  to  the  establishing  of 
communications  between  New  Mexico  and  Alta  Califor- 
nia by  way  of  the  Colorado  River,  he  took  the  opposite  side. 
He  gave  a  history  of  plans  to  this  end  since  the  massacre 
of  1781,  laying  particular  stress  on  the  disadvantages,  and 
said  that  a  more  careful  exploration  of  the  lands  would  be 
necessary.  Arrillaga  himself  had  not  been  satisfied  with 
the  one  he  had  made,  he  said,  despite  the  care  that  he  had 
used.  Borbon  thought  it  best  to  await  the  opinion  of  the 
new  governor  of  Alta  California,  and  the  royal  decision  with 
regard  to  dividing  the  Californias,  which  would  enable 
them  to  understand  the  matter  of  communication  better. 
Meanwhile,  he  suggested  that  a  copy  of  the  papers  on  the 
subject  be  sent  to  Nava,  and  another  copy  to  Arrillaga, 
then  ad  interim  governor  of  Alta  California,  pending  the 
arrival  of  Borica's  successor.  They  should  read  the  papers 
and  state  their  opinions. ^^ 

Arrillaga^s  reply  is  lacking,  but  Nava's  under  date  of 
July  20,  1801,  is  available.  He  adhered  to  the  opinion  ex- 
pressed by  him  in  1797.  A  single  post  would  not  be  enough 
for  the  passage  of  so  considerable  a  desert,  he  said,  while 
to  withdraw  so  many  persons  from  New  Mexico  would 
harm  that  province.  True,  there  were  1500  persons  in  New 
Mexico  without  work,  but  they  ought  to  be  used  in  rees- 
tablishing abandoned  settlements  between  El  Paso  and  Santa 
Fe;  he  had  just  arranged  for  that  to  be  done.  The  ad- 
vantages of  reopening  the  Colorado  route,  said  Nava,  were 
reduced  to  two ;  the  possibility  of  aiding  the  Californias, 
in  case  of  a  foreign  invasion ;  and  the  benefits  of  reciprocal 
trade  between  the  Californias  and  New  Mexico.  As  to 
the  first,  if  the  necessity  should  arise,  it  would  be  possible 

30  Borb6n,  Parecer,  in  A.P.C.H.,  Prov.  St.  Papers,  XVIII,  37-44. 


1783]  THE   AFTERMATH  433 

to  send  aid  by  land,  if  a  considerable  force  went  along ;  or 
by  way  of  the  Gulf,  unless  that  route  should  have  been  in- 
tercepted by  the  enemy.  In  the  absence  of  a  foreign  at- 
tack, there  was  no  need  to  keep  the  route  open.  As  for 
commerce,  New  Mexico  was  more  advanced  in  settled  life 
than  the  Californias,  but  did  not  yield  so  many  products 
or  manufactures  that  it  required  new  outlets  for  its  trade. 
It  had  been  accustomed  to  send  all  its  surplus  products  to 
Chihuahua,  with  an  absolute  certainty  of  being  able  to  dis- 
pose of  them,  and  to  procure  in  return  all  that  it  needed. 
It  would  be  inadvisable  to  expose  its  scant  capital  to  spec- 
ulations of  doubtful  outcome,  when  because  of  distance  the 
expense  would  be  so  great.  Moreover,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  defeat  the  Indians  opposing  the  passage,  thus  making 
them  hostile  and  increasing  the  burdens  of  the  frontier.  He 
was  not  in  favor  of  extending  the  line  of  presidios ;  not  only 
would  that  increase  expense,  but  it  would  also  make  it  more 
difficult  to  defend  the  provinces,  since  they  would  embrace 
a  vast  territory,  which,  much  of  the  time,  would  serve  no 
good  purpose.^^ 

The  opinions  of  Nava  and  Borbon  prevailed.  The 
separation  of  the  provinces  was  ordered  in  1804,  but  the 
matter  of  the  route  was  not  acted  upon  favorably.  The 
plan  of  developing  Alta  California  by  means  of  it  had  been 
given  up.  Therefore,  why  use  the  route  any  longer?  It 
was  there  when  the  need  should  arise.  A  large  body  of 
troops  would  have  to  be  employed  if  the  route  were  not  kept 
open,  but  in  case  of  a  foreign  attack  only  a  considerable 
force  would  be  of  any  avail  to  Alta  California.  Other 
proposals  to  reopen  the  route  may  have  been  made,  but  no 
attempt  has  been  made  to  follow  them;  certainly  nothing 
came   of  these  projects.^^     Fear  of  foreign   aggressions  in 

'1  Nava,  Informe,  in  A.P.C.H.,  Prov.  and  the  possibility  of  their  descending 

St.  Papers,  XVIII,  34-37.  the    Colorado    was    mentioned.     The 

^  One  such   proposal  was  made   at  Russian    colony    in    Alta    California, 

the    very    inception    of    independent  formed  in  1812,  a  little  north  of  San 

Mexican  rule.     Danger  to  the  Califor-  Francisco,  was  the  cause  of  misgiving 

nias  from  the  Americans  and  the  Rus-  as   to    the    Russians.     A   remedy   was 

sians     was     alleged.     The     Americans  suggested  in  convict  colonization,  free- 

were  feared  along  the  whole  northern  dom  of  trade,  and  the  establishing  of 

frontier  from  Texas  to  the  Columbia,  communication    between    the    Califor- 

2p 


434     THE  FOUNDING  OF  SPANISH  CALIFORNIA     [Ch.  XVIII 


Spanish  Settlements  op  Alta  California. 


Alta  Calif ol'nia  certainly   continued,  with  ever-increasing 
justification^^^  butl^he  day  of  action  haSTpa^sied. 
"The  closing  decades  of  Spanish  rule  in  Alta   California 
form  one  of  those  periods  in  the  life  of  man  which  is  the 


nias,  Sonora,  and  New  Mexico.  Tadeo 
Ortiz  de  Ayala,  Resumen  de  la  esta- 
distica  del  imperio  mexicano.  For 
another  proposal  at  the  same  time,  see 
Richman,  237,  470. 

'8  With  regard  to  foreign  voyages  on 
the  Pacific  coast  of  New  Spain  and. 


partictilarly,  voyages  to  the  Califor- 
nias  the  following  thirteen  legajos  of 
the  Archivo  General  de  Indias  are 
exceedingly  rich  in  materials :  Estado, 
Aitdiencia  de  Mexico,  1,  4-15.  I 
found  nearly  two  hundred  such  docu- 
ments in  these  legajos. 


1783]  THE   AFTERMATH  435 

delight  of  the  poet  and  romancer.  '^Life  was  one  con- 
tinuous round  of  hospitality  and  social  amenities,  tempered 
with  vigorous  outdoor  sport.  There  were  no  hotels  in 
California.  Every  door  was  open,  and  food,  lodging,  a 
fresh  horse,  and  money,  even,  were  free  to  the  guest,  whether 
friend  or  stranger.  No  white  man  had  to  concern  himself 
greatly  with  work,  and  even  school  books  were  a  thing  apart. 
Music,  games,  dancing,  and  sprightly  conversation  —  these 
were  the  occupations  of  the  time  —  these  constituted  educa- 
tion. Also,  men  and  women  were  much  in  the  open ;  all 
were  expert  horsemen,  could  throw  a  lasso,  and  shoot  un- 
erringly, even  the  women,  accomplishments  which  fitted 
their  type  of  life,  and  made  hunting  a  general  pastime. 
When  foreign  ships  came,  there  were  balls  and  the  gayest 
of  festivals,  nor  were  these  visits  the  only  occasion  for  that 
type  of  entertainment. '^  ^^  In  fine,  here  was  an  Acadia. 
Life  was  less  stirring  than  in  other  days,  but  infinitely  more 
agreeable.  Yet,  although  the  inhabitants  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  known  it,  they  were  playing  a  part  in  history, 
fraught  with  moment.  They  were  holding  Alta  California 
safe  from  foreign  occupation,  with  its  vast  mineral  wealth 
undiscovered.  Meanwhile,  the  United  States  was  steadily 
preparing  to  succeed  to  the  rich  inheritance  which  awaited 
her  on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific. 

^  Chapman,  Spanish  settlements  on  the  Pacific  coast. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

I.  Printed  Works 

The  number  of  works  which  at  some  point  touch  the  field  embraced^by 
this  volume  is  very  great.  A  complete  Ust  would  not  only  include  very 
many  narratives  of  the  Spanish  conquest,  both  by  contemporaries,  whether 
participants  or  not,  and  by  writers  of  a  later  day,  but  would  also  give  space 
to  works  on  Spanish  colonial  institutions  and  Spanish  colonization  in 
general.  Its  value,  however,  in  a  work  of  this  sort  based  primarily  on 
manuscript  materials,  would  be,  at  most,  academic.  Thus,  a  great 
number  of  works  which  I  have  actually  employed  in  study  surrounding  my 
work  will  not  be  found  in  the  hst  that  follows.  My  bases  for  inclusion  of 
titles  have  been :  first,  actual  reference  in  my  text  to  the  works  in  ques- 
tion ;  or,  secondly,  in  the  case  of  a  number  of  works  not  actually  cited,  a 
very  intimate  connection,  nevertheless,  with  the  field  of  this  study.  As  for 
works  in  the  first  class,  I  have  not  included  them  where  the  reference  has 
been  incidental,  without  any  necessary  connection  with  the  narrow 
limits  of  my  field.  As  regards  works  of  the  second  group,  I  havejncluded 
outstanding  works  concerning  the  advance  of  the  Spanish  conquest  up 
the  Pacific  coast  toward  the  Californias  and  general  histories  of  California. 
I  have  omitted  works  dealing  with  the  period  of  Cortes,  however,  not  alone 
because  of  their  number,  but  also  because  their  references  to  northwest- 
ward advance  form  only  a  meagre  conclusion,  as  a  rule,  to  their  tale  of 
Cortes'  earlier  conquests.  Popular  histories  and  references  to  repeated 
editions  are  omitted,  an  indication  being  given  only  of  the  edition  used,  or, 
in  the  case  of  works  not  cited,  the  first  editions  of  works  contemporary 
with  my  narrative  and  the  latest  editions  of  modern  general  histories. 
Distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  materials  has  been  abandoned, 
but  it  is  beheved  that  the  object  of  that  mode  of  arrangement  has  been 
attained  by  an  index  chronologically  arranged  according  to  the  dates  which 
the  individual  works  represent  as  documents.  Where  pubUcation  followed 
promptly  on  completion  of  the  work,  the  earhest  date  of  publication  is 
assigned ;  but  where  publication  was  delayed  for  many  years  a  rough 
attempt  is  made  to  indicate  the  date  when  the  writer  completed  his  work. 
Comment  on  most  of  the  items  included  in  my  list  is  unnecessary,  but  a  few 
words  may  be  said  with  regard  to  some  of  them. 

Hubert  Howe  Bancroft's  works  have  been  used  more  than  other  printed 
materials  in  preparing  this  volume,  especially  the  first  volume  of  the 
North  Mexican  States  and  Texas,  but  except  in  the  first  chapter  they  have 
not  been  employed  to  any  considerable  extent.  Of  late  it  has  been  the 
fashion  to  pick  flaws  in  Bancroft.  Nevertheless,  all  students  of  Pacific 
coast  history  must  begin  with  his  works;  they  are  the  indispensable 
starting  point. 

437 


438  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

Of  early  Spanish  works  treating  of  the  progress  of  northwestward 
advance  only  those  of  Burriel  and  Palou  have  been  drawn  upon  to  any 
extent.  It  may  be  said  of  all  works  of  this  class  that  they  are  useful 
primarily  for  events  of  the  religious  conquest,  but  rarely  provide  a  clue 
to  the  causes  of  governmental  action.  These  works  should  eventually 
take  their  place,  therefore,  as  supplementary  material,  and  the  official 
correspondence  should  be  substituted  as  the  principal  source  on  which 
investigators  should  rely  for  secular  history. 

Richman  has  been  cited  a  number  of  times,  usually,  as  it  happens,  in 
order  to  point  out  his  errors.  Nevertheless,  there  is  much  in  Richman's 
work  of  value  to  the  investigator,  especially,  perhaps,  in  his  notes.  Rich- 
man  did  not  make  adequate  use  of  the  materials  that  he  cited,  but  unques- 
tionably his  is  the  best  brief  history  of  Spanish  and  Mexican  California 
that  has  yet  been  written. 

Father  Engelhardt  is  doing  valuable  service  in  his  work,  not  yet  coni- 
pleted,  in  which  he  is  bringing  together  a  vast  amount  of  data  on  the 
history  of  the  Catholic  missions  of  the  CaUfornias. 

The  Colecddn  has  been  cited  only  once  (chap.  I,  n.  11),  but  a  few  words 
about  that  set,  based  on  my  personal  knowledge  of  some  of  the  original 
documents  from  which  the  Colecddn  was  made  up,  and  on  general  report 
current  among  workers  at  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias,  may  not  be  out 
of  place.  The  Colecddn  was  compiled  as  a  result  of  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment's desire  to  encourage  the  study  of  Spanish-American  history,  orders 
being  given  for  the  publication  of  documents.  As  an  inducement  to 
that  end  and  to  prevent  delays  a  bonus  was  offered  of  so  much  for  every 
printed  page  that  should  be  published.  The  result  in  quantity  was  gratify- 
ing. To  avoid  slow,  painstaking  investigation  the  compilers  drew  very 
largely  on  legajos  of  the  Patronato  Real,  a  small  group  in  the  Archivo 
General  de  Indias  which  has  been  used  more  than  others  and  was  known 
to  contain  valuable  materials  about  the  early  explorers  and  conquerors. 
From  these  legajos  they  selected  documents  which  were  easy  to  read, 
choosing  one  or  two  in  some  cases  from  an  expediente  that  contained 
twenty,  and  giving  the  title  of  the  whole  group  to  the  one  or  two  that 
they  copied.  Such,  at  least,  was  the  case  with  certain  New  Mexico 
materials  appearing  in  volumes  fifteen  and  sixteen  of  the  Colecddn. 

Senor  Torres  Lanzas  has  contributed  a  valuable  work,  very  well  done,  but 
it  should  be  understood  that  it  is  by  no  means  inclusive  of  all  the  maps  in  the 
Archivo  General  de  Indias  bearing  on  the  regions  named.  Senor  Torres 
Lanzas  is  gathering  materials  for  a  second  and  much  amplified  edition. 

The  work  by  N.N.  deals  with  the  entire  Spanish  domain  in  the  Americas, 
not  merely  with  the  region  which  we  now  call  the  West  Indies ;  indeed, 
that  region  gets  very  little  attention.  There  are  several  chapters  dealing 
with  the  northern  frontier  of  New  Spain,  one  of  them  being  devoted  wholly 
to  the  Califomias. 

Addison,  Joseph.     Charles  III  of  Spain.    Oxford.     1900. 

Alegre,   Francisco   Javier.    Historia  de  la  Compania  de  Jesus.    3   v. 

Mexico.     1842. 
Altamira  y  Crevea,   Rafael.    Historia  de  Espana  y  de  la  dvilizadon 
la.    3  ed.    4  v.    Barcelona.     1913-14. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES  439 

Arlegui,  Jos6.     Chrdnica  de  la  provinda  de  n.  s.  p.  s.  Francisco  de  Zacatecas. 

Mexico.     1737. 
Arricivita,  Juan  Domingo.     Crdnica  serdfica  y  apostolica  del  Colegio  de 

Propaganda  Fide  de  la  Santa  Cruz  de  Queretaro  en  la  Nueva  Espana. 

Mexico.     1792. 
Ascensidn,  Antonio  de  la.    Descuhrimiento  y  demarcacion  de  la  California, 

in  Colecdon  de  documentos  ineditos,  relativos  al  descuhrimiento,  con- 

quista  y  organizacion  de  las  antiguas  posesiones  espanolas  de  America 

y  Oceania,  VIII,  537-74.     Madrid.     1867. 
Baegert,  Jakob.    Nachrichten  von  der  amerikanischen  halbinsel  Calif arnien. 

Mannheim.     1772. 
Bancroft,  George.    History  of  the  United  States  of  America,    v.  III-V. 

New  York.     1883-85. 
Bancroft,  Hubert  Howe.     Works.    San  Francisco.     1883-91. 
V.  I.     The  native  rax^es,  I.     1886. 
V.  VI-VII.    History  of  Central  America.    I-II.     1886. 
V.  IX-XI.    History  of  Mexico,  I-III.     188&-87. 

V.  XV.    History  of  the  north  Mexican  states  and  Texas,  I.     1886. 
V.  XVII.    History  of  Arizona  and  New  Mexico.     1889. 
V.  XVIII.    History  of  California,  I.     1886. 
V.  XXVI.    History  of  Utah.     1889. 
V.  XXVII.    History  of  the  northwest  coast,  I.     1886. 

V.  XXXIII.    History  of  Alaska.     1886. 
V.  XXXVIII.     Essays  and  miscellany.     1890. 
Beaumont,  Pablo  de  la  Purlsima  Concepci6n.     .  .  .  Crdnica  de  la  provinda 

de  los  Santos  apdstolos  S.  Pedro  y  S.  Pablo  de  Michoacdn.  5  v.  Mexico. 

1873-74. 
Bolton,  Herbert  Eugene.    Guide  to  materials  for  the  history  of  the  United 

States  in  the  principal  archives  of  Mexico.     (Carnegie  institution  of 

Washington.     Publication  no.  163.     Papers  of  the  Dept.  of  historical 

research).    Washington.     1913. 
Bolton,  Herbert  Eugene.     The  Spanish  occupation  of  Texas,  1619-1690, 

in  Southwestern  historical  quart&rly,  XVI,  1-26.    Austin.     1912. 
Bolton,  Herbert  Eugene.     Texas  in  the  middle  eighteenth  century.     (Uni- 
versity of  California,  Publications  in  history,    v.  III).     Berkeley. 

1915. 
Bryce,  George.     The  remarkable  history  of  the  Hudson* s  Bay  company. 

London.     1900. 
Burpee,  Lawrence  Johnstone.     The  search  for  the  western  sea;    the  story 

of  the  exploration  of  north-western  America.     New  York.     1908. 
Burriel,  Andres  Marcos.    A  natural  and  dvil  history  of  California  .  .  . 

Translated  from  the  original  Spanish.    2  v.     London.     1759. 
Burriel,  Andres  Marcos.    Notida  de  la  California  y  de  su  conquista  temporal 

y  espiritual,  hasta  el  tiempo  presente.    Sacada  de  la  historia  manuscrita, 

formada  en  Mexico  ano  de  1739.     [ !]  por  el  padre  Miguel  Venegas. 

3v.     Madrid.     1757. 
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Chronological  Index  of  Printed  Works,  Arranged  According  to 
Approximate  Date  of  Completion  of  the  Work 


1574 

L6pez 

1737-84 

Croix 

1775-77 

Carets 

1589 

Sudrez 

1742 

Mota 

1775-77 

Carets 

1596 

Mendieta 

PadiUa 

1779 

Neve 

11-15 

Herrera 

1746 

Espinosa 

1780 

Beaumont 

1615 

Torque- 

1746^8 

ViUa-Senor 

1781-82 

Pages 

mada 

1754 

Ortega 

1783 

Palou 

1620 

Ascensi6n 

1757 

Burriel 

1786 

G^vez,  B. 

1626 

Zdrate 

1757 

Burriel 

1787 

Palou 

1632 

Cardona 

1767 

Alegre 

1789 

Clavigero 

1645 

P6rez 

1769-70 

Costans6 

1789 

Ferndn- 

1653 

Tello 

1769-70 

Portold 

Nunez 

1655 

N.N.  ^ 

1770 

Costans6 

1791 

Fonseca 

1681 

Recopila- 

1770 

Pages 

1792 

Arricivita 

ci6n 

1771 

Gdlvez,  J. 

1793 

Revilla 

1694 

Florencia 

1772 

Baegert 

Gigedo 

1697 

Vetancurt 

1772 

Reglamento 

1793 

ReviUa 

1734 

Gonzalez 

1774 

Serra 

Gigedo 

1737 

Arlegui 

1775-76 

Font 

1794 

Cavo 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 


445 


1809-14 

Humboldt 

1891-96 

Danvila 

1911 

Hackett 

1809-14 

Humboldt 

1897 

Engelhardt 

1911 

Laut 

1809-14 

Humboldt 

1899 

Engelhardt 

1911 

Richman 

1815 

Coxe 

1899 

Willson 

1911-12 

TwitcheU 

1822 

Ortiz 

1900 

Addison 

1912 

Bolton 

1833 

Frejes 

1900 

Bryce 

1912 

Eldredge 

1836 

Bustamante 

1900 

Torres 

1912-13 

Hackett 

1844 

Greenhow 

Lanzas 

1913 

Bolton 

1850-67 

Lafuente 

1900-11 

Altamira 

1914 

Golder 

1852-74 

Bancroft, 

1901 

Fernandez 

1914 

Hughes 

G. 

Duro 

1914 

Twitchell 

1853 

Mayer 

1904 

Manning 

1915 

Bolton 

1856 

Ferrer  del 

1907 

Rousseau 

1915 

Chapman 

Rfo 

1907-10 

Hodge 

1915 

Chapman 

1873 

Rivera 

1908 

Burpee 

1915 

Chapman 

1878 

Zamacois 

1908 

Fita 

1915 

History 

1883-90 

Bancroft, 

1908-09 

Eldredge 

1915 

Pacific 

H. 

1908-12 

Engelhardt 

1915 

Teggart 

1885 

Doniol 

1909 

DeUen- 

1916 

Chapman 

1885-97 

Hittell 

baugh 

1916 

Chapman 

II.    Manuscript  Materials 

The  bulk  of  the  present  work  rests  upon  manuscript  materials  not 
hitherto  used  by  historical  writers .  While  a  certain  small  proportion  of  the 
documents  cited  have  been  drawn  on  by  others,  notably  by  Bancroft, 
Richman,  and  Engelhardt,  such  materials,  when  employed  here,  have  been 
utilized  independently,  and  usually  in  a  different  way  than  in  other  works 
referring  to  them.  Only  a  general  description  of  manuscript  material 
used  by  me  can  be  given  here. 

A.  Documents  in  the  Academy  of  Pacific  Coast  History,  Berkeley,  Cali- 
fornia. These  include  local  records,  and  copies  from  various  archives  of 
Mexico  and  Spain.  Except  for  the  documents  referred  to  in  paragraphs 
B,  C,  and  D,  I  have  drawn  wholly  on  the  Academy  collection  for  manu- 
script materials.  As  regards  material  from  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias, 
I  used  the  Academy  copies  in  many  cases,  but  was  able  later  to  verify  the 
references  by  comparison  with  the  originals  in  the  Archivo  General  de 
Indias,  in  which  event  citations  are  made  by  my  Catalogue  number  to  docu- 
ments of  the  latter  archive.  In  a  few  instances  Academy  copies  from  that 
.archive  were  used  of  material  that  does  not  appear  in  the  Catalogue. 
In  those  cases  citation  has  been  made  to  the  legajo  number  of  the  Archivo 
General  de  Indias  preceded  by  A.G.I. ,  but  it  is  to  be  understood  that  the 
Academy  copies  were  used.  The  same  practice  has  been  followed  with 
regard  to  copies  acquired  from  Mexican  and  other  Spanish  archives  by  the 
Academy,  that  is,  since  the  "Bancroft  Collection"  became  the  property 
of  the  University  of  California.  A  number  of  documents  of  the  Archivo 
General  y  Publico  de  la  Naci6n  (A.G.P.)  and  Museo  Nacional  (M.N.) 
of  the  City  of  Mexico  have  been  referred  to,  and  a  few  citations  have  been 
made  to  Mexican  archives  outside  of  the  capital.    Bolton's  Guide  (in- 


446  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

eluded  in  my  list  of  printed  works)  wiU  supply  any  information  that  may 
be  lacking  in  my  citations.  Many  of  the  copies  thus  far  referred  to  were 
part  of  Professor  Bolton's  private  collection  when  I  used  them.  A  few 
copies  from  the  Archivo  Hist6rico  Nacional  (A.H.N.)  of  Madrid,  Spain, 
have  also  been  used.  Other  documents  of  the  Academy  have  been  cited 
according  to  their  location  in  volumes  of  the  Bancroft  Collection,  preceded 
by  A.P.C.H.  Special  notice  should  be  accorded  to  the  James  Bryce 
Historical  Essay  manuscript  of  Mr.  Karl  C.  Leebrick,  used  extensively 
in  chapter  eight. 

B.  Documents  in  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias,  Seville,  Spain.  These 
have  been  by  far  the  principal  source  for  this  volume.  Out  of  the  immense 
mass  of  material  in  that  archive  bearing  on  the  subject  of  this  work  I  have 
listed  6257  items.  These  in  fact  represent  a  great  many  more  documents, 
because  testimonios,  which  often  contain  scores  or  even  hundreds  of  separate 
documents,  were  entered  as  one  item.  Thousands  of  items  might  have 
been  added  had  time  permitted,  but,  as  matters  are,  most  of  the  documents 
fall  between  the  years  1760  and  1786.  The  entire  list  has  been  arranged  in 
chronological  order  with  a  view  to  possible  publication,  for  the  documents 
are  of  value  for  far  more  than  has  been  undertaken  in  this  work.  The 
list  alone  would  fill,  if  published,  two  or  three  octavo  volumes.  Reference 
to  such  of  these  items  as  I  have  used  has  been  made  by  a  number  preceded 
by  the  letter  C.  The  C  stands  for  Catalogue,  the  first  word  of  the  title  of  a 
manuscript  hst  of  the  items  in  question ;  the  number  is  the  serial  number 
of  the  document  cited  in  a  chronological  arrangement  of  the  Hst.  Publica- 
tion of  the  Catalogue  is  contemplated,  but  even  if  it  shall  not  be  published, 
it  will  be  accessible  in  manuscript  at  the  Academy  of  Pacific  Coast  History. 
It  seems  necessary,  however,  to  supply  information  here  regarding  the 
location  of  the  documents  cited  by  me,  and  such  information  is  provided  at 
the  end  of  this  section.  The  material  in  Appendix  I,  referred  to  in  chapter 
three,  was  used  at  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias,  although  not  entered 
in  my  Catalogue.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  Crame  map.  Attention 
may  be  called  to  the  extraordinary  wealth  for  the  historical  investigator 
of  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias.  It  is  intended  that  all  of  the  official  cor- 
respondence of  Spain's  four  centuries  of  over-seas  administration  shall 
eventually  be  gathered  into  that  one  archive,  and  possibly  half  of  all 
materials  on  that  subject  now  in  Spain  is  already  there.  The  advantages 
of  pursuing  studies  at  one  point,  instead  of  having  to  visit  the  hundreds  of 
smaller  archives  in  the  Americas,  are  obvious.  The  materials  are  also  of 
the  highest  authority,  being  the  official  documents  on  which  the  Council 
of  the  Indies  and  the  ministros  generates  based  their  decisions.  They  con- 
sist chiefly  of  the  following :  originals  (signed  with  the  name  and  rubric 
of  the  writer)  of  colonial  officials  writing  to  Spain;  copies,  usually  from 
originals  and  usually  certified,  enclosed  with  documents  of  the  first-named 
class ;  drafts,^  retained  as  the  file  copy,  of  replies,  or  orders  sent  from  Spain 
to  the  colonies;  similarly,  origuials,  copies,  and  drafts  of  inter-depart- 
mental correspondence  in  Spain ;  and  finally  originals  and  drafts  of  intra- 
departmental  correspondence,  by  means  of  which  afi'airs  were  dealt  with  by 
the  ministros  generates  and  the  Council  themselves.     Cf .  chap.  VII,  n.  63. 

C.  Documents  in  the  British  Museum,  London.  Considerable  use 
has  been  made  in  chapter  five  of  an  expediente  in  manuscript  volume 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES  447 

13,974,  section  G.,  of  the  British  Museum.  These  papers  are  not  tran- 
scripts, but  must  originally  have  been  deposited  in  the  archives  of  the 
viceroyalty  or  of  the  College  of  San  Fernando,  probably  in  the  former. 
Father  Superior  Verger's  letters  are  signed  with  his  rubric  and  marked 
duplicate.  Those  from  Palou  and  others  in  the  Calif ornias  to  him  are 
copies,  often  certified.  In  other  words  this  is  only  the  first  remove  from 
the  technically  best  file,  and  lacks  only  the  drafts  of  the  fiscaVs  replies 
to  Verger  (which  would  almost  surely  appear  in  the  original  file)  to  be  as 
useful  as  the  principal  expediente.  These  papers  were  purchased  by  the 
British  Museum  of  ''Tho.  Rodd,"  March  11,  1843.  How  Mr.  Rodd  got 
them  is  not  explained.  A  copy  of  the  British  Museum  expediente  now 
exists  in  the  Academy  of  Pacific  Coast  History. 

D.  The  Biblioteca  Nacional,  Madrid.  The  only  document  used 
independently  of  copies  in  the  Academy  of  Pacific  Coast  History  is  the 
Cardona  memorial,  with  maps,  cited  in  chapter  one. 

In  the  list  that  follows  of  manuscript  materials  of  the  Archivo  General 
de  Indias  used  in  preparation  of  this  volume,  the  number  at  the  left  is  the 
Catalogue  (C-)  number,  followed  by  a  reference  to  the  location  of  the 
particular  document  in  the  archive  at  Seville.  Where  numbers  are  em- 
ployed they  represent  (from  left  to  right)  estante,  cajon,  and  legajo  numbers. 
Documents  in  the  Papeles  de  Estado  group  are  numbered  on  a  different 
plan.  The  following  abbreviations  are  employed  in  citing  them:  Est, 
Estado;  Am.  G,  America  en  General;  A.  G,  Avdiencia  de  Guadalajara; 
A.  M,  Audiencia  de  Mexico. 

186 
187 
188 
189 
191 
192 
193 
199 
201 
202 
203 
204 
205 
207 
208 
212 

213      103-5-25 

217 

219 

"      224 

67-^^5    225 

228 

231 

"      232 

45         "      185         "      236       67-3-29 


15 

104-3-4 

46 

16 

<< 

47 

17 

67-3-27 

48 

20 

67-3-28 

49 

21 

67-3-27 

50 

24 

(< 

51 

26 

<( 

52 

27 

(( 

53 

28 

104-6^17 

54 

30 

67-3-27 

55 

31 

(< 

56 

32 

« 

57 

33 

<• 

68 

34 

tt 

59 

35 

it 

60 

36 

t( 

61 

37 

a 

62 

38 

n 

63 

39 

67-3-28 

65 

40 

67-3-27 

66 

41 

<( 

177 

42 

67-3-28 

178 

43 

tt 

182 

44 

It 

.  184 

448 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 


239 

103-&-25 

337 

(( 

395 

u 

240 

67-3-29 

338 

{( 

397 

67-3-31 

241 

103-5-25 

339 

n 

398 

104-3-4 

242 

67-3-29 

340 

67-3-31 

399 

67-5-3 

243 

t( 

341 

li 

400 

u 

244 

a 

343 

103-6-23 

401 

CI 

245 

ii 

344 

11 

402 

104r-3-4 

246 

11 

345 

103-5-20 

403 

11 

249 

103-5-25 

348 

67-3-31 

404 

It 

253 

67-3-29 

349 

104-3-4 

405 

103-3-6 

254 

103-5-25 

350 

67-3-31 

409 

67-3-31 

256 

n 

351 

it 

411 

103-6-23 

259 

67-3-29 

352 

104-3-4 

412 

u 

260 

11 

353 

67-3-31 

413 

CI 

263 

« 

354 

103-3-6 

415 

l( 

266 

ti 

355 

67-3-31 

416 

67-3-31 

272 

11 

356 

104-3-4 

417 

(( 

274 

(( 

357 

li 

418 

67-5-3 

276 

(I 

358 

104-3-5 

419 

67-3-31 

277 

a 

359 

(( 

420 

67-5-3 

278 

<( 

360 

(( 

421 

103-6-23 

279 

(I 

361 

u 

427 

<( 

283 

104-3-4 

362 

(I 

428 

« 

286 

103-5-20 

363 

it 

429 

tt 

287 

(( 

364 

tt 

431 

67-3-31 

290 

(C 

365 

u 

432 

It 

291 

a 

366 

tt 

433 

tt 

292 

67-3-31 

367 

tt 

434 

103-fr-23 

295 

103-6-23 

368 

tt 

435 

tt 

307 

67-3-29 

369 

tt 

437 

67-3-31 

308 

(( 

370 

tt 

438 

104-3-4 

310 

67-3-31 

371 

tt 

440 

It 

311 

(( 

372 

67-5-3 

441 

tt 

313 

67-3-30 

373 

ti 

442 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

314 

67-a-31 

374 

It 

444 

67-3-31 

315 

67-3-29 

375 

It 

448 

tt 

316 

67-3-31 

377 

(( 

449 

ft 

317 

67-3-29 

379 

103-3-6 

450 

104-3-4 

321 

67-3-31 

380 

103-6-23 

451 

103-3-6 

322 

a 

381 

67-3-31 

453 

104-3-4 

324 

103-5-20 

382 

104-3-4 

454 

103-6-21 

325 

67-3-31 

383 

67-3-31 

455 

tt 

326 

11 

384 

104-3-4 

458 

104-3-4 

327 

103-5-20 

386 

103-e-23 

459 

tt 

330 

67-3-31 

387 

67-3-31 

460 

It 

331 

a 

388 

104-3-4 

461 

103-a-6 

332 

a 

389 

103-6-23 

468 

103-6-27 

334 

104-3-4 

391 

(t 

469 

103-6-23 

335 

(( 

393 

104-3-5 

470 

104-3-4 

336 

11 

394 

67-5-3 

472 

103-6-24 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 


449 


477 

103-4r-9 

593 

103-3-21 

1271 

104-3-2 

478 

(( 

596 

104-6-13 

1284 

104-1-7 

483 

14r-60-13 

597 

(( 

1290 

104-3-2 

484 

(( 

598 

(f 

1294 

it 

485 

Cl 

622 

tt 

1305 

it 

486 

n 

628 

103-3-21 

1317 

tt 

489 

n 

705 

104-6-13 

1348 

104^1-7 

492 

103-6-24 

706 

it 

1356 

89-3-22 

493 

104r-6-13 

712 

96-1-11 

1365 

Est,  A.  M,  19 

494 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

731 

103-4-15 

1384 

89-3-22 

495 

103-6-24 

735 

96-1-11 

1421 

104-6-14 

496 

it 

775 

104-6-13 

1434 

104-1-7 

499 

104r-6-13 

811 

104^3-2 

1441 

it 

501 

ii 

840 

it 

1447 

104-3-4 

502 

it 

842 

it 

1455 

ii 

503 

ti 

845 

104-6-13 

1460 

a 

511 

{( 

880 

104-3-2 

1468 

104-3-2 

512 

({ 

888 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

1473 

104-6-14 

513 

(t 

908 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

1504 

104-3-4 

518 

u 

930 

104-6-15 

1514 

ti 

519 

({ 

938 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

1543 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

520 

it 

940 

104-3-2 

1549 

104-6-14 

521 

it 

952 

104-3-4 

1553 

ii 

524 

(C 

954 

104-3-2 

1579 

104-3-4 

527 

(t 

956 

it 

1583 

104-6-14 

528 

104-1-6 

961 

It 

1602 

104-3-4 

530 

104-6-13 

974 

104-6-13 

1712 

103-7-1 

531 

88-5^25 

977 

a 

1720 

104-6-14 

533 

104-6-13 

990 

104-3-3 

1725 

104-3-2 

540 

104-5-19 

993 

104-2-13 

1729 

104^6-14 

542 

104-6-13 

994 

104-3-2 

1731 

104-3-2 

544 

104-5-19 

1000 

it 

1735 

it 

545 

Est,Am.G,  1 

1001 

tt 

1738 

it 

546 

104-6-13 

1002 

104-3-3 

1752 

tt 

549 

11 

1014 

11 

1759 

103-4-15 

550 

ii 

1051 

104-3-2 

1760 

If 

555 

tt 

1066 

it 

1765 

104-6-15 

558 

iC 

1068 

ti 

1778 

104-6-14 

560 

103-6-25 

1069 

103-3-12 

1782 

104-3^ 

561 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

1070 

104-3-4 

1783 

104-6-14 

562 

104-5-19 

1076 

104-3-2 

1792 

11 

564 

104-6-13 

1080 

It 

1799 

it 

569 

a 

1100 

104-3-3 

1802 

if 

571 

(( 

1118 

104-3-4 

1806 

if 

572 

i( 

1150 

96-1-11 

1807 

it 

573 

tc 

1167 

104-3-2 

1810 

104-3-2 

574 

11 

1207 

it 

1813 

104-6-14 

582 

n 

1237 

104-1-7 

1820 

u 

590 

tt 

1250 

104-3-2 

1821 

it 

591 

(( 

1253 

104-1-7 

1834 

Est,  A.  M,  15 

2a 


450 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 


1841 

104-6-14 

2197 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2394 

u 

1843 

104-6-24 

2199 

104-6-14 

2396 

104-6-15 

1850 

104-&-14 

2203 

104^6-15 

2397 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

1872 

104r-6-15 

2204 

(I 

2405 

104-6-14 

1895 

104r-6^14 

2209 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2424 

104r-6-15 

1908 

i( 

2210 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2425 

104^-6-14 

1909 

n 

2211 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2430 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

1910 

It 

2218 

104-6-15 

2438 

104r-6-14 

1915 

tl 

2219 

(( 

2439 

11 

1922 

u 

2221 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2441 

n 

1925 

104-6-17 

2229 

104-6-15 

2446 

10^6-15 

1926 

104r^l4 

2230 

2447 

104-6-14 

1931 

11 

2231 

2454 

104-3-4 

1941 

u 

2233 

2455 

104^6-16 

1959 

i04r-a-4 

2234 

2456 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

1969 

104-6-14 

2237 

2457 

It 

1983 

(( 

2244 

2464 

(( 

1992 

(< 

2246 

" 

2489 

103-^14 

1993 

u 

2247 

2496 

104-6-16 

1995 

il 

2249 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2501 

104-6-15 

2007 

u 

2250 

2502 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2010 

11 

2252 

2503 

104-3-4 

2037 

104-6-15 

2254 

104-6-15 

2506 

104-6-15 

2038 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2270 

104-6-14 

2507 

u 

2045 

104-6-15 

2278 

104-6-16 

2508 

104^6-16 

2056 

104-3-4 

2279 

104r-3-4 

2509 

tc 

2058 

104-6-14 

2289 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2514 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2060 

il 

2290 

tt 

2520 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2074 

104-6-15 

2295 

It 

2521 

tl 

2077 

« 

2296 

104-6-14 

2522 

104-6-16 

2103 

104-&-16 

2304 

(( 

2533 

10^6-15 

2106 

11 

2306 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2543 

u 

2108 

tt 

2324 

104-6-14 

2550 

104-6-16 

2109 

n 

2331 

104-6-16 

2551 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2113 

104-6-15 

2332 

104-6-14 

2554 

104-6-15 

2126 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2334 

104-6-15 

2560 

104-3^ 

2137 

104-6-15 

2337 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2566 

104-6-16 

2140 

>       it 

2342 

88-5-17 

2567 

104-6-15 

2149 

tt 

2346 

104-6-14 

2597 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2152 

tt 

2350 

104-6-16 

2602 

104-3-4 

2161 

104-3-4 

2352 

104-6-14 

2603 

i( 

2162 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2356 

tl 

2607 

104-6-15 

2175 

104-6-15 

2365 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2608 

tl 

2177 

104-6-16 

2380 

it 

2615 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2178 

104-6-15 

2388 

104-6-15 

2624 

104-6-15 

2180 

104-6-14 

2389 

104-6-16 

2625 

u 

2185 

tt 

2390 

tt 

2626 

It 

2186 

it 

2391 

tt 

2627 

tt 

2195 

ft 

2392 

tl 

2628 

tl 

2196 

ft 

2393 

104-6-14 

2634 

88-5-17 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 


451 


2636 

Est,  Am.  G,  1 

2792 

104-6-16 

2976 

It 

2640 

104-6-17 

2816 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2977 

tt 

2642 

104-6-15 

2826 

104-6^16 

2978 

104-6-16 

2644 

104r-6^17 

2837 

104-6-17 

2979 

104-6-17 

2645 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2839 

104r-3-4 

2983 

104-6-16 

2648 

104-6-15 

2840 

11 

2984 

tt 

2649 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2841 

104r-6-17 

2985 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2653 

104-6-17 

2845 

104r-3-4 

2998 

104-6-17 

2654 

t{ 

2846 

104-6-18 

3000 

104^6-16 

2656 

104-6-15 

2848 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

3001 

104r-6^18 

2657 

ii 

2857 

104-6-16 

3002 

Est,  A.  M,  19 

2658 

11 

2858 

11 

3003 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2659 

(( 

2859 

(I 

3004 

It 

2676 

103-4-14 

2860 

(t 

3005 

tt 

2679 

104-&-15 

2861 

104-6-15 

3006 

tt 

2680 

(< 

2862 

a 

3014 

Est,  A.  M,  19 

2681 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2870 

104r-6-17 

3019 

104r-6-17 

2705 

104-6^15 

2872 

104r-6-16 

3025 

tt 

2706 

(( 

2874 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

3026 

104-6-16 

2707 

(I 

2875 

u 

3028 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2708 

i( 

2878 

104-6-16 

3032 

u 

2709 

11 

2885 

104-6-17 

3033 

tt 

2716 

Est,  A.  G,  1 

2893 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

3034 

u 

2718 

104-6-15 

2896 

104-6-16 

3035 

tt 

2719 

104-6-17 

2900 

Est,  A.  M,  19 

3036 

104-6-17 

2720 

<< 

2901 

u 

3037 

tt 

2721 

« 

2902 

n 

3038 

tt 

2722 

104-^15 

2904 

104-6-17 

3039 

tt 

2723 

ii 

2906 

103-3-13 

3042 

ti 

2724 

a 

2910 

104-6-17 

3044 

tt 

2732 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2911 

(( 

3045 

It 

2735 

104-6-15 

2912 

104-6-16 

3050 

104-6-16 

2737 

(< 

2916 

11 

3051 

104-6-17 

2740 

ii 

2917 

it 

3052 

It 

2745 

11 

2919 

u 

3053 

tt 

2757 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2920 

tl 

3067 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2761 

104-6-16 

2923 

(( 

3058 

tt 

2762 

ii 

2928 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

3062 

tt 

2763 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2929 

u 

3070 

104-^18 

2764 

104-6-15 

2930 

it 

3110 

(( 

2765 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2933 

104-6-17 

3142 

104-6-17 

2766 

104-6-16 

2934 

104r-6-16 

3143 

tt 

2771 

8^5-17 

2935 

(< 

3152 

tt 

2777 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2944 

Est,  A.  M,  19 

3154 

tt 

2780 

'   « 

2945 

({ 

3155 

tt 

2781 

104-6-16 

2949 

104-6-17 

3156 

tt 

2782 

88-5-17 

2951 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

3157 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2783 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

2967 

<c 

3162 

104-6-17 

2784 

n 

2969 

it 

3167 

tt 

2785 

104-6-15 

2975 

104-6-17 

3173 

ti 

452 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 


3175 

it 

3365 

(I 

3527 

(( 

3180 

n 

3370 

it 

3529 

(( 

3183 

tt 

3373 

(( 

3530 

>       a 

3184 

l( 

3375 

tc 

3532 

ti 

3185 

(( 

3376 

tl 

3534 

ft 

3186 

If 

3377 

(( 

3538 

ft 

3191 

tt 

3379 

tt 

3539 

ft 

3193 

tt 

3380 

t( 

3540 

tt 

3204 

tt 

3382 

11 

3547 

ft 

3205 

<( 

3389 

u 

3558 

(( 

3206 

it 

3390 

tt 

3562 

tt 

3223 

Est,  A.  M,  1 

3394 

103-1-13 

3563 

ft 

3248 

104r-6-17 

3401 

104-6-17 

3564 

ft 

3252 

(( 

3402 

(< 

3565 

ft 

3254 

96-1-12 

3403 

11 

3574 

a 

3260 

104-6-17 

3404 

(( 

3606 

if 

3262 

104r-6-18 

3406 

104-6-18 

3613 

ft 

3265 

ii 

3409 

ti 

3615 

it 

3266 

(( 

3410 

(( 

3619 

ti 

3267 

104r-6-17 

3411 

(I 

3624 

a 

3268 

n 

3412 

a 

3625 

It 

3269 

tt 

3413 

(( 

3626 

if 

3270 

tt 

3416 

It 

3638   V 

<< 

3272 

tt 

3418 

ti 

3639 

ft 

3275 

tt 

3423 

li 

3641 

104-6-17 

3276 

tt 

3430 

li 

3650 

« 

3280 

tt 

3431 

a 

3655 

104-6-18 

3285 

tt 

3432 

ii 

3660 

103-4-12 

3288 

104-5-24 

3433 

103-6-8 

3671 

104-6-18 

3291 

104r-6-18 

3453 

104-6-18 

3673 

li 

3292 

(( 

3454 

ii 

3674 

103-4-12 

3293 

103-3-13 

3455 

ii 

3675 

fi 

3294 

C( 

3457 

104-5-24 

3676 

104-6-18 

3299 

104-6-18 

3460 

104-6-18 

3678 

li 

3300 

(( 

3462 

a 

3687 

if 

3301 

104-6-17 

3464 

ii 

3688 

ft 

3311 

104-6-18 

3465 

it 

3689 

ft 

3319 

96-1-12 

3469 

a 

3691 

« 

3323 

104-7-33 

3470 

tt 

3693 

<( 

3325 

104-6-17 

3474 

if 

3697 

tf 

3326 

li 

3475 

ii 

3705 

ft 

3327 

104-6-18 

3478 

a 

3712 

tf 

3328 

It 

3479 

a 

3719 

104-6-17 

3331 

104-6-17 

3481 

if 

3723 

103-4-12 

3343 

104-6-18 

3484 

ft 

3741 

ft 

3346 

104-6-17 

3494 

ft 

3743 

ft 

3351 

104-6-18 

3496 

a 

3791 

103-4-9 

3357 

104-6-17 

3521 

if 

3879 

li 

3358 

104-6-18 

3522 

ft 

3880 

103-4-12 

3360 

(( 

3525 

ft 

3881 

103-4-17 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 


453 


3882 

103-4-9 

4330 

n 

5160 

104^5-19 

3917 

103-^19 

4354 

tl 

5161 

tt 

3924 

104-fr-19 

4406 

103-4-24 

5176 

It 

3925 

tc 

4408 

« 

5204 

103-5-5 

3926 

tt 

4409 

it 

5206 

103-5-6 

3965 

103-^9 

4430 

({ 

5227 

103-5-5 

3966 

u 

4492 

103-4-13 

5244 

103-5-6 

3974 

103-4-12 

4493 

(( 

5258 

104-5-19 

3997 

103-^19 

4514 

104-6-19 

5297 

(( 

4017 

104-6-19 

4541 

103-4-14 

5298 

104-5-24 

4082 

103-3-24 

4568 

103-3-24 

5302 

104-5-19 

4095 

103-^13 

4633 

103^-13 

5399 

105-1-25 

4097 

It 

4727 

103-5-2 

5400 

(( 

4103 

u 

4767 

104-6-20 

5453 

104-5-19 

4128 

104^6-19 

4793 

103-5-3 

5458 

It 

4129 

t( 

4915 

103-5-4 

5492 

ft 

4130 

a 

4932 

a 

5613 

Est,  A.  M,  2 

4131 

103-4-19 

4933 

ii 

5711 

103-5-11 

4189 

103-7-7 

4934 

tt 

5712 

(( 

4190 

(( 

4935 

tt 

5722 

tl 

4244 

103-4-14 

4938 

tt 

APPENDIX  I 

Table  Showing  Total  Receipts  and  Disbursements  of  the  Real 
Caja  of  Guadalajara  in  Each  Year  from  1743  to  1781 

The  following  table  was  prepared  by  the  writer  from  materials  in 
legajos  104-3-9  and  104r-3-21  in  the  Archivo  General  de  Indias.  The 
three  sets  of  figures  given  in  each  column  are  for  pesos,  tomines  or  reales, 
and  granos,  respectively.  Remissions  were  made  to  the  caja  real  of  the 
place  named.  Percentage  is  reckoned  on  the  basis  of  the  proportion  of  the 
amount  remitted  to  the  amount  of  receipts.  These  figures  are  commented 
upon  in  chapter  three. 


Remissions 

Years 

Receipts 

Disbursements 

% 

Mexico 

Alamos 

1743 

255,183-2-4 

37,119-4-10 

218,063-5-6 

85 

1744 

234,952-0-3 

36,825-2-3^ 

198,126-6-0 

— 

84 

1745 

227,650-1-8^ 

31,082-6-6- 

196,567-3-2 

— 

86 

1746 

200,050-0-91 

33,621-5-6- 

166,428-3-3 

— 

83 

1747 

213,648-5-5^ 

35,775-5-5 

177,873-0-0 

— 

83 

1748 

256,947-2-9 

37,970-5-Of 

2 18,976-5-8  J 

— 

85 

1749 

244,502^-10 

58,531-0-2 

185,971-4-8 

— 

761 

1750 

346,357-^-0 

32,513-6-8 

313,843-5-4 

— 

90 

1751 

344,796-4-1 

39,370-7-3 

305,425-4r-10 

— 

88 

1752 

279,934-3-5 

34,576-7-9 

245,357-3-8 

— 

87 

1753 

381,447-3-1 

36,755-5-7 

344,691-5-6 

— 

90 

1754 

248,254-1-3^ 

35,259-0^^ 

212,995-0-11 

— 

85 

1755 

281,326-1-4 

32,841-2-3^ 

248,484-7-^ 

— 

88 

1756 

253,962-1-10^ 

34,430-0-7^ 

219,532-1-3 

— 

86 

1757 

263,468-0-5^ 

34,215-3-21 

229,252-5-3 

— 

87 

1758 

302,522-1-9 

34,001-0-U 

268,521-1-7 

— 

88 

1759 

304,736-2-11 

34,638^t-2 

270,097-6-9 

— 

88 

1760 

277,108-1-3 

35,630-2-6^ 

241,477-6-8^ 

4 

87 

1761 

321,828-6-2^ 

36,527-5-5^ 

285,301-0-9 

— 

88 

1762 

348,568-1-21 

36,074-6-8^ 

312,493-2-6 

— 

89 

1763 

410,041-5-5 

37,544-1-6 

372,497-3-11 

— 

90 

1764 

354,940-3-8 

42,299-3-0 

312,641-0-8 

— 

88 

1765 

418,981-6-11 

46,353-2-9 

372,628-4-2 

— 

88 

1766 

514,073-7-0 

36,864-3-11 

477,209-3-1 

— 

92 

1767 

425,691-5-0 

43,014-7-10 

382,676-5-2 

— 

89 

1768 

453,036-5-1 

53,756-5-7 

399,279-7-6 

— 

88 

1769 

432,699-5-9^ 

44,961-7-1^ 

387,737-6-8 

— 

89 

iThe     amount    remitted     in     1749       if  disbursements  included  the  situado 
would  have  been  eighty-four  per  cent,       for  a  presidio,  as  seems  likely. 

45.5 


456 


APPENDIX  I 


Table  Showing  Total  Receipts  and  Disbursements  of  the  Real 
Caja  of  Guadalajara  in  Each  Year  from  1743  to  1781. ;  Continued 


Remissions 

Years 

Receipts 

Disbursements 

% 

Mexico 

Alamos 

1770 

344,667-6-9 

43,322-7-8^ 

301,344-6-1 

_ 

87 

1771 

344,608-6-10 

49,148-0-4 

295,460-6-6 

— 

85 

1772 

382,643-1-3 

56,915-1-11 

314,930-1-0 

— 

82  2 

1773 

540,986-6-4 

58,086-1-4 

376,940-1-7 

91,995 

86  2 

1774 

510,874-1-4 

70,030-0-61 

324,479-1-6^ 

104,493-1-0 

842 

1775 

524,422-5-91 

64,553-0-lOi 

316,991-4-2 

132,991-2-0 

852 

1776 

496,383-6-11 

60,591-0-9 

314,027-1-3^ 

110,000 

852 

1777 

450,317-7-6 

92,883-6-81 

290,486-1-0 

50,000 

752 

1778 

567,368-1-8 

97,337-6-4 

350,030-3-4 

120,000 

82 

1779 

628,338-7-51 

15,668-4-21 

312,670-3-3 

200,000 

813    4 

1780 

526,072-2-5 

70,146-7-0 

307,806-6-0 

140,000 

85« 

1781 

717,847-7-lOi 

81,516-1-6 

436,475-1-8^ 

130,000 

792    4 

14,631,242-6-1 

1,892,757-1-6^ 

11,505,995-4-1  U 

1,079,479-3-0 

86 

2  The  discrepancy  between  totals 
for  these  years  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
small  amounts  were  kept  on  hand,  e.g. 
in  1772,  10,797-6-^. 

3  The  total  receipts  in  1779  were 
948,338-7-53^,  but  of  this  amount 
320,000  had  been  sent  from  Mexico. 

,    *  In  the  columns  for  remissions  to 


Alamos,  San  Bias  figured  twice.  In 
1779,  San  Bias  got  80,000  from  Guada- 
lajara, and  in  1781,  the  full  130,000. 
In  fact,  San  Bias  got  400,000  in  1779, 
but  that  sum  included  the  320,000  sent 
from  Mexico  (supra,  n.  3).  Of  this 
amount  150,000  was  for  the  Philippines. 


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APPENDIX  III 

Diaries  of  the  Anza  Expeditions 

In  recent  years  many  copies  of  different  diaries  of  the  Anza  expeditions 
have  been  procured  by  American  Ubraries,  and  a  number  of  them  have 
been  translated  and  published,  so  that  most  are  accessible.  It  would  not 
be  worth  while  to  attempt  to  make  a  list  of  all  such  copies,  but  there  is  a 
real  value  in  pointing  out  the  location  of  original  diaries,  or,  where  that  is 
not  known,  of  such  contemporary  copies  as  were  used  by  the  government 
at  that  time  as  a  basis  for  action.  It  is  still  far  from  possible  to  provide 
a  complete  list,  but  I  shall  point  out  as  many  of  the  diaries  as  I  have  been 
able  to  get  trace  of,  giving  also  a  brief  indication  of  their  content  and  use. 
I  shall  eliminate  variants,  rough  drafts,  and  extracts.  All  of  the  diaries 
mentioned,  except  the  larger  Font,  exist  in  some  form  in  the  Academy  of 
Pacific  Coast  History. 

7.     The  Expedition  of  1774 

A.  1774.  Jan.  8  to  Apr.  5.  San  Gabriel.  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza. 
Diario  de  la  Ruta  y  operadones  que  yo  el  infrascrito  Capitdn  .  .  .  hdgo  y 
practico  en  solicitud  de  abrir  camino  de  dha  Provincia  [Sonora]  d  la  California 
Setemptrional.  Certified  copy,  June  26,  1774,  Mexico.  120  pages,  21J 
by  31  cm.    A.G.I.,  104r-6^15 ;  another,  A.G.I.,  104-3^.     C-2503. 

B.  1774.  Apr.  6  to  May  27.  Dated  Nov.  13,  Mexico.  Juan  Baup*.* 
de  Anza.  Continuacion  del  Diario  del  Capitdn  .  .  .  Anza  .  .  .  que  .  .  . 
comprehende  su  regreso  hasta  .  .  .  Tubac.  Certified  copy,  Nov.  26,  1774, 
Mexico.  23  pages,  21^  by  31  cm.  A.G.I.,  104-6-15;  another,  A.G.I., 
104^3-4.     C-2602. 

C.  1774.  Jan.  8  to  May  27.  Dated  Nov.  13,  Mexico.  Juan  Bap*» 
de  Anza.  Diario  dela  1°.  Expedicion  q  practico  por  Tierra  el  ano  de  74  el 
Ten^.^  coronet  .  .  .  Ansa  d  los  Nuevos  estahlecim^"?  de  la  California. 
Original.  [A.P.C.H.  copy,  92  pages,  21  by  27^  cm.,  typed.]  A.G.P., 
Historia,  v.  396. 

D.  1774.  Jan.  8  to  Mar.  22.  San  Gabriel.  Juan  Diaz.  Diario,  que 
forma  el  Padre  Fr.  Juan  Diaz  .  .  .  en  el  viage  .  .  .  para  abrir  camino  desde 
la  Provincia  de  la  Sonora  d  la  California  Septentrinal.  Original. 
[A.P.C.H.  copy,  33  pages,  21  by  27^  cm.,  typed.]  A.G.P.,  Historia, 
V.  396. 

E.  1774.  May  3  to  May  26.  Tubac.  Juan  Diaz.  Diario  que  formd 
el  P.  Fr.  Juan  Diaz  .  .  .  en  el  Viage,  que  hizo  desde  .  .  .  S^  Gabriel  .  .  . 
hasta  .  .  .  Tubac.  Certified  copy,  Sept.  26,  1774,  Mexico.  19  pages, 
21i  by  31  cm.    A.G.I.,  104-6-17.    02616. 

457 


458  APPENDIX  III 

F.  1774.  Jan.  22  to  Apr.  26.  San  Dionisio  [near  the  junction  of  the 
Gila  and  Colorado  rivers].  Francisco  Garc^s.  Diario  de  la  Entrada 
que  se  practica  .  .  .  para  los  nuevos  Establecimientos  de  San  Diego,  y  Mon- 
terrey. Original.  [A.P.C.H.  copy,  from  an  unnamed  source  in  Spain, 
52  pages,  23  by  33  cm.,  typed].    A.G.P.,  Historia,  v.  52. 

The  latter  part  of  C  is  the  same  as  B,  but  the  earlier  part  of  C  differs 
substantially  from  A.  The  paragraphing  is  the  same,  but  in  C  remarks 
are  added  or  left  out  and  the  Spanish  phraseology  is  improved.  A,  D, 
and  F  were  carried  to  Mexico  by  Anza's  courier  Valdes,  being  deUvered  to 
Bucarely  early  in  June.  No  continuation  of  Garc^s'  diary  has  been  found, 
nor  any  complete  Diaz  or  Garc^s  diary  like  the  C  of  Anza.  Garces  prob- 
ably wrote  a  continuation,  and  this  seems  the  more  likely  since  he  remained 
in  one  of  the  Cocomaricopa  villages  of  the  Gila,  after  Anza's  expedition 
had  departed.^  The  signfccance  of  the  opening  and  closing  dates  of  the 
diaries  is  explained  in  a  note.^ 

A,  B,  and  C  are  fullest  in  details,  and  perhaps  had  most  weight  with 
governmental  officials  of  the  time.  D  and  E  are  brief,  and  much  like 
A,  J5,  and  C  in  matters  of  route,  but  add  something  in  other  respects. 
F  is  strikingly  original,  good  on  matters  of  route,  and  teeming  with 
Garces'  ideas  concerning  the  advancement  of  the  conquest.  D  and  E  are 
in  excellent  Spanish ;  the  Spanish  of  F  is  so  bad  as  to  be  at  times  almost 
unintelUgible ;  ^  and  A,  B,  and  C  are  a  readable  medium  between  them. 


//.   The  Expedition  of  1775-76 

G.  1775,  Oct.  23,  to  June  1,  1776.  Horcasitas.  Juan  Bap*.*  de 
Anza.  Diario  de  la  Rutta  y  Operadones  que  Yo  el  Infrascripto  Theniente 
Coronet  .  .  .  practico  segunda  vez  .  ,  .  d  la  California  Setemptrional. 
Original.  [A.P.C.H.  copy,  142  pages,  21  by  27^  cm.,  typed].  A.G.P., 
.9ai,.osritY3QH 

H.  1775,  Oct.  21,  to  Sept.  17,  1776.  Dated  Jan.  3,  1777.  Tubutama. 
Francisco  Garces.  Diario  que  ha  formado  .  .  .  en  el  triage  hecho  este  ano 
de  1775  .  .  .  con  .  .  .  Anza,  y  .  .  .  Font  .  .  .  acompandndolos  hasta  el 
rlo  Colorado.  Certified  copy.  May  31,  1777,  Mexico.  215  pages,  21|  by 
31  cm.  A.G.I. ,  104r-6-18 ;  another  copy,  not  certified,  in  the  same  legajo. 
C-3001. 

1  Garc6s  was  desirous  of  finding  out  begins  a  new  diary ;  April  26,  the  party 
whether  he  could  get  a  letter  through  sent  back  to  the  Colorado  under  Garc6s 
to  New  Mexico  from  that  point.  reaches  San  Dionisio,  near  the  junction ; 

2  January  8,  the  expedition  leaves  May  3,  the  remainder  of  Anza's  forces 
Tubac ;  January  22,  the  departure  leaves  San  Gabriel  for  the  return  to 
from  Caborca,  after  which  point  the  Sonora ;  May  26,  Anza  and  Diaz  reach 
march  was  to  proceed  through  lands  Tubac  ahead  of  the  expedition ;  May 
not  nearly  so  well  known  as  those  be-  27,  the  expedition  reaches  Tubac. 
tween  Tubac  and  Caborca ;  March  22,  3 1  am  inclined  to  believe  that  Garc6s' 
the  arrival  at  San  Gabriel ;  April  5,  bad  Spanish  is  in  some  measure  the 
Anza  decides  to  send  back  part  of  his  fault  of  copyists.  Garc6s  refers  to  the 
forces  to  the  Colorado  River  and  ends  illegible  character  of  his  penmanship 
diary  A,  in  order  to  send  that  with  the  in  Garc6s  to  Bucarely,  Mar.  8,  1773 
returning  party,  and  thence  to  Mexico ;  (In  C-2113.) 

April  6,  while  still  at  San  Gabriel,  Anza 


APPENDIX  III  459 

/.  1775,  Sept.  29,  to  June  2,  1776.  Dated  June  23,  1776,  Ures.  Pedro 
Font.  Diario  que  forma  .  .  .  del  viage  que  hizo  d  Monterey  y  Puerto  de 
S^  Francisco.    Original.     79  pages,  15f  by  21  cm.  A.P.C.H. 

/.  1775,  Sept.  29,  to  June  2,  1776.  Dated  May  11,  1777,  Tubutama. 
Pedro  Font.  Diario  que  formo  .  .  .  en  el  viage  que  hizo  d  Monterey. 
Original.  336  pages,  14f  by  20  cm.  John  Carter  Brown  Library, 
Providence.'* 

Father  Eixarch  accompanied  the  expedition  as  far  as  the  junction  of  the 
Gila  and  Colorado  rivers,  but  no  diary  by  him  has  been  found.  /  is  an 
expansion  of  /,  the  two  being  identical  except  for  the  extensive  insertions 
in  J.^  Although  there  are  wide  differences  in  the  Garc^s  diaries  that  have 
come  to  light,  it  is  probable  that  they  are  but  variants  from  the  same 
original.^  The  opening  and  closing  dates  of  the  diaries  are  explained  in  a 
note.^ 

F  is  an  exceptionally  important  document,  but  not  so  valuable  for  the 
Anza  expedition  as  the  others,  since  Garc^s  did  not  go  on  with  Anza  when 
the  latter  departed  from  the  Gila  and  Colorado  junction  on  December  4. 
Further  references  to  the  expedition  appear,  however,  in  entries  of  later 
date.  H  was  accorded  prominent  attention  by  the  governmental  authori- 
ties, but  more  particularly  for  its  testimony  concerning  the  region  of  the 
Colorado  and  Gila  and  the  route  to  Moqui.  For  the  expedition  proper, 
G  was  the  most  important  diary  from  the  standpoint  of  official  use.  The 
style  and  the  Spanish  of  G  and  H  are  similar  respectively  to  A,B,  C,  and  F 
of  the  1774  diaries.  /,  the  official  Font  diary,  is  a  meagre  account,  not 
comparable  with  G  in  value,  except  for  information  regarding  the  explora- 
tion of  San  Francisco  Bay,  in  which  case  the  story  is  given  by  it  in  detail. 
/  seems  not  to  have  been  written  with  a  view  to  being  submitted  to  the 
governmental  authorities,  nor  have  I  seen  any  reference  to  it  in  official 
correspondence.  For  the  facts  of  the  expedition,  however,  it  is  a  note- 
worthy supplement  to  G,  and  for  information  about  the  lands  and  peoples 
along  the  march  it  is  very  valuable,  mentioning  details  not  occurring  in 
other  diaries  of  the  two  expeditions,  e.g.  descriptions  of  flora.  Although 
something  of  a  pedant,  Font  perhaps  had  a  greater  fund  of  learning  than 

*  Mr.  Champlin  Burrage,  librarian  nal.  Cf.  n,  3.  H  was  not  known  to 
of  the  John  Carter  Brown  Library,  Coues.  It  would  seem  to  be  nearest 
very  graciously  supplied  me  with  the  to  the  original,  in  point  of  date  of  certi- 
technical  data  concerning  diary  J.  fication,  of  any  Garc6s  diary  at  present 

*  The  Font  accounts  are  considered  known.  Coues  translated  into  English 
in  Pedro  Font,  The  Anza  expedition  of  one  of  the  versions  that  he  refers  to. 
1775-1776 ;  diary  of  Pedro  Font,  edited  Another  appears  in  Spanish  in  Docu- 
by  Frederick  J.  Teggart,  in  A.P.C.H.,  mentos  para  la  historia  de  Mexico.  2d 
Publications,  III,  3-5.     Berkeley,  1913.  series,  I,  225-374. 

In  the  same  work,  pages  6  to  131,  the  ^September   29,    1775,    the    expedi- 

Spanish  and  an  English  translation  of  tion    leaves    Horcasitas;    October    21, 

/  appear.     Of  the  four  accounts  men-  Oarers  goes  from  his  mission  of  Bac  to 

tioned  there,  one  seems  to  have  been  Tubac,   to  join  the  expedition  there ; 

a  report  by  Font  to  his  college,  not  a  October     23,     the     expedition     leaves 

diary,  and  another  was  the  rough  draft  Tubac;  June  1,   1776,  arrival  at  Hor- 

that  he  made  in  course  of  the  march.  casitas  on  the  return ;  June  2,  still  at 

'  A    consideration    of    three  Oarers  Horcasitas,     where     Font    makes     an 

diaries  is  given  in  Garc6s  (Coues  ed.),  astronomical  observation;     September 

I,   Introditction.     Coues  surmised  that  17,  Garc6s  reaches  Bac  on  his  return, 
all  three  were  based  on  the  same  origi- 


460  APPENDIX  III 

the  other  frontier  missionaries  whose  diaries  have  come  to  my  notice,  and 
he  does  not  fail  to  display  his  knowledge  in  diary  J  whenever  occasion 
offers.  Much  space  is  devoted  also  to  the  expression  of  his  petty  and 
rather  harmless  spite  against  Anza.  From  the  trivial  details  which  he 
cites  in  this  connection,  however,  and  so  too  from  other  portions  of  his 
account,  one  gets  such  an  intimate  view  of  the  march  as  rarely  appears  in 
official  diaries.  From  the  standpoint  of  interest  as  a  story,  I  have  never 
read  a  diary  that  compares  with  the  J  of  Font. 


APPENDIX  IV 

The   Echeveste-Anza  Calculation  of  the  Probable  Cost  of  the 
Second  Anza  Expedition 

In  course  of  the  preparations  for  Anza's  second  expedition  Anza  and  Juan 
Jos6  de  Echeveste  were  asked  to  draw  up  a  minute  calculation  of  the  prob- 
able cost  of  the  expedition.  A  translation  of  their  calculation  is  given 
below,  partly  because  it  bears  a  relation  to  the  northwestward  movement, 
showing  in  one  instance  the  expense  which  the  government  was  ready  to 
undergo,  but  more  because  of  its  interest  from  the  standpoint  of  individual 
equipment,  wages,  and  prices  at  that  time.  The  estimates  are  in  pesos 
and  reales,  eight  reaks  being  worth  one  peso.  The  present  value  of  a  peso 
would  be  fifty  cents.  I  have  seen  copies  of  this  document  in  three  testi- 
monios  concerning  the  preparations  for  the  second  Anza  expedition.  The 
location  and  nature  of  the  three  testimonies  are  as  follows : 

A.  Certified  copy,  dated  December  24,  1774,  Mexico,  in  A.G.I.,  104r-6- 
16.     (C-2496.) 

B.  Copy  in  A.P.C.H,  of  a  certified  copy,  dated  January  18,  1775, 
Mexico,  in  A.G.P.,  California^,  v.  72. 

C.  Copy  in  A.P.C.H.  of  a  certified  copy,  dated  March  20, 1777,  Mexico, 
in  A.G.P.,  California^,  v.  35. 

The  original  is  probably  in  A.G.P.,  Provincias  Internas,  v.  134,  a  volume 
which  contains  the  originals  of  other  documents  in  the  file  of  papers  con- 
cerning the  authorization  of  the  second  Anza  expedition.  Jos^  de  Gorrdez 
certified  that  the  copies  mentioned  in  A  and  B  conformed  to  the  original, 
and  Melchor  de  Peramds  did  so  for  the  copy  referred  to  in  C.  There  are 
some  differences  in  the  three.  B  employs  abbreviations  of  words,  while 
the  words  appear  in  full  in  A  and  C.  Certain  obvious  errors  or  omissions 
in  some  of  the  copies  are  corrected  by  use  of  the  others.  The  translation 
is  based  on  all  three,  with  an  indication  in  notes  of  some  of  their  difficulties 
and  differences. 

"Minute  calculation  of  the  cost  that  it  may  amount  to :  for  the  ward- 
robe of  thirty  recruits,  their  wives,  and  the  garments  adequate  for  one 
hundred  and  eighty  children,  six  for  each  one,  half  for  males  and  half  for 
females ;  for  the  arms,  riding-horses,  rations,  and  baggage  for  the  service 
and  transportation  of  all,  from  the  province  of  Ostimuri  to  the  presidio  of 
San  Carlos  de  Monterey,  namely : 

461 


462 


APPENDIX  IV 


"  Wardrobe  jor  a  Man 


3  shirts  of  good  Silesian  linen 


at  18  redks      6  pesos  6 


3  pairs  of  underdrawers  of  Puebla  cloth  ^  of  4  varas,^ 

each  one  "  2  "  3  "  0 
2  cloth  coats  which  with  their  lining  and  trimmings 

are  worth  9  "  3 

2  pairs  of  trousers,  ditto  5  "  3 

2  pairs  of  stockings                                                    "  2     "          0  "  4 

2  pairs  of  chamois-skin  boots                                    "  10     "          2  "  4 

3  pairs  of  gaiter  shoes  ^                                              ''  5     "          1  "  7 
1  cloth  cape  lined  with  thick  flannel  11  ''  0 

1  hat  0  "  6 

2  Puebla  powder-cloths  *                  -                         "  2     "          0  "  4 
1  ribbon  for  the  hat  and  hair  0  "  4 


"  Ditto  for  a  Woman 
3  shirts  i 

3  pairs  of  white  Puebla  petticoats 
2  pairs  of  petticoats,  some  of  silk  serge,  others  of 
thick  flannel,  and  an  underskirt,  all  at  a  cost  of 
2  varas  of  linen  stuff  for  two  linings 
2  pairs  of  Brussels  stockings 
2  pairs  of  hose 
2  pairs  of  shoes 
2  women's  shawls 
Ihat 
6  varas  of  ribbon 

41  pesos  3 

For  30  wardrobes  of  men  and  women  at  83  pesos,  4  reales        2505  pesos 


42 

pesos  1 

it   4  pesos 

12 

pesos  0 

"  12  reales 

4 

u     4 

16 

"     0 

u    5     .. 

1 

"     2 

"  ^  " 

1 

"     1 

u    2      « 

0 

"     4 

u      g        u 

1 

u     4 

u  12      '< 

3 

"     0 

0 

"     6 

0 

"     6 

"  Clothing  for  Ninety  Boys 

5  pieces  of  cloth  containing  180  varas  at  12  reales  270  pesos  0 
12  pieces  of  Puebla  cloth  for  linings  and 

white  trousers  "  6  pesos  4  reales  78  "  0 
270  varas  of  linen  stuff  for  shirts  of  about 

S  varas  "  5      "      168     "  6 

50  hats  «*  "  4     "        25  "  0 

8  dozen  shoes  for  children  of  various  sizes  "  4     '<                     32  "  0 


*  The  Spanish  is  Manta  de  la  Puebla. 
Manta  is  a  coarse  kind  of  cloth. 

2  A  vara  is  equivalent  to  2.78  feet. 

3J5  has  zapatos  ahotonad^  which 
might  be  rendered  "button  shoes." 
A  and  C  have  it  zapatos  abotinados  (or 
avotinados  in  C) ,  which  might  mean  black 
shoes  or  gaiter  shoes  as  rendered  above. 


*  This  is  a  doubtful  translation  for 
Pafioa  de  Polvos  Poblanos. 

8  Possibly  the  fifty  hats  were  only 
a  reserve  supply,  as  the  boys  might  be 
expected  to  have  a  hat  apiece  to  begin 
with.  Certainly  fifty  hats  could  not 
be  divided  among  ninety  boys. 


APPENDIX  IV  463 

"  Clothing  for  an  Equal  Number  of  Girls 

270  varas  of  linen  stuff  for  shirts                   at    5  reales  168  pesos  6 
4  pieces  of  Puebla  cloth  ^  for  petticoats  and 

linings  "  6  pesos  4  26  "  0 
90  cloths  for  women's  shawls  of  all  sizes  "  10  reales  112  "  4 
2  pieces  of  thick  flannel  for  little  petticoats  "  45  pesos  90  "  0 
4  pieces  of  cloth  of  about  34  vara^  for  under- 
shirts ''12  reales  a  vara  204  "  0 
12  pieces  of  ribbon  for  bands  20  "  0 
16  ditto  of  fine  rope  5  "  0 
8  dozen  shoes  for  girls  of  various  sizes  '*  4  pesos  32  "  0 
120  blankets,  single  bed  size  for  all  "  15  reales  225  "  0 
120  shepherds' 7  blankets                                "     5     "  75  "  0 

"  Arms 
20  saddle-tree  guns  * 
20  cases  of  those  that  they  call /undos  ordi- 

narias  ^^  of  good  timber 
20  swords 
20  lances 
22  ^1  leather  jackets  ^^  of  about  7  ases  ^^  each 

a  vara  and  a  quarter  in  length 
30  shoulder-belts  with  the  name  of  San 

Carlos  de  Monterey 
20  cartridge-boxes  with  14  bullets 

996  pesos  6 
"  Horses  and  Trapping  for  a  Man  ^* 

60  horses,  2  for  each  recruit  at  8  pesos             480  pesos  0 

20  saddles  "  9   "      4  reales  190     "     0 

20  pairs  of  spurs  "  7    "          17     "     4 

20  fine  mule-bits  "  11    "         27     "     4 

20  pairs  of  pads  "  2  "                     40     "     0 

*  Mania  is  rendered  "Puebla  cloth,"  men,  which  are  attached  to  the  saddle- 

although    de  la  Puebla  does  not  appear  tree.     The   word    "guns"    is   used   in- 

in  this  case.  stead  of  "shot-gun"  because  escopetas 

'  For  Pastoras,  a  word  that  does  not  was   frequently  used   in  documents  of 

appear    in    the    Spanish    dictionaries.  that   time,    as   if   it   were   the   general 

Probably  it  was  made  from  the  noun  word  for  "gun." 

Pasfor,  meaning  "shepherd."    Blankets  ^°  Fundas  ordinaries    is    equivalent 
worn   to-day   by   shepherds  in  Mexico  to  "ordinary  cases." 
have  a  hole  in  the  centre  through  which  ^^  Eight  of  the  thirty  soldiers  were 
the  wearer  puts  his  head,  leaving  the  to   be  veterans ;  therefore  but  twenty- 
blanket    to    fall    naturally    about    his  two  were  necessary, 
shoulders.                                                                '^  B  has  cuerdas  which  would  mean 

'Thus  it  appears  that  the  wardrobe  "ropes,"  "cords,"  or  "halters,"  clearly 

for   each   man   in   terms   of   American  an  error  for  cueras  which  A  and  C  have, 
money,   if  a  peso  is  reckoned  as  fifty  "  An    as    is    a    measure  of    weight 

cents,  was  to  cost  $21,03  ;  each  woman,  amounting   to   eleven   ounces.     There- 

$20.59;    each    boy,    $4.02;    and  each  fore,    these   jackets   would   weigh   four 

girl,  $4.48.  pounds  and  eleven  ounces  each. 

» Escopetas  de  Arzon  means  literally  "  This  paragraph  was  omitted  in  A, 

"shot-guns    of    saddle-tree,"    probably  an  error  of  the  copyist,  for  these  esti- 

referring  to  the  guns  used  by  cavalry-  mates  of  expense  appear  in  the  totals. 


1532  pesos  08 

at  12  pesos 

240  pesos  0 

"   15  reales 

37  "  4 
85  "  0 
40     "     0 

"  24  pesos 

528     "     0 

"  11  reales 

41  "  2 
25     "     0 

464  APPENDIX  IV 

"  Ditto  for  a  Woman  and  Family 

60  mares  at    8  pesos  480  pesos  0 

30  saddles  "    9     "     4reales285     "     0 

30  fine  mule-bits  "  11      "      41     ''     2 

1561  pesos  2 
By  60  rations,  3  ^^  each  family  at  1|  reales  in  40  days  which  is 
reckoned  as  the  duration  of  the  march,  with  the  neces- 
sary delays,  in  the  200  leagues  from  Alamos  ^^  to  the  pre- 
sidio of  Tubac  450  pesos  o 

"Baggage  and  Beasts  of  Burden 

20  mules  at  25  pesos  500  pesos  0 

20  instruments   and    things    in  connec- 
tion with  them  «    4     «     2^  reales  8^     "     2 

30  chamois-skin  gripsacks  for  the  soldiers 

and  their  families  "    2     "  60     "     0 

646  pesos  2 

By  3  months'  pay  in  advance  to  the  lieutenant,  sergeant,  and 
28  soldiers :  the  first  at  the  rate  of  the  enjoyment  of  700 
pesos  a  year ;  450  to  the  second ;  and  one  peso  daily  to 
each  soldier  2807  pesos  4 

10,498  pesos  6 

"  Collection  of  stores  at  the  presidio  of  Tubac  necessary  for  the  expedition, 
of  useful  articles  necessary  for  it,  of  cattle,  provisions,  and  their  convey- 
ances, to  ration  all  its  people,  reckoning  70  days'  march,  including  rests, 
for  122  individuals,  to  which  its  number  reaches,  the  expense  of  everything 
in  detail  and  that  of  the  aid  [in  useful  articles]  which  it  is  bearing  to  the 
presidio  of  San  Carlos  de  Monterey,  namely : 

I  flag  with  the  royal  coat  of  arms  12  pesos  0 

II  tents  for  cavalry  of  bramant  linen,  with  wooden 

frames  from  those  that  the  factory  of  the  royal 

estate  ^^  possesses,  and  [of  a  kind]  that  shall  be 

fit  for  use,^^  10  for  the  30  families  and  [the 

other]  for  the  Father  Chaplain 
4  Biscayan  hatchets  well  strengthened  with  iron 
4  spades  ditto 
4  shovels  ditto 
1  small  crow-bar 
10  ball  cartridges 

40  sole-leather  powder-flasks  for  blasting 
Carry  forward 

"  This  should  be  two  rations  a  day  fact  the  vicinity  where  Anza  intended 

for    each    family,    because    there    were  to  recruit  his  force. 

thirty  families,   and,  in  fact,   but  two  ^^  Real    Hacienda,   referring    to    the 

meals    a    day   were    taken   during   the  board  of  finance  in  Mexico, 
march.     It  is  written  "3"  in  B  and  C,  ^^  B  and  C  omit  the  part  of  this  sen- 

and  'Hrea"  in  A.  ,  tence  after  "possesses"  through  "use." 

^^  B  has  los  hams.     Alamos  was  in 


at  27  pesos 

292     ' 

'     0 

n 

3     " 

12     ' 

'     0 

11 

9  reales 

4     ' 

'     4 

(I 

3  pesos 

12     ' 

'     0 

(f 

5     ' 

'     0 

0     ' 

'     0 

(I 

4  reales 

20     ' 

'     0 

345  pe 

SOS  4 

APPENDIX  IV 


465 


Brought  forward  345  pesos  4 

8  iron  pans  ^*  '      at    2  pesos 

10  copper  campaign  kettles  " 

12  large  chocolate-pots  ditto  " 

1  case  of  iron  pieces  ^^  well  adapted  and  arranged ; 

f  for  horses  and  ^  for  mules ;  with  a  duplicate 

key 

1  tool-chest  [with   the  instruments]   for  shoeing 

horses  10 

2  blank-books  for  military  registers  "    2     "      __4 

550  pesos  4 

"  Cattle  and  Provisions  to  Ration  the  People  of  the  Expedition 


16 

75  » 

6 


82 


100  head  of  cattle,  one  for  each  day 
30  loads  of  flour  for  tortillas  ^2 
60  fanegas  ^  of  pinole  ^ 
60  fanegas  of  kidney-beans 
6  cases  of  ordinary  chocolate 

2  tercios  ^  of  white  sugar  with  6  ^  arrobas 
12  pesos  [worth]  of  soap 

3  barrels  of  aguardiente  ^  for  necessities 


at 


8  pesos  800  pesos  0 
8  "  240  "  0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 


18  reales  135 

5  pesos  300 

225 

12 

12 

213 


2 
71 


1957  pesos  0 

"Table  for  the  comandante  and  chaplain  about  which  Echeveste  is 
making  a  statement  to  His  Excellency  the  viceroy  against  the  objection 
of  the  party  concerned  [Anza]. 

1  case  of  beans  ^  with  7  arrobas  at    5  pesos     35  pesos  0 

25  pounds  of  pork-sausage  "     1     "        25     "     0 

6  cases  of  biscuit  96     "     0 

1  ditto  of  fine  chocolate  with  7  arrobas  at  3f  reales  ^  82     "     0 

1  barrel  of  wine  65     "     0 

6  arrobas  of  cheese  at    2  pesos     12     "     0 

4  pounds  of  pepper  "5^  reales    2     "     6 

i  pound  of  saffron  3     "     0 

4  ounces  of  cloves  at    6  pesos  a  pound         1     "     4 

4  ditto  of  cinnamon  "    9     "     "     "  2     "     2 

Carry  forward 


i»  Comales,  or  flat  pans,  used  in  cook- 
ing corn-cakes. 

20  B  and  C  have  15  pesos,  but  the  75 
of  A  is  in  accord  with  the  totals  and 
with  the  normal  price. 

21  The  Spanish  word  is  herreaje  in  A 
and  errage  in  B  and  C,  for  what  is  now 
herraje.  The  literal  translation  has 
been  preferred  rather  than  "shoes" 
or  "horseshoes,"  which  the  writers 
probably  meant,  that  word  being 
herradura. 

22  A  kind  of  pan-cake. 

2'  A  fanega  is  equivalent  to  about 
1.6  bushels. 


223  pesos  4 

2*  A  kind  of  cereal  meal. 

2s  A  tercio  is  one  of  the  packages  of  a 
mule-load. 

2«  A  has  16,  but  6  seems  to  be  right. 

^  An  arroba  is  equivalent  to  25 
pounds. 

28  A  spirituous  liquor. 

25  In  A  it  is  jamones,  or  hams. 

*>  The  extension  for  the  amount  and 
price  stated  is  wrong,  but  some  small 
measure  seems  to  be  contemplated.  At 
SH  reales  a  pound  the  extension  would 
be  correct  and  more  in  keeping  with  the 
price  that  we  would  expect. 


2h 


466  APPENDIX  IV 

Brought  forward  323  pesos  4 

1  jug  31  of  [olive]  oil  at                    4     ''     2 

1  ditto  of  vinegar  5     "     0 
For  the  freight  of  all  the  pieces  reckoned 

at  500  arrobas  "  28  reales  750     "     0 
For  sleeping-mats,32  guangoches,^  large 

sacks  and  plaited  bass-ropes  78  ^^^     6 

For  140  leathern  sacks  for  the  provisions  "4  reales    70     "     0 

2232  pesos  4 

"  Beasts  of  Burden  for  Carriage  [of  Freight] 

4  divisions  composed  of  132  mules  at  25  pesos  3300  pesos 

100  complete  harnesses  for  the  4  divisions  "  6^     "      650     "     0 

20  mule-drivers  with  their  respective  monthly  sal- 
aries from  8  to  14  pesos,  reckoned  for  a  journey 

of  only  2|  months  540     "     0 

4490  pesos  0 
"  Provision  and  Aid  for  the  New  Establishments 

200  head  of  cattle :  bulls  and  cows  at  6  pesos  1200  pesos  0 

6  Indian  cowboys  at  1  real  each  day  52     "     4 

1252  pesos  4 
"  Gifts  far  the  Indians 

6  cases  of  glass  beads  that  contain  no  black  and 

abound  in  red,  with  600  war-clubs  at  8|  reales  637  pesos  4 

1  sleeveless  cloak  of  blue  cloth  lined  with  gold  "                    20     "     0 

1  coat  and  trousers  of  chamois-skin  "                    13     "     0 

2  shirts  ^s    ^  "4  pesos         8     "     0 

1  cap  with  its  coat  of  arms  like  that  of  dragons  5     "     0 

2  terdos  of  highest  grade  tobacco  containing  350  lbs.  262     "     4 

946  pesos  0 
[Total]  21,927  pesos  2 

"  As  appears  in  the  margin,  the  calculation  of  the  outfit  of  the  30  recruits 
with  their  families  and  wardrobe,  the  arms,  horses  and  trappings,  baggage 
and  beasts  of  burden,  and  other  expenses  of  the  second  expedition  of 
Captain  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza,  from  his  presidio  of  San  Ignacio  de  Tubac 
to  that  of  San  Carlos  de  Monterey,  [amounts  to]  21,927  pesos,  2  reales,  in 
which  quantity  is  included  the  ^estimated  value  of  the  effects  at  present 
in  the  royal  estate  here  and  at  Alamos,  to  the  end  that  one  may  at  once 
gain  a  clear  knowledge  of  the  total  cost  of  the  expedition."  ^^ 

^  Botija,   a  round,    earthen,    short-  eluding  it  the  total  becomes  a  peso  too 

necked  jug.  high,  but  without  it  would  be  9  pesos 

^  The  word  is  petates,  which  might  too    much.     The    shirts,    as    also    the 

also  be  rendered  "luggage"  or  "bag-  cloak,   coat,   and  trousers,   were  for  a 

gage."  gift  to  Chief  Palma  of  the  Yumas. 

83  Guangoches  is   the  Mexican  word  ^s  xhe  signature    of    Juan    Jos6   de 

for  a  certain  kind  of  thick,  coarse  cloth.  Echeveste  alone  appears  on  all  three 

^  B  and  C  have   18  pesos,  but  the  copies,  but  it  is  clear  from  other  docu- 

78  of  A  accords  with  the  totals.  ments  that  Anza  helped  Echeveste  to 

^  B  and  C  omit  this  item.     By  in-  draw  up  the  document. 


APPENDIX  V 

Resolution   of   the    Junta    of   December    16,    1774,  Concerning 
Authorization  of  a  Second  Expedition  by  Anza  to  Alta  California 

The  following  literal  translation  was  based  on  a  copy  in  the  Academy  of 
Pacific  Coast  History  from  the  original  resolution,  signed  with  the  names 
and  rubrics  of  the  members  of  the  junta,  in  A.G.P.,  Provindas  Internas, 
V.  134.  This  was  compared  and  found  to  agree  substantially  with  copies 
B  and  C,  referred  to  in  Appendix  IV.  The  document  is  also  in  copy  A  of 
Appendix  IV  (C-2496).  It  is  referred  to  in  the  text  in  chapter  XII,  where 
the  names  of  the  signers  are  given,  in  note  70. 

"  It  was  resolved  by  common  agreement :  that,  for  the  new  expedition  or 
sally  which  Captain  Don  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza  is  to  make  from  his 
presidio  of  San  Ignacio  de  Tubac  to  that  of  San  Carlos  de  Monterey  and  to 
the  two  new  missions  which  are  to  be  estabhshed,  everything  be  done  as  he 
has  proposed  for  the  accomplishment  of  so  laudable  an  enterprise,  to  which 
effect  and  as  regards  enlistments  of  those  [soldier-settlers]  whom  His 
Excellency  deemed  necessary  to  accompany  him,  let  there  be  issued  by  the 
said  Excellency  the  suitable  decrees  for  appointments  of  a  lieutenant  and  a 
sergeant  from  one  of  the  subjects  proposed  for  each  position  by  Captain 
Anza,  leaving  to  his  [Anza's]  judgment  the  choice  of  ten  soldiers  that  he 
needs  to  accompany  him  [to  Alta  California  and  back],  and  granting  that  he 
himself  may  recruit  the  rest  to  his  satisfaction.  And  to  this  end,  and  that 
such  desertion  as  may  occur  may  be  checked,  let  His  Excellency  despatch 
the  strictest  orders  to  the  respective  courts  of  justice,  that  they  on  their 
part  may  aid  Captain  Don  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza  on  this  and  other  matters 
which  may  present  themselves  in  the  accompUshment  of  this  undertaking, 
until  [he  may  go]  by  way  of  the  same  route  that  he  discovered,  deliver  his 
people  to  Comandante  Don  Fernando  de  Rivera  y  Moncada,  and  assist  in 
exploring  the  Rio  de  San  Francisco,  and  thereupon  be  able  to  inform  His 
Excellency  of  what  he  may  see  there,  and  return  with  the  ten  soldiers 
accompanying  him.  And  let  him  be  accompanied,  as  on  the  first  expedition, 
by  Father  Carets  who  will  wait  for  him  on  the  banks  of  the  Colorado  until 
his  return ;  and  besides  the  said  Father,  he  shall  be  accompanied  also  by 
Fray  Pedro  Font  on  all  the  journey,  so  that  [the  latter]  as  one  skilled  in 
these  matters  may  observe  latitudes.  And  to  this  effect  let  there  be  sent 
to  him  by  the  hand  of  Captain  Anza  the  instruments  which  he  may  need, 
and  for  this  matter  [about  Font]  let  the  fitting  official  letter  of  request  and 
command  be  despatched  by  His  Excellency  to  the  Reverend  Father  Supe- 
rior [of  Queretaro]. 

"  And  having  noted  the  total  of  expense  to  which  this  expedition  amounts, 
and  that  Don  Jos6  de  Echeveste  and  the  captain  himself  took  things  into 
consideration  in  detail  in  order  to  form  it,^  and  as  this  royal  junta  has 
considered  the  matter  with  exceeding  particularity,  it  was  resolved  with 

*  This  refers  to  the  itemized  list  of  expected  expenditures.     See  Appendix  IV. 

467 


468  APPENDIX  V 

respect  to  these  affairs,  that  from  the  pious  funds  employed  for  propaga- 
tion of  the  faith  in  the  Californias  there  be  spent  10,000  pesos  of  the  treas- 
ure at  present  in  the  money  chest  assigned  for  its  custody,  to  which  end 
the  director  [of  the  pious  fund]  shall  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  royal 
officials  of  this  court  10,000  pesos  for  the  expenses  of  the  new  expedition, 
which  sum  they  shall  deliver  to  the  factor  Don  Manuel  Ramon  de  Goya, 
and  they  shall  do  the  same  with  whatever  more  may  be  required  to  be 
spent  for  it,  and  whatever  it  shall  be,  let  it  be  charged  to  the  account  of  the 
royal  treasury.  Let  2000  more  pesos  from  the  same  funds  [be  delivered] 
to  the  syndic  of  the  College  of  San  Fernando,  a  thousand  for  each  of  the 
new  missions  which  are  going  to  be  established  at  the  Rio  de  San  Francisco 
or  in  its  vicinity,  it  likewise  remaining  in  the  duty  of  His  Excellency  to 
despatch  the  corresponding  official  letter  to  the  Reverend  Father  Superior 
[requiring  him]  to  put  in  them  the  missionary  Fathers  of  his  [college]  who 
are  now  in  Monterey.  And  [let]  10,000  pesos  [be  employed]  to  assist  in 
expenses  of  the  Department  of  San  Bias,  which  amount,  conformably  to 
the  royal  junta  of  July  8  of  last  year,  is  due  to  be  supplied  with  despatch 
for  the  first  named  [San  Bias],  and  for  this  once  only,  from  the  pious  funds 
of  the  treasure  which  is  in  the  aforesaid  chest,  and  still  this  amount  has  not 
been  paid.  And  finally,  as  to  what  Don  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza  set  forth 
about  not  being  able  to  gather  by  himself  the  things  for  provision  of  the 
individuals  of  the  expedition,  because  he  has  to  be  occupied  in  recruiting 
the  new  troop  in  different  places,  to  this  effect  His  Excellency  named  a 
person  who  may  do  it,  or  rather  let  it  be  Don  Miguel  Gregorio  de  Echarri,^ 
whom  the  said  captain  proposes,  and  of  whom  he  says  that  he  managed 
these  matters  with  credit  in  the  barracks  of  Pitic  during  the  military 
expedition  in  those  provinces,  or  [let  it  be]  another,  whoever  shall  be  to  his 
will,  as  a  favor  that  is  due  to  him  for  his  work,  and  let  the  person  that  he 
shall  be  pleased  to  appoint  keep  an  account  and  explanation  of  what  he 
shall  spend  so  as  to  present  it  to  the  intendente  or  royal  official  of  Alamos. 

"  And  for  everything,  let  there  be  drawn  up  sworn  copies  [testimonios]  of 
the  explanation  of  costs  and  [of  the  proceedings]  of  this  junta:  one  for 
Comandante  Don  Fernando  [Rivera  y]  Moncada ;  another  for  the  factor, 
Manuel  Ram6n  de  Goya ;  another  for  the  Tribunal  y  Real  Audiencia  de 
Cuentas  [tribunal  and  royal  court  of  accounts] ;  another  for  the  royal  offi- 
cials of  this  count ;  and  another  of  the  same  and  of  his  representations  of 
the  17th  ultimo  and  5th  instant,  for  Captain  Don  Juan  Bautista  de  Anza, 
and  let  the  latter,  the  factor  Goya,  and  Comandante  [Rivera  y]  Moncada, 
and  in  the  same  way  the  missionary  Fathers  make  separately  a  formal  and 
approved  account  of  their  respective  expenses  to  remit  to  His  Excellency,  as 
soon  as  their  distribution  and  employment  have  taken  place.  And  finally, 
let  it  be  drawn  up  in  triplicate  so  as  to  give  an  account  to  His  Majesty  of 
everything  new  that  has  been  done  up  to  now  since  [the  time  of]  the  royal 
order  with  his  approval,  for  he  has  already  had  a  report  of  what  happened 
before  that. 

"  Thus,  this  is  agreed  upon,  and  the  gentlemen  who  composed  it  [the 
junta]  signed." 

2  This  wording  of  the  resolution  is  got  its  role  of  appearing  to    order  the 

some  evidence  to  show  that  Bucarely  appointment,    and    then    in     language 

was    the    real    ordering    authority.     It  corrected  itself.     Cf.  chap.  VII,  n.  63. 
looks  as  if  the  junta  momentarily  for- 


APPENDIX  VI 

Galvez's  Order  op  March  6,  1779,  Directing  Croix  to  Give  the 
Californias  Preference  in  His  Attention 

This  document  is  the  draft,  retained  for  the  ministro  generaFs  file,  and 
consequently  not  signed,  of  a  letter  of  the  date  mentioned  from  Gdlvez  to 
Teodoro  de  Croix.  It  is  to  be  found  in  A.G.I.,  103^r-9,  (C-3965).  The 
phrase  For  Dup^  indicated  that  both  an  original  and  a  duplicate  were  to 
be  presented  to  Gdlvez  for  his  signature  and  both  mailed  to  Croix.  The 
document,  used  briefly  in  chapter  XVII,  is  here  inserted  entire : 

Ha  entendido  el  Rey  los  progresos  que  los  PP^?  Misioneros  han  con- 
seguido  en  las  Misiones  y  Presidios  de  Californias,  assi  en  la  extension  de  la 
Religion  Catolica,  como  en  el  beneficio  y  Cultivo  de  aquellos  Terrenos :  lo  que 
ha  sido  mui  del  agrado  de  S.M.  y  me  manda  que  reitere  a  V.S.  el  encargo  de  q 
mire  p^.  aquellos  Establecimientos  con  la  preferencia  y  esmero  (f.  merece  Su 
importanda,  como  S.M.  lo  espera  del  zelo  de  V.S.  cuya  vida  g^  Dios  mt  a? 
El  Pardo  d6de  Marzo  de  1779.    S'.  D?  teodoro  de  Croix.  Par  Dup^ 


469 


APPENDIX  VII 

Table  Showing  the  Population  by  Districts  of  Sinaloa  and  Sonora 

IN  1781 

The  status  of  settlements  in  Sinaloa  and  Sonora  was  a  fact  of  great 
importance  at  all  times  in  its  bearing  on  matters  of  northwestward  ad- 
vance. In  the  table  following  there  appears  for  the  year  1781,  an  impor- 
tant date  in  the  history  of  Spanish  conquest  in  the  direction  of  Alta  Cali- 
fornia, more  complete  data  than  is  usually  available  for  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  table  shows  not  only  the  total  population,  but  also  its 
distribution  by  districts,  distinguishing,  too,  according  to  sex,  and  as 
between  adults  and  children.  The  figures  may  be  taken  to  include  the 
entire  Christian  population,  without  distinction  as  to  blood,  but  they 
probably  did  not  include  unconverted  Indians.  The  table  appears  in 
paragraph  227  of  Teodoro  de  Croix's  long  memorial  of  October  30,  1781, 
(C-4430)  of  which  the  original  is  in  A.G.I.,  103-4-24.  This  table  is  re- 
ferred to  in  chapter  XVIII. 


Districts 

Men 

Women 

Boys 

Girls 

Totals 

Real  del  Rosario  .     .     . 

1546 

1868 

1217 

996 

5627 

S.     Juan    Bautista    de 

Maloya 

629 

568 

283 

270 

1750 

S.  Jos6  de  Copald      .     . 

2725 

2274 

1657 

1715 

8371 

S.  Miguel  de  Culiacdn   . 

3234 

3254 

2055 

1947 

10490 

Sinaloa 

2471 

2531 

2144 

2032 

9178 

Fuerte 

2376 

2172 

897 

706 

6151 

Cosald 

1184 

1055 

685 

595 

3519 

Alamos 

2055 

2005 

2107 

1670 

7837 

Ostimuri 

3477 

3564 

3058 

3581 

13680 

Sonora 

6231 

6052 

4495 

4263 

21041 

Totals    .... 

25,928 

25,343 

18,598 

17,775 

87,644 

470 


INDEX 


Academy  of  Pacific  Coast  History,  445, 
446. 

Academy  of  Sciences  of  St.  Petersburg, 
247. 

Acapulco,  7,  8,  40,  58,  194,  265, 268,  370, 
372,  377,  379,  380,  423.  See  Manila 
galleon. 

Africa,  174,  179. 

Agriculture.     See  Crops,  Food  supplies. 

Aguilar,  241. 

Aguilar's  River,  58,  332,  333. 

Alamos,  48,  131,  383 ;  Real  Caja  of,  52, 
53,  88,  131,  132,  140,  394,  395,  404, 
455,  456,  468. 

Alarcon,  Hernando  de,  7,  9. 

Alaska,  176,  177,  418.  See  Californias, 
North  America,  Russians. 

Alberoni,  22,  23. 

Albuquerque,  39. 

Aleutian  Islands,  176-78. 

Algiers,  199,  237. 

Almodovar,  Marqu6s  de,  61. 

Alta  California,  VII-XII,  7,  8,  13,  24, 
34,  57,  59,  60,  68-70,  80,  84-88,  91-94, 
96-115,  118-30,  143,  145-47,  149,  151, 
153-56,  158-61,  167,  179,  217-19,  222, 
231,  232,  234,  238,  240,  244,  249-80, 
283-90,  293,  294,  298-301,  308,  309, 
311,  313-38,  341,  342,  346-48,  350, 
352-57,  359,  360,  363-72,  377-90, 
393,  396-98,  406,  410,  411,  413-15, 
422,  427-35,  467,  470.  See  Baja 
California,  Californias,  Colonization, 
Crops,  Deserters,  Domestic  animals. 
Expense,  Food  supplies.  Foreign  dan- 
ger, Gifts  for  Indians,  Gila  and  Colo- 
rado, Gold,  Goods  and  effects,  Indians, 
Junction  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado, 
Laborers,  Land  route,  Mails,  Manila 
galleon.  Military,  Military  equipment. 
Northwestward  conquest.  Pious  fund, 
San  Bias,  Sea  route.  Settlers,  Supply 
ships. 

Altamira,  Marques  de,  43,  44. 

Altamirano,  Pedro,  56,  61. 

Altar,  44,  48,  61,  89,  132,  134,  135,  137, 
156,  164,  167,  275-77,  280,  284,  286, 
343,  403,  404,  429. 


Altar  River,  13,  19. 

Alva,  Duque  de,  77,  78. 

Amarillas,  Marqu6s  de,  62,  63,  85,  150. 

Amarillo,  Rio,  65. 

America,  188,  190.  See  American  colo- 
nies, Americans,  Americas,  Brazil, 
North  America,  South  America,  Span- 
ish America,  United  States. 

American  colonies,  188,  194,  197,  2Q0, 
203-15. 

American  Revolution.  See  American 
colonies. 

Americans,  183,  186,  208,  419.  See 
American  colonies,  United  States. 

Americas,  82,  174,  179.  See  America, 
Spanish  America. 

Anian,  Strait  of,  8,  26. 

Anson,  George,  30,  60,  73,  75,  181,  377. 

Antilles,  204. 

Anza,  Juan  Bautista  de,  (Jr.),  14,  24,  90, 
92,  115,  127,  130,  145-60,  162-70,  217, 
218,  223,  231,  234,  236,  238-40,  253- 
56,  265,  266,  269-71,  273-304,  307, 
314-17,  319-22,  325-27,  335,  337-42, 
346-61,  364,  365,  378,  380,  384,  386, 
387,  391-95,  400-2,  411,  413-18,  426, 
431,  457-68. 

Anza,  Juan  Bautista  de,  (St.),  24-29,  47, 
157. 

Apacheria,  43,  64,  66,  135. 

Apaches,  3,  13,  16,  18,  26,  28,  29,  34,  35, 
37,  39,  41-50,  54,  61,  65,  66,  69,  78,  79, 
91,  130,  132-37,  139,  140,  144,  147, 
149-52,  156,  157,  162,  164,  275,  280, 
301-4,  306,  307,  338,  340-43,  345,  346, 
351,  363,  365,  367,  386,  390-92,  399- 
402,  406,  409,  411,  412,  414,  424,  425, 
428. 

Aragon,  Pedro  de,  49. 

Aranda,  188,  192,  193,  195,  196,  198, 
201-4,  206-11,  213. 

Arce  y  Arroyo,  62. 

Archangel,  225,  241. 

Archivo  General  de  Indias,  446. 

Arctic  Ocean,  176,  186,  246. 

Areche,  155,  156,  159,  167,  168,  260, 
370-72. 

Argentine,  the,  216. 


471 


472 


INDEX 


Arisivi,  150. 

Arispe,  48,  387,  395,  407. 

Arivaca,  343. 

Arivechi,  48. 

Arizona,  6,  20.  See  Arizonac,  Pimeria 
Alta.  . 

Arizonac,  4,  24-29,  49,  64,  89^ ^> 

Arriaga,  JuMn  de,  73,  77-83r85,  89,  112, 
114,  119,  121,  128,  131-33,  136,  138, 
140,  141,  144,  149,  152,  153,  157,  158, 
165,  168,  169,  220,  221,  223-25,  227, 
229,  231,  233-36,  238-40,  242-44,  247, 
248,  250-52,  255-57,  263,  266,  269, 
270,  272,  274,  277,  278,  286,  288-91, 
298,  299,  303,  304,  308,  309,  311,  312, 
317-20,  325-27,  344,  369,  373,  374,  396. 

Arrillaga,  418,  430-32. 

Arteaga,  371,  418,  419. 

Ascension,  9, 

Asia,  174-76,  178,  179,  225,  241. 

Asiento,  50,  51. 

Asumpcion,  Juan  de  la,  366. 

Ati,  48. 

Atlantic  coast,  75,  174,  178,  183,  189 
337,  376. 

Atlantic  Ocean,  75,  401,  421. 

Australia,  182. 

Austria,  211. 

Ayala,  239,  243,  314,  325-27. 

Ay  game,  131. 

Aysa,  Marques  de,  30,  32,  264. 

Aztecs,  1,  26,  351. 

Azuela,  415. 

Babispe,  49. 

Bac,  San  Javier  del,  20,  24,  48,  70,  146 
154,  361. 

Baegert,  Jacob,  103. 

Baffin,  184,  241. 

Baffin  Bay,  232. 

Baikal,  Lake,  175. 

Baja  California,  7,  10,  11,  15,  17-20,  23, 
29-35,  37,  44,  57-60,  62,  67,  69,  70, 
77,  85-87,  92,  93,  97,  99,  100,  102-12, 
114-20,  125,  128,  155,  156,  160,  161, 
218,  219,  250,  257,  258,  260,  263-65, 
268,  270,  286,  287,  301,  308-13,  317, 
326,  329,  330,  338,  346,  347,  354,  368, 
370,  377,  382,  397,  428-32.  See 
Californias. 

Bakersfield,  361. 

Balthasar,  Juan  Antonio,  62. 

Barbary  Coast,  207. 

Barbastro,  Francisco,  403. 

Barclay,  419. 

Barreneche,  413. 

Barrera,  Marcial,  345. 


Barry,  Felipe,  111,  112,   119,  251,  252, 
266,  267,  311,  312. 

Bayorca,  48. 

Beasts  of   burden.     See   Domestic   ani- 
mals. 

Bejar.     See  San  Antonio  de  Bejar. 

Bering,  Vitus,  176,    177,   221,   225,   241, 
246. 

Bering  Island,  177. 

Bering  Strait,  175,  176,  183,  246. 

Bernal,  19. 

Bicufier,  San  Pedro  y  San  Pablo  de,  412, 
413. 

Bill  Williams'  Fork,  9,  30,  32. 

Bings,  219,  220,  378. 

Biron,  181,  182,  191,  376. 

Bisani,  343. 

"Blue  Lady."  See  Maria  de  Jesus  de 
Agreda. 

Bodega,  port  of,  423,  424. 

Bodega  y  Cuadra,  Juan  de  la,  217,  239, 
242-44,  247,  332,  369-73,  377,  418. 

Boines,  198. 

Bolas  de  plata.     See  Arizonac. 

Bolson  de  Mapiml.     See  Mapimf. 

Bonet,  373,  374. 

Bonilla,  Antonio,  288,  289,  302,  303, 
411. 

Borbon,  432,  433. 

Borica,  418,  430-32. 

Boris,  246. 

Borja,  San  Francisco  de,  67,  309,  380. 

Boston,  203. 

Bougainville,  191. 

Bourbons,  50,  51,  189,  190,  195,  201,  207, 
210,  213. 

Branciforte,  Alta  California,  430. 

Bravo,  Antonio,  296. 

Brazil,  200-2. 

Breteuil,  Baron  de,  197. 

British  East  India  Company,  179. 

British  Isles,  195.     See  England. 

Bucarely  y  Ursiia,  Antonio  Maria,  VIII- 
X,  68,  81,  83,  89,  91-96,  101,  110-12, 
114,  115,  117-22,  127-46,  149,  150, 
153-59,  162,  164,  165,  167-73,  177, 
194,  218-25,  227-40,  242^5,  247-57, 
260-74,  276-81,  283,  284,  286-312, 
314-28,  332,  335,  337-39,  341,  342, 
344,  346,  347,  349-51,  354,  356-64, 
366-96,  402,  403,  409,  411,  417,  418, 
421,  458. 

Buena,  Mariano  de,  149. 

Buenavista,  mining  camp,  49. 

Buenavista,  presidio,  29,  67,  71,  132-34, 
137,  139,  140,  164,  167,  339,  343,  344, 
351,  359,  390,  409,  411,  412. 


INDEX 


473 


Buenos  Aires,  192,  193,  200,  204,  205, 

212,  213. 
Burgoyne,  212. 
Burriel,  Andres,  56-61,  86. 

Cabeza  de  Vaca,  Alvar  Ntinez,  6. 

Caborca,  19,  48,  76,  276,  340,  343. 

Cabots,  the,  184. 

Cabrillo.     See  Rodriguez. 

Cddiz,  200,  213,  373,  374. 

Cajon  Pass,  361. 

Cajuenches,  281,  363,  364,  400,  405-7. 

California.  See  Alta  California,  Baja 
California,  Californias,  Gulf. 

California,  185. 

Californias,  V,  VII,  2,  4,  8-11,  18,  20-24, 
26,  27,  30,  31,  33-35,  39,  40,  42,  44, 
58-60,  62,  65-67,  70,  73-80,  82-84, 
86,  87,  89,  92,  96,  98,  104-6,  108-12, 
115-19,  121,  127-30,  137,  141,  144, 
145,  161,  173,  179,  184,  185,  187,  217- 
20,  223-25,  227,  231,  232,  240-42,  245, 
249-51,  257-72,  275,  300,  318,  326, 
337,  340,  347,  360,  367,  368,  375,  376, 
378-80,  382,  386-88,  393-96,  402,  409, 
410,  412,  413,  419-26,  431-33,  468, 
469.  See  Alta  California,  Baja  Cali- 
fornia, San  Bias. 

Camb6n,  360. 

Campa,  327. 

Campeche,  194. 

Campo  Viergol,  251,  261,  263. 

Campos,  23,  24,  27. 

Canada,  184,  211. 

Cancio,  Lorenzo,  71,  72. 

Canizares,  326. 

Carabajal,  6. 

Caracas,  205. 

Carbajal  y  Lancaster,  Jos6,  36. 

Carbonel,  Esteban,  11. 

Cardona,  Nicolds  de,  9,  10. 

Cardona,  Tomds  de,  10. 

Caribbean  Sea,  216. 

Carmelo,  101,  120,  288,  324,  332,  335, 
356.     See  Monterey. 

Carmelo  River,  30,  37-41. 

Carpio,  Jos6  Manuel  Diaz  del,  151. 

Carrizal,  in  western  Sonora,  133,  140. 

Carrizal,  on  the  northern  frontier,  302. 

Carrizos,  41. 

Cartagena,  205. 

Carteret,  181,  182,  376. 

Casa  de  Contrataci&n,  374. 

Casa-Fuerte,  Marques  de,  139. 

Casa  Grande,  of  Chihuahua,  26. 

Casa  Grande,  of  the  Gila,  19,  26,  351. 

Casa  Tilly,  Marqu6s  de,  200. 


Casafonda,  Manuel  Lanz  de,  103,  104, 
108. 

Casas  Grandes,  4,  16. 

Castejon,  373-75. 

Castillo,  391. 

Catalina  Island,  9. 

Catherine  II,  246. 

Cavendish,  Thomas,  179. 

Ceballos,  Pedro,  200,  201. 

Cermeno,  8. 

Cerro  Prieto,  29,  35,  46,  87,  89,  138,  151, 
153,  284. 

Cerros  Island,  7. 

Chacala,  369. 

Charles  III,  187-90,  193-95,  200-2,  204- 
6,  208-10,  212-16. 

Chatham.     See  Pitt. 

Chemeguabas,  365. 

Chenard,  J036,  375. 

Chihuahua,  province  of,  4,  6,  16,  37,  134, 
135,  400,  433.     See  Nueva  Vizcaya. 

Chihuahua,  San  Felipe  de,  76,  395. 

China,  179,  182,  226,  366,  417,  419,  420. 

Chinese,  174. 

Chinipas,  401. 

"Chirikof,"  221. 

Chirikof,  Alexei,  176,  177,  225,  240,  241, 
246,  247. 

Choiseul,  192-94,  196. 

Choquet  de  la  Isla,  Diego,  373. 

Chukchis,  175,  176,  233,  244. 

Cibola,  6. 

Cieneguilla,  69,  89,  90,  131,  132,  304, 
305,  307,  391. 

Civilians,  part  played  by,  in  Spanish  con- 
quests, 2.     See  Settlers. 

"Civilized  people,"  4. 

Gierke,  183. 

Clipperton,  180. 

Coahuila,  3-5,  78,  136,  139,  140,  302,  303, 
393,  395,  399,  401,  403. 

Coatzacoalcos  River,  217,  224,  234. 

Cocomaricopas,  31,  350,  364,  400,  407. 

Cocospera,  19. 

Cojats,  280. 

Colnett,  419. 

Colonization,  of  the  Californias,  V-IX, 
20-23;  of  Alta  California,  38.  See 
Alta  California,  Baja  California,  Cali- 
fornias, the  Military,  Religious  con- 
quest, Settlers. 

Colorado  Desert,  148,  170,  273,  275,  279, 
281  349  352. 

Colorado  River,'  3,  7,  9,  14,  18-20,  23,  26, 
27,  29-31,  38-41,  43,  58,  65-67,  75,  91, 
117,  118,  130,  148,  153-55,  157,  162, 
163,  165,  166,  265,  266,  269,  270,  276, 


474 


INDEX 


279-82,  284-88,  293,  295,  299,  345-47, 
350,  353,  354,  356,  361-63,  383,  400, 
401,  429-32,  467  ;  passage  of,  340,  351, 
352,  357,  358,  413 ;  westward  branch 
of,  30, 37,  277,  378.  See  Amarillo,  Car- 
melo  River,  Gila  and  Colorado,  Junc- 
tion of  the  Gila  and  Colorado,  Settle- 
ments on  the  Colorado,  Yumas. 

Colorado  River,  of  the  east.  <See  Roxo 
River. 

Columbia  River,  243,  423. 

Comanches,  143,  144,  399,  401,  402, 
415. 

Comandancia  general,  37,  74-78,  137, 
138,  257,  272,  307,  338,  347,  380,  386- 
417,  426. 

Comandante  general.  See  Comandancia 
general,  T.  Croix,  Nava,  Neve,  Rengel, 
Ugarte. 

Comandante  inspector,  137,  138,  140,  169. 
See  Oconor. 

Commons,  House  of,  376. 

Comondti,  San  Jos6,  309,  380. 

Compostela,  12. 

Concepcidn,  260,  261,  370. 

Concepcion,  Point,  37. 

Concha,  Fernando  de  la,  416. 

Conchos,  4. 

Conquest,  agencies  of,  1,  2, 14r-16 ;  north- 
ward, lines  of,  2,  3.  See  Colonization, 
Foreign  danger,  the  Military,  North- 
westward conquest,  Religious  con- 
quest, Settlers. 

Conquistadores,  1,  2. 

Consag,  Fernando,  33,  65,  347. 

Consulado  of  Mexico,  71. 

Conversions  to  Christianity.  See  Reli- 
gious conquest. 

Cook,  buccaneer,  180. 

Cook,  James,  181-83,  220,  362,  368,  376- 
80,  417,  419. 

Copald,  San  Jos6  de,  470. 

Coppermine  River,  186. 

Corbaldn,  Pedro,  89,  131,  132,  149,  394, 
403-7,  414. 

C6rdova,  Juan  de  Dios  de,  117,  264. 

Corodeguache.     See  Fronteras. 

Coronado,  7,  9,  366. 

Corral,  Miguel  de,  369. 

Corres,  Norberto  de,  395. 

Cortes,  1,  6,  77,  231. 

Coruna,  375. 

CosaM,  470. 

Cossacks,  175,  225,  245. 

Costanso,  Miguel,  86,  99,  100,  155,  156, 
159,  325,  429. 

Council  of  Castile,  193. 


Council  of  the  Indies,  20,  21,  28,  30,  32, 
34,  35,  39^2,  46,  63,  77,  79,  85,  115- 
18,  170,  171,  249,  264,  269-72,  420. 

Cowley,  180. 

Crab  Island.     See  Viegues. 

Crame,  Agustin,  217,  224,  230,  231,  233, 
234,  238,  337. 

Crespl,  100,  105,  318,  333. 

Crespo,  Benito,  25,  27,  28. 

Crespo,  Francisco,  276-78,  287,  289,  305, 
339-42,  344,  391,  411. 

Croix,  Francisco  de,  71,  73,  74,  77-79, 
81-89,  94,  102,  110,  113-16,  118,  136, 
137,  139,  141,  152,  153,  179,  193,  194, 
216,  219,  266,  268,  330,  390. 

Croix,  Teodoro  de,  VIII,  IX,  80,  151, 
272,  307,  308,  310,  338,  359,  360,  367- 
69,  386-98,  400-5,  407-16,  425,  469, 
470. 

Cromwell,  203. 

Crops,  in  Alta  California,  102,  120,  124, 
125,  127,  251,  252,  256,  259,  262,  314, 
315,  320,  321,  324,  325,  329-31,  336, 
381-84,  427,  428 ;  in  Baja  California, 
308-11. 

Cruillas,  71,  141,  190. 

Cuba,  94,  208,  374. 

Cucapds,  361,  363,  400,  405. 

Cuellar,  Lope  de,  79. 

Cuerno  Verde,  415. 

Cuesta,  Antonio  de  la,  375. 

CuUacdn,  San  Miguel  de,  6,  12,  36,  47, 
292-94,  470. 

Cumand,  205. 

D'Aiguillon,  193,  195,  196. 

Dampier,  180. 

Danadisiki  Bay,  246. 

Darien,  178. 

Dates,    important,    in    California    and 

United  States  history,  IX. 
Davis,  buccaneer,  180. 
Davis,  seeker  of  the  Northwest  Passage, 

184. 
Decrees,  royal,   11,  20-25,  28,  34,  265, 

307,     See    Arriaga,    Council    of    the 

Indies,  Galvez,  Philip  V,  Trivino. 
D'Estaing,  213. 
De  L'Isle,  241. 
Demetrius,  246. 

Department  of  San  Bias.     See  San  Bias. 
Descripcidn  Geogrdfica  Natural  y  Curiosa 

de  la  Provincia  de  Sonora,  49. 
Desertions,  of  Alta  California  soldiers, 

110-12,  119,  120,  298,  407. 
Deshnef,  Simeon,  175,  246. 
Diablo,  Mt.,  356. 


INDEX 


475 


Diaz,  Juan,  254,  273,  276,  281-83,  285, 
290,  338,  342,  344,  351,  359,  404,  405, 
407-11,  457,  458. 

Diaz,  Melchor,  7,  9. 

Discovery,  376. 

Dixon,  419. 

Dobbs,  Arthur,  185. 

Dolores,  19,  20. 

Dolores,  Alta  California,  360.  See  San 
Francisco  de  Asis. 

Domestic  animals,  for  Alta  California, 
59,  93,  99,  102,  110-12,  161,  218,  250, 
259-61,  271,  273,  276,  284,  285,  294, 
314,  315,  318,  322,  326,  338,  348,  352, 
360,  380-83,  389,  394,  395,  465,  466 ; 
in  Alta  California,  102,  103,  125,  126, 
262,  281,  324,  327,  328,  336,  381,  384, 
417,  427,  428;  in  Baja  California, 
308-11. 

Domlnguez,  337,  367,  398,  399,  402. 

Dominicans,  12,  102,  109,  110,  112,  115- 
19,  163,  165,  249,  257,  261,  264,  265, 
268-71,  308-12.  322,  346,  347,  428-30. 
See  Baja  California. 

Douglas,  419. 

Doz,  Vicente,  240,  241,  244. 

Drake,  Francis,  7,  178,  179. 

Drake's  Bay,  7,  8,  102,  112,  114. 

Duncan,  419. 

Durango,  bishop  of,  28,  265 ;  city  of,  76, 
78,  87,  395  ;  province  of,  4,  {See  Nueva 
Vizcaya) ;   Real  Caja  of,  140. 

Dutch,  60,  64,  74,  75,  174,  179,  183,  186, 
227. 

East  Indies,  59,  75,  179,  195. 

Eaton,  180. 

Echarri,  Miguel  Gregorio  de,  297,  468. 

Echeveste,  Juan  Jose  de,  257,  258,  260- 

62,  267,  273,  295,  296.  461-67.     See 

Reglamento. 
Efifects.     See  Goods  and  effects. 
Egmont,  Port,  191-93. 
Eixarch,  347,  351,  459. 
Elizabeth,  of  England,  178. 
Elizabeth,  of  Russia,  246. 
Elizondo,  Domingo.  69,  71-73,  78,  79, 

81,  87-90,  130,  132,  151-53,  322. 
El  Paso,  28,  399,  432. 
Encino,  San  Miguel  del,  428. 
England,  30,  50,  51,  55,  66,   174,   187- 

215,  388,  420,  421,  423. 
English,  3,  59-61,  64,  65,  67,  75,  167, 

178-86,  217,  219-21,  231-34,  241,  246, 

247,    368,    417,    419-24.     See    Cook 

(James). 
English  Revolution,  204. 


Ensenada,  Marques  de,  36. 

Escalante,  Silvestre  V61ez  de,  337,  344, 
345,  366,  367,  398-402. 

Escandon,  6. 

Escarano,  205-7,  214. 

Escobar,  32-34. 

Espinosa,  Jos6  Ignacio,  296. 

Esplritu  Santo,  5,  137. 

Estehacowy,  225. 

Estrajort,  Guillermo,  27. 

Europe,  22,  24,  53,  75,  174,  187,  193,  194, 
200,  201,  245. 

Expediente,  defined,  XIV. 

Expense,  154,  344 ;  for  Alta  California, 
93,  94,  98,  104,  106-9,  111,  156,  160, 
161,  168,  169,  231,  258,  259,  296,  297, 
299,  348,  349,  354,  365,  380,  382,  394, 
396,  397,  461-68 ;  for  Baja  California, 
10,  11,  20-23,  258,  259,  397,  (See  Baja 
California) ;  for  northwestward  con- 
quest, 63,  69,  386,  417 ;  for  San  Bias, 
115,  231,  258,  259,  397;  for  San  Bias 
and  the  Californias,  127-29,  259,  421- 
24;  for  the  Californias,  106,  115,  224, 
398;  for  the  Colorado  River  settle- 
ments, 407-12,  414;  for  the  frontier 
provinces,  433  ;  for  the  region  of  the  Gila 
and  Colorado,  28,  34,  166 ;  for  voyages 
of  exploration,  236,  242,  369.  See  Fi- 
nances, Gifts  for  Indians,  Pious  fund. 

Explorations,  by  missionaries,  discussed 
by  Morfi,  398-400.  See  Northwest- 
ward conquest,  and  names  of  explorers. 

Factor,  of  the  Californias,  259,  382. 

Fages,  Pedro,  101,  102,  111-14,  119-21, 
218,  251,  254,  262,  263,  266,  267,  288, 
297,  315,  316,  320,  325,  328-32,  354, 
418,  428-30. 

Falkland  Islands,  187,  188,  191-94,  216. 

Families  of  settlers  for  Alta  California. 
See  Colonization,  Settlers. 

Family  Compact,  55,  66,  187-89,  193, 
194,  196-98,  201-4,  213,  421. 

Famine  in  Alta  California.  See  Food 
supphes. 

Favores  Celestiales,  20. 

Favorita,  418. 

Fenix,  372. 

Ferdinand  VI,  51. 

Fermin,  25. 

Ferndn-Nrinez,  199. 

Fernandez,  Diego,  79. 

Fernandinos,  100,  106,  109,  116,  118,  265, 
268,  270,  326,  332,  334,  335,  429.  See 
Franciscans,  Religious  conquest,  San 
Fernando,  and  names  of  Fernandinos. 


476 


INDEX 


Ferrelo,  7. 

Finances,  25,  46,  51-53,  69,  71,  76,  78- 
80,  90,  190,  261,  266,  268,  401,  425, 
455,  456.  See  Expense,  Junta  de 
ffuerra  y  real  hacienda,  and  names  of 
cajas  reales. 

Finland,  198. 

Fiscal,  39 ;  of  Mexico,  43,  62,  271,  320, 
(See  Areche,  Borb6n,  Casafonda,  Goye- 
neche,  Rebolledo) ;  of  the  Council  of 
the  Indies,  28,  31,  42,  63,  117,  270. 

Florence,  94. 

Florida,  5,  6,  189,  190,  211. 

Floridablanca,  188,  211-14. 

Font,  Pedro,  151,  297,  299,  339,  347,  351, 
355,  356,  364,  459,  460,  467. 

Food  supplies,  for  Alta  California,  59,  93, 
96-102,  107,  113,  119,  124,  125,  160, 
161,  235,  240,  249-57,  259,  260,  280, 
281,  284,  289,  317,  320,  331,  340,  357, 
359,  368,  370-72,  381,  382,  427.  See 
Crops,  Domestic  animals.  Supply 
ships. 

Foreign  danger,  3,  16,  32,  38,  53,  58-61, 
63,  65,  73-75,  82,  83,  85,  86,  92-94, 
113,  116,  117,  129,  146,  167,  173-75, 
187,  188,  192,  216,  217,  219,  220,  228, 
229,  235,  236,  238-40,  242,  274,  314, 
315,  320,  338,  341,  387,  411,  417-20, 
427,  432-34.  See  Americans,  Dutch, 
English,    French,    Portuguese,    Rus- 


France,  55,  66,  75,  174,  187-89,  191-98, 
201-14,  420,  421. 

Franciscans,  12,  23,  34,  70,  102,  104,  112, 
116,  117,  249,  253,  257,  264,  308,  315, 
322  ;  of  Jalisco,  72,  88.  See  Fernandi- 
nos,  Queretaranos,  Quer6taro,  San 
Fernando. 

French,  3,  5,  16,  36-41,  43,  55,  60,  65-67, 
75,  179,  181,  183,  184,  186,  241,  246, 
247,  419. 

Frobisher,  184. 

Fronteras,  Corodeguache  de,  16,  19,  24- 
26,  29,  48,  54,  132,  134,  135,  150,  305, 
343. 

Frontier  provinces,  1-13,  43,  44,  65,  66, 
73-81,  87,  92,  237,  248,  257,  266,  301- 
4,  307,  308,  410-12,  417,  433.  See 
Alta  California,  Apaches,  Baja  Cali- 
fornia, Californias,  Chihuahua,  Coa- 
huila,  Comandancia  general,  Durango, 
Moqui,  New  Mexico,  Nueva  Vizcaya, 
Nuevo  Leon,  Nuevo  Santander,  Pi- 
meria  Alta,  Sinaloa,  Sonora,  Texas. 

Fuca,  241. 

Fuenclara,  Conde  de,  31,  34. 


Fuerte  de  Montesclaros,  13,  47,  292,  293, 

425,  470. 
Funnel,  180. 
Fur  trade,  75,  175,  177,  178,  182-86,  225, 

226,  245-47,  417,  419,  420,  422. 

Gage,  General,  204. 

Gali,  Francisco,  8. 

Gallardo,  Jos6,  35,  54. 

Gallo,  4. 

Galvez,  Bernardo  de,  426,  428. 

Gdlvez,  Jos6  de,  VIII,  45,  51-53,  67-71, 
73-89, 91, 94, 97, 105, 106, 108, 110, 113, 
116-18,  141,  143,  145,  153,  154,  161, 
179,  190,  219,  248,  249,  257,  263-72, 
304-6,  312,  316,  320,  325,  326,  328, 
347,  354,  357,  359,  360,  362,  364,  367, 
369,  372-80,  386-93,  395,  396,  398, 
402,  403,  409,  411,  413,  415,  416,  418, 
419,  469. 

Garc6s,  Francisco,  70,  145-49,  153-59, 
162-67,  169,  218,  254,  265,  273-76, 
281,  283-88,  295,  297,  299,  337^4, 
346,  347,  352-54,  359-66,  387,  401-7, 
411,  413,  414,  430,  458,  459,  467. 

Gamier,  201,  204,  205. 

Gente  de  razdn.     See  "Civilized  people." 

Georgia,  59. 

Gibraltar,  51,  189,  213,  214. 

Gifts  for  Indians,  106,  107,  124,  132,  133, 
166,  276,  287,  291,  293,  348,  350,  351, 
357,  362,  385, 404-6,  412,  413,  424,  425, 
466. 

Gil  de  Bernab6,  Juan  Crisostomo,  133, 
158. 

Gil  Samaniego,  Manuel,  89. 

Gila  and  Colorado  rivers,  region  of  the, 
14-20,  22-25,  28-35,  37-45,  47,  50, 
53-55,  57-59,  62-64,  66,  88,  89,  92, 
118,  145,  146,  150,  153,  162,  164,  166, 
168,  271,  283,  290,  299,  337-44,  351, 
353,  35^60,  364-67,  386,  387,  390, 
394,  398-415.  See  Colorado  River, 
Gila  River,  Junction  of  the  Gila  and 
Colorado. 

Gila  Mountains,  19,  148. 

Gila  River,  7,  13,  19,  20,  24,  26,  29,  33, 
47,  76,  79,  91,  117,  130,  146-48,  275, 
288,  304,  345,  349,  350,  358,  362,  363, 
406,  409,  411. 

Gold,  in  Alta  California,  V,  VI,  VIII-X, 
272,  388,  418-20,  427,  435.  See 
Precious  metals. 

Gonzaga,  San  Luis,  67. 

Gonzdlez  Cabrera  Bueno,  37,  84. 

Gonzdlez  Carvajal,  Ciriaco,  419,  420. 

Good  Hope,  Cape  of,  179,  226. 


INDEX 


477 


Goods  and  Effects,  for  Alta  California, 
59,  93,  94,  96,  120,  127,  231,  250,  253, 
254,  258-60,  265,  272,  284,  314,  368, 
382-84,  394,  395,  397,  398,  418,  427, 
(See  Military  equipment.  Supply 
ships) ;  for  San  Bias,  372,  373. 

Government,  170-72.  See  Comandancia 
general,  Council  of  the  Indies,  Fiscal, 
Junta,  Junta  de  guerra,  Ministro  gene- 
ral, Reglamento,  and  names  of  officers 
and  governmental  agencies. 

Goya,  Manuel  Ram6n  de,  374,  468. 

Goyeneche,  Jos6  de,  40,  41. 

Graft,  66,  77,  139,  141-43,  152,  167,  289, 
304,  342,  343,  392. 

Grantham,  Lord,  202,  214. 

Gray,  419. 

Great  Lakes,  186. 

Great  Wall,  the,  226. 

Grijalva,  Juan  Pablo,  296,  347,  352. 

Grimaldi,  Marqu6s  de,  82,  188,  192,  193, 
195,  196,  198,  199,  201-3,  205-11,  220, 
221,  224,  225,  227,  233,  244,  247,  373. 

Grogniet,  180. 

Groseilliers,  184. 

Guadalajara,  12,  27,  74,  79,  82,  87,  316, 
381 ;  Audiencia  of,  12,  30,  52,  74,  76, 
79,  82  ;  bishop  of,  265  ;  Real  Caja  of, 
52,  53,  85,  140,  425,  455,  456. 

Guadalupe,  N.  S.  de,  309,  380. 

Guadalupe  River,  394. 

Guatemala,  369. 

Guayaquil,  371,  372. 

Guaymas,  29,  49,  87,  132,  429. 

Guebavi,  20,  24,  48,  49. 

Guines,  203. 

Guise,  419. 

Gulf  of  California,  10,  19,  27,  32,  33,  40, 
57,  103,  116,  118,  161,  166,  268,  346, 
366,  418,  433.     See  Storms. 

Guzmdn,  Nuno  de,  6,  11,  12. 

Habilitado,  142,  143. 

Haller,  226. 

Hanna,  419. 

Haro,  420. 

Harris,  180. 

Havana,  205,  209,  211,   212,   237,   373- 

75. 
Hawaiian  Islands,  182,  183. 
Hawkins,  178. 

Hearne,  Samuel,  185,  186,  220. 
Heceta,  Bruno    de,  217,  236,  238,   239, 

242-44,  247,  314,  321,  327,  332,  334, 

369-71,  377,  378,  418. 
Hermosillo,  29. 
Herreria,  Vizconde  de  la,  61,  82,  227. 


Hijosa,  Francisco,  128,  229,  230,  238, 
251,  252,  255,  256,  263. 

Holland,  191. 

Honduras,  51,  190,  211. 

Horcasitas,  San  Miguel  de,  35,  43,  44, 
54,  61,  62,  134,  135,  137,  139,  140,  164, 
167,  297,  305,  339,  343,  344,  349,  351, 
356,  359,  390,  392,  409,  411,  412. 

Horn,  Cape,  191,  192,  377,  379. 

Hudson,  184,  241. 

Hudson  Bay,  184-86,  232,  234,  333. 

Hudson  Strait,  184. 

Hudson's  Bay  Company,  184r-86,  220, 
232,  233. 

Huerta,  San  Antonio  de  la,  48,  90. 

Hurdaide.     See  Martinez  de  Hurdaide. 

Ibarra,  Francisco  de,  4. 

Imperial  Academy  of  Sciences,  227. 

India,  179. 

Indians,  of  Alta  California,  93,  98,  106- 
9,  111,  124-26,  252,  318,  320,  323,  324, 
328-34 ;  of  northern  Baja  California, 
103,  107.  See  Apaches,  Aztecs,  Ca- 
juenches,  Carrizos,  Chemaguabas, 
Chukchis,  Cocomaricopas,  Cojats,  Co- 
manches,  Cucupds,  Gila  and  Colorado, 
Jalchedunes,  Jalliquamais,  Jamajabes, 
Jequiches,  Lipanes,  Mayos,  the  Mili- 
tary, Monterey,  Moquis,  Nataj6s, 
Navaj6s,  Nixores,  Opas,  Opatas, 
Pdpagos,  Piatos,  Pimas,  Quiquimas, 
Religious  conquest,  Salineros,  San 
Diego,  San  Gabriel,  Santa  Barbara 
Channel,  Seris,  Shoshonean  family, 
Sibubapas,  Soyopas,  Suaquis,  Tarau- 
mares,  Tejas,  Tepocas,  Yabipais, 
Yaquis,  Yumas,  Yutas,  Zuflis,  and 
names  of  Indian  chiefs  and  villages. 

Ireland,  209. 

Iriarte,  Juan  Pedro,*  115-17. 

Irkutsk,  175. 

Isabelas,  Islas,  230. 

Italy,  94. 

Iturbe,  Juan  de,  10. 

Ivan  IV,  175,  246. 

Jalapa,  71. 

Jalchedunes,    340,   341,   363,   364,   400, 

405-7. 
Jalisco,  6. 

Jalliquamais,  364,  400. 
Jamaica,  59,  189,  190. 
Jamajabes,  363,  364,  400,  405. 

Janos,'4,  16,  79,  132,  134,  150,  288,  402, 
411. 


478 


INDEX 


Japan,  176,  226,  232,  246. 

Japanese,  174. 

Jequiches,  364. 

Jesuits,  3,  12,  13,  15,  17,  18,  21-24,  26, 
29-34,  36,  42,  46-^8,  56,  57,  59,  61,  62, 
69,  72,  85,  86,  105,  106,  109,  115-17, 
128,  146,  153,  162,  163,  266,  267,  271, 
277.     See  Baja  California,  Sonora. 

Jose  I,  200. 

Juan,  Jorge,  225. 

Juan  de  Fuca,  Strait  of,  333. 

Junction  of  the  Gila  and  Colorado,  19, 
57,  59,  69,  70,  76,  78,  117,  143,  148, 
234,  265,  273-76,  283,  339,  349,  362, 
387.  See  Gila  and  Colorado  rivers, 
Yumas. 

Junta,  73,  77-79,  83,  97,  99,  171,  172, 
370,  371,  413,  414. 

Junta  de  guerra  y  real  hacienda  of  Mexico, 
21,  23,  28,  35,  36,  38,  40-^2,  62,  63,  71, 
118,  121,  133,  137,  141,  14&^8,  156- 
59,  161,  162,  167-72,  224,  228,  236, 
258,  260-63,  268,  271,  274,  294,  295, 
297-99,  304,  321,  467,  468. 

Kadiak  Island,  178,  418. 

Kamchatka,   176,   177,  220-22,  224-26, 

232,  240,  241,  244-47. 
Kansas,  7. 

Keller,  Ignacio,  29,  46. 
Kendrick,  419. 
King,  the.     See  Decrees. 
Kino,  Eusebio,  18-23,  65. 
Krenitzin,  177,  225. 
Kurile  Islands,  176,  246,  247. 

Labaquera,  Pedro  de,  55,  63-67,  141. 

Laborers,  for  Alta  California,  107,  110, 
120,  126,  127,  298. 

La  Brea  ranch,  107. 

Lacy,  Conde  de,  177,  220-22,  224-27, 
232,  233,  244-47. 

Ladrones  Islands,  376. 

Lampon,  419. 

Land  Route,  between  New  Mexico  and 
Alta  California,  89,  130,  143,  159,  160, 
218,  265,  266,  271,  316,  337,  345,  361, 
362,  367,  378,  387,  392,  400-3,  418, 
426,  430-33  ;  between  Sonora  and  Alta 
Qalifornia,  37,  38,  70,  ^  89,  91-93, 
103,  106,  107,  109,  110,  115,  119,  1^ 
145-47,  149,  150,  153-60,  163,  165-70, 
218,  234,  250,  265,  269,  271,  273-92, 
295,  301,  315-17,  326,  337-43,  349- 
63,  357,  358,  361,  365-68,  380,  387, 
390,  409,  410,  413,  414,  417,  418,  424, 
426-33 ;      between  Sonora  and    Baja 


California,  30-33,  42,  95,  117,  163, 
346,  347 ;  between  Sonora  and  the 
Calif ornias,  39,  42,  44,  66,  69,  77,  141, 
144  ;  between  Sonora  and  New  Mexico 
38,  44,  66,  69,  143,  145,  149,  163,  337, 
338,  340-46,  387,  400-3,  430 ;  to  Alta 
California  (generally),  93,  98. 

La  Paz,  6. 

La  P6rouse,  419,  420. 

La  Salle,  5. 

Lasuen,  253,  254. 

Lauretana,  260,  261. 

Leaders,  importance  of,  as  an  agency  of 
conquest,  16. 

Lee,  Arthur,  212. 

Lena  River,  175. 

Le6n,  Alonso  de,  5. 

Le6n,  Isla  de,  373. 

Levashef,  177. 

Leyden  Gazette,  245. 

Lima,  370,  371. 

Linares,  Viceroy,  23. 

Link,  Wenceslao,  67. 

Lipanes,  399,  400 

Lisbon,  201,  208. 

Lizazoin,  49. 

Lloyd,  226. 

London,  60,  193,  196,  203-5,  213,  216, 
376,  379. 

Lorenzana,  77. 

Loreto,  109-11,  120,  156,  161,  218,  250- 
52,  259-61,  263,  265,  267,  268,  271, 
288,  309,  313,  317,  383,  423,  431. 

Los  Angeles,  398. 

Louis  XV,  193,  196. 

Louis  XVI,  196,  197,  203,  214. 

Louisiana,  5,  183,  190,  208,  209,  401. 

Lowrie,  419. 

Luis,  Don,  45,  46. 

Luzon,  419. 

Lynd,  247. 

Madrid,  20,  56,  117,  137,  197,  202,  213. 

See  Spain. 
Rlagdalena,  307. 
Magellan,  Straits  of,  179. 
Mails,  for  Alta  California,  263,  284,  312, 

313,  382,  383,  428,  429. 
Maloya,  San  Juan  Bautista  de,  470. 
Maluinas.     See  Falkland  Islands. 
Manchus,  175. 
Mangino,  260,  261. 
Manila,  8,  60,  179,  190,  223,  224,    231, 

419. 
Manila  galleon,  7-9,  18,  21,  32,  38,   41, 

58,  60,  64,  83,  179-81,  194,  219,   222, 

262,  265,  268,  271,  272,  284,  319,  381. 


INDEX 


479 


Manrique,  Miguel,  236,  238,  239,  256, 
321. 

Manufactured  articles.  See  Goods  and 
efifects.  Military  equipment. 

Manxon,  Francisco  374. 

MapimI,  Bolson  de,  138. 

Maria  de  Jestis  de  Agreda,  333. 

Maria  Victoria,  200. 

Marias,  Islas.     See  Tres  Marias. 

Martinez,  420. 

Martinez  de  Hurdaide,  Diego,  13. 

Matagorda  Bay,  5. 

Matanchel,  369. 

Maurepas,  198,  206,  211. 

Mayorga,  Martin  de,  398. 

Mayos,  29,  36. 

Mazatldn,  48,  180. 

Meares,  419. 

Melilla,  199. 

Mendinueta,  Pedro  Fermin  de,  143,  144, 
344,  345,  367,  402. 

Mendocino,  Cape,  8,  58,  60,  116,  241. 

Mendoza,  Juan  de,  62-63,  153. 

Messa,  Jos6  de,  27. 

Mexico,  archbishop  of,  115,  116,  118; 
Audiencia  of,  43,  104 :  Gulf  of,  106, 
216  ;    Real  Caja  of,  52,  53. 

Mexico  City,  1,  2,  28,  33,  35,  36,  38,  40, 
42,  49,  56,  58,  59,  62,  67,  69,  71,  73,  74, 
76,  79,  89,  103,  106,  112-14,  119,  128, 
141,  146,  158,  159,  161,  165,  170,  219, 
234,  237,  238,  242,  257,  259-61,  273, 
275,  281,  285-92,  300,  304,  311,  313, 
338,  356,  357,  359,  366,  375,  382,  384, 
390,  394,  395,  397,  455,  456. 

Michoacdn,  12. 

Miera,  Bernardo,  345. 

Military,  the,  part  played  by,  in  Spanish 
conquests,  1,  2  ;  in  Alta  California,  93, 
106-8,  111-14,  120,  122,  127,  159, 
258,  263,  267,  268,  315,  323,  325,  328- 
34,  354,  381,  384,  394,  396,  397,  428, 
(See  Desertions,  Indians,  Military 
equipment.  Settlers)  ;  in  Baja  Cali- 
fornia, 258,  268,  312,  397. 

Military  equipment,  for  Alta  California, 
220,  254,  260,  314,  320 ;  for  the  Cali- 
fornias,  224,  230. 

Mining,  2.     See  Precious  metals. 

Ministro  general  de  Indias,  defined,  XIV. 
See  Arriaga,  Gdlvez,  Trivino. 

Minorca,  51,  189,  213. 

Missionaries.     See  Religious  conquest. 

Missions.     See  Religious  conquest. 

Mississippi  River,  55,  183,  366. 

Missouri  River,  241. 

Mojave  River,  361. 


Moluccas,  226. 

Monclova,  5. 

Monterey,  8,  18,  23,  32,  37,  40,  41,  58- 
60,  70,  75,  78,  81-85,  97,  98,  100,  101, 
107-11,  114,  115,  117,  120,  122-25, 
127,  149,  153-56,  158,  161-63,  166, 
168,  169,  218,  220,  222,  223,  228-30, 
234-36,  238-40,  243,  244,  250,  251, 
253-56,  259,  260,  262,  265-67,  271, 
272,  280,  281,  283-85,  288,  294,  295, 
297,  312-14,  316-19,  321-27,  331, 
332,  335,  337,  338,  340-43,  345,  349, 
353,  355,  356,  361,  363-67,  371,  378, 
379,  381-84,  389,  392,  394,  396,  399- 
401,  403,  407,  411,  423,  467,  468. 

Monterey  River,  319. 

Montesclaros.  See  Fuerte  de  Montes- 
claros. 

Montevideo,  191,  192. 

Montezuma,  150. 

Montmorin,  213. 

Montreal,  220. 

Moqui,  23,  24,  27-30,  33,  34,  38,  43,  44, 
47,  57,  59,  69,  146,  147,  149,  333,  337 ,~ 
340,  341,  344,  345,  351,  361,  362,  364- 
67,  386,  400,  401. 

Moquis,  18,  47,  147,  345,  362,  365,  403. 

Mora,  309-12. 

Moraga,  Jos6  Joaquin,  296,  347,  352, 
356,  360,  384. 

Morfi,  Juan,  398-402. 

Morgan,  Sir  Henry,  178. 

Morocco,  187,  198,  199,  203. 

Muller,  61,  177,  241,  246,  247. 

Muleg6,  Santa  Rosalia,  309. 

Nacori,  48. 

Naples,  189,  190. 

Narvdez,  6. 

Natajes,  399,  400. 

Nava,  Pedro  de,  431-33. 

Navajos,  345,  401. 

Navarro,  Pedro  Galindo,  408,  409,  414. 

Nayarit,  138,  140. 

New  Mexico,  2-4,  6,  7,  9,  18,  23,  24,  28, 
32-34,  37-39,  44,  55,  58,  66,  69,  75,  78, 
80,  89,  130,  135,  137,  138,  140,  143-45, 
147,  149,  155,  157-60,  162,  163,  218, 
265,  266,  271,  284,  301,  307,  333,  337, 
338,  340-45,  347,  351,  362,  363,  365- 
67,  376,  378,  387-89,  392,  399-403, 
415-18,  423,  425,  426,  430-33.  ^See 
Moqui. 

New  Orleans,  5,  56. 

New  Spain,  22,  26,  30,  32,  41,  45,  52,  58, 
59,  61-63,  66,  67,  71,  75,  80,  86,  94-96, 
115,  116,  118,  137,  139,  154,  173,  174, 


480 


INDEX 


180,  181,  190,  194,  205,  208,  211,  216, 
233,  237,  248,  249,  264,  266,  269,  274, 
314,  319,  355,  372,  376,  377,  386,  388, 
390,  422,  424,  428. 

New  Zealand,  182. 

Newfoundland,  211. 

Neve,  FeUpe  de,  310-13,  322,  326,  346, 
354,  356,  357,  369,  380-85,  387,  388, 
393-98,  410,  413-15. 

Nicaragua,  215. 

Nixores,  265,  404. 

Niza,  Marcos  de,  6. 

Nootka,  179,  420-24,  429 ;  controversy, 
417,  420,  421. 

Nootka  Sound,  419. 

North,  Lord,  193,  206. 

North  Africa,  199. 

North  America,  38,  58,  77,  82,  167,  174, 
176-78,  182,  183,  189,  197,  198,  208, 
216,  220-22,  224-27,  232,  240,  241, 
245-47,  386,  400,  417,  419. 

North  Pole,  219,  378. 

North  West  Company,  186. 

Northwest  passage,  65,  178,  182,  184, 
185,  241,  376-78. 

Northwestward  conquest,  6-8,  10-13, 
23-29,  45,  55-62,  68-70,  74,  77,  81, 
173,  211,  216,  227,  249,  255,  314,  318, 
320-22,  386,  388,  417,  420.  See  Con- 
quest, Gila  and  Colorado,  Land  routes. 
Voyages  of  exploration. 

Noticia  de  la  California,  56-61. 

Nueva  Galicia,  12,  30,  63,  73,  74. 

Nueva  Galicia.     See  Santiago. 

Nueva  Vizcaya,  2^,  21,  38,  39,  41,  48, 
50,  54,  63,  73-80,  90,  133-35,  139,  140, 
144,  289,  303,  307,  312,  388,  389,  399, 
401,  402,  411,  416.  See  Chihuahua, 
Durango. 

Nuevo  Leon,  3,  5,  6,  138,  140,  399,  401, 
426. 

Nuevo  Santander,  3,  6,  426. 

Nunez,  Alvar.     See  Cabeza  de  Vaca. 

Nutrias,  343. 

Ob  River,  175. 

Ocio,  Antonio  de,  317. 

Ocio,  Manuel  de,  64. 

Oconor,  Hugo,  134-36,  138-40,  142,  143, 

237,  238,  289,  301-7,  338,  344,  345, 

351,  390,  391,  411,  414. 
Okhotsk,  175,  176,  246,  247. 
Olguln,  Antonio  de,  162,  163. 
Onate,  4,  9,  10,  398. 
Opas,  146,  147,  149,  265,  350. 
Opatas,  139,  157,  392. 
Oregon,  V,  IX. 


O'Reilly,  Alejandro,  Conde  de,  140,  152, 

199,  223,  237-39,  278. 
Ortega,  105,  322. 
Ossun,  197,  201-5,  207,  213. 
Ostimuri,  48,  49,  470. 
Otondo,  11,  18. 
Overland  routes.     See  Land  route. 

Pacific  coast,  22,  30,  32,  37,  40,  55,  74, 
75,  82,  83,  173-75,  178-81,  185,  188, 
216,  217,  220,  223,  224,  232,  234,  239- 
41,  267,  362,  377,  388,  411,  418. 

Pacific  Ocean,  30,  37,  39-41,  59,  60,  65, 
70,  73,  75,  146,  155,  166,  174-76,  178- 
88,  217,  220,  222,  231,  233,  234,  241, 
244,  246,  247,  337,  376,  401,  421, 
435. 

Palma,  Salvador,  275,  277-79,  282, 
285-88,  290,  293,  338,  349-51,  356, 
357,  359,  360,  367.  401,  403,  405-7, 
412. 

Palou  Francisco,  100,  105,  106,  108,  110, 
122-26,  153,  159,  252,  269,  274,  278, 
284,  318,  323-25,  327,  335,  360. 

Panamd,  Isthmus  of,  1,  110,  178,  180, 
205. 

Pangua,  335. 

Panowbafew,  225. 

Papagueria,  19,  146-48,  ^57,  273,  275- 
77,  343,  362,  405,  406. 

Papagos,  27,  34,  151,  157,  164,  279,  362, 
364,  399,  400,  405,  407,  424. 

Paris,  201,  240,  376. 

Parliament,  185,  193. 

Parras,  4. 

Parrilla,  Diego,  35,  39,  45,  46,  54. 

Pasage,  4,  5. 

Paterna,  108. 

Pearl  fishinjg.  10,  11,  21,  22,  30,  32,  67, 

—110. 

Pedro  III  of  Aragon,  X. 

Pena,  318. 

Peramds,  Melchor  de,  234,  285. 

Perez,  Juan,  113,  217,  222-24,  227-31, 
233-36,  238-45,  251-53,  255,  322. 

Perfecto,  Father,  149. 

Peru,  192,  216,  370-73,  414^  _         .  ^  ■ 

Peter  the  Great,  176,  246.     ^' "' '     ' 

Petrograd.     See  St.  Petersburg. 

Peyrdn,  Diego,  151. 

Philip  V,  20,  34. 

Philippine  Company,  420. 

Philippines,  31,  41,  58,  116,  181,  215, 
319,  419,  420,  422. 

Piatos,  134,  343,  344,  399. 

Pilar,  260,  261. 

Pilar,  N.  S.  de.     See  Todos  Santos. 


INDEX 


481 


Pimas,  26,  27,  29,  37,  41,  42,  44-46,  49, 
54,  62,  68,  72,  78,  79,  87,  132,  134,  139, 
150,  164-66,  279,  305-7,  343,  345,  363, 
391,  399,  424.  See  Pimas  Altos, 
Pimas  Bajos,  Pimas  Gilenos,  Piatos. 

Pimas  Altos,  17,  34,  54,  392. 

Pimas  Bajos,  49. 

Pimas  Gilenos,  28,  146,  147,  149,  153-55, 
157,  164,  340,  342,  362,  364,  365,  400, 
405-7. 

Pimeria,  33,  57,  72,  90, 166,  275,  399,  401. 

Pimeria  Alta,  13,  15,  18-20,  23,  24,  28, 
31,  32,  34,  41,  42,  44,  45,  48,  49,  64,  69, 
79,  90,  134,  140,  146,  158,  162,  264, 
280,  297,  333,  391. 

Pimeria  Baja,  79,  167. 

Pineda,  Juan  de,  152. 

Pious  fund,  17,  115,  128,  259-61,  265, 
271,  299,  423,  468. 

Pitic,  132,  133,  140,  297,  307,  468. 

Pitiqui,  29,  31,  33,  35,  44,  54,  61.  , 

Pitt,  William,  189,  205,  206. 

Plata,  Rio  de  la,  51,  199. 

Poland,  195,  197. 

Pombal,  199.  200,  202,  204. 

Porciuncula  River,  398. 

Portlock,  419. 

Porto  Rico,  194,  196,  205,  208,  209,  212. 

Portobello,  205. 

Portold,  Caspar  de,  84,  85,  96-101,  112, 
113,  318,  330,  331. 

Portsmouth,  195. 

Portugal,  51,  187,  198-206,  208-10. 

Portuguese,  174,  179,  183,  186. 

PotosI,  Real  Caja  of,  140. 

Prat,  Pedro,  121. 

Precious  metals,  15,  37,  40,  47-^9,  53, 
64,  65,  69,  76-79,  85-88,  131,  425. 
See  Arizonac,  Cieneguilla,  Gold, 
Huerta. 

Presidios,  line  of,  301-4.  See  Gila  and 
Colorado,  Graft,  Military,  North- 
westward conquest,  Reglamento,  and 
names  of  captains  and  presidios. 

PHncipe,  229,  230,  236,  251-57,  260,  354, 
370-72,  381,  384. 

Princesa,  418,  420. 

Provincias  Internas.  See  Frontier  prov- 
inces. 

Provisional  reglamento.     See  Reglamento. 

Provisions.     See  Food  supplies. 

Prussia,  211. 

Pueblos,  in  Alta  California,  428. 

Purlsima  Concepcion,  of  Alta  Califor- 
nia, 434;  of  Baja  California,  309; 
on  the  Colorado  River,  412,  413. 

Puritans,  203. 
2i 


Queretaranos,  72,  8S,  117,  118,  133,  145, 
146,  167,  265,  271.  See  Franciscans, 
Queretaro,  and  names  of  Queretaranos. 

Quer6taro,  3,  312,  395 ;  College  of,  339, 
342,  467.     See  Queretaranos. 

Quiquimas,  163,  165. 

Quiros,  256,  371. 

Quivira,  7,  26,  333,  367. 

Rdbago,  Francisco,  375. 

Radisson,  184. 

Ramos,  Antonio,  305. 

Rations.     See  Fopd  supplies. 

Real  Caja.  See  Alamos,  Durango,  Gua- 
dalajara, Mexico,  Potosi,  Rosario. 

Rebolledo,  Juan  Ollvar,  27,  157. 

Red  River.     See  Roxo  River. 

Reggio,  Andres,  373. 

Reglamento,  of  presidios,  69,  134,  136-40, 
142-44;  of  the  Californias,  119,  121, 
217,  218,  223,  224,  249,  257-64,  266- 
72,  298,  395-98. 

Religious  conquest,  2,  3,  14,  15,  290,  291 
in  Alta  California,  101,  114,  119,  121- 
25,  127,  161,  227,  251,  252,  256,  259, 
262,  263,  266,  267,  315,  317,  321,  323- 
28,  335,  336,  382,  383,  385,  427.  See 
Dominicans,  Femandinos,  Francis- 
cans, Gila  and  Colorado,  Indians,  Ja- 
lisco, Jesuits,  Military,  Queretaranos, 
San  Fernando,  Secular  clergy.  Secu- 
larization, Settlements,  and  names  of 
missionaries,  missions,  and  regions. 

Rengel,  Jos6  Antonio,  416. 

Residencia,  95. 

Resolution,  376. 

Revilla  Gigedo,  Conde,  de,  (Jr.),  420-24, 
428,  429. 

Revilla  Gigedo,  Conde  de,  (Sr,),  34,  62. 

Reyes,  Point,  323. 

Richmond,  205. 

Rincon,  331. 

Rio  Chico,  48. 

Rio  Grande,  presidio,  403. 

Rio  Grande  de  Cosninas,  344. 

Rio  Grande  River,  4,  5,  400,  401. 

Rivera,  Pedro  de,  80. 

Rivera  Cambas,  Manuel,  95. 

Rivera  y  Moncada,  Fernando  de,  99, 
102,  112,  113,  217-20,  229,  254,  255, 
262,  263,  267,  268,  274,  278,  295,  297- 
99,  313-17,  319-22,  324-28,  335,  336, 
353-57,  360,  381-85,  393-95,  413,  467, 
468. 

Rivero,  82. 

Rocha,  411. 

Rochford,  Lord,  203,  207. 


482 


INDEX 


Rodriguez  Cabrillo,  Juan,  7,  9. 

Rogers.     See  Woodes  Rogers. 

Rolandegui,  Bernardo,  20,  21. 

Romano,  23. 

Rome,  20. 

Rosario,  Real  Caja  of,  52,  53. 

Rosario,  Real  del,  47,  470. 

Routes.     See     Baja     California,     Land 

route.  Sea  route. 
Roxo  River,  400-2. 
Rubi,  Marqu6s  de,  69,  80,  81,  130,  136, 

139,  141,  150-52,  343,  344. 
Ruiz,  Felipe,  373. 
Russia,  174,  187,  195,  197,  198,  211,  388, 

422. 
Russian  Academy,  226. 
Russians,  58,  60,  61,  70,  75,  82-84,  97, 

98,   117,  167,   175-78,  183,  186,  217, 

219-27,  229,  231-34,  236-41,  243^7, 

267,  269,  274,  326,  369,  377,  380,  418- 
20,  422. 

Russo-Turkish  War,  195,  198. 

Sacramento,  51,  190,  199,  200. 

Saguaguanas  River,  400. 

Sahuaripa,  48. 

Saint  Francis,  384. 

Saint  Peter  and  Saint  Paul,  port  of,  221, 
247. 

Saint  Petersburg,  61,  176,  177,  221,  222, 
224,  227,  232,  247. 

Sal,  Hermenegildo,  384. 

Salaries.     See  Expense. 

Salineros,  41. 

Saltillo,  4,  5. 

Salvatierra,  Juan  Maria,  17-19,  21. 

San  Antonio,  97-100,  113. 

San  Antonio  de  Bejar,  5,  137,  403. 

San  Antonio  de  la  Huerta.     See  Huerta. 

San  Antonio  de  Padua,  101,  123-25,  127, 
331. 

San  BartoIom6,  9. 

San  Bernab6,  Bay  of,  86,  268. 

San  Bernardino,  Sonora,  305,  343,  391. 

San  Bias,  70,  80-84,  93,  96-98,  101,  102, 
109,  110,  115,  119-21,  125,  127-29, 
156,  160,  161,  219,  222-24,  229-31, 
234,  235,  242-44,  250-52,  254-63,  267, 

268,  270,  288,  298,  299,  322,  326,  327, 
331,  368-75,  377-84,  389,  394,  397, 
418,  421,  423,  456,  468.  See  Gulf, 
Sea  route.  Storms. 

San  Buenaventura,   111,  122,  323,  330, 

429. 
San  Carlos,  97,  100,  109,  110,  239,  243, 

250-52,  256,  257,  260,  335,  354,  370- 

72,  382. 


San  Carlos  (another),  420. 

San  Carlos  Borromeo  de  Monterey.  See 
Carmelo,  Monterey. 

San  Diego,  8,  9,  58,  60,  81,  84,  85,  97- 
101,  103,  105,  107-11,  113,  118,  120, 
123-27,  153,  156,  163,  166,  168,  169, 
222,  223,  229,  234-36,  250-54,  256, 
259,  260,  267,  268,\?81,  283,  285,  312, 
316,  322-24,  328-31,  333,  338,  352-56, 
360,  363,  366,  379,  381-84,  394,423, 
429,  431. 

San  Dionisio,  276,  277. 

San  Domingo,  208,  209,  211. 

Santo  Domingo,  mission,  346. 

San  Felipe  Canyon,  280. 

San  Felipe  de  Chihuahua.  See  Chi- 
huahua. 

San  Felipe  de  Sinaloa,  12,  47,  54. 

San  Felipe  River,  429,  430. 

San  Fernando,  College  of,  100,  102-6, 
108-11,  115,  253,  254,  270,  284,  315, 
326,  332-34,  354,  429,  468.  See 
Fernandinos. 

San  Fernando  Rey,  430. 

San  Francisco,  VIII,  98,  113,  114,  121, 
217,  218,  220,  231,  234,  236,  240,  256, 
262,  266,  273,  278,  284,  294,  298,  299, 
314,  316,  317,  319-25,  327,  328,  331, 
333,  335,  337,  338,  340,  341,  348,  356, 
360,  363,  364,  366,  369,  371,  379-84, 
386,  394,  396,  399,  419,  423,  429; 
Bay,  8,  84,  94,  102,  112-14,  238  ,239, 
243,  256,  278,  422,  (See  Drake's  Bay)  ; 
de  Asfs,  360 ;  Rio  de,  292,  295,  314, 
321,  333,  467,  468. 

San  Francisco,  Rio  de,  branch  of  the 
Gila,  345. 

San  Francisco  de  Borja.     See  Borja. 

San  Francisco  de  Velicatd.     See  Velicata. 

San  Francisco  Javier  Viaundo.  See 
Viaund6. 

San  Gabriel,  101,  111,  114,  123-25,  234, 
253,  274,  275,  279-81,  283-88,  316, 
329-31,  333,  349,  350,  352-55,  361, 
383. 

San  Gabriel  River,  of  Alta  Cahfornia, 
394 ;  of  Texas,  5. 

San  Gregorio,  349. 

San  Ignacio,  19,  48,  309,  380. 

San  Ignacio  de  Tubac.     See  Tubac. 

San  Jacome,  149,  279. 

San  Javier  del  Bac.     See  Bac. 

San  Joaquin  River,  356. 

San  Jose,  396. 

San  JosS,  288. 

San  Jos6  Comondti.     See  Comondti. 

San  Jos6  de  Guadalupe.     See  San  Jose. 


INDEX 


483 


San  Jose  del  Cabo,  268,  309. 

San  Juan  Capistrano,  327,  383,  396. 

San  Juan  de  Dios,  310. 

San  Juan  de  Sonora,  37. 

San  Julidn,  Bay  of,  192. 

San  Lucas,  Cape,  7,  64,  65,  86,  179,  180, 

222,  251,  268,  419. 
San  Luis  Gonzaga.     See  Gonzaga. 
San  Luis  Obispo,  101,  102,  123-25,  280, 

323,  324,  330,  331. 
San  Luis  Potosi.     See  Potosl. 
San  Luis  Rey,  430. 

San  Miguel  de  Culiacan.     See  Culiacdn. 
San  Miguel  de  Horacasitas.     See  Hor- 

casitas. 
San  Miguel  del  Encino.     See  Encino. 
San  Pedro,  at  the  junction  of  the  Gila 
,   and  Colorado,  149. 
San  Pedro,  presidio.     See  Pitiqui. 
San  Pedro  River,  339,  343,  409,  411. 
San  Pedro  y  San  Pablo  de  Bicuner.     See 

Bicuner. 
San  Sebastian,  along  the  Anza  route,  285, 

352. 
San  Sebastian,  Sinaloa,  47. 
San  Simon,  132. 
Sdnchez  Salvador,  Fernando,  36-42,  44, 

48,  54,  55,  62,  74,  265. 
Santa  Ana,  49. 
Santa  Ana  River,  394. 
Santa  Barbara,  Pimeria  Alta,  49. 
Santa  Barbara  Channel,  155,  325,  330, 

331,  382,  383,  394,  398. 
Santa  Catalina,  431. 
Santa  Catherina,  200,  201. 
Santa  Clara,  mission,  396,  429 ;  proposed 

mission,    along    the    Santa    Barbara 

Channel,  113,  121,  323  ;  proposed  mis- 
sion, at  San  Francisco,  383. 
Santa  Cruz,  Alta  California,  429,  430; 

Sonora,  305,  306,  343,  402. 
Santa  Cruz  River,  19,  20. 
Santa  F6,  137,  143,  160,  337,  345,   367, 

389,  392,  399,  401,  403,  432. 
Santa  Gertrudis,  309. 
Santa  Isabel,  346.      , 
Santa  Maria  de  los  Angeles,  309. 
Santa  Maria  Suamca,  19,  24,  48. 
Santa  Olaya,  279,  280,  349,  352,  429-31. 
Santa  Rosalia  Muleg6.     See  Muleg6. 
Santa  Tecla,  204. 
Santa  Teresa  Creek,  343. 
Santiago,  229,  234-36,  238,  239,  242,  243, 

251-57,   260,  281,  326,   370-72,  382, 

384. 
Santiago  de  las  Coxas,  309. 
Saratoga,  212. 


Saric,  48,  305-7. 

Sarove,  Juan,  151. 

Sartine,  206. 

Saskatchewan  River,  186. 

Sastre,  Mateo,  133-35,  150,  151,  157-59, 
161,  162,  164,  167. 

Scotch,  178. 

Scottish  merchants,  186,  220. 

Sea  route,  to  Alta  California,  59,  70,  77, 
93,  97,  98,  109,  156,  250,  287,  288.  See 
Baja  California,  Gulf,  San  Bias, 
Storms. 

Seai  Rocks,  323. 

Secular  clergy,  part  played  by,  in  the 
conquest,  2. 

Secularization,  in  Baja  Claifomia,  116, 
265,  271,  312 ;  in  Sinaloa,  36,  40,  48, 
56,  57,  72,  88 ;  in  Sonora,  36,  40,  46, 
167,  265. 

Sedelmayr,  Jacobo,  29,  30,  32,  33,  42, 
43,  65. 

Segurola,  Francisco,  375. 

Segurola,  Ramon,  375. 

Seris,  13,  17,  26,  27,  29,  33-35,  37,  39-43, 
45,  46,  48,  49,  54,  62,  63,  67-69,  72,  78, 
79,  87,  132-35,  138-40,  144,  150,  151, 
154,  164,  307,  343,  344,  391,  392,  399, 
409,  411,  412,  414,  424. 

Serra,  Junlpero,  99-101,  104,  105,  107, 
113,  114,  119-26,  146,  158-61,  230, 
235,  252,  255,  257,  263,  266,  267,  299, 
314-16,  318,  321-25,  327,  329,  335, 
381-83,  385,  393. 

Settlements,  in  Alta  California,  {See 
Colonization,  Settlers,  and  names  of 
settlements) ;  on  the  Colorado,  403- 
14,  421. 

Settlers,  for  Alta  California,  59,  120,  121, 
126,  127,  155,  156,  218,  250,  256.  259, 
273,  284,  291-96,  298,  299,  314-17, 
320,  321,  324,  325,  330,  331,  338,  347- 
50,  352,  360,  382,  384,  389,  394,  395, 
413,  418,  429-32,  461-64;  in  Alta 
CaUfornia,  93,  220,  262,  263,  336, 
381,  383,  384,  427,  428.  See  Coloni- 
zation. 

Seven  Cities,  the,  6,  26. 

Seven  Years'  War,'  51,  174,  181,  189, 
190. 

Seville,  94. 

Shelburne,  206. 

Shelikof,  Grigor,  178. 

Shelvocke,  180. 

Shoshonean  family,  281. 

Siberia,  175,  176,  226,  245-47. 

Sibubapas,  87,  133,  134,  139,  140,  150. 

Silver.     See  Precious  metals. 


484 


INDEX 


Sinaloa,  3,  4,  6,  12,  13,  21,  31-33,  36,  38, 
47-49,  56,  57,  71,  72,  74,  76,  79,  87,  88, 
131,  268,  292,  304,  316,  317,  324,  386, 
389,  394,  395,  425-27,  470.  ^See  San 
Felipe  de  Sinaloa. 

Soledad,  429,  430. 

Sonoita,  19,  166,  405,  429,  430. 

Sonora,  2^,  6,  7,  9,  12,  13,  16-18,  21-24, 
27-30,  35-40,  42,  44-50,  52-54,  57,  59, 
61-64,  66-85,  87-93,  103,  106,  107, 
109-11,  115,  117,  119,  130-35,  137^1, 
143-47,  149,  151,  153,  154,  156-59, 
161,  163,  167,  218,  234,  236,  265,  266, 
268,  269,  271,  273,  275,  276,  280,  283- 
90,  292,  293,  295,  297,  300-8,  315-18, 
320,  322,  326,  337,  338,  341,  344-47, 
356,  362,  363,  367,  368,  377,  378,  380, 
382,  383,  386-89,  391-96,  399-406, 
410,  411,  414,  417,  424-26,  429,  430, 
470. 

Sonora,  238,  239,  242,  243,  256,  260,  261, 
370. 

Sonora  River,  17,  19. 

Sonora  valley,  13,  48. 

South  America,  51,  174,  178-81,  188, 
198-202,  208,  209. 

Soyopa.     See  Huerta. 

Soyopas,  277. 

Spain,  IX,  X,  14-16,  23,  26,  27,  30,  35, 
36,  41,  45,  49-53,  55,  63-67,  71,  74, 
75,  82,  89,  94,  119,  140,  173-75,  178, 
179,  181-84,  186-219,  221,  222,  228, 
231^1,  244,  320,  321,  329,  333,  354, 
362,  366,  373,  374,  386,  388,  401,  417, 
418,  420-23,  427.  See  Foreign  danger, 
Madrid. 

Spanberg,  246. 

Spanish  America,  189-92,  204-7,  212, 
216,  219. 

Spanish  Californians,  418. 

Spanish  Empire,  94,  186,  386,  424. 

Squillace,  191. 

Steller,  225. 

Stock-raising,  influence  of,  in  Spanish 
conquest,  2.     See  Domestic  animals. 

Stormont,  Lord,  201-3. 

Storms,  in  the  Gulf,  18,  109,  110,  250 ;  in 
voyages  to  Alta Calif ornia,i250, 251, 256. 

Stratford,  William.     See  Estrajort. 

Strait,  through  North  America,  421-23. 

Strange,  419. 

Suaqui,  140,  343. 

Suaquis,  151,  399. 

Supplies.  See  Baja  California,  Domes- 
tic animals.  Food  supplies,  Goods  and 
effects.  Land  route,  Military  equip- 
ment. Supply  ships. 


Supply  ships,  for  Alta  California,  96,  99- 
101,  110,  119,  124,  219,  222,  249-57, 
260,  274,  278,  289,  315,  319,  320,  357, 
370-72,  377,  385,  389.  427.  See  Con- 
cepcidn,  Domestic  animals.  Food  sup- 
plies. Goods  and  effects,  Lauretana, 
Military  equipment,  Principe,  San 
Bias,  San  Carlos,  Santiago,  Sea  route. 
Settlers,  Sonora,  Storms. 

Swan,  180. 

Sweden,  195-98. 

Tahiti,  182,  376. 

Tamaron,  Bishop,  4,  47-49,  90,  151. 

Tampico,  3. 

Tanucci,  190,  191. 

Taos,  144. 

Tarabal,  Father,  56. 

Tarabal,  Sebastian,  275,  276,  279,  281, 

303,  415. 
Taraumara,  401. 
Taraumares,  138,  400. 
Tartars,  175. 
Teguayo,  Gran,  26. 
Tehuantepec,  Isthmus  of,  217,  230,  231, 

377  ;  town  of,  224,  234. 
Tejas,  5. 
Tepocas,  29. 
Terrenate,  29,  48,  54,  132,  134,  135,  143, 

162,  288,  289,  292,  303-6,  343,  345. 
Testimonio,  defined,   XIV ;     illustrated, 

11. 
Texas,  3,  5,  6,  38,  44,  46,  55,  79,  80,  91, 

130,  137,  138,  140,  302,  388,  389,  391, 

393,  395,  399,  401,  403,  416. 
Tiburon  Island,  35,  40,  89,  424. 
Tiburones,  41,  133,  139,  140. 
Tinaja,  391. 
Tipping,  419. 
Tobolsk,  175. 
Todos  Santos,  309. 
Toledo,  56. 
Tomds,  Manuel,  345. 
Tomsk,  175. 
Tories,  203,  205. 
Torquemada,  333. 
Torrubia,  61. 

Tovar,  Francisco,  143,  304,  306. 
Townley,  180. 
Tres  Marias  Islands,  32,  36,  79,  83,  264, 

271. 
Tribunal  de  Cuentas  of  Mexico,  160,  169, 

267. 
Trinidad,  Guatemala,  369  ;  on  the  north- 
west coast,  378. 
Trinidad  de  Plata,  48. 
Trinity  River,  5,  55. 


INDEX 


485 


Trivino,  Fernando,  30-32. 

Tschemalow,  247. 

Tubac,  44,  48,  54,  61,  91,  92,  130,  132, 
134,  135,  150-52,  154-56,  158,  162, 
164,  170,  218,  266,  273,  275,  276,  280, 
281,  284,  288,  292,  293,  299,  303,  343, 
347,  349,  350,  467. 

Tubutama,  19,  48. 

Tucson,  406. 

Tueros,  Pedro  de,  131,  289,  304,  305,  391, 
392,  403,  404,  414. 

Tulare  Lake,  361. 

Tumacdcori,  19,  20,  24. 

Turgot,  198. 

Turkey,  197,  198,  226. 

Ugarte,  Jacobo,  411,  415,  416,  428,  429. 

Ulloa,  Francisco  de,  7. 

United  States  of  America,  174,  183,  194, 

272,  388,  416,  418,  435. 
Ural  Mountains,  175. 
Ures,  342. 

Urrea,  Bernardo  de,  277,  278,  289. 
Ursua  family,  94. 
Utah,  367. 
Utrecht,  Treaty  of,  184. 

Vald6s,   Juan   Bautista,   234,   235,    276, 

285,  286,  458. 
Vancouver  Island,  419. 
Veldzquez,  Jos6,  338,  346,  347. 
V61ez  de  Escalante,  Silvestre.     See  Es- 

calante. 
Velicatd,  San  Fernando  de,  86,  99,  103, 

107,  108,  117,  270,  298,  309,  310,  317, 

322,  324,  333,  346. 
Venegas,  Miguel,  56. 
Ventura,  9. 

Vera,  Nicolds  de,  20,  21. 
Vera  Cruz,  190,  194,  212,  213,  231,  261, 

373,  374. 
Vergara,  Francisco  de,  11. 
Vergennes,  196-98,  201-7,  209-11,  213, 

214. 
Verger,  Rafael,   103-11,   114,   126,   127, 

251. 
Viaund6,  S.  F.  Javier,  309. 
Vidal,  Mariano,  347. 
Viegues  Island,  196. 
Vienna,  197. 
Vila,  100,  101. 
Vildosola,  Agustin,  35. 


Vildosola,  Gabriel  de,  134,  150,  289,  305. 

Vildosola,  Jos6  Antonio  de,  139,  143, 
289. 

Vinadaco,  Rosario  de,  310,  347. 

Virginia,  180. 

Visitador,  153.  See  Gallardo,  Jo86  de 
Gdlvez,  Mora,  Pedro  Rivera. 

Vizarron,  25,  27,  28. 

Vizcaino,  Sebastidn,  8,  9,  319. 

Voyages  of  exploration,  173,  180-83,  216, 
223,  231,  247,  248,  278,  369-72,  377, 
386,  417-19,  421-24.  See  Sea  route, 
Stipply  ships,  and  names  of  com- 
manders and  of  ships. 

Wafer,  180. 

Wallis,  181,  182,  376. 

Walter,  60. 

Washington,  state  of,  V,  IX. 

West  Indies,  188,  190,  195,  211,  216. 

Weymouth,  Lord,  214. 

Whigs,  203. 

Woodes  Rogers,  180. 

Woods,  Lake  of  the,  75. 

Xim^nez,  Diego,  353,  362,  364. 

Yabipais  Tejuas,  364,  365. 

Yakutsk,  175. 

Yaqui  River,  17, 48,  49,  57,  67,  71,  72,  90. 

Yaquis,  29,  33,  36,  132. 

Yenesseisk,  175. 

Yermak,  Timofeief,  175. 

Yuman  family,  281,  282. 

Yumas,  31,  151,  154,  155,  163,  165,  166, 
265,  273-82,  286,  287,  290,  291,  304, 
338-42,  349-51,  353-64,  387,  390,  400, 
401, 403-10, 412-17, 424.  See  Junction 
of  the  Gila  and  Colorado,  Settlements 
on  the  Colorado. 

Yutas,  345. 

Zacatecas,  312. 

Zacatula,  1. 

Zaikof,  Potap,  178. 

Zalazar,  Esteban  de,  149,  158. 

Zanjones,  332. 

Zapata,  12,  13. 

Zapotillo,  421,  423. 

Zufii,  6,  345,  362. 

Zufiis,  345. 

Ziiniga,  Jos6,  430. 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America. 


npHE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a 
few  of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects. 


Filibusters  and  Financiers 

By  WILLIAM  O.  SCROGGS,  Ph.D. 

Professor  of  Economics  and  Sociology  in  the  University  of  Louisiana 

Cloth^  8vOy  $2.^0 

Professor  Scroggs  has  written  a  very  valuable  supplement  to 
American  history  in  this  account  of  the  activities  of  William 
Walker  and  his  associates  in  the  filibustering  activities  of  the 
mid-nineteenth  century.  Nothing  but  scant  notice  has  ever  been 
accorded  by  historians  to  Walker's  exploits  in  Central  America 
and  consequently  one  has  never  been  able  to  form  a  just  appre- 
ciation of  the  Latin-American  attitude  toward  the  United  States. 
Walker  and  his  band  were  Americans,  and  it  was  as  Americans 
that  Nicaraguans  and  Costa  Ricans  came  to  distrust  and  fear 
them. 

The  author  in  his  preface  says,  "  The  part  played  in  Walker's 
career  and  in  Central  American  politics  by  American  financiers 
and  captains  of  industry;  the  designs  of  Walker  upon  Cuba; 
his  utter  repudiation  of  the  annexation  of  his  conquests  to  the 
United  States;  the  appeals  of  Central  American  governments 
to  the  leading  European  powers  for  deliverance  from  the  filibus- 
ters ;  the  thinly  veiled  machinations  of  Great  Britain,  Spain,  and 
France  against  the  American  adventurers  —  these  are  some  of 
the  facts,  hitherto  overlooked  or  ignored,  which  it  is  here  sought 
to  set  forth  in  their  true  light." 

The  Pacific  Ocean  in  History  {Preparing) 

Papers  and  Addresses  Presented  at  the 
Panama-Pacific  Historical  Congress 

Edited  by  HENRY  MORSE^  STEPHENS 

AND 

HERBERT  E.  BOLTON 


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The  German  Empire  Between  Two  Wars 

By  ROBERT  H.   FIFE,  Jr. 

Professor  of  German  at  Wesleyan  University 

Cloth^  8vo^  $1.^0 

This  is  not  a  "  war  book  "  and  yet  one  of  its  several  interests 
undoubtedly  arises  from  the  application  of  the  matters  which  it 
discusses  to  present  events.  The  author  writes  impartially ;  he 
is  not  pro-German  but  treats  Germany  sympathetically  as  well 
as  critically.  In  the  first  part  of  the  volume  he  considers  the 
relations  of  Germany  with  foreign  powers  from  1 871- 19 14,  after 
which  he  takes  up  internal  politics  during  the  same  period.  He 
then  presents  a  view  of  the  Germany  of  to-day,  giving  special 
attention  to  the  government  of  the  rapidly  growing  cities,  the 
school  systems,  the  church,  and  the  press. 


Japanese  Expansion  and  American  Policies 

By  J.  F.  ABBOTT 

Of  Washington  University 

Clothy  i2mo^  $1.30 

Here  Professor  Abbott  sums  up  dispassionately  and  impar- 
tially the  history  of  the  diplomatic  and  social  relations  of  Japan 
with  the  United  States,  and  in  particular  gives  the  facts  that  will 
enable  an  American  to  form  his  own  opinion  as  to  the  possibility 
of  future  conflicts  between  these  two  countries. 


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Travels  in  the  American  Colonies,  1690-1  783 

Edited   by  NEWTON   D.   MERENESS 
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Cloth,  8vo,  $3.00 

This  book  consists  of  eighteen  hitherto  unpubUshed  narratives, 
some  written  originally  in  English,  others  being  translations 
from  the  French  or  German.  They  give  accounts  of  travel  on 
the  Atlantic  slope  from  Savannah  to  Albany ;  from  Albany  to 
Niagara  Falls,  Quebec,  Hartford,  and  Boston;  through  the 
Great  Lakes  from  Detroit  to  Chicago ;  up  the  Mississippi  from 
New  Orleans  to  St.  Louis ;  down  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi 
from  Pittsburgh  to  New  Orleans ;  up  the  Tennessee ;  through 
the  country  of  the  Choctaws,  the  Creeks,  and  the  Cherokees  and 
through  the  backwoods  from  Pennsylvania  to  North  Carolina. 


The  Mastering  of  Mexico 

By   KATE  STEPHENS 

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The  conquest  of  Mexico  by  Cortes  in  the  sixteenth  century 
was  one  of  the  most  thrilling  and  picturesque  exploits  in  all  the 
annals  of  the  art  of  war.  The  stern  and  hardy  explorer  and  his 
few  hundred  heroes  who  led  Europe's  quest  for  the  treasure-land 
of  the  new  world,  left  behind  them  memories  full  of  adventure 
more  stirring  than  the  strongest  fiction.  The  tale  of  one  of  these 
adventurers,  Bernal  Diaz  del  Castillo,  with  a  genial  spirit  which 
we  are  not  apt  to  attribute  to  men  of  his  time,  has  left  for  us  the 
picture  of  this  little  band  of  Spaniards  triumphing  over  a  mili- 
tarized nation  of  fierce  warriors,  sweeping  through  Mexico  on 
foaming  horses  from  the  sea-board  to  the  Aztec  capital,  with  the 
glory  of  conquest  blazing  in  their  eyes  through  the  glitter  of 
swords  and  the  flash  of  muskets  and  the  gleam  of  the  southern 
sun.  In  retelling  Diaz'  narrative  for  modern  readers  Miss 
Stephens  has  lost  no  particle  of  that  astonishing  visuaUzation  of 
the  deeds  and  sufferings  of  Cortes'  intrepid  conquerors,  and  none 
of  the  impression  of  sturdy,  single-hearted  faith  in  comrades  and 
captain  which  so  richly  pervaded  the  original. 


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IMPORTANT  NEW  WORKS  OF  BIOGRAPHY 

The  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson 

By   JOHN    SPENCER    BASSETT,  Ph.D. 

With  Illustrations.     New  Edition.     Two  Volumes  in 

One 

Cloth,  8vo,  $2.50 

This  is  a  one-volume  edition  of  a  biography  that  has, 
since  its  first  publication  several  years  ago,  come  to  be 
regarded  as  one  of  the  most  faithful  stories  of  Jackson's 
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ten. Professor  Basse tt  has  not  slighted  Jackson's  failings 
or  his  virtues ;  he  has  tried  to  refrain  from  commenting 
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of  the  political  manipulations  which  surrounded  Jackson 
and  in  which  he  was  an  important  factor.  The  volume 
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The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams 

Volume  VI.     Edited  by 
WORTHINGTON   C.  FORD 

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This  volume  brings  Mr.  Ford's  remarkable  series  up  to 
the  year  1821.  Mr.  Adams's  last  dispatches  from  London, 
while  minister  there,  deal  with  the  matters  left  undeter- 
mined by  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  and  with  his  association  with 
the  English  reformers  of  the  day. 


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